[TrumpCard]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

Indeed they are, partly because it has been common since the 1990s and partly because this time military spending has caused employment numbers and wages to rise at a healthy clip. They also then ask "If not Putin, who?" Since there is no answer to that question they believe they have little choice but to accept what comes with Putin, inflation and a war in Ukraine. Until the answer to the question becomes "literally anybody but Putin" no change will be forthcoming.

Interesting way to frame it.  Is it a light switch?  Yesterday, Putin fine, today, Putin on the gallows with no prior warning or trend indicating it would occur?  Or is it more of a process that happens over time?  Quiet conversations between top members of the military that transition from joking to serious?  Things that look like a black box from the outside aren't necessarily stagnant on the inside.

[TrumpCard]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

Indeed they are, partly because it has been common since the 1990s and partly because this time military spending has caused employment numbers and wages to rise at a healthy clip. They also then ask "If not Putin, who?" Since there is no answer to that question they believe they have little choice but to accept what comes with Putin, inflation and a war in Ukraine. Until the answer to the question becomes "literally anybody but Putin" no change will be forthcoming.

Interesting way to frame it.  Is it a light switch?  Yesterday, Putin fine, today, Putin on the gallows with no prior warning or trend indicating it would occur?  Or is it more of a process that happens over time?  Quiet conversations between top members of the military that transition from joking to serious?  Things that look like a black box from the outside aren't necessarily stagnant on the inside.

[Goose]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

Indeed they are, partly because it has been common since the 1990s and partly because this time military spending has caused employment numbers and wages to rise at a healthy clip. They also then ask "If not Putin, who?" Since there is no answer to that question they believe they have little choice but to accept what comes with Putin, inflation and a war in Ukraine. Until the answer to the question becomes "literally anybody but Putin" no change will be forthcoming.

Interesting way to frame it.  Is it a light switch?  Yesterday, Putin fine, today, Putin on the gallows with no prior warning or trend indicating it would occur?  Or is it more of a process that happens over time?  Quiet conversations between top members of the military that transition from joking to serious?  Things that look like a black box from the outside aren't necessarily stagnant on the inside.

It is undoubtedly true that discontent can build up over time, especially inside "elites" like the FSB and the military. However, in totalitarian societies lots of that discontent is not voiced, or is voiced only hesitantly "under four eyes". The consequences of having "improper" opinions are so bad they often remain internal. Nobody "jokes" because that is no defense. When the public finally is totally fed up and a few people/groups start expressing the discontent in public it may act like a catalyst for the pent-up rage. Thus it looks from the outside much as a light switch, where an avalanche of opposition seemingly comes from nowhere. Of course, if Putin can nip the initial expression of discontent in the bud, the result will be a damp squib.
 
The elites usually will not initiate the activity because they have too much to loose if it does not catch on immediately. They will however rapidly join in if it looks promising. Of course military coups do exist, but truly "good" totalitarian societies organize their military in such a way staging a coup is very difficult. There aren't enough natural  horizontal contacts to make it happen, only vertical ones. Russia historically has been very good at that, and Putin is no exception.

[Goose]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

Indeed they are, partly because it has been common since the 1990s and partly because this time military spending has caused employment numbers and wages to rise at a healthy clip. They also then ask "If not Putin, who?" Since there is no answer to that question they believe they have little choice but to accept what comes with Putin, inflation and a war in Ukraine. Until the answer to the question becomes "literally anybody but Putin" no change will be forthcoming.

Interesting way to frame it.  Is it a light switch?  Yesterday, Putin fine, today, Putin on the gallows with no prior warning or trend indicating it would occur?  Or is it more of a process that happens over time?  Quiet conversations between top members of the military that transition from joking to serious?  Things that look like a black box from the outside aren't necessarily stagnant on the inside.

It is undoubtedly true that discontent can build up over time, especially inside "elites" like the FSB and the military. However, in totalitarian societies lots of that discontent is not voiced, or is voiced only hesitantly "under four eyes". The consequences of having "improper" opinions are so bad they often remain internal. Nobody "jokes" because that is no defense. When the public finally is totally fed up and a few people/groups start expressing the discontent in public it may act like a catalyst for the pent-up rage. Thus it looks from the outside much as a light switch, where an avalanche of opposition seemingly comes from nowhere. Of course, if Putin can nip the initial expression of discontent in the bud, the result will be a damp squib.
 
