07-03-2022, 03:27 PM
Thanks Samuel. This is nice to hear and definitely some info I missed. Let’s talk again July 12. That’ll be an interesting day.
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
Football Recruiting Class of 2023
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
07-03-2022, 11:45 PM
(07-03-2022, 01:24 PM)SamuelMcF Wrote: Quantity, addressing all positions, and not "dipping even further into the pool" for guys who aren't credible P5 recruits is just as important to me.
This! In past Shaw classes, we would have a few mega-whale headliners, but gaping holes in other positions, or we would have to put in desperate late offers on plan C guys.
Yes, we’ve featured fewer headliners last year and this, but the classes have been balanced, full, and deep, with fewer gaps than in past years. I think it is a recipe for more success over the long haul, though of course there is now a lot of uncertainty over what the long haul means.
BC
(07-03-2022, 01:24 PM)SamuelMcF Wrote: Quantity, addressing all positions, and not "dipping even further into the pool" for guys who aren't credible P5 recruits is just as important to me.
This! In past Shaw classes, we would have a few mega-whale headliners, but gaping holes in other positions, or we would have to put in desperate late offers on plan C guys.
Yes, we’ve featured fewer headliners last year and this, but the classes have been balanced, full, and deep, with fewer gaps than in past years. I think it is a recipe for more success over the long haul, though of course there is now a lot of uncertainty over what the long haul means.
BC
07-04-2022, 06:26 AM
(07-03-2022, 11:45 PM)BostonCard Wrote:(07-03-2022, 01:24 PM)SamuelMcF Wrote: Quantity, addressing all positions, and not "dipping even further into the pool" for guys who aren't credible P5 recruits is just as important to me.
This! In past Shaw classes, we would have a few mega-whale headliners, but gaping holes in other positions, or we would have to put in desperate late offers on plan C guys.
Yes, we’ve featured fewer headliners last year and this, but the classes have been balanced, full, and deep, with fewer gaps than in past years. I think it is a recipe for more success over the long haul, though of course there is now a lot of uncertainty over what the long haul means.
BC
I don't think this is the best way to describe Shaw's recruiting. He has recruited by far the best on paper depth of any coach in Stanford history. The guys in the bottom half of the class are much more frequently Power Five-level recruits than any coach before him. His recruiting successes have not been about a few mega whale headliners, or at least not solely so. Yes, 2012, 2014, and 2017 were quite notable for having significantly more whales than the Stanford norm. But 2015, 2016, 2019, 2020, and 2022 tell a more representative story of his recruiting. Those classes were supremely deep compared to the Stanford norm (as were 2012 and 2014). Among the deepest in program history compared to what was done before him.
That is not to say there weren't holes. We have had stretches of recruiting at OL and ILB in particular that did indeed leave gaping holes. To some degree, though, that's the story of college football outside the most elite recruiting teams. It's not easy to check all boxes and maintain full balance. Look at how pitiful UCLA offensive line recruiting has been for several years.
I agree with you that balance has been a nice attribute of our recent recruiting. Not all recruits are created equally, however, and there are holes as a result. Rose and Hudson are bodies but they're pretty fringe Power Five recruits. It's charitable to put our ILB recruiting on the balanced/deep side of the ledger. There are other positions where 2022-2023 looks to bring in the volume you'd hope for but at a lower quality level than the prior norm - RB, OL, DL - and it remains to be seen whether that adversely impacts us or not.
(07-03-2022, 11:45 PM)BostonCard Wrote:(07-03-2022, 01:24 PM)SamuelMcF Wrote: Quantity, addressing all positions, and not "dipping even further into the pool" for guys who aren't credible P5 recruits is just as important to me.
This! In past Shaw classes, we would have a few mega-whale headliners, but gaping holes in other positions, or we would have to put in desperate late offers on plan C guys.
Yes, we’ve featured fewer headliners last year and this, but the classes have been balanced, full, and deep, with fewer gaps than in past years. I think it is a recipe for more success over the long haul, though of course there is now a lot of uncertainty over what the long haul means.
BC
I don't think this is the best way to describe Shaw's recruiting. He has recruited by far the best on paper depth of any coach in Stanford history. The guys in the bottom half of the class are much more frequently Power Five-level recruits than any coach before him. His recruiting successes have not been about a few mega whale headliners, or at least not solely so. Yes, 2012, 2014, and 2017 were quite notable for having significantly more whales than the Stanford norm. But 2015, 2016, 2019, 2020, and 2022 tell a more representative story of his recruiting. Those classes were supremely deep compared to the Stanford norm (as were 2012 and 2014). Among the deepest in program history compared to what was done before him.
That is not to say there weren't holes. We have had stretches of recruiting at OL and ILB in particular that did indeed leave gaping holes. To some degree, though, that's the story of college football outside the most elite recruiting teams. It's not easy to check all boxes and maintain full balance. Look at how pitiful UCLA offensive line recruiting has been for several years.
I agree with you that balance has been a nice attribute of our recent recruiting. Not all recruits are created equally, however, and there are holes as a result. Rose and Hudson are bodies but they're pretty fringe Power Five recruits. It's charitable to put our ILB recruiting on the balanced/deep side of the ledger. There are other positions where 2022-2023 looks to bring in the volume you'd hope for but at a lower quality level than the prior norm - RB, OL, DL - and it remains to be seen whether that adversely impacts us or not.
