[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/a-warga..._permalink

This is a rather sobering assessment suggesting that there is a growing consensus that Russia could carry out an incursion into Lithuania as soon as next year.

In the exercise, Russia used the pretext of a humanitarian crisis in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad to seize the Lithuanian city of Marijampole, a key crossroads in the narrow gap between Russia and Belarus. Russian portrayals of the invasion as a humanitarian mission were sufficient for the U.S. to decline invoking NATO’s Article 5 that calls for allied assistance. Germany proved indecisive, and Poland, while mobilizing, didn’t send troops across the border into Lithuania. The German brigade already deployed to Lithuania failed to intervene, in part because Russia used drones to lay mines on roads leading out of its base.

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/a-warga..._permalink

This is a rather sobering assessment suggesting that there is a growing consensus that Russia could carry out an incursion into Lithuania as soon as next year.

In the exercise, Russia used the pretext of a humanitarian crisis in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad to seize the Lithuanian city of Marijampole, a key crossroads in the narrow gap between Russia and Belarus. Russian portrayals of the invasion as a humanitarian mission were sufficient for the U.S. to decline invoking NATO’s Article 5 that calls for allied assistance. Germany proved indecisive, and Poland, while mobilizing, didn’t send troops across the border into Lithuania. The German brigade already deployed to Lithuania failed to intervene, in part because Russia used drones to lay mines on roads leading out of its base.

BC

[BostonCard]

Good analysis of the Russian fiscal situation, which looks... stretched.

https://theovershoot.co/p/russian-war-sp...dium=email

Even with massive increases in value-added taxes, excise taxes, income taxes, and social insurance taxes, more than 80% of the increase in Russian federal spending over the past 12 months was financed by an increase in the deficit and more than 70% of the increase in spending by the “pension and social insurance fund of the Russian fund” was financed by an increase in the deficit. Across the consolidated budget, incremental deficit increases financed about two-thirds of the overall spending increase (in rubles).

BC

[BostonCard]

Good analysis of the Russian fiscal situation, which looks... stretched.

https://theovershoot.co/p/russian-war-sp...dium=email

Even with massive increases in value-added taxes, excise taxes, income taxes, and social insurance taxes, more than 80% of the increase in Russian federal spending over the past 12 months was financed by an increase in the deficit and more than 70% of the increase in spending by the “pension and social insurance fund of the Russian fund” was financed by an increase in the deficit. Across the consolidated budget, incremental deficit increases financed about two-thirds of the overall spending increase (in rubles).

BC

[dabigv13]

Interesting footage of a Ukrainian F16 with a gun kill of a shahed type drone. 

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2020...05845?s=20

[dabigv13]

Interesting footage of a Ukrainian F16 with a gun kill of a shahed type drone. 

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2020...05845?s=20

[TrumpCard]

I was looking for information about the ongoing supply of weapons to Ukraine and found this article:
No Drop in Military Aid (Supposedly)

Admittedly, it is from December and it lacks the specifics I would want.  
So I am curious whether the top line takeaway from the article is true, and if so, whether that seems likely to continue.
Relatedly, I'm wondering whether there is any prospect of equipping Ukraine with a sufficient number of fighter jets to defend its skies properly.

[TrumpCard]

I was looking for information about the ongoing supply of weapons to Ukraine and found this article:
No Drop in Military Aid (Supposedly)

Admittedly, it is from December and it lacks the specifics I would want.  
So I am curious whether the top line takeaway from the article is true, and if so, whether that seems likely to continue.
Relatedly, I'm wondering whether there is any prospect of equipping Ukraine with a sufficient number of fighter jets to defend its skies properly.

[Goose]

Interesting footage of a Ukrainian F16 with a gun kill of a shahed type drone. 

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2020...05845?s=20

Thanks for the link. It is indeed a good illustration of taking down this kind of drone with the gun. Using air to air missiles for such a job is economically unsound. The F-16 can't carry enough such missiles anyway. Using the gun costs much less and can increase the F-16's time on station.
 
The following link illustrates the successes and capabilities of the F-16 school set up in Romania. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/gene...16969.html This school can't deliver more than 8-10 Ukrainian pilots per cycle given that its capacity is only 25 students. The Romanians themselves need at least half the slots. That said, it is much, much better than nothing. If this effort had been started by the US administration fairly promptly when the war began, it would be producing today's results at least two years ago, if not sooner. Oh what might have been :-).
 