The elites usually will not initiate the activity because they have too much to loose if it does not catch on immediately. They will however rapidly join in if it looks promising. Of course military coups do exist, but truly "good" totalitarian societies organize their military in such a way staging a coup is very difficult. There aren't enough natural  horizontal contacts to make it happen, only vertical ones. Russia historically has been very good at that, and Putin is no exception.

[Papa John]

Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker writes about authoritarian regimes and their fear of what he calls "common knowledge:"

https://www.persuasion.community/p/why-a...-knowledge

[Papa John]

Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker writes about authoritarian regimes and their fear of what he calls "common knowledge:"

https://www.persuasion.community/p/why-a...-knowledge

[TrumpCard]

Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker writes about authoritarian regimes and their fear of what he calls "common knowledge:"

https://www.persuasion.community/p/why-a...-knowledge

Russia is a vast country with elites concentrated near Moscow and war casualties concentrated in the outlying regions.  I don't have any actual evidence that discontent is building in the outlying regions, but I can imagine every funeral functioning like the guy in the subway handing out blank pamphlets in the article linked above.  

I also wonder what is happening in the former Soviet republics (besides the Baltics, which are already NATO).  If Georgia and Moldova showed increased confidence in challenging Putin in regions where frozen conflicts exist, would that create the kind of "common knowledge" needed among domestic elites to overthrow Putin?  Is there any reason to think that Kazakhstan would further distance itself from Russia, and if so, what "common knowledge" might that support?

[TrumpCard]

Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker writes about authoritarian regimes and their fear of what he calls "common knowledge:"

https://www.persuasion.community/p/why-a...-knowledge

Russia is a vast country with elites concentrated near Moscow and war casualties concentrated in the outlying regions.  I don't have any actual evidence that discontent is building in the outlying regions, but I can imagine every funeral functioning like the guy in the subway handing out blank pamphlets in the article linked above.  

I also wonder what is happening in the former Soviet republics (besides the Baltics, which are already NATO).  If Georgia and Moldova showed increased confidence in challenging Putin in regions where frozen conflicts exist, would that create the kind of "common knowledge" needed among domestic elites to overthrow Putin?  Is there any reason to think that Kazakhstan would further distance itself from Russia, and if so, what "common knowledge" might that support?

[TrumpCard]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

[TrumpCard]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

[fullmetal]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

Starlink recently cut off access from black market Russian terminals, and that's thrown quite a wrench into their C3I.

[fullmetal]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

Starlink recently cut off access from black market Russian terminals, and that's thrown quite a wrench into their C3I.

[dabigv13]

4 years now since the start of Putin's special military operation. March of 2022 I posted this and I think it holds up-

There is no way at this point for Russia to "win", that is accomplish their political objectives of regime change and a puppet Ukraine. Russia doesn't have the troops to defeat and occupy Ukraine. Even if their initial operation to take Kiev and assassinate Zelensky had been a success a la the storming of Tajbeg palace, just like in Afghanistan this would only lead to a festering wound that would continually hurt Russia.

Of course Putin probably can't abide a loss. So end states for the conflict in my mind are three 1) Putin murdered by FSB 2) Ukraine cedes Crimea and Donbas formally, there is some formal neutrality declaration (this probably is not a stable end state) 3) nuclear exchange.

2 definitely the likeliest outcome. But still probably at least another year and likely more of fighting.

[dabigv13]

4 years now since the start of Putin's special military operation. March of 2022 I posted this and I think it holds up-

There is no way at this point for Russia to "win", that is accomplish their political objectives of regime change and a puppet Ukraine. Russia doesn't have the troops to defeat and occupy Ukraine. Even if their initial operation to take Kiev and assassinate Zelensky had been a success a la the storming of Tajbeg palace, just like in Afghanistan this would only lead to a festering wound that would continually hurt Russia.

Of course Putin probably can't abide a loss. So end states for the conflict in my mind are three 1) Putin murdered by FSB 2) Ukraine cedes Crimea and Donbas formally, there is some formal neutrality declaration (this probably is not a stable end state) 3) nuclear exchange.

2 definitely the likeliest outcome. But still probably at least another year and likely more of fighting.

[Mick]

For the first time, Russia is losing more men by casualty than it can recruit, per The Telegraph. 

They are losing 40,000 men per month and recruiting 35,000 men per month.