07-04-2022, 08:15 AM
At one point in the near past we were operating at 79 scholarships, and that’s not including the fact that we gave scholarships to some preferred walk ons or fifth years to some marginal contributors. It’s a lot easier to achieve balance when you fill your scholarships.
Yes, at some point everyone will have some recruiting gaps, and we will continue to have strengths and weaknesses, but I hope I never live to see the day when we see one defensive lineman recruited over a two year period. That happened twice in Shaw’s tenure.
BC
Yes, at some point everyone will have some recruiting gaps, and we will continue to have strengths and weaknesses, but I hope I never live to see the day when we see one defensive lineman recruited over a two year period. That happened twice in Shaw’s tenure.
BC
At one point in the near past we were operating at 79 scholarships, and that’s not including the fact that we gave scholarships to some preferred walk ons or fifth years to some marginal contributors. It’s a lot easier to achieve balance when you fill your scholarships.
Yes, at some point everyone will have some recruiting gaps, and we will continue to have strengths and weaknesses, but I hope I never live to see the day when we see one defensive lineman recruited over a two year period. That happened twice in Shaw’s tenure.
BC
Yes, at some point everyone will have some recruiting gaps, and we will continue to have strengths and weaknesses, but I hope I never live to see the day when we see one defensive lineman recruited over a two year period. That happened twice in Shaw’s tenure.
BC
07-04-2022, 08:45 AM
Not only has that not happened twice in Shaw’s tenure, he’s never even done that once. I wonder what years you’re talking about?
2019 and 2020 and the years preceding the Williams/Peak/Swann class.
BC
BC
07-04-2022, 10:26 AM
2019-2020: Joshua Pakola, Tobin Phillips, Lance Keneley
2014-2015: Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, Dylan Jackson, Wesley Annan
2014-2015: Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, Dylan Jackson, Wesley Annan
07-04-2022, 12:12 PM
Of all those guys mentioned only Harry and Thomas were effective.
What I remember the most about 2010-12 was that they could bring in a guy like Mauro off the bench. For years there has been no depth.
In the last two years of Ralston there were at least eight guys who could have started in the 4-3.
Everybody needs to work harder. Just a little improvement up front would be welcomed.
What I remember the most about 2010-12 was that they could bring in a guy like Mauro off the bench. For years there has been no depth.
In the last two years of Ralston there were at least eight guys who could have started in the 4-3.
Everybody needs to work harder. Just a little improvement up front would be welcomed.
Of all those guys mentioned only Harry and Thomas were effective.
What I remember the most about 2010-12 was that they could bring in a guy like Mauro off the bench. For years there has been no depth.
In the last two years of Ralston there were at least eight guys who could have started in the 4-3.
Everybody needs to work harder. Just a little improvement up front would be welcomed.
What I remember the most about 2010-12 was that they could bring in a guy like Mauro off the bench. For years there has been no depth.
In the last two years of Ralston there were at least eight guys who could have started in the 4-3.
Everybody needs to work harder. Just a little improvement up front would be welcomed.
(07-04-2022, 11:59 AM)McKenwood Wrote:(07-04-2022, 10:26 AM)msqueri Wrote: 2019-2020: Joshua Pakola, Tobin Phillips, Lance Keneley
2014-2015: Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, Dylan Jackson, Wesley Annan
Pakola was recruited as a linebacker I believe.
He was (correctly) designated a DL almost immediately and put on something like 50 lbs during his redshirt season. Nitpicking really isn't necessary here.
The overall takeaway should be that since half of the guys don't pan out for whatever reason, we should be recruiting more and/or reducing the number of starting spots. As it stands, we are doing both. And there has NEVER been an instance of 1 DL in a 2-season cohort under Shaw, as Matt correctly noted. (It may have felt that way due to aforementioned not panning out, though, and just 1 per year over multiple years obviously doesn't cut it either.)
(This post was last modified: 07-04-2022, 12:31 PM by SamuelMcF.)
(07-04-2022, 11:59 AM)McKenwood Wrote:(07-04-2022, 10:26 AM)msqueri Wrote: 2019-2020: Joshua Pakola, Tobin Phillips, Lance Keneley
2014-2015: Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, Dylan Jackson, Wesley Annan
Pakola was recruited as a linebacker I believe.
He was (correctly) designated a DL almost immediately and put on something like 50 lbs during his redshirt season. Nitpicking really isn't necessary here.
The overall takeaway should be that since half of the guys don't pan out for whatever reason, we should be recruiting more and/or reducing the number of starting spots. As it stands, we are doing both. And there has NEVER been an instance of 1 DL in a 2-season cohort under Shaw, as Matt correctly noted. (It may have felt that way due to aforementioned not panning out, though, and just 1 per year over multiple years obviously doesn't cut it either.)
07-04-2022, 12:55 PM
The rule I use for classifying positions for all Stanford players is the position the official site listed them at as true freshmen. Pakola was a DL.
Bringing Mauro off the bench was a good or bad thing? We had depth.
