[Goose]

He does not explain it sufficiently in that article, but he has also been giving cable interviews which you can probably find on the internet.  His argument is that if Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Israel, and the nation with the two holiest sites in Islam makes peace with Israel, it will change the conflict that Hamas is stoking from an existential one to a national one--one in which compromise is possible and one in which fanaticism is lessened.  Hamas certainly does not desire that.

I am not sure that I understand the reasoning here. There is a religious conflict and "national" one. Of the two, I would argue that the "national" one is regarded by the Palestinians as the "existential" one.  The Palestinians could have arguably settled in Jordan back when the PLO moved there. They could have practiced their religion and become economically "successful". That was not acceptable because the Palestinians simply insist on returning to and governing in "Palestine".

Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel does remove a lot of the religious argument that Muslim states should not and must not recognize Israel because their religion forbids such tolerance. However, it more importantly removes Saudi Arabia from the set of nations that supports the Palestinians returning to and ruling in Palestine as an unconditional goal. Both are indeed blows to Hamas, but it is the latter, not the former, that IMO is the more serious. Egypt (and Jordan, sort of) have already put paid to the idea that Muslim states must not recognize Israel. The Saudi's as the keepers of the holy places do carry more weight in that area, but conceptually the issue is already settled. OTOH, Saudi money can and has (at least to some degree) helped support the Palestinian cause of destroying Israel. Losing that support and more importantly the possibility of much larger support in the future is IMO a much greater blow to Hamas than the "religious" aspect. Making a "forever war" against Israel clearly less practical is a "existential threat" to Hamas.

I'm not sure what to believe and have never been happier that I pursued a different branch of my discipline!  But while the scholarly community is somewhat divided so far, the theory that this attack--its timing, ferocity, and barbarity--serves the strategic interest of Iran is not far fetched, especially when you consider that the strategic interests of Hamas may be the same. 

Ross also blames Hamas for doing something similar to blow up (literally) the peace process in 1996 when Shimon Peres was implementing Oslo after the assassination of Rabin.  Hamas bombed two buses in Jerusalem, killing 45, and this successfully undermined the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and ended the momentum of Oslo.  Prior to the bombings most Israelis supported moving ahead; after the bombings this was reversed.  And 1996 proved to be the last truly hopeful year for the peace process. 

https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/s...833234.pdf

So Hamas has shown in the past that it times its terrorism strategically to undermine diplomatic events that it thinks are moving against its interests, and it is reasonable to think that this act also fits the pattern.  Of course, this is likely not all there is to the story.

I totally agree it is probable that Hamas was motivated by an attempt to prevent an Israel-Saudi agreement. I am less sure Iran is directly involved in this action. Iran may believe the Saudi's are leaving the role of Muslim leadership to Iran by "selling out". IMO an operation lead by Iran would certainly involve Hezbollah. Attacking only in the south risks destroying Hamas for a minimal gain. As you point out, Hamas as a lot to lose from a Saudi-Israel agreement. IMO Hamas is perfectly capable of acting to prevent that without Iran leading the way.

[Goose]

He does not explain it sufficiently in that article, but he has also been giving cable interviews which you can probably find on the internet.  His argument is that if Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Israel, and the nation with the two holiest sites in Islam makes peace with Israel, it will change the conflict that Hamas is stoking from an existential one to a national one--one in which compromise is possible and one in which fanaticism is lessened.  Hamas certainly does not desire that.

I am not sure that I understand the reasoning here. There is a religious conflict and "national" one. Of the two, I would argue that the "national" one is regarded by the Palestinians as the "existential" one.  The Palestinians could have arguably settled in Jordan back when the PLO moved there. They could have practiced their religion and become economically "successful". That was not acceptable because the Palestinians simply insist on returning to and governing in "Palestine".

Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel does remove a lot of the religious argument that Muslim states should not and must not recognize Israel because their religion forbids such tolerance. However, it more importantly removes Saudi Arabia from the set of nations that supports the Palestinians returning to and ruling in Palestine as an unconditional goal. Both are indeed blows to Hamas, but it is the latter, not the former, that IMO is the more serious. Egypt (and Jordan, sort of) have already put paid to the idea that Muslim states must not recognize Israel. The Saudi's as the keepers of the holy places do carry more weight in that area, but conceptually the issue is already settled. OTOH, Saudi money can and has (at least to some degree) helped support the Palestinian cause of destroying Israel. Losing that support and more importantly the possibility of much larger support in the future is IMO a much greater blow to Hamas than the "religious" aspect. Making a "forever war" against Israel clearly less practical is a "existential threat" to Hamas.

I'm not sure what to believe and have never been happier that I pursued a different branch of my discipline!  But while the scholarly community is somewhat divided so far, the theory that this attack--its timing, ferocity, and barbarity--serves the strategic interest of Iran is not far fetched, especially when you consider that the strategic interests of Hamas may be the same. 

Ross also blames Hamas for doing something similar to blow up (literally) the peace process in 1996 when Shimon Peres was implementing Oslo after the assassination of Rabin.  Hamas bombed two buses in Jerusalem, killing 45, and this successfully undermined the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and ended the momentum of Oslo.  Prior to the bombings most Israelis supported moving ahead; after the bombings this was reversed.  And 1996 proved to be the last truly hopeful year for the peace process. 

https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/s...833234.pdf

So Hamas has shown in the past that it times its terrorism strategically to undermine diplomatic events that it thinks are moving against its interests, and it is reasonable to think that this act also fits the pattern.  Of course, this is likely not all there is to the story.

I totally agree it is probable that Hamas was motivated by an attempt to prevent an Israel-Saudi agreement. I am less sure Iran is directly involved in this action. Iran may believe the Saudi's are leaving the role of Muslim leadership to Iran by "selling out". IMO an operation lead by Iran would certainly involve Hezbollah. Attacking only in the south risks destroying Hamas for a minimal gain. As you point out, Hamas as a lot to lose from a Saudi-Israel agreement. IMO Hamas is perfectly capable of acting to prevent that without Iran leading the way.