Russian soldiers being killed faster than Kremlin can recruit them

[Mick]

For the first time, Russia is losing more men by casualty than it can recruit, per The Telegraph. 

They are losing 40,000 men per month and recruiting 35,000 men per month.

Russian soldiers being killed faster than Kremlin can recruit them

[Goose]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

Starlink recently cut off access from black market Russian terminals, and that's thrown quite a wrench into their C3I.

Russia had gone further than C3I functions. They were using counterfeit Starlink terminals in drones as part of the normal weapons system guidance. These drones are now not usable at all. The C3I disruption has definitely played hob with the Russian logistics system and the rapid sharing of drone acquired targeting information. By the time the information reaches Russian artillery, it is obsolete. They are back in the "bad old days" before they adapted to a more modern war requiring a faster targeting cycle. It won't be easy to "fix" this problem.

For the first time, Russia is losing more men by casualty than it can recruit, per The Telegraph. 

They are losing 40,000 men per month and recruiting 35,000 men per month.

Russian soldiers being killed faster than Kremlin can recruit them

This is indeed a serious problem for Putin. Previously the Russians were paying very generous enlistment bonus and salary to recruits. They still are, but it isn't enough. The Russian economy has a very low unemployment rate. This is driven by the war economy, the number of men who have fled the country, and the number of men already in the Russian military. Many men  joined the Russian military for the money and because they had no hope of other employment. Today, jobs are much more plentiful. The article asserts that the potential recruits now realize it is a one-way trip for many. In reality, they always knew that. The fact they have a reasonable alternative is what is killing Russian recruitment. Russia can't afford to raise the compensation to recruit soldiers, and even if it could getting people to accept the "great offer" with a 2.6% civilian unemployment number is going to be a very heavy lift indeed.
 
This situation matters for two reasons. First, not having as many troops reduces the pressure Russia can apply to Ukraine. Ukraine is still heavily outnumbered, but not as bad. Second, and much more importantly, a lack of troops may require conscription of more "ordinary Russians" to serve in combat roles against Ukraine. This will require a "general mobilization". That will be a "big deal" for the Russian public that up to now have faced few immediate consequences due to a war in Ukraine. Putin really, really doesn't want to do that, but if he is forced to do so things could go off the rails for him real fast.

[Goose]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

Starlink recently cut off access from black market Russian terminals, and that's thrown quite a wrench into their C3I.

Russia had gone further than C3I functions. They were using counterfeit Starlink terminals in drones as part of the normal weapons system guidance. These drones are now not usable at all. The C3I disruption has definitely played hob with the Russian logistics system and the rapid sharing of drone acquired targeting information. By the time the information reaches Russian artillery, it is obsolete. They are back in the "bad old days" before they adapted to a more modern war requiring a faster targeting cycle. It won't be easy to "fix" this problem.

For the first time, Russia is losing more men by casualty than it can recruit, per The Telegraph. 

They are losing 40,000 men per month and recruiting 35,000 men per month.

Russian soldiers being killed faster than Kremlin can recruit them

This is indeed a serious problem for Putin. Previously the Russians were paying very generous enlistment bonus and salary to recruits. They still are, but it isn't enough. The Russian economy has a very low unemployment rate. This is driven by the war economy, the number of men who have fled the country, and the number of men already in the Russian military. Many men  joined the Russian military for the money and because they had no hope of other employment. Today, jobs are much more plentiful. The article asserts that the potential recruits now realize it is a one-way trip for many. In reality, they always knew that. The fact they have a reasonable alternative is what is killing Russian recruitment. Russia can't afford to raise the compensation to recruit soldiers, and even if it could getting people to accept the "great offer" with a 2.6% civilian unemployment number is going to be a very heavy lift indeed.
 
This situation matters for two reasons. First, not having as many troops reduces the pressure Russia can apply to Ukraine. Ukraine is still heavily outnumbered, but not as bad. Second, and much more importantly, a lack of troops may require conscription of more "ordinary Russians" to serve in combat roles against Ukraine. This will require a "general mobilization". That will be a "big deal" for the Russian public that up to now have faced few immediate consequences due to a war in Ukraine. Putin really, really doesn't want to do that, but if he is forced to do so things could go off the rails for him real fast.