07-05-2022, 12:43 AM
My mistake. I looked at the personnel chart and saw Phillips and no seniors, but forgot about Pekola (and with the shift to a 4-3, Kennelly moved to “edge”), and I could have sworn there were two years between the Phillips and Thomas class and the Williams/Peak/Swann class.
Nonetheless, if you figure you have 85 scholarships, you should on average be recruiting 20ish players a year, so basically an almost complete offensive and defensive 11. That means that in a 3-4, we should have been recruiting 3 defensive linemen every year (5-6 every two year period), and we have chronically under recruited the lines. The result is no room for players that don’t pan out or a requirement to put underdeveloped players to the line. It doesn’t help that even when we have had upperclassmen they have underperformed.
BC
Nonetheless, if you figure you have 85 scholarships, you should on average be recruiting 20ish players a year, so basically an almost complete offensive and defensive 11. That means that in a 3-4, we should have been recruiting 3 defensive linemen every year (5-6 every two year period), and we have chronically under recruited the lines. The result is no room for players that don’t pan out or a requirement to put underdeveloped players to the line. It doesn’t help that even when we have had upperclassmen they have underperformed.
BC
My mistake. I looked at the personnel chart and saw Phillips and no seniors, but forgot about Pekola (and with the shift to a 4-3, Kennelly moved to “edge”), and I could have sworn there were two years between the Phillips and Thomas class and the Williams/Peak/Swann class.
Nonetheless, if you figure you have 85 scholarships, you should on average be recruiting 20ish players a year, so basically an almost complete offensive and defensive 11. That means that in a 3-4, we should have been recruiting 3 defensive linemen every year (5-6 every two year period), and we have chronically under recruited the lines. The result is no room for players that don’t pan out or a requirement to put underdeveloped players to the line. It doesn’t help that even when we have had upperclassmen they have underperformed.
BC
Nonetheless, if you figure you have 85 scholarships, you should on average be recruiting 20ish players a year, so basically an almost complete offensive and defensive 11. That means that in a 3-4, we should have been recruiting 3 defensive linemen every year (5-6 every two year period), and we have chronically under recruited the lines. The result is no room for players that don’t pan out or a requirement to put underdeveloped players to the line. It doesn’t help that even when we have had upperclassmen they have underperformed.
BC
I think that’s probably an excessive amount of DL recruits. The base defense was/is more of a 2-4-5. If you’re projecting off of usage needs or roster balance two is a better number than three, so your logic would point to two per year/four over two year stretches. The other problem with aiming for 5-6 over two years is how difficult it is to find good DL and how useless the utter whiffs are. I realize that’s also an argument for spreading your bets/taking your shots but that only works if there’s some plausibility with the recruit. Does taking an extra Lance Callihan/Anthony Hayes a year help? I don’t think so.
The imbalance in our recruiting has been everywhere in the front seven other than DL. In the base defense, DL/Edge/ILB are all essentially two positions in the base defense. Your logic, which I think is very sound, would suggest that in a six year stretch we should have 12 at each of those positions. In the six year 2017-2022 span we recruited 13 DL, 8 ILB, and 7 OLB. The reality is we are on target at DL, heavy on DB, heavy on offense generally, and very, very light at Edge/ILB over the last half decade plus. When you consider that LBs typically have more special teams utility than DL the disparity is even starker.
The causes of our DL shortcomings in recent year have been coaching, strength and conditioning, and retention, not recruiting. Moreover, a case can be made that performance failures have been more on the second level than in the trenches. Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, and Thomas Booker (twice) were all all-conference. The only linebacker to be all-conference in that span was Casey Toohill, and he didn’t deserve it. Given an even distribution of all-conference across the positions, you’d expect about twice as many LBs as DL. The story of our defensive decline has been as much pitiful LB play as anything.
The imbalance in our recruiting has been everywhere in the front seven other than DL. In the base defense, DL/Edge/ILB are all essentially two positions in the base defense. Your logic, which I think is very sound, would suggest that in a six year stretch we should have 12 at each of those positions. In the six year 2017-2022 span we recruited 13 DL, 8 ILB, and 7 OLB. The reality is we are on target at DL, heavy on DB, heavy on offense generally, and very, very light at Edge/ILB over the last half decade plus. When you consider that LBs typically have more special teams utility than DL the disparity is even starker.
The causes of our DL shortcomings in recent year have been coaching, strength and conditioning, and retention, not recruiting. Moreover, a case can be made that performance failures have been more on the second level than in the trenches. Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, and Thomas Booker (twice) were all all-conference. The only linebacker to be all-conference in that span was Casey Toohill, and he didn’t deserve it. Given an even distribution of all-conference across the positions, you’d expect about twice as many LBs as DL. The story of our defensive decline has been as much pitiful LB play as anything.
I think that’s probably an excessive amount of DL recruits. The base defense was/is more of a 2-4-5. If you’re projecting off of usage needs or roster balance two is a better number than three, so your logic would point to two per year/four over two year stretches. The other problem with aiming for 5-6 over two years is how difficult it is to find good DL and how useless the utter whiffs are. I realize that’s also an argument for spreading your bets/taking your shots but that only works if there’s some plausibility with the recruit. Does taking an extra Lance Callihan/Anthony Hayes a year help? I don’t think so.
