[Goose]

I was ok with going for it early on 4th and 1, for the reason you stated; when you are the inferior team, a high-risk, high-reward strategy makes sense.  Losing 42-14 is no different from losing 28-24 in the standings.

BC

IMO 4th and 1 has a "high enough" probability of success that it is at least reasonable to attempt it. However, I don't agree that a "high-risk, high reward" strategy necessarily "makes sense" when you are the "inferior" team, at least as it is cast by going for it on fourth and one. If the the inferior team can keep the score close, like 28-24, the superior team is one mistake (on offense or defense) away from losing the game. Going in the direction of 42-14 allows plenty of mistakes by the superior team with still no chance of victory by Stanford. College teams as a genre make mistakes frequently, even the "superior" ones.

If you want to look at it as a "high-risk, high-reward" strategy, betting on Clemson to screw up once may be a better strategy that betting Stanford can make a particular fourth and one when there are plenty of plays yet to unfold. Stanford's can put pressure on Clemson and "facilitate" them screwing up by playing consistently "well". Making it on fourth and one arguably will do that. However, failure moves inexorably toward the 42-14 direction in a way that is not reversible. Maybe better to punt and hope for a better opportunity to apply pressure where the consequences of failure aren't as bad. Pick your spots and don't force yourself into "all or nothing at all" if you don't have to.

Realistically, if Stanford is the "inferior" team Stanford will not "beat" the superior team if both teams play "to chalk". Stanford had to rely on Clemson at least partially beating themselves. The "Greatest Upset Ever" was certainly an example of that. You need to give the "superior" team as much opportunity as possible to make a mistake. Giving them a short field does the opposite.

[Goose]

I was ok with going for it early on 4th and 1, for the reason you stated; when you are the inferior team, a high-risk, high-reward strategy makes sense.  Losing 42-14 is no different from losing 28-24 in the standings.

BC

IMO 4th and 1 has a "high enough" probability of success that it is at least reasonable to attempt it. However, I don't agree that a "high-risk, high reward" strategy necessarily "makes sense" when you are the "inferior" team, at least as it is cast by going for it on fourth and one. If the the inferior team can keep the score close, like 28-24, the superior team is one mistake (on offense or defense) away from losing the game. Going in the direction of 42-14 allows plenty of mistakes by the superior team with still no chance of victory by Stanford. College teams as a genre make mistakes frequently, even the "superior" ones.

If you want to look at it as a "high-risk, high-reward" strategy, betting on Clemson to screw up once may be a better strategy that betting Stanford can make a particular fourth and one when there are plenty of plays yet to unfold. Stanford's can put pressure on Clemson and "facilitate" them screwing up by playing consistently "well". Making it on fourth and one arguably will do that. However, failure moves inexorably toward the 42-14 direction in a way that is not reversible. Maybe better to punt and hope for a better opportunity to apply pressure where the consequences of failure aren't as bad. Pick your spots and don't force yourself into "all or nothing at all" if you don't have to.

Realistically, if Stanford is the "inferior" team Stanford will not "beat" the superior team if both teams play "to chalk". Stanford had to rely on Clemson at least partially beating themselves. The "Greatest Upset Ever" was certainly an example of that. You need to give the "superior" team as much opportunity as possible to make a mistake. Giving them a short field does the opposite.