The article discusses link-16 in the NATO context. It is unclear if the Ukrainian trainees participate in that training. It is also still unclear to me whether the Ukrainian F-16AMs retained their link-16 capability. There are claims both ways on the internet. The Saab 340s that Ukraine received also had a link-16 capability. However, it is not exportable without US approval. I don't know if that was granted or not.
 
I do know that using F-16s to chase down drones without some kind of AEW control is real inefficient. This is especially true for F-16s that must remain at low altitude to avoid Russian long range air to air missiles launched from inside Russian airspace. Their radar horizon is quite limited, better than a ground based radar, but not much. Ideally targets would be handed to the F-16s based on priority and proximity. This would maximize the F-16s efficiency and kill the most targets. Given the small number of F-16s Ukraine has maximizing efficiency  is pretty important.

[Goose]

Interesting footage of a Ukrainian F16 with a gun kill of a shahed type drone. 

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2020...05845?s=20

Thanks for the link. It is indeed a good illustration of taking down this kind of drone with the gun. Using air to air missiles for such a job is economically unsound. The F-16 can't carry enough such missiles anyway. Using the gun costs much less and can increase the F-16's time on station.
 
The following link illustrates the successes and capabilities of the F-16 school set up in Romania. https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/gene...16969.html This school can't deliver more than 8-10 Ukrainian pilots per cycle given that its capacity is only 25 students. The Romanians themselves need at least half the slots. That said, it is much, much better than nothing. If this effort had been started by the US administration fairly promptly when the war began, it would be producing today's results at least two years ago, if not sooner. Oh what might have been :-).
 
The article discusses link-16 in the NATO context. It is unclear if the Ukrainian trainees participate in that training. It is also still unclear to me whether the Ukrainian F-16AMs retained their link-16 capability. There are claims both ways on the internet. The Saab 340s that Ukraine received also had a link-16 capability. However, it is not exportable without US approval. I don't know if that was granted or not.
 
I do know that using F-16s to chase down drones without some kind of AEW control is real inefficient. This is especially true for F-16s that must remain at low altitude to avoid Russian long range air to air missiles launched from inside Russian airspace. Their radar horizon is quite limited, better than a ground based radar, but not much. Ideally targets would be handed to the F-16s based on priority and proximity. This would maximize the F-16s efficiency and kill the most targets. Given the small number of F-16s Ukraine has maximizing efficiency  is pretty important.

[Goose]

This post doesn't contain anything really "new", but a link from BC and finding a couple of articles has delivered what I think is a very succinct picture of the war in Ukraine and what keeps it going. Ref 1  asserts that Russia cannot significantly increase its military capability because its lacks the economic resources to do so. The title of the article is, after all, Russian War Spending May be Maxed Out. The article makes some good arguments why this is so. However, the article really doesn't demonstrate that Russia lacks the ability to borrow a lot more money. Their ratio of debt to GDP is 25%. Ours is 135%. While this ratio is not the whole story, there is no "organic" reason Russia can't borrow more money. China has indicated interest in buying Ruble denominated debt from Russia. The reasons are probably entirely political, as both inflation and convertibility problems argue against such actions. I am not convinced Russia is "maxed out".
 
The article also states

... he Russian strategy over the past 12 months has focused on trying to convince U.S. officials to pressure the Ukrainians into surrendering the territory without a fight.

While I agree that Russia is indeed doing this, it is clearly not all there is in the "Russian strategy". Russia (as it typically does) has a multi-prong strategy. IMO they are clearly engaged in three activities.
 

1. Russia is indeed attempting to convince the administration that it should force Ukraine to "surrender" the Donbas. Ukraine is dead set against doing so. IMO this may actually be a "red herring" action on Russian's part. Putin is in a situation where a settlement leaving any kind of a Ukrainian state in existence would not be acceptable to his population. The suffering and death wouldn't have been worth it in terms of restoring a "Russian Empire". Putin does benefit from the process of faking negotiations because it affects what Washington and Kiev are able to do. If peace is inevitably around the corner, long-term plans are useless. Therefore there will be none. 
    
   
2. Use drones, cruise missile, and ballistic missiles to inflict maximum pain and death on the Ukrainian population. If possible, convince them that indeed "resistance is futile". This winter Russia has definitely made a massive effort to "break" the resolve of the Ukrainian population. This is one path for a Russian victory. 
       
   
3. Continue to apply maximum pressure all along the line of contact, particularly in the Donbas. Russia outnumbers the Ukrainian defenders 3:1 on average. In some places the disparity is even greater. Eventually Ukraine's defenses will succumb to this numbers game. As long as Russia can keep the pressure on, this is indeed inevitable.
   

 
The forces that keep this war going, despite Russia's strategy outlined above are actually quite simple. There have been over 2 million casualties in this war so far. Quite a few are Ukrainian civilians, and that number is growing every day. Yer Ukraine fights on. Ref 2 tells us why.

People often ask who is winning. But that seems like the wrong question. Ukrainians are keenly aware of the price they are paying. But as long as Russia remains intent on destroying the Ukrainian state, they see no alternative.

Ukraine will have an "alternative" when/if the population becomes convinced that Russia can't be prevented from absorbing all of Ukraine, or that most Ukrainians believe they individually will not survive the conflict. At that point, they will quit. Regarding the Russians, the same article states

There are many who don’t support President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade, or who oppose the Kremlin overall. But they fear that, should Russia lose in Ukraine, their lives could just collapse as they did in the 1990s during the painful post-Soviet transition.

So far, most Russians aren't suffering economic hardships that make them believe that the war itself will inevitably lead to such an economic collapse. When/if that happens, the Russian population will force an end of the war. Not before.
 
Thus, it appears probable that neither side is going to quit anytime soon. It may well be that the side that runs out of men first will lose simply because it physically can't continue, despite the best will in the world. That side will be Ukraine, so unless something changes, that is unfortunately how this war will end. Of course, it is possible that the Russian people will realize that they too are the victims of this war. They just don't know it yet.

[Goose]

This post doesn't contain anything really "new", but a link from BC and finding a couple of articles has delivered what I think is a very succinct picture of the war in Ukraine and what keeps it going. Ref 1  asserts that Russia cannot significantly increase its military capability because its lacks the economic resources to do so. The title of the article is, after all, Russian War Spending May be Maxed Out. The article makes some good arguments why this is so. However, the article really doesn't demonstrate that Russia lacks the ability to borrow a lot more money. Their ratio of debt to GDP is 25%. Ours is 135%. While this ratio is not the whole story, there is no "organic" reason Russia can't borrow more money. China has indicated interest in buying Ruble denominated debt from Russia. The reasons are probably entirely political, as both inflation and convertibility problems argue against such actions. I am not convinced Russia is "maxed out".
 
The article also states

... he Russian strategy over the past 12 months has focused on trying to convince U.S. officials to pressure the Ukrainians into surrendering the territory without a fight.

While I agree that Russia is indeed doing this, it is clearly not all there is in the "Russian strategy". Russia (as it typically does) has a multi-prong strategy. IMO they are clearly engaged in three activities.
 

1. Russia is indeed attempting to convince the administration that it should force Ukraine to "surrender" the Donbas. Ukraine is dead set against doing so. IMO this may actually be a "red herring" action on Russian's part. Putin is in a situation where a settlement leaving any kind of a Ukrainian state in existence would not be acceptable to his population. The suffering and death wouldn't have been worth it in terms of restoring a "Russian Empire". Putin does benefit from the process of faking negotiations because it affects what Washington and Kiev are able to do. If peace is inevitably around the corner, long-term plans are useless. Therefore there will be none. 
    
   
2. Use drones, cruise missile, and ballistic missiles to inflict maximum pain and death on the Ukrainian population. If possible, convince them that indeed "resistance is futile". This winter Russia has definitely made a massive effort to "break" the resolve of the Ukrainian population. This is one path for a Russian victory. 
       
   
3. Continue to apply maximum pressure all along the line of contact, particularly in the Donbas. Russia outnumbers the Ukrainian defenders 3:1 on average. In some places the disparity is even greater. Eventually Ukraine's defenses will succumb to this numbers game. As long as Russia can keep the pressure on, this is indeed inevitable.
   

 
The forces that keep this war going, despite Russia's strategy outlined above are actually quite simple. There have been over 2 million casualties in this war so far. Quite a few are Ukrainian civilians, and that number is growing every day. Yer Ukraine fights on. Ref 2 tells us why.

People often ask who is winning. But that seems like the wrong question. Ukrainians are keenly aware of the price they are paying. But as long as Russia remains intent on destroying the Ukrainian state, they see no alternative.

Ukraine will have an "alternative" when/if the population becomes convinced that Russia can't be prevented from absorbing all of Ukraine, or that most Ukrainians believe they individually will not survive the conflict. At that point, they will quit. Regarding the Russians, the same article states

There are many who don’t support President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade, or who oppose the Kremlin overall. But they fear that, should Russia lose in Ukraine, their lives could just collapse as they did in the 1990s during the painful post-Soviet transition.

So far, most Russians aren't suffering economic hardships that make them believe that the war itself will inevitably lead to such an economic collapse. When/if that happens, the Russian population will force an end of the war. Not before.
 
Thus, it appears probable that neither side is going to quit anytime soon. It may well be that the side that runs out of men first will lose simply because it physically can't continue, despite the best will in the world. That side will be Ukraine, so unless something changes, that is unfortunately how this war will end. Of course, it is possible that the Russian people will realize that they too are the victims of this war. They just don't know it yet.

[BostonCard]

The posts have been deleted out of an abundance of caution.  While I don’t think there was any malice in the poster’s question other than academic interest (therefore no warning to the poster), I do wonder how appropriate that sub thread was for this board.

The posts can be restored if anyone clamors for it or if the other mods feel differently.

BC

[BostonCard]

The posts have been deleted out of an abundance of caution.  While I don’t think there was any malice in the poster’s question other than academic interest (therefore no warning to the poster), I do wonder how appropriate that sub thread was for this board.

The posts can be restored if anyone clamors for it or if the other mods feel differently.

BC

[dabigv13]

Some neat footage from the past few days. When SAMs work vs when they don't.

Remarkable IR footage of a Ukrainian Patriot SAM system successfully shooting down an incoming salvo of Russian Iskander ballistic missiles over Kyiv on Thursday.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2022933500471738713

Footage of a Russian Pantsir missing an incoming Ukrainian attack drone, which then proceeds to slam into the Russian SAM system, destroying it.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2022...11456?s=20

[dabigv13]

Some neat footage from the past few days. When SAMs work vs when they don't.

Remarkable IR footage of a Ukrainian Patriot SAM system successfully shooting down an incoming salvo of Russian Iskander ballistic missiles over Kyiv on Thursday.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2022933500471738713

Footage of a Russian Pantsir missing an incoming Ukrainian attack drone, which then proceeds to slam into the Russian SAM system, destroying it.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2022...11456?s=20

[fullmetal]

Any thoughts on Rubio's words at the Munich security conference?  Ugh.

[fullmetal]

Any thoughts on Rubio's words at the Munich security conference?  Ugh.

[MV72018]

Any thoughts on Rubio's words at the Munich security conference?  Ugh.

My reaction: Outrageous, especially the parochial and sanitized characterization of "Western civilization" 
by the son of Cuban immigrants. Had his boss's anti-Hispanic and anti-Black immigration policy been in 
effect in May 1956, his parents would never have made it to the U.S. for economic reasons.

[MV72018]

Any thoughts on Rubio's words at the Munich security conference?  Ugh.

My reaction: Outrageous, especially the parochial and sanitized characterization of "Western civilization" 
by the son of Cuban immigrants. Had his boss's anti-Hispanic and anti-Black immigration policy been in 
effect in May 1956, his parents would never have made it to the U.S. for economic reasons.

[M T]

Let's pull away from the political discussion.

[M T]

Let's pull away from the political discussion.

[BostonCard]

Interetsing paper on how conflicts end:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication...on_dataset

Using these data, general trends and patterns are presented, showing that conflicts do not exclusively end with decisive outcomes such as victory or peace agreement but more often under unclear circumstances where fighting simply ceases.

If Russia and Ukraine can’t come to a peace agreement, could the conflict wind up more or less freezing?

BC

[BostonCard]

Interetsing paper on how conflicts end:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication...on_dataset

Using these data, general trends and patterns are presented, showing that conflicts do not exclusively end with decisive outcomes such as victory or peace agreement but more often under unclear circumstances where fighting simply ceases.

If Russia and Ukraine can’t come to a peace agreement, could the conflict wind up more or less freezing?

BC

[M T]

If Russia and Ukraine can’t come to a peace agreement, could the conflict wind up more or less freezing? 

When did it freeze in the last 12 years?

[M T]

If Russia and Ukraine can’t come to a peace agreement, could the conflict wind up more or less freezing? 

When did it freeze in the last 12 years?

[Papa John]

I don't know about freezing but I think fighting more or less subsided for a while after the second Minsk agreement.

[Papa John]

I don't know about freezing but I think fighting more or less subsided for a while after the second Minsk agreement.

[Goose]

I don't know about freezing but I think fighting more or less subsided for a while after the second Minsk agreement.