The imbalance in our recruiting has been everywhere in the front seven other than DL. In the base defense, DL/Edge/ILB are all essentially two positions in the base defense. Your logic, which I think is very sound, would suggest that in a six year stretch we should have 12 at each of those positions. In the six year 2017-2022 span we recruited 13 DL, 8 ILB, and 7 OLB. The reality is we are on target at DL, heavy on DB, heavy on offense generally, and very, very light at Edge/ILB over the last half decade plus. When you consider that LBs typically have more special teams utility than DL the disparity is even starker.
The causes of our DL shortcomings in recent year have been coaching, strength and conditioning, and retention, not recruiting. Moreover, a case can be made that performance failures have been more on the second level than in the trenches. Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, and Thomas Booker (twice) were all all-conference. The only linebacker to be all-conference in that span was Casey Toohill, and he didn’t deserve it. Given an even distribution of all-conference across the positions, you’d expect about twice as many LBs as DL. The story of our defensive decline has been as much pitiful LB play as anything.
The imbalance in our recruiting has been everywhere in the front seven other than DL. In the base defense, DL/Edge/ILB are all essentially two positions in the base defense. Your logic, which I think is very sound, would suggest that in a six year stretch we should have 12 at each of those positions. In the six year 2017-2022 span we recruited 13 DL, 8 ILB, and 7 OLB. The reality is we are on target at DL, heavy on DB, heavy on offense generally, and very, very light at Edge/ILB over the last half decade plus. When you consider that LBs typically have more special teams utility than DL the disparity is even starker.
The causes of our DL shortcomings in recent year have been coaching, strength and conditioning, and retention, not recruiting. Moreover, a case can be made that performance failures have been more on the second level than in the trenches. Solomon Thomas, Harrison Phillips, and Thomas Booker (twice) were all all-conference. The only linebacker to be all-conference in that span was Casey Toohill, and he didn’t deserve it. Given an even distribution of all-conference across the positions, you’d expect about twice as many LBs as DL. The story of our defensive decline has been as much pitiful LB play as anything.
I had to look this up because it sounded too outlandish. It’s borderline criminal that Stanford could not put Okereke in a position to get all conference recognition. Mustafa Branch was taking snaps from him. The guy played hard, so I don’t mean to demean him in any way, but he’s just not quality NFL starter material like Okereke has proven he is. Noor Davis, Peter Kalambayi, Kevin Palma, Sean Barton, Joey Alfieri, Curtis Robinson. So many elite recruits who couldn’t put together an all conference season. Several couldn’t even figure out a position to play. Why was Anderson able to put together such stout defenses in 2014 and 2015 (and arguably 2016) but not since?
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(This post was last modified: 07-05-2022, 07:01 PM by TrumpCard.)
I had to look this up because it sounded too outlandish. It’s borderline criminal that Stanford could not put Okereke in a position to get all conference recognition. Mustafa Branch was taking snaps from him. The guy played hard, so I don’t mean to demean him in any way, but he’s just not quality NFL starter material like Okereke has proven he is. Noor Davis, Peter Kalambayi, Kevin Palma, Sean Barton, Joey Alfieri, Curtis Robinson. So many elite recruits who couldn’t put together an all conference season. Several couldn’t even figure out a position to play. Why was Anderson able to put together such stout defenses in 2014 and 2015 (and arguably 2016) but not since?
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
07-06-2022, 07:04 AM
I think you have to slightly overweight DL, compared to the secondary. While we played slightly more in the nickel than in our base 3-4, you can easily slot in a freshman to be the nickel back. Defensive linemen generally need to physically develop, so it is harder to slot in freshmen to play, even as back-ups. Moreover while DB’s can pretty much play nearly every snap, to be effective, defensive linemen should get a blow to be effective. In an ideal scenario, you have at least five upper class defensive linemen, both to ensure you have enough to play base, and to ensure that you have someone who can spell the starters. For defensive backs, as long as you have eight adequate DB’s across all classes, you should be fine.
BC
BC
I think you have to slightly overweight DL, compared to the secondary. While we played slightly more in the nickel than in our base 3-4, you can easily slot in a freshman to be the nickel back. Defensive linemen generally need to physically develop, so it is harder to slot in freshmen to play, even as back-ups. Moreover while DB’s can pretty much play nearly every snap, to be effective, defensive linemen should get a blow to be effective. In an ideal scenario, you have at least five upper class defensive linemen, both to ensure you have enough to play base, and to ensure that you have someone who can spell the starters. For defensive backs, as long as you have eight adequate DB’s across all classes, you should be fine.
BC
BC
(In response to TrumpCard)
Yep, a lot of talent and athleticism without it turning into good results on Saturdays for Stanford, but as you'll see below dropoff in LB talent has actually been a big part of the story.
I wouldn't call Anderson's defense in 2015 stout. It looked good based on basic stats like scoring defense but it was a reverse of the phenomenon of what happened with Teevens' 2004 defense. In 2004, a pitiful offense kneecapped the defense and made life so much tougher that conventional stats obscured how nationally elite the 2004 Stanford defensive crew was. In 2015, one of the greatest offenses in Stanford history propped up an above-average but not great defense and made them look better based on conventional stats. Moreover, Shaw offenses are virtually always better than conventional counting stats indicate and Shaw defenses are virtually always worse, due to pace of play issues that distort the picture. Looking at more advanced stats tell a different story than points per game. Here are the Defensive FEI ranks for Anderson's defenses:
2014: #8
2015: #43
2016: #15
2017: #52
2018: #42
2019: #79
2020: #111
2021: #94
Your question remains a good one. What happened after 2016? Anderson's defenses were clearly very successful in aggregate over his first three years, with two of the three nationally elite and 2015 above-average. I think the simplest explanation is the one Shaw's critics often use about him, which is that he could succeed with the abundance of riches he inherited but flailed once ownership transferred completely to him. Frankly the evidence is even stronger for Anderson on that score than it is for Shaw. If anything, a direct line can be drawn between Shaw's decline and the steady decline of Anderson's defenses, which eventually became a nose-dive off a cliff.
As with most things in life, I don't think the causal story for this is monocausal. I'll observe several things that changed:
* Between 2009-2014, defensive recruiting included nine arguable whales: Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Lyons, Davis, Carter, Shittu, Kalambayi, Thomas. Between 2015-2020, the number cratered to just three: Buncom, Robinson, Adebo. That's a pretty calamitous drop in elite talent and one would definitely expect a severe dropoff. If one is going to pinpoint a single cause for the decline in Stanford's defense, it is probably that we went from a team with an abundance of front seven talent to one with much less. If one focuses on recruiting, there is a galactic difference between Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Davis, Shittu, Kalambayi, and Thomas versus just Robinson (and the former cohort also had Okereke and Alfieri, who nobody thought were whales but were definitely blue chip). If one focuses on dominant college talent, our best defenses had guys like Skov, Trent Murphy, Chase Thomas, and Henry Anderson. Anderson's defenses have not had those kind of superstars. Talent is a H-U-G-E part of the explanation.
* Randy Hart coached our DL from 2010-2015. When we hired him I marveled at his insane, historically legendary performance of having coached at least one all-conference level DL for many, many years. Dude just never missed. And then at Stanford he delivered with a fitting capstone for his career. But you can't work forever and eventually we had to replace him, and Diron Reynolds absolutely sucks compared to Hart. Most anyone would, but it's hurt us to go from the best DL in the conference to, well, not that.
* Shannon Turley was fired after the 2018 season. To the extent strength and conditioning was a big part of Stanford's success prior to that, this is a factor.
There may be more, but those are big ones. My view is that unless we're going to start recruiting 1.5 defensive whales a year we need a new defensive coordinator. The evidence is overwhelming that without superior talent Anderson can't get it done.
Will end on a positive note: I think it's clear that the dropoff in front seven talent is the biggest single explanation for our decline, and we are bringing in a true freshmen class with two arguable whale edge defenders, which followed a class with two guys not on that level but still blue chip. Getting Bailey, Cooper, Armitage, and Aybar is like getting Vaughters, Davis, Okereke, and Alfieri in a two year stretch - definitely worthy of our previous salad days. One would expect the 2024 Stanford defense to be pretty filthy. I just wish I had more confidence in the coaches to get the 2022 and 2023 defenses in shape.
Yep, a lot of talent and athleticism without it turning into good results on Saturdays for Stanford, but as you'll see below dropoff in LB talent has actually been a big part of the story.
I wouldn't call Anderson's defense in 2015 stout. It looked good based on basic stats like scoring defense but it was a reverse of the phenomenon of what happened with Teevens' 2004 defense. In 2004, a pitiful offense kneecapped the defense and made life so much tougher that conventional stats obscured how nationally elite the 2004 Stanford defensive crew was. In 2015, one of the greatest offenses in Stanford history propped up an above-average but not great defense and made them look better based on conventional stats. Moreover, Shaw offenses are virtually always better than conventional counting stats indicate and Shaw defenses are virtually always worse, due to pace of play issues that distort the picture. Looking at more advanced stats tell a different story than points per game. Here are the Defensive FEI ranks for Anderson's defenses:
2014: #8
2015: #43
2016: #15
2017: #52
2018: #42
2019: #79
2020: #111
2021: #94
Your question remains a good one. What happened after 2016? Anderson's defenses were clearly very successful in aggregate over his first three years, with two of the three nationally elite and 2015 above-average. I think the simplest explanation is the one Shaw's critics often use about him, which is that he could succeed with the abundance of riches he inherited but flailed once ownership transferred completely to him. Frankly the evidence is even stronger for Anderson on that score than it is for Shaw. If anything, a direct line can be drawn between Shaw's decline and the steady decline of Anderson's defenses, which eventually became a nose-dive off a cliff.
As with most things in life, I don't think the causal story for this is monocausal. I'll observe several things that changed:
* Between 2009-2014, defensive recruiting included nine arguable whales: Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Lyons, Davis, Carter, Shittu, Kalambayi, Thomas. Between 2015-2020, the number cratered to just three: Buncom, Robinson, Adebo. That's a pretty calamitous drop in elite talent and one would definitely expect a severe dropoff. If one is going to pinpoint a single cause for the decline in Stanford's defense, it is probably that we went from a team with an abundance of front seven talent to one with much less. If one focuses on recruiting, there is a galactic difference between Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Davis, Shittu, Kalambayi, and Thomas versus just Robinson (and the former cohort also had Okereke and Alfieri, who nobody thought were whales but were definitely blue chip). If one focuses on dominant college talent, our best defenses had guys like Skov, Trent Murphy, Chase Thomas, and Henry Anderson. Anderson's defenses have not had those kind of superstars. Talent is a H-U-G-E part of the explanation.
