[Goose]

Agree. Moreover, there's no reason why an analytics system can't be tailored to a specific matchup prior to or even during a game. I know nothing about being a football coach, but if it were my job, I'd have a really smart statistician in the booth feeding analytics and time management to me constantly.

I think there are very good reasons this tailoring is impossible. For each opponent you can possibly get "tendencies" based on some level of "history". However, each year is potentially very different. Including data from the past in a time-varying system may tell you nothing at all about the opponent's intentions today. OTOH using "recent" data suffers from lack of numbers (very small "N"). What happened in one or two cases may tell you nothing about what the opponent is going to do on the next play. On top of all that, your opponent evaluates your team and will play against you differently than he does other teams in ways the "past" cannot predict.  There are many internal states in the system that are not observable. In order to get reasonable "N" about a particular opponent the statisticians often must group plays together as "the same" when in reality they are not. In any given situation those differences are submerged and the numbers tell you nothing at all. Add injuries into the mix and things get even murkier. Your opponents "favorite play" may be impossible for them to run because the guys they need to run it aren't available.

I'd love to know more about the analytical basis for Taylor's 4th down decisions. I suspect it's based on the generic studies and data, combined with a feeling that our chances of winning are extremely low either way, so we have to pull out all the stops. I do find it ironic that we've gone from one end of the spectrum (Shaw) to the other extreme end (TT) in terms of 4th down aggressiveness and reverence for field position. Between the two, I prefer TT's approach, but it all depends on what kind of team you have.

I have no idea what "data", if any, TT uses to make his decisions to "go for it". It seems it is almost a matter of principle rather than a case-by-case basis. I too would like to know more about the process. Shaw at least could explain why he did what he did. He too (mostly) behaved based on a "theory" about field position and risk avoidance. Sometimes we didn't agree with it, but at least we knew why he did what he did. So far, TT hasn't given his theory of the case regarding 4th downs. He always says (more or less) that we do it in order to establish that we play to win the game. I find that a little thin, but I am unsure we will ever get more than that :-).

[Goose]

Agree. Moreover, there's no reason why an analytics system can't be tailored to a specific matchup prior to or even during a game. I know nothing about being a football coach, but if it were my job, I'd have a really smart statistician in the booth feeding analytics and time management to me constantly.

I think there are very good reasons this tailoring is impossible. For each opponent you can possibly get "tendencies" based on some level of "history". However, each year is potentially very different. Including data from the past in a time-varying system may tell you nothing at all about the opponent's intentions today. OTOH using "recent" data suffers from lack of numbers (very small "N"). What happened in one or two cases may tell you nothing about what the opponent is going to do on the next play. On top of all that, your opponent evaluates your team and will play against you differently than he does other teams in ways the "past" cannot predict.  There are many internal states in the system that are not observable. In order to get reasonable "N" about a particular opponent the statisticians often must group plays together as "the same" when in reality they are not. In any given situation those differences are submerged and the numbers tell you nothing at all. Add injuries into the mix and things get even murkier. Your opponents "favorite play" may be impossible for them to run because the guys they need to run it aren't available.

I'd love to know more about the analytical basis for Taylor's 4th down decisions. I suspect it's based on the generic studies and data, combined with a feeling that our chances of winning are extremely low either way, so we have to pull out all the stops. I do find it ironic that we've gone from one end of the spectrum (Shaw) to the other extreme end (TT) in terms of 4th down aggressiveness and reverence for field position. Between the two, I prefer TT's approach, but it all depends on what kind of team you have.

I have no idea what "data", if any, TT uses to make his decisions to "go for it". It seems it is almost a matter of principle rather than a case-by-case basis. I too would like to know more about the process. Shaw at least could explain why he did what he did. He too (mostly) behaved based on a "theory" about field position and risk avoidance. Sometimes we didn't agree with it, but at least we knew why he did what he did. So far, TT hasn't given his theory of the case regarding 4th downs. He always says (more or less) that we do it in order to establish that we play to win the game. I find that a little thin, but I am unsure we will ever get more than that :-).