10-10-2023, 09:25 AM
Unfortunately Israel faces a situation in Gaza that has no "obvious" best choice as to the "way ahead". Israel at one time occupied Gaza and ran a military occupation. That did not work well for Israel, in that the occupation cost them significant money to execute, significant social disruption to provide the necessary troops to execute it, and a not insignificant number of lives. It also created a situation where any kind of a "peace" with the occupants was impossible. Israel doesn't want to go back to this situation, but some argue they have no other alternative.
Recovering the current hostages is a priority, but it is unclear how that can be done. Israel is currently using long range fires to damage the military capability of Hamas. The assumption is that this activity is preliminary to an IDF ground "incursion" to rescue the hostages (at a minimum). It is unclear that this can work. The hostages probably would be killed before they could be reached.
The Israeli population undoubtedly believes that Hamas must be eradicated in Gaza. To do that will however require the IDF to fight an urban battle in a densely built up area with a population of 2.3 million people. Of that 2.3 million, how many will resist the IDF by actually fighting? How big a "regular" force does Hamas have and how many "irregular" fighters will they get if/when the IDF invades? I am not sure Israeli intelligence has a good estimate of the former and I am virtually certain nobody (including Hamas) has one for the latter. Urban warfare, even for a "superior" military force, entails high casualties. Air power is of limited utility in this kind of warfare. The IDF will need draftees to do this task, whatever it ends up being. The Israeli populace will certainly support the IDF, at least at the start and probably much longer than such support would last in the US. The high casualties will obviously be a strain on the IDF and cannot be tolerated indefinitely. Can the IDF accomplish it's "mission" (whatever that turns out to be) before the public begins to question the strategy? Who knows, but getting this "wrong" could be a real problem for Israel.
The other "wild card" is Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah is a much greater military threat to Israel than Hamas could be in their wildest dreams. The IDF could and would defeat Hezbollah if it attacked Israel (either via missiles, troops, or both) without question. The IDF would take casualties, and would need to invade parts of Lebanon and Syria to do it, but they could and would do exactly that. However, their ability to do this while fighting an urban warfare battle in the south becomes questionable. It may require a "Hezbollah first" strategy, but if Hezbollah doesn't attack immediately but rather waits for Israel to become deeply committed in Gaza, what then? Some will say a preemptive strike in the North is required. There is precedent for this approach. No matter how one looks at it, this situation is fraught with peril for all involved (and those who don't want to be involved but may be compelled to act by "events").
I don't have any idea what Israel will decide to do, but I don't envy their choices.
Recovering the current hostages is a priority, but it is unclear how that can be done. Israel is currently using long range fires to damage the military capability of Hamas. The assumption is that this activity is preliminary to an IDF ground "incursion" to rescue the hostages (at a minimum). It is unclear that this can work. The hostages probably would be killed before they could be reached.
The Israeli population undoubtedly believes that Hamas must be eradicated in Gaza. To do that will however require the IDF to fight an urban battle in a densely built up area with a population of 2.3 million people. Of that 2.3 million, how many will resist the IDF by actually fighting? How big a "regular" force does Hamas have and how many "irregular" fighters will they get if/when the IDF invades? I am not sure Israeli intelligence has a good estimate of the former and I am virtually certain nobody (including Hamas) has one for the latter. Urban warfare, even for a "superior" military force, entails high casualties. Air power is of limited utility in this kind of warfare. The IDF will need draftees to do this task, whatever it ends up being. The Israeli populace will certainly support the IDF, at least at the start and probably much longer than such support would last in the US. The high casualties will obviously be a strain on the IDF and cannot be tolerated indefinitely. Can the IDF accomplish it's "mission" (whatever that turns out to be) before the public begins to question the strategy? Who knows, but getting this "wrong" could be a real problem for Israel.
The other "wild card" is Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah is a much greater military threat to Israel than Hamas could be in their wildest dreams. The IDF could and would defeat Hezbollah if it attacked Israel (either via missiles, troops, or both) without question. The IDF would take casualties, and would need to invade parts of Lebanon and Syria to do it, but they could and would do exactly that. However, their ability to do this while fighting an urban warfare battle in the south becomes questionable. It may require a "Hezbollah first" strategy, but if Hezbollah doesn't attack immediately but rather waits for Israel to become deeply committed in Gaza, what then? Some will say a preemptive strike in the North is required. There is precedent for this approach. No matter how one looks at it, this situation is fraught with peril for all involved (and those who don't want to be involved but may be compelled to act by "events").
I don't have any idea what Israel will decide to do, but I don't envy their choices.