* Randy Hart coached our DL from 2010-2015. When we hired him I marveled at his insane, historically legendary performance of having coached at least one all-conference level DL for many, many years. Dude just never missed. And then at Stanford he delivered with a fitting capstone for his career. But you can't work forever and eventually we had to replace him, and Diron Reynolds absolutely sucks compared to Hart. Most anyone would, but it's hurt us to go from the best DL in the conference to, well, not that.
* Shannon Turley was fired after the 2018 season. To the extent strength and conditioning was a big part of Stanford's success prior to that, this is a factor.
There may be more, but those are big ones. My view is that unless we're going to start recruiting 1.5 defensive whales a year we need a new defensive coordinator. The evidence is overwhelming that without superior talent Anderson can't get it done.
Will end on a positive note: I think it's clear that the dropoff in front seven talent is the biggest single explanation for our decline, and we are bringing in a true freshmen class with two arguable whale edge defenders, which followed a class with two guys not on that level but still blue chip. Getting Bailey, Cooper, Armitage, and Aybar is like getting Vaughters, Davis, Okereke, and Alfieri in a two year stretch - definitely worthy of our previous salad days. One would expect the 2024 Stanford defense to be pretty filthy. I just wish I had more confidence in the coaches to get the 2022 and 2023 defenses in shape.
(In response to TrumpCard)
Yep, a lot of talent and athleticism without it turning into good results on Saturdays for Stanford, but as you'll see below dropoff in LB talent has actually been a big part of the story.
I wouldn't call Anderson's defense in 2015 stout. It looked good based on basic stats like scoring defense but it was a reverse of the phenomenon of what happened with Teevens' 2004 defense. In 2004, a pitiful offense kneecapped the defense and made life so much tougher that conventional stats obscured how nationally elite the 2004 Stanford defensive crew was. In 2015, one of the greatest offenses in Stanford history propped up an above-average but not great defense and made them look better based on conventional stats. Moreover, Shaw offenses are virtually always better than conventional counting stats indicate and Shaw defenses are virtually always worse, due to pace of play issues that distort the picture. Looking at more advanced stats tell a different story than points per game. Here are the Defensive FEI ranks for Anderson's defenses:
2014: #8
2015: #43
2016: #15
2017: #52
2018: #42
2019: #79
2020: #111
2021: #94
Your question remains a good one. What happened after 2016? Anderson's defenses were clearly very successful in aggregate over his first three years, with two of the three nationally elite and 2015 above-average. I think the simplest explanation is the one Shaw's critics often use about him, which is that he could succeed with the abundance of riches he inherited but flailed once ownership transferred completely to him. Frankly the evidence is even stronger for Anderson on that score than it is for Shaw. If anything, a direct line can be drawn between Shaw's decline and the steady decline of Anderson's defenses, which eventually became a nose-dive off a cliff.
As with most things in life, I don't think the causal story for this is monocausal. I'll observe several things that changed:
* Between 2009-2014, defensive recruiting included nine arguable whales: Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Lyons, Davis, Carter, Shittu, Kalambayi, Thomas. Between 2015-2020, the number cratered to just three: Buncom, Robinson, Adebo. That's a pretty calamitous drop in elite talent and one would definitely expect a severe dropoff. If one is going to pinpoint a single cause for the decline in Stanford's defense, it is probably that we went from a team with an abundance of front seven talent to one with much less. If one focuses on recruiting, there is a galactic difference between Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Davis, Shittu, Kalambayi, and Thomas versus just Robinson (and the former cohort also had Okereke and Alfieri, who nobody thought were whales but were definitely blue chip). If one focuses on dominant college talent, our best defenses had guys like Skov, Trent Murphy, Chase Thomas, and Henry Anderson. Anderson's defenses have not had those kind of superstars. Talent is a H-U-G-E part of the explanation.
* Randy Hart coached our DL from 2010-2015. When we hired him I marveled at his insane, historically legendary performance of having coached at least one all-conference level DL for many, many years. Dude just never missed. And then at Stanford he delivered with a fitting capstone for his career. But you can't work forever and eventually we had to replace him, and Diron Reynolds absolutely sucks compared to Hart. Most anyone would, but it's hurt us to go from the best DL in the conference to, well, not that.
* Shannon Turley was fired after the 2018 season. To the extent strength and conditioning was a big part of Stanford's success prior to that, this is a factor.
There may be more, but those are big ones. My view is that unless we're going to start recruiting 1.5 defensive whales a year we need a new defensive coordinator. The evidence is overwhelming that without superior talent Anderson can't get it done.