[M T]

Regarding the Russian casualties:
  BBC: Russian soldiers tell BBC they saw fellow troops executed on commanders' orders
   which is about the BBC show "The Zero Line: Inside Russia's War" (I don't know that it is available in the US currently)
   One story mentions 20 men, all convicts, that arrive one night, and are all killed the next morning, with the commander taking all their bank cards.

Regarding the US negotiations involving Russia and Ukraine
  AP: Ukrainian envoy says US raised concerns about strikes aimed at Russia that impacted US oil interests
"The Caspian Pipeline Consortium operates a pipeline from the Caspian coast in northwest Kazakhstan to the Novorossiysk port. The pipeline handles much of the crude exports from three major Kazakh fields in which major U.S. energy companies, Chevron and ExxonMobil, have stakes." So, the US companies, and thus the US, is making money via the Russian port that Ukraine recently attacked. Would the US have preferred Ukraine attack residences?

[M T]

Regarding the Russian casualties:
  BBC: Russian soldiers tell BBC they saw fellow troops executed on commanders' orders
   which is about the BBC show "The Zero Line: Inside Russia's War" (I don't know that it is available in the US currently)
   One story mentions 20 men, all convicts, that arrive one night, and are all killed the next morning, with the commander taking all their bank cards.

Regarding the US negotiations involving Russia and Ukraine
  AP: Ukrainian envoy says US raised concerns about strikes aimed at Russia that impacted US oil interests
"The Caspian Pipeline Consortium operates a pipeline from the Caspian coast in northwest Kazakhstan to the Novorossiysk port. The pipeline handles much of the crude exports from three major Kazakh fields in which major U.S. energy companies, Chevron and ExxonMobil, have stakes." So, the US companies, and thus the US, is making money via the Russian port that Ukraine recently attacked. Would the US have preferred Ukraine attack residences?

[TrumpCard]

It must suck to be a Ukrainian diplomat who has to grin while listening to stuff like that. What can the diplomat do?  It’s the US, the supposed leader of the free world.

[TrumpCard]

It must suck to be a Ukrainian diplomat who has to grin while listening to stuff like that. What can the diplomat do?  It’s the US, the supposed leader of the free world.

[Mick]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

Starlink recently cut off access from black market Russian terminals, and that's thrown quite a wrench into their C3I.

Russia had gone further than C3I functions. They were using counterfeit Starlink terminals in drones as part of the normal weapons system guidance. These drones are now not usable at all. The C3I disruption has definitely played hob with the Russian logistics system and the rapid sharing of drone acquired targeting information. By the time the information reaches Russian artillery, it is obsolete. They are back in the "bad old days" before they adapted to a more modern war requiring a faster targeting cycle. It won't be easy to "fix" this problem.

For the first time, Russia is losing more men by casualty than it can recruit, per The Telegraph. 

They are losing 40,000 men per month and recruiting 35,000 men per month.

Russian soldiers being killed faster than Kremlin can recruit them

This is indeed a serious problem for Putin. Previously the Russians were paying very generous enlistment bonus and salary to recruits. They still are, but it isn't enough. The Russian economy has a very low unemployment rate. This is driven by the war economy, the number of men who have fled the country, and the number of men already in the Russian military. Many men  joined the Russian military for the money and because they had no hope of other employment. Today, jobs are much more plentiful. The article asserts that the potential recruits now realize it is a one-way trip for many. In reality, they always knew that. The fact they have a reasonable alternative is what is killing Russian recruitment. Russia can't afford to raise the compensation to recruit soldiers, and even if it could getting people to accept the "great offer" with a 2.6% civilian unemployment number is going to be a very heavy lift indeed.
 
This situation matters for two reasons. First, not having as many troops reduces the pressure Russia can apply to Ukraine. Ukraine is still heavily outnumbered, but not as bad. Second, and much more importantly, a lack of troops may require conscription of more "ordinary Russians" to serve in combat roles against Ukraine. This will require a "general mobilization". That will be a "big deal" for the Russian public that up to now have faced few immediate consequences due to a war in Ukraine. Putin really, really doesn't want to do that, but if he is forced to do so things could go off the rails for him real fast.

More on how the loss of Starlink affected the battlefield strategies employed by Ukrainians vs. Russian troops.

Ukraine Goes on the Offensive || Peter Zeihan

[Mick]

As we approach the 4th anniversary, I saw this ISW update:
https://understandingwar.org/research/ru...y-21-2026/

I am not sure if this update merely looks at the war through old rose colored glasses, but it's notable that ISW is claiming that Ukraine made advances of late.  I was under the impression that Russia has been on a slow but inexorable march forward for the past 2+ years.