The intensity of the conflict went down considerably, but both sides garrisoned the line of contact in the Donbas region where two of the Oblasts were partially occupied by Russian troops. IMO Putin cannot politically or economically "afford" to reduce the level of Russian military commitment in Ukraine. If he does, he will have failed to reach his main war aim, which was and is the destruction of the Ukrainian state. His population will eventually (maybe quickly) realize that, and the ensuing economic downturn accompanying the reduction in military spending will force the public over the edge. The exact reason they kept Putin was to prevent what happened to them in the late 1990s. It will be happening again not in spite of him but because of him. He can weather that storm ONLY if he delivers Ukraine, destroyed  though it may be. Russian patriotism goes a long way, but one can't invoke it to explain a "frozen" conflict after killing so many Russians.

[Goose]

I don't know about freezing but I think fighting more or less subsided for a while after the second Minsk agreement.

The intensity of the conflict went down considerably, but both sides garrisoned the line of contact in the Donbas region where two of the Oblasts were partially occupied by Russian troops. IMO Putin cannot politically or economically "afford" to reduce the level of Russian military commitment in Ukraine. If he does, he will have failed to reach his main war aim, which was and is the destruction of the Ukrainian state. His population will eventually (maybe quickly) realize that, and the ensuing economic downturn accompanying the reduction in military spending will force the public over the edge. The exact reason they kept Putin was to prevent what happened to them in the late 1990s. It will be happening again not in spite of him but because of him. He can weather that storm ONLY if he delivers Ukraine, destroyed  though it may be. Russian patriotism goes a long way, but one can't invoke it to explain a "frozen" conflict after killing so many Russians.

[M T]

BBC frequently posts articles supporting Ukraine or negative on Russia. 
This article on food prices in Russia is certainly negative 
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1mjrgkk1m8o
 
Their sample of groceries has gone up 18.6% in 2 years.

[M T]

BBC frequently posts articles supporting Ukraine or negative on Russia. 
This article on food prices in Russia is certainly negative 
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1mjrgkk1m8o
 
Their sample of groceries has gone up 18.6% in 2 years.

[Leftcoast]

BBC frequently posts articles supporting Ukraine or negative on Russia. 
This article on food prices in Russia is certainly negative 
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1mjrgkk1m8o
 
Their sample of groceries has gone up 18.6% in 2 years.

Somehow an 18% rise in grocery prices seems ... normal.  Almost expected.  I believe US prices are up ~24% since 2022 so this datapoint on it's own doesn't seem outrageously out of line.

See third graphic in report below:
https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/in...ed-states/

Mods, observation only and no politics intended but feel free to delete if this observation prompts a political discussion!)

[Leftcoast]

BBC frequently posts articles supporting Ukraine or negative on Russia. 
This article on food prices in Russia is certainly negative 
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1mjrgkk1m8o
 
Their sample of groceries has gone up 18.6% in 2 years.

Somehow an 18% rise in grocery prices seems ... normal.  Almost expected.  I believe US prices are up ~24% since 2022 so this datapoint on it's own doesn't seem outrageously out of line.

See third graphic in report below:
https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/in...ed-states/

Mods, observation only and no politics intended but feel free to delete if this observation prompts a political discussion!)

[M T]

This is why one has to look at the data. 

Your 2022 inflation numbers are not comparable.  That same article shows the US 2024+2025 food price inflation figures as 2.3% + 2.8%, or about 5.1% for the same 2-year 18+% grocery increase documented in Russia. 

Using 2022 food price inflation is like using 2020 mortality numbers. If someone doesn’t remember, here’s the USDA info on 2022
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/c...tId=105676

[M T]

This is why one has to look at the data. 

Your 2022 inflation numbers are not comparable.  That same article shows the US 2024+2025 food price inflation figures as 2.3% + 2.8%, or about 5.1% for the same 2-year 18+% grocery increase documented in Russia. 

Using 2022 food price inflation is like using 2020 mortality numbers. If someone doesn’t remember, here’s the USDA info on 2022
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/c...tId=105676

[BostonCard]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

[BostonCard]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

[Goose]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

Indeed they are, partly because it has been common since the 1990s and partly because this time military spending has caused employment numbers and wages to rise at a healthy clip. They also then ask "If not Putin, who?" Since there is no answer to that question they believe they have little choice but to accept what comes with Putin, inflation and a war in Ukraine. Until the answer to the question becomes "literally anybody but Putin" no change will be forthcoming.

[Goose]

Russians may be more tolerant to inflation in the high single digits than Americans.

BC

Indeed they are, partly because it has been common since the 1990s and partly because this time military spending has caused employment numbers and wages to rise at a healthy clip. They also then ask "If not Putin, who?" Since there is no answer to that question they believe they have little choice but to accept what comes with Putin, inflation and a war in Ukraine. Until the answer to the question becomes "literally anybody but Putin" no change will be forthcoming.