Will end on a positive note: I think it's clear that the dropoff in front seven talent is the biggest single explanation for our decline, and we are bringing in a true freshmen class with two arguable whale edge defenders, which followed a class with two guys not on that level but still blue chip. Getting Bailey, Cooper, Armitage, and Aybar is like getting Vaughters, Davis, Okereke, and Alfieri in a two year stretch - definitely worthy of our previous salad days. One would expect the 2024 Stanford defense to be pretty filthy. I just wish I had more confidence in the coaches to get the 2022 and 2023 defenses in shape.
Yep, a lot of talent and athleticism without it turning into good results on Saturdays for Stanford, but as you'll see below dropoff in LB talent has actually been a big part of the story.
I wouldn't call Anderson's defense in 2015 stout. It looked good based on basic stats like scoring defense but it was a reverse of the phenomenon of what happened with Teevens' 2004 defense. In 2004, a pitiful offense kneecapped the defense and made life so much tougher that conventional stats obscured how nationally elite the 2004 Stanford defensive crew was. In 2015, one of the greatest offenses in Stanford history propped up an above-average but not great defense and made them look better based on conventional stats. Moreover, Shaw offenses are virtually always better than conventional counting stats indicate and Shaw defenses are virtually always worse, due to pace of play issues that distort the picture. Looking at more advanced stats tell a different story than points per game. Here are the Defensive FEI ranks for Anderson's defenses:
2014: #8
2015: #43
2016: #15
2017: #52
2018: #42
2019: #79
2020: #111
2021: #94
Your question remains a good one. What happened after 2016? Anderson's defenses were clearly very successful in aggregate over his first three years, with two of the three nationally elite and 2015 above-average. I think the simplest explanation is the one Shaw's critics often use about him, which is that he could succeed with the abundance of riches he inherited but flailed once ownership transferred completely to him. Frankly the evidence is even stronger for Anderson on that score than it is for Shaw. If anything, a direct line can be drawn between Shaw's decline and the steady decline of Anderson's defenses, which eventually became a nose-dive off a cliff.
As with most things in life, I don't think the causal story for this is monocausal. I'll observe several things that changed:
* Between 2009-2014, defensive recruiting included nine arguable whales: Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Lyons, Davis, Carter, Shittu, Kalambayi, Thomas. Between 2015-2020, the number cratered to just three: Buncom, Robinson, Adebo. That's a pretty calamitous drop in elite talent and one would definitely expect a severe dropoff. If one is going to pinpoint a single cause for the decline in Stanford's defense, it is probably that we went from a team with an abundance of front seven talent to one with much less. If one focuses on recruiting, there is a galactic difference between Skov, Lueders, Vaughters, Davis, Shittu, Kalambayi, and Thomas versus just Robinson (and the former cohort also had Okereke and Alfieri, who nobody thought were whales but were definitely blue chip). If one focuses on dominant college talent, our best defenses had guys like Skov, Trent Murphy, Chase Thomas, and Henry Anderson. Anderson's defenses have not had those kind of superstars. Talent is a H-U-G-E part of the explanation.
* Randy Hart coached our DL from 2010-2015. When we hired him I marveled at his insane, historically legendary performance of having coached at least one all-conference level DL for many, many years. Dude just never missed. And then at Stanford he delivered with a fitting capstone for his career. But you can't work forever and eventually we had to replace him, and Diron Reynolds absolutely sucks compared to Hart. Most anyone would, but it's hurt us to go from the best DL in the conference to, well, not that.
* Shannon Turley was fired after the 2018 season. To the extent strength and conditioning was a big part of Stanford's success prior to that, this is a factor.
There may be more, but those are big ones. My view is that unless we're going to start recruiting 1.5 defensive whales a year we need a new defensive coordinator. The evidence is overwhelming that without superior talent Anderson can't get it done.
Will end on a positive note: I think it's clear that the dropoff in front seven talent is the biggest single explanation for our decline, and we are bringing in a true freshmen class with two arguable whale edge defenders, which followed a class with two guys not on that level but still blue chip. Getting Bailey, Cooper, Armitage, and Aybar is like getting Vaughters, Davis, Okereke, and Alfieri in a two year stretch - definitely worthy of our previous salad days. One would expect the 2024 Stanford defense to be pretty filthy. I just wish I had more confidence in the coaches to get the 2022 and 2023 defenses in shape.
07-06-2022, 08:55 AM
(07-06-2022, 07:14 AM)msqueri Wrote: (In response to TrumpCard)You and I were engaged in a discussion that I too enjoyed. Unfortunately I have been a bit busy and didn't follow up. You have made the argument that Stanford ranked sort of in the middle of the pack in defensive line recruiting but that results were worse than that. Your explanation was, as I understand it anyway, that our recruiting was OK based on our class rankings (except for a couple of outlier "bad" years) and that our poor results were due almost entirely to various coaching failures. At first, your most recent post made me think you were revising your position but I now understand you are actually saying our recruiting has to be way above average for us to get adequate results because coach Anderson et al can't create even an "average" defense with "average" players.
There may be more, but those are big ones. My view is that unless we're going to start recruiting 1.5 defensive whales a year we need a new defensive coordinator. The evidence is overwhelming that without superior talent Anderson can't get it done.
My problem with this analysis is that you assume that class ranking should be absolutely predictive of expected performance. I think that is a "fact" not in evidence, and I also think it just isn't so. The class ranking is a single number that tries to capture the "quality" of a recruiting class that consists of several recruits. As you point out Stanford did recruit some 4* defensive linemen (even fairly recently) that did well in college and moved on to the NFL. The problem is that class rankings tend to average these 4* (or even "whale" recruits) in with other recruits that are not nearly so good.
Unfortunately, the variance in Stanford recruits is large, probably larger than most in the bottom half of the conference. There has been discussion of the fact we have often ended up with "plan b" or even "plan c" recruits on the DL. In a few cases we have ended up with classes that were smaller than desired. We also often have one highly rated guy. On average we are OK, but unfortunately the opposing offense goes to great lengths to avoid our highly rated guy and just run over our plan b guys. The DL isn't as good as it's average player. It is as good as it's worst player, because that is where the attack will concentrate. This is one fatal flaw in using class ranking as unconditionally predictive.
The second major problem is that class ranking doesn't consider need. It looks at what you got, not what you desperately needed and did not get. This is true both on a macro level (we didn't have enough "good" DL and needed more) and a more individual level. Often times it at least seems we have recruited players that had good talent but that did not thrive in the position we asked them to play. It could be bad player development but it also could be recruiting the "wrong" guys. Lacking the right mix of talent we misuse guys because we have no other choice. Somebody has to play that position. It is also difficult to make all conference when you are always cleaning up some other players failure. The player tries to do too much or is always trying to anticipate what bad thing will happen next. You make reference to the number of DL needed for a 2-4-5. That's fine, but we were actually wanted to run a 3-4-4, certainly on run downs. We couldn't because we didn't have enough DL to put out there that could play well enough to do so. Instead, we ended up in nickel. Injuries contributed, but when you are trying to play Tucker Fisk on the DL, you have a problem.
So, my belief is that we have not recruited "well enough" to have an average defensive line. I think we both would agree we haven't had a DL that gave us confidence for a while. I am not arguing we don't have all the deficiencies you cite in player development etc. What I am arguing is that our recruiting was also deficient, and that class ranking by it's nature is not universally predictive of on-field performance for the reasons listed above.
(07-06-2022, 07:14 AM)msqueri Wrote: (In response to TrumpCard)You and I were engaged in a discussion that I too enjoyed. Unfortunately I have been a bit busy and didn't follow up. You have made the argument that Stanford ranked sort of in the middle of the pack in defensive line recruiting but that results were worse than that. Your explanation was, as I understand it anyway, that our recruiting was OK based on our class rankings (except for a couple of outlier "bad" years) and that our poor results were due almost entirely to various coaching failures. At first, your most recent post made me think you were revising your position but I now understand you are actually saying our recruiting has to be way above average for us to get adequate results because coach Anderson et al can't create even an "average" defense with "average" players.
There may be more, but those are big ones. My view is that unless we're going to start recruiting 1.5 defensive whales a year we need a new defensive coordinator. The evidence is overwhelming that without superior talent Anderson can't get it done.
My problem with this analysis is that you assume that class ranking should be absolutely predictive of expected performance. I think that is a "fact" not in evidence, and I also think it just isn't so. The class ranking is a single number that tries to capture the "quality" of a recruiting class that consists of several recruits. As you point out Stanford did recruit some 4* defensive linemen (even fairly recently) that did well in college and moved on to the NFL. The problem is that class rankings tend to average these 4* (or even "whale" recruits) in with other recruits that are not nearly so good.
Unfortunately, the variance in Stanford recruits is large, probably larger than most in the bottom half of the conference. There has been discussion of the fact we have often ended up with "plan b" or even "plan c" recruits on the DL. In a few cases we have ended up with classes that were smaller than desired. We also often have one highly rated guy. On average we are OK, but unfortunately the opposing offense goes to great lengths to avoid our highly rated guy and just run over our plan b guys. The DL isn't as good as it's average player. It is as good as it's worst player, because that is where the attack will concentrate. This is one fatal flaw in using class ranking as unconditionally predictive.
The second major problem is that class ranking doesn't consider need. It looks at what you got, not what you desperately needed and did not get. This is true both on a macro level (we didn't have enough "good" DL and needed more) and a more individual level. Often times it at least seems we have recruited players that had good talent but that did not thrive in the position we asked them to play. It could be bad player development but it also could be recruiting the "wrong" guys. Lacking the right mix of talent we misuse guys because we have no other choice. Somebody has to play that position. It is also difficult to make all conference when you are always cleaning up some other players failure. The player tries to do too much or is always trying to anticipate what bad thing will happen next. You make reference to the number of DL needed for a 2-4-5. That's fine, but we were actually wanted to run a 3-4-4, certainly on run downs. We couldn't because we didn't have enough DL to put out there that could play well enough to do so. Instead, we ended up in nickel. Injuries contributed, but when you are trying to play Tucker Fisk on the DL, you have a problem.
So, my belief is that we have not recruited "well enough" to have an average defensive line. I think we both would agree we haven't had a DL that gave us confidence for a while. I am not arguing we don't have all the deficiencies you cite in player development etc. What I am arguing is that our recruiting was also deficient, and that class ranking by it's nature is not universally predictive of on-field performance for the reasons listed above.
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