Starlink recently cut off access from black market Russian terminals, and that's thrown quite a wrench into their C3I.

Russia had gone further than C3I functions. They were using counterfeit Starlink terminals in drones as part of the normal weapons system guidance. These drones are now not usable at all. The C3I disruption has definitely played hob with the Russian logistics system and the rapid sharing of drone acquired targeting information. By the time the information reaches Russian artillery, it is obsolete. They are back in the "bad old days" before they adapted to a more modern war requiring a faster targeting cycle. It won't be easy to "fix" this problem.

For the first time, Russia is losing more men by casualty than it can recruit, per The Telegraph. 

They are losing 40,000 men per month and recruiting 35,000 men per month.

Russian soldiers being killed faster than Kremlin can recruit them

This is indeed a serious problem for Putin. Previously the Russians were paying very generous enlistment bonus and salary to recruits. They still are, but it isn't enough. The Russian economy has a very low unemployment rate. This is driven by the war economy, the number of men who have fled the country, and the number of men already in the Russian military. Many men  joined the Russian military for the money and because they had no hope of other employment. Today, jobs are much more plentiful. The article asserts that the potential recruits now realize it is a one-way trip for many. In reality, they always knew that. The fact they have a reasonable alternative is what is killing Russian recruitment. Russia can't afford to raise the compensation to recruit soldiers, and even if it could getting people to accept the "great offer" with a 2.6% civilian unemployment number is going to be a very heavy lift indeed.
 
This situation matters for two reasons. First, not having as many troops reduces the pressure Russia can apply to Ukraine. Ukraine is still heavily outnumbered, but not as bad. Second, and much more importantly, a lack of troops may require conscription of more "ordinary Russians" to serve in combat roles against Ukraine. This will require a "general mobilization". That will be a "big deal" for the Russian public that up to now have faced few immediate consequences due to a war in Ukraine. Putin really, really doesn't want to do that, but if he is forced to do so things could go off the rails for him real fast.

More on how the loss of Starlink affected the battlefield strategies employed by Ukrainians vs. Russian troops.

Ukraine Goes on the Offensive || Peter Zeihan

[Mick]

Xi Jinping just purged China's top general, Gen. Zhang Youxia (Vice Chair of Central Military Commission), right after he purged Gen. He Weidong (#3 in the military) along with eight other senior officers. Gen. Liu Zhenli (another member of the CMC) is under investigation. The CMC now has just one of the original six generals named to it, General Zhang Shengmin, who has overseen the purges. The only other member of the CMC is Xi himself.

Earlier, Xi had purged admirals, regional military commanders and others. Surface issue is graft and corruption. Of the 44 uniformed officers appointed to the Communist Party's Central Committee, 29 have been purged or are "missing."

Xi’s Purge of China’s Military Brings Its Top General Down - The New York Times
China Ousts Senior General on Corruption Charges - The New York Times

I'd be curious as to anyone's interpretation of these events; how they affect Russia, Ukraine, Taiwan and America.

Jinping's purge of his military establishment continues. Nine more senior officers purged less than a week before the CCP's most important annual political gathering in Beijing. Two admirals, four major generals, two generals, one lieutenant general.

China purges nine military officials ahead of key meeting for Xi

[Mick]

Xi Jinping just purged China's top general, Gen. Zhang Youxia (Vice Chair of Central Military Commission), right after he purged Gen. He Weidong (#3 in the military) along with eight other senior officers. Gen. Liu Zhenli (another member of the CMC) is under investigation. The CMC now has just one of the original six generals named to it, General Zhang Shengmin, who has overseen the purges. The only other member of the CMC is Xi himself.

Earlier, Xi had purged admirals, regional military commanders and others. Surface issue is graft and corruption. Of the 44 uniformed officers appointed to the Communist Party's Central Committee, 29 have been purged or are "missing."

Xi’s Purge of China’s Military Brings Its Top General Down - The New York Times
China Ousts Senior General on Corruption Charges - The New York Times

I'd be curious as to anyone's interpretation of these events; how they affect Russia, Ukraine, Taiwan and America.

