[newguy]

BC

omfg 
that is just too good.

[newguy]

BC

omfg 
that is just too good.

[BostonCard]

The Finnish sniper captcha meme has been on the internet a while; I wish I had thought of it.

Now for some sad news…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1512367574511718404?s=21&t=k4dJKaaiZqqGrIeCaAN00w[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

The Finnish sniper captcha meme has been on the internet a while; I wish I had thought of it.

Now for some sad news…

[tweet]https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1512367574511718404?s=21&t=k4dJKaaiZqqGrIeCaAN00w[/tweet]

BC

[TrumpCard]

Russia has been a sponsor (and direct agent) of terror for years, but labeling it as such was seen as potentially counterproductive. Attacks like the one on the train station and the Mariupol theater may change the calculus as the designation gives the US some powerful tools:

https://www.foley.com/en/insights/public...-terrorism

[TrumpCard]

Russia has been a sponsor (and direct agent) of terror for years, but labeling it as such was seen as potentially counterproductive. Attacks like the one on the train station and the Mariupol theater may change the calculus as the designation gives the US some powerful tools:

https://www.foley.com/en/insights/public...-terrorism

[Goose]

As long as article 5 remains credible, Russia will not attack a NATO member.  However, as soon as there is doubt as to whether nato will aid, say, Estonia were it to be attacked by Russia, that dramatically increases the probability it will happen.

You and I are going to disagree quite a bit on this post. Article 5 remains credible if and only if NATO will aid any nation attacked and that NATO CAN effectively aid a nation so attacked. The main reason the US did not push hard to admit Ukraine and Georgia is the belief they are a bridge too far. There were other reasons back in 2008 (including political stability issues), but Merkel didn't get her arm twisted when she said no.

Russia's terrible tactical performance has obscured the fact that if they had performed even at an "average" level Ukraine would have been overrun before any effective NATO aid would have arrived. In 1990 the GDR had 12 "combat effective" Army divisions (you could argue that 4 of those divisions were at 80% strength until their reservists could report). Right now they have zero. Yes, zero. Belgium sold their entire armored force to Poland. The 6th fleet effectively no longer exists. The BAOR no longer exists. The list goes on. USAFE would have done what they could, but it wouldn't have been near enough. It is a very open question whether NATO can defend Romania and Bulgaria as it is.

It is very helpful to keep in mind that the great performance in Gulf War I by the US Army could not be repeated by the time 9/11 happened. We had downsized greatly to take advantage of the "peace dividend". One also must remember that all the "endless war's" we have fought since 1990 were either wars "of choice", where we could determine the time and place, or wars where the other side gave us MONTHS to stage our forces and "shape the battle space". As far as being "ready to fight tonight", we are not, and have not been for quite a while.

This is arguably to be expected, because "the cold war is over". However, committing NATO to defend everybody who wants it under those conditions just isn't credible. NATO balked at Ukraine and Georgia because the military basically said they brought greatly increased risk of a conflict we couldn't credibly deter or effectively prosecute. Finland is different, but some of the same issues apply. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are also effectively indefensible. They are in NATO because it is felt we have a moral obligation to extend an umbrella over them and commit to a long war to free them if necessary. Finland can be more easily defended, but is also a direct threat to Russia's Baltic Sea fleet and the Kalingrad enclave. It is a mixed bag.

Putin thought that the West would react as it had when he invaded Crimea.  The current Ukrainian war was a major wake-up moment for the alliance, and has majorly backfired on Putin, almost no matter what happens in Ukraine.  He has now gotten NATO allies to spend money on their millitaries, is likely leading Finland and Sweden to join NATO, and NATO to station more troops further East than you would have seen in the alternative universe where Putin doesn’t invade.



BC

Yes, but for how long? Once the Ukraine is not in the news, European politicians are going to look at how to get elected, and generally large military budgets are are not the way to do it. If Ukraine ceases to exist as a country, you can bet that many countries in Europe are going to re-think their position. Do they believe we will trade Los Angeles for Budapest? Probably not, at least that is a concern. Remember, Hungary is a NATO country and they are already supporting Russia in this conflict. Turkey bought the S400 system. There are lots of "shades of gray" in Eastern Europe.