Jinping's purge of his military establishment continues. Nine more senior officers purged less than a week before the CCP's most important annual political gathering in Beijing. Two admirals, four major generals, two generals, one lieutenant general.

China purges nine military officials ahead of key meeting for Xi

[M T]

I hope we don't continue this thread drift, but I felt like Mick's assertion isn't quite clear.

Jinping's purge of his military establishment continues. Nine more senior officers purged less than a week before the CCP's most important annual political gathering in Beijing. Two admirals, four major generals, two generals, one lieutenant general.

China purges nine military officials ahead of key meeting for Xi

I guess I'm a bit clueless as to how things work in China.  To me, a purge would have removed someone from their post - a general removed from the military, often for political reasons.  But when I read the article, it indicates the 9 have been removed from their membership in China's top legislature (which just rubber stamps things anyway).  Yes, that's going to impact that person's stature, but I see no indication (yet) that they were removed from their command.  At the same time, 10 others in that legislature were also removed.

[M T]

I hope we don't continue this thread drift, but I felt like Mick's assertion isn't quite clear.

Jinping's purge of his military establishment continues. Nine more senior officers purged less than a week before the CCP's most important annual political gathering in Beijing. Two admirals, four major generals, two generals, one lieutenant general.

China purges nine military officials ahead of key meeting for Xi

I guess I'm a bit clueless as to how things work in China.  To me, a purge would have removed someone from their post - a general removed from the military, often for political reasons.  But when I read the article, it indicates the 9 have been removed from their membership in China's top legislature (which just rubber stamps things anyway).  Yes, that's going to impact that person's stature, but I see no indication (yet) that they were removed from their command.  At the same time, 10 others in that legislature were also removed.

[Mick]

I apologize for the thread drift, I was unintentionally obscure. China and Russia are close allies, and both Putin and Jinping are at the heads of political systems that are similar, and in which both are under some duress -- for very different reasons. Both Putin and Jinping have conducted purges in countries with history of purges. And finally, like Putin, Jinping has consolidated power, specifically millitary power. The Central Military Commission is down to Jinping and the accuser Zhenli.

I don't think it affects the strategic alliance between Russia and China. I don't think there's much immediate operational impact on the Ukraine conflict. The purged Youxia was a key interlocutor between Russia and China, so I wondered if that has an impact, or signals a change in relations.

Personally, I wonder if it makes China more or less likely to invade Taiwan. More likely because there are fewer brakes on Jinping's power, but less likely as he moves to ensure the side effects of the purge aren't distracting as he consolidates power.

Specifically vis-a-vis Russian execution of war efforts, my take is:

1) Constrains large scale Chinese millitary support of Russia.
2) Serious quality control issues with advanced missiles and aerospace, the sectors Russia would want to tap.
3) CCP is most cocnerned about corruption and factionalism inside the PLA, which could jeopardize Chinese security.
4) Moscow's lifeline is China both for economic and technological reasons. PLA turmoil means fewer exports.
5) Long term Russian dependence on Chinese industry reinforces Russia's status as the junior partner.
6) Just my general suspicion, but that because of the purges, the American military and diplomats have fewer touchpoints with the CCP and PLA.
7) Ukraine is marginally aided by capping Russia's upside (realistic or otherwise) from Chinese military aid, and therefore, Russia will not gain a new decisive battlefield edge.

[Mick]

I apologize for the thread drift, I was unintentionally obscure. China and Russia are close allies, and both Putin and Jinping are at the heads of political systems that are similar, and in which both are under some duress -- for very different reasons. Both Putin and Jinping have conducted purges in countries with history of purges. And finally, like Putin, Jinping has consolidated power, specifically millitary power. The Central Military Commission is down to Jinping and the accuser Zhenli.

I don't think it affects the strategic alliance between Russia and China. I don't think there's much immediate operational impact on the Ukraine conflict. The purged Youxia was a key interlocutor between Russia and China, so I wondered if that has an impact, or signals a change in relations.

Personally, I wonder if it makes China more or less likely to invade Taiwan. More likely because there are fewer brakes on Jinping's power, but less likely as he moves to ensure the side effects of the purge aren't distracting as he consolidates power.

Specifically vis-a-vis Russian execution of war efforts, my take is:

1) Constrains large scale Chinese millitary support of Russia.
2) Serious quality control issues with advanced missiles and aerospace, the sectors Russia would want to tap.
3) CCP is most cocnerned about corruption and factionalism inside the PLA, which could jeopardize Chinese security.
4) Moscow's lifeline is China both for economic and technological reasons. PLA turmoil means fewer exports.
5) Long term Russian dependence on Chinese industry reinforces Russia's status as the junior partner.
6) Just my general suspicion, but that because of the purges, the American military and diplomats have fewer touchpoints with the CCP and PLA.
7) Ukraine is marginally aided by capping Russia's upside (realistic or otherwise) from Chinese military aid, and therefore, Russia will not gain a new decisive battlefield edge.

[dabigv13]

Keeping this Ukraine focused, will say that it seems the US and Arab states have not necessarily learned from Ukraine how to intercept Shahed type drones. They seem to have done well with cruise missile and ballistic missile defense thus far, but multiple Shahed impacts including the main radome at the US Navy base in Bahrain.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2027...16482?s=20

Yikes there's more

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/202...37651?s=20

[dabigv13]

Keeping this Ukraine focused, will say that it seems the US and Arab states have not necessarily learned from Ukraine how to intercept Shahed type drones. They seem to have done well with cruise missile and ballistic missile defense thus far, but multiple Shahed impacts including the main radome at the US Navy base in Bahrain.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2027...16482?s=20

Yikes there's more

https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/202...37651?s=20

[Goose]

Keeping this Ukraine focused, will say that it seems the US and Arab states have not necessarily learned from Ukraine how to intercept Shahed type drones. They seem to have done well with cruise missile and ballistic missile defense thus far, but multiple Shahed impacts including the main radome at the US Navy base in Bahrain.

If you are not speaking tongue-in-cheek, your comment  is inaccurate on many levels. First, Ukraine does not shoot down anywhere close to 100% of the Shahed type drones that Russia fires at them. Some number of these drones hit without being detected until the explode. Ukraine does do a very good job given their constraints, but it is far from "cast iron" coverage.
 
Second, we have no idea what percentage of drones the US and its "allies" shot down as compared to a similar statistic for a "comparable" size attack by Russia. We do know that several times when Iran fired these types of drones toward Israel the US and Israel took down all of them, at least that is what was reported. Of course, the geometry is much more favorable for defense in that case, because the drones have to be in the air a long time, while Bahrain, UAE, And Qatar  are quite close to Iran, just across the Persian Gulf.
 
Third, the resources available to the US and Israel are very different from those available to Ukraine. In most cases, the US is much better off. We have AWACS to spot the Shahed and we have lots of F-15s/F-18s (and probably some F-16s too) available to shoot them down. Ukraine has AFAWK no effective AWACS coverage to direct their very few F-16s against incoming Shahed  missiles. In addition, the few F-16s are undoubtedly often directed to attack more damaging air-breathing cruise missiles. The US approach has overwhelming advantages if the Shahed  missiles are in the air for a relatively long time. If the range is short however, there may be cases where no available aircraft can reach the drone before it impacts. Geometry wins.
 
On the other hand what Ukraine has that the US does not is a very, very large number of anti-drone troops stationed all around important targets. Some of these troops are armed with machine guns and the like. Some are armed with FPV drones. Some others are armed with various legacy anti-aircraft guns. The US has nothing like that kind of footprint in the "host nations" along the Persian Gulf. We would never be allowed by the host country to deploy that kind of an anti-drone force even if we had one. Therefore, one of Ukraine's main strengths is not available to us, full stop. "Learning" about it might be of academic interest but it would do us no good in the real world.
 
A third important consideration is that the US is operating out of host nations with their consent. However, they reasonably insist on being viewed as allies and fully intend to "defend themselves". Thus, some of the inbound targets may be assigned to our Gulf state allies and are their responsibility to take down. Politically, it has to be that way. Practically, it also has to be that way because "blue on blue" casualties would be inevitable without deconfliction of forces. Sometimes when crossing national organizational lines delays are introduced that make the defensive problem very difficult. The US and Israel, who use virtually the same equipment and organization, have some trouble with it. With our Gulf allies the problem is undoubtedly worse. I don't know if this was the case in the  Shaheds that got through, but it might well have been.

[Goose]

Keeping this Ukraine focused, will say that it seems the US and Arab states have not necessarily learned from Ukraine how to intercept Shahed type drones. They seem to have done well with cruise missile and ballistic missile defense thus far, but multiple Shahed impacts including the main radome at the US Navy base in Bahrain.

If you are not speaking tongue-in-cheek, your comment  is inaccurate on many levels. First, Ukraine does not shoot down anywhere close to 100% of the Shahed type drones that Russia fires at them. Some number of these drones hit without being detected until the explode. Ukraine does do a very good job given their constraints, but it is far from "cast iron" coverage.
 
Second, we have no idea what percentage of drones the US and its "allies" shot down as compared to a similar statistic for a "comparable" size attack by Russia. We do know that several times when Iran fired these types of drones toward Israel the US and Israel took down all of them, at least that is what was reported. Of course, the geometry is much more favorable for defense in that case, because the drones have to be in the air a long time, while Bahrain, UAE, And Qatar  are quite close to Iran, just across the Persian Gulf.
 
Third, the resources available to the US and Israel are very different from those available to Ukraine. In most cases, the US is much better off. We have AWACS to spot the Shahed and we have lots of F-15s/F-18s (and probably some F-16s too) available to shoot them down. Ukraine has AFAWK no effective AWACS coverage to direct their very few F-16s against incoming Shahed  missiles. In addition, the few F-16s are undoubtedly often directed to attack more damaging air-breathing cruise missiles. The US approach has overwhelming advantages if the Shahed  missiles are in the air for a relatively long time. If the range is short however, there may be cases where no available aircraft can reach the drone before it impacts. Geometry wins.
 
On the other hand what Ukraine has that the US does not is a very, very large number of anti-drone troops stationed all around important targets. Some of these troops are armed with machine guns and the like. Some are armed with FPV drones. Some others are armed with various legacy anti-aircraft guns. The US has nothing like that kind of footprint in the "host nations" along the Persian Gulf. We would never be allowed by the host country to deploy that kind of an anti-drone force even if we had one. Therefore, one of Ukraine's main strengths is not available to us, full stop. "Learning" about it might be of academic interest but it would do us no good in the real world.
 
A third important consideration is that the US is operating out of host nations with their consent. However, they reasonably insist on being viewed as allies and fully intend to "defend themselves". Thus, some of the inbound targets may be assigned to our Gulf state allies and are their responsibility to take down. Politically, it has to be that way. Practically, it also has to be that way because "blue on blue" casualties would be inevitable without deconfliction of forces. Sometimes when crossing national organizational lines delays are introduced that make the defensive problem very difficult. The US and Israel, who use virtually the same equipment and organization, have some trouble with it. With our Gulf allies the problem is undoubtedly worse. I don't know if this was the case in the  Shaheds that got through, but it might well have been.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine leaks some Shaheds, true. But their air defenses are extremely depleted compared to what the US and allies have in theater.

Embarassing for the US to leak multiple Shaheds at a main USN base imho.

[dabigv13]

Ukraine leaks some Shaheds, true. But their air defenses are extremely depleted compared to what the US and allies have in theater.

Embarassing for the US to leak multiple Shaheds at a main USN base imho.

[dabigv13]

Another wild video. Patriots vs Iranian ballistic missile, with the patriots failing to get a clean intercept and the missile impacting nearby. Unclear if the missile hit it's intended target.

https://x.com/markito0171/status/2027826...52814?s=20

[dabigv13]

Another wild video. Patriots vs Iranian ballistic missile, with the patriots failing to get a clean intercept and the missile impacting nearby. Unclear if the missile hit it's intended target.

https://x.com/markito0171/status/2027826...52814?s=20

[BostonCard]

Interesting, apparently the US is using Shahed clones (I assume that is the reference to “copied Kamikaze drones”:

https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-st...yURL_share

What I’m not sure of is whether this is designed to fool Iranian air defenses into thinking these were friendly drones (of course, they would be headed in the wrong direction) or if we were just copying the designs because they were effective or even something looser, like copying the concept.

If mass produced, I wonder if we could find a way to get them to Ukraine?

BC

[BostonCard]

Interesting, apparently the US is using Shahed clones (I assume that is the reference to “copied Kamikaze drones”:

https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/iran-st...yURL_share

What I’m not sure of is whether this is designed to fool Iranian air defenses into thinking these were friendly drones (of course, they would be headed in the wrong direction) or if we were just copying the designs because they were effective or even something looser, like copying the concept.

If mass produced, I wonder if we could find a way to get them to Ukraine?

BC