It has been clear for years to "any thinking person" that a NATO based EU relying on Russian gas is very, very stupid. Using some, fine, but relying on it? Yet six months ago Nord Stream 2 was regarded as "just fine". IMHO right today if the EU was actually serious about this current situation, they would stop using Russian gas. The US should commit to reducing our consumption to allow us to supply what Europe needs. If necessary, we should adopt price controls during this effort (and I am a Republican). Yes, there are challenges. Yes, Germany may have a recession as their economics ministry fears. However, if the West can't do these relatively "little things", can anybody believe the West would "die for Estonia"? Didn't think so. Yes, Ukraine isn't in NATO, but it still is a test of NATO's resolve. If Ukraine is defeated, there is a message there, and to many that message will be "NATO isn't a reliable deterrent. Our country need a more flexible alternative. Call Vlad and make a deal".

[Goose]

As long as article 5 remains credible, Russia will not attack a NATO member.  However, as soon as there is doubt as to whether nato will aid, say, Estonia were it to be attacked by Russia, that dramatically increases the probability it will happen.

You and I are going to disagree quite a bit on this post. Article 5 remains credible if and only if NATO will aid any nation attacked and that NATO CAN effectively aid a nation so attacked. The main reason the US did not push hard to admit Ukraine and Georgia is the belief they are a bridge too far. There were other reasons back in 2008 (including political stability issues), but Merkel didn't get her arm twisted when she said no.

Russia's terrible tactical performance has obscured the fact that if they had performed even at an "average" level Ukraine would have been overrun before any effective NATO aid would have arrived. In 1990 the GDR had 12 "combat effective" Army divisions (you could argue that 4 of those divisions were at 80% strength until their reservists could report). Right now they have zero. Yes, zero. Belgium sold their entire armored force to Poland. The 6th fleet effectively no longer exists. The BAOR no longer exists. The list goes on. USAFE would have done what they could, but it wouldn't have been near enough. It is a very open question whether NATO can defend Romania and Bulgaria as it is.

It is very helpful to keep in mind that the great performance in Gulf War I by the US Army could not be repeated by the time 9/11 happened. We had downsized greatly to take advantage of the "peace dividend". One also must remember that all the "endless war's" we have fought since 1990 were either wars "of choice", where we could determine the time and place, or wars where the other side gave us MONTHS to stage our forces and "shape the battle space". As far as being "ready to fight tonight", we are not, and have not been for quite a while.

This is arguably to be expected, because "the cold war is over". However, committing NATO to defend everybody who wants it under those conditions just isn't credible. NATO balked at Ukraine and Georgia because the military basically said they brought greatly increased risk of a conflict we couldn't credibly deter or effectively prosecute. Finland is different, but some of the same issues apply. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are also effectively indefensible. They are in NATO because it is felt we have a moral obligation to extend an umbrella over them and commit to a long war to free them if necessary. Finland can be more easily defended, but is also a direct threat to Russia's Baltic Sea fleet and the Kalingrad enclave. It is a mixed bag.

Putin thought that the West would react as it had when he invaded Crimea.  The current Ukrainian war was a major wake-up moment for the alliance, and has majorly backfired on Putin, almost no matter what happens in Ukraine.  He has now gotten NATO allies to spend money on their millitaries, is likely leading Finland and Sweden to join NATO, and NATO to station more troops further East than you would have seen in the alternative universe where Putin doesn’t invade.



BC

Yes, but for how long? Once the Ukraine is not in the news, European politicians are going to look at how to get elected, and generally large military budgets are are not the way to do it. If Ukraine ceases to exist as a country, you can bet that many countries in Europe are going to re-think their position. Do they believe we will trade Los Angeles for Budapest? Probably not, at least that is a concern. Remember, Hungary is a NATO country and they are already supporting Russia in this conflict. Turkey bought the S400 system. There are lots of "shades of gray" in Eastern Europe.

It has been clear for years to "any thinking person" that a NATO based EU relying on Russian gas is very, very stupid. Using some, fine, but relying on it? Yet six months ago Nord Stream 2 was regarded as "just fine". IMHO right today if the EU was actually serious about this current situation, they would stop using Russian gas. The US should commit to reducing our consumption to allow us to supply what Europe needs. If necessary, we should adopt price controls during this effort (and I am a Republican). Yes, there are challenges. Yes, Germany may have a recession as their economics ministry fears. However, if the West can't do these relatively "little things", can anybody believe the West would "die for Estonia"? Didn't think so. Yes, Ukraine isn't in NATO, but it still is a test of NATO's resolve. If Ukraine is defeated, there is a message there, and to many that message will be "NATO isn't a reliable deterrent. Our country need a more flexible alternative. Call Vlad and make a deal".

[dabigv13]

Maybe Russia is sucking so so hard because they are trying to convince NATO they don't actually need to increase their defense budgets. Poland could march on Moscow at this point if Russia didn't have nukes. Russia will take many years to rebuild their officer corps and replenish equipment losses into anything that could remotely threaten a single NATO country let alone all of them.

As has been said, the worst thing to be is a bully who can't back it up.

Russia getting Finland and Sweden to join NATO and Germany to reorient away from Russian gas and reconsider nuclear power is a massive own goal for Russia. If Xi realizes what a drain Putin will be for him over the next few years, Russia will be well and truly boned. At that point just a matter of the right enterprising colonel coming along.

[dabigv13]

Maybe Russia is sucking so so hard because they are trying to convince NATO they don't actually need to increase their defense budgets. Poland could march on Moscow at this point if Russia didn't have nukes. Russia will take many years to rebuild their officer corps and replenish equipment losses into anything that could remotely threaten a single NATO country let alone all of them.

As has been said, the worst thing to be is a bully who can't back it up.

Russia getting Finland and Sweden to join NATO and Germany to reorient away from Russian gas and reconsider nuclear power is a massive own goal for Russia. If Xi realizes what a drain Putin will be for him over the next few years, Russia will be well and truly boned. At that point just a matter of the right enterprising colonel coming along.

[TrumpCard]

Interesting post from Goose. The factual premises seem correct. The West’s militaries don’t have sufficient readiness and Europe is far too reliant on Russian energy. I’m no expert in the field, but I’m not so pessimistic on the conclusions to draw from those premises. 

Building the necessary military strength may not be so unpopular as you think. Right wing nationalists who support a strong defense are ascendant in Europe. Recall that strong militaries were very popular during the Cold War. I’m not convinced either way here, but I could imagine the West mustering the necessary resolve. 

It’s certainly plausible to frame the calculus of defending the Baltics the way you did. But there are other ways to see it. If the West were to allow Russia to overrun the Baltics, what’s to stop Russia from taking Poland or the country after that?  And why should we consider the Baltics indefensible?  If we were to permanently station 20,000 heavily armored troops there along with Patriot batteries, isn’t that a really strong deterrent?  Why would Kaliningrad be any more defensible for Russia than the Baltics are for the West?  It would be pretty embarrassing for Putin to have territory taken from Russia in a defensive response to an attack on the Baltics. 

I’m not saying that any of these possible outcomes is likely, but I see Russia taking these possible outcomes into account. If Russia were to occupy all of Ukraine, maybe it would be sufficiently confident to dismiss these possible outcomes, but given what we’ve seen in this war so far, what makes us think that Russia could realistically take and hold anything more than the Donbas and the East bank of the Dneiper River in the South?

[TrumpCard]

Interesting post from Goose. The factual premises seem correct. The West’s militaries don’t have sufficient readiness and Europe is far too reliant on Russian energy. I’m no expert in the field, but I’m not so pessimistic on the conclusions to draw from those premises. 

Building the necessary military strength may not be so unpopular as you think. Right wing nationalists who support a strong defense are ascendant in Europe. Recall that strong militaries were very popular during the Cold War. I’m not convinced either way here, but I could imagine the West mustering the necessary resolve. 

It’s certainly plausible to frame the calculus of defending the Baltics the way you did. But there are other ways to see it. If the West were to allow Russia to overrun the Baltics, what’s to stop Russia from taking Poland or the country after that?  And why should we consider the Baltics indefensible?  If we were to permanently station 20,000 heavily armored troops there along with Patriot batteries, isn’t that a really strong deterrent?  Why would Kaliningrad be any more defensible for Russia than the Baltics are for the West?  It would be pretty embarrassing for Putin to have territory taken from Russia in a defensive response to an attack on the Baltics. 

I’m not saying that any of these possible outcomes is likely, but I see Russia taking these possible outcomes into account. If Russia were to occupy all of Ukraine, maybe it would be sufficiently confident to dismiss these possible outcomes, but given what we’ve seen in this war so far, what makes us think that Russia could realistically take and hold anything more than the Donbas and the East bank of the Dneiper River in the South?

[dabigv13]

Slovakia sent Ukraine their S300 missile defense battery some days ago it has just been reported. US will send Slovakia a Patriot battery. 

https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22881118/slov...raine.html

Slovakia's S300 is a relatively modern variant, the S-300PMU which may have a somewhat better radar and longer range missiles than most of Ukraine's systems. Only one battery though, Ukraine estimated to have 70-80 in service at the moment.

https://web.archive.org/web/201210291743...0_nato.htm

[dabigv13]

Slovakia sent Ukraine their S300 missile defense battery some days ago it has just been reported. US will send Slovakia a Patriot battery. 

https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22881118/slov...raine.html

Slovakia's S300 is a relatively modern variant, the S-300PMU which may have a somewhat better radar and longer range missiles than most of Ukraine's systems. Only one battery though, Ukraine estimated to have 70-80 in service at the moment.

https://web.archive.org/web/201210291743...0_nato.htm

[TreesAndBirds]

People are right to criticize Europes reliance on Russian energy.

But we are reliant on China for other important products (as we recently saw with something as simple as face masks, although thankfully we werent in a conflict and they amped up production). 

We need to make sure our own house is in order…I am far from an expert on rare earths, electronics and pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and of course semiconductor fabs (with Taiwan clearly in China’s sites), but we need to learn from Europe’s predicament.

This will be expensive and uneconomic, and is probably best analyzed together with our allies, but it seems like an insurance policy we need to buy. That said, I think there is an advantage to having good trade relations with China, just not being dependent.

[TreesAndBirds]

People are right to criticize Europes reliance on Russian energy.

But we are reliant on China for other important products (as we recently saw with something as simple as face masks, although thankfully we werent in a conflict and they amped up production). 

We need to make sure our own house is in order…I am far from an expert on rare earths, electronics and pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and of course semiconductor fabs (with Taiwan clearly in China’s sites), but we need to learn from Europe’s predicament.

This will be expensive and uneconomic, and is probably best analyzed together with our allies, but it seems like an insurance policy we need to buy. That said, I think there is an advantage to having good trade relations with China, just not being dependent.

[Goose]

Interesting post from Goose. The factual premises seem correct. The West’s militaries don’t have sufficient readiness and Europe is far too reliant on Russian energy. I’m no expert in the field, but I’m not so pessimistic on the conclusions to draw from those premises. 

Building the necessary military strength may not be so unpopular as you think. Right wing nationalists who support a strong defense are ascendant in Europe. Recall that strong militaries were very popular during the Cold War. I’m not convinced either way here, but I could imagine the West mustering the necessary resolve.

I can too, but not if it depends on right wing nationalists. It has to be the policy of essentially all the parties or you have France in 1930-1939. Each party undoes what the previous administration did. We also have to deal with a Germany that has been in a "don't scare the bear" mode since reunification. It has served their national interest to be militarily weak for quite a while. Convincing the current generations (who have never seen otherwise) that is not a good idea is a heavy lift.

It’s certainly plausible to frame the calculus of defending the Baltics the way you did. But there are other ways to see it. If the West were to allow Russia to overrun the Baltics, what’s to stop Russia from taking Poland or the country after that?  And why should we consider the Baltics indefensible?  If we were to permanently station 20,000 heavily armored troops there along with Patriot batteries, isn’t that a really strong deterrent?

It sure would be a deterrent. Right now, the Army has ten active divisions. Exactly one such division is armored (1st), although many others have significant armor. A US division is about 15,000 personnel. Which 10% of our total active army strength do you suggest we deploy to countries that are easily cut off from sea support by the Baltic fleet (or just a good minefield) and are connected to Europe by a relatively narrow corridor of Polish territory that is right next to Belarus and under the Kaligrad IAD? We could do this, but I suspect it is a non-starter.

Why would Kaliningrad be any more defensible for Russia than the Baltics are for the West?  It would be pretty embarrassing for Putin to have territory taken from Russia in a defensive response to an attack on the Baltics.

It isn't more defensible. In fact it is much less so. Poland alone could probably do the job. However, Germany held it for quite a while even after it was cut off. The DKM could still get there because the Russian navy was ineffective (until the very end). Russian air was a big problem however. Different war, different time. Russia has packed it with missiles to allow it to really mess up Poland and Germany before it falls. However, the deal here is that it is part of Russia, and if you attack it, Putin has repeatedly made it clear that would probably result in him using at least tactical nuclear weapons. Now, would he actually do so is another question, but is NATO feeling lucky? I hear at one time Konigsberg was a nice city.

I’m not saying that any of these possible outcomes is likely, but I see Russia taking these possible outcomes into account. If Russia were to occupy all of Ukraine, maybe it would be sufficiently confident to dismiss these possible outcomes, but given what we’ve seen in this war so far, what makes us think that Russia could realistically take and hold anything more than the Donbas and the East bank of the Dneiper River in the South?

Recently Russia has not exhibited lots of realism in it's actions. This war never made any sense as far as anyone can tell. One thing that helps Ukraine is that it has lots of territory, so losing some of it doesn't take it out of the war. The Baltics are much smaller, so losing much territory hurts them a lot more.
IMHO Ukraine will keep fighting if Russia cuts them off from the Sea of Azov. Probably they will keep fighting if Russia attempts to keep the Kherson Oblast. The Ukraine needs these areas because they are critical to it's transportation network. As long as Ukraine fights, it is possible they will collapse and Russia gets it all. The opposite outcome is also possible. A war of attrition can actually defeat both parties. That is where we are right now IMHO. Negotiating a peace is going to be real hard. If Ukraine would give up Crimea and the Donbas while getting back everything else, that MIGHT work for them politically. Not sure it would for Putin. Also, the security assurances in terms of real troops are going to be expensive and "interesting".

---

Slovakia sent Ukraine their S300 missile defense battery some days ago it has just been reported. US will send Slovakia a Patriot battery. 

https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22881118/slov...raine.html

Slovakia's S300 is a relatively modern variant, the S-300PMU which may have a somewhat better radar and longer range missiles than most of Ukraine's systems. Only one battery though, Ukraine estimated to have 70-80 in service at the moment.

https://web.archive.org/web/201210291743...0_nato.htm

This is great news. Unfortunately as this war drags on attrition will become a greater problem. Do you (or anybody reading this) know if Ukraine has a Regimental radar like "Big Bird"? I can't find any reference saying they do, but given they still are running a Russian style integrated air defense it would sure be a "nice to have".

[Goose]

Interesting post from Goose. The factual premises seem correct. The West’s militaries don’t have sufficient readiness and Europe is far too reliant on Russian energy. I’m no expert in the field, but I’m not so pessimistic on the conclusions to draw from those premises. 

Building the necessary military strength may not be so unpopular as you think. Right wing nationalists who support a strong defense are ascendant in Europe. Recall that strong militaries were very popular during the Cold War. I’m not convinced either way here, but I could imagine the West mustering the necessary resolve.

I can too, but not if it depends on right wing nationalists. It has to be the policy of essentially all the parties or you have France in 1930-1939. Each party undoes what the previous administration did. We also have to deal with a Germany that has been in a "don't scare the bear" mode since reunification. It has served their national interest to be militarily weak for quite a while. Convincing the current generations (who have never seen otherwise) that is not a good idea is a heavy lift.

It’s certainly plausible to frame the calculus of defending the Baltics the way you did. But there are other ways to see it. If the West were to allow Russia to overrun the Baltics, what’s to stop Russia from taking Poland or the country after that?  And why should we consider the Baltics indefensible?  If we were to permanently station 20,000 heavily armored troops there along with Patriot batteries, isn’t that a really strong deterrent?

It sure would be a deterrent. Right now, the Army has ten active divisions. Exactly one such division is armored (1st), although many others have significant armor. A US division is about 15,000 personnel. Which 10% of our total active army strength do you suggest we deploy to countries that are easily cut off from sea support by the Baltic fleet (or just a good minefield) and are connected to Europe by a relatively narrow corridor of Polish territory that is right next to Belarus and under the Kaligrad IAD? We could do this, but I suspect it is a non-starter.

Why would Kaliningrad be any more defensible for Russia than the Baltics are for the West?  It would be pretty embarrassing for Putin to have territory taken from Russia in a defensive response to an attack on the Baltics.

It isn't more defensible. In fact it is much less so. Poland alone could probably do the job. However, Germany held it for quite a while even after it was cut off. The DKM could still get there because the Russian navy was ineffective (until the very end). Russian air was a big problem however. Different war, different time. Russia has packed it with missiles to allow it to really mess up Poland and Germany before it falls. However, the deal here is that it is part of Russia, and if you attack it, Putin has repeatedly made it clear that would probably result in him using at least tactical nuclear weapons. Now, would he actually do so is another question, but is NATO feeling lucky? I hear at one time Konigsberg was a nice city.

I’m not saying that any of these possible outcomes is likely, but I see Russia taking these possible outcomes into account. If Russia were to occupy all of Ukraine, maybe it would be sufficiently confident to dismiss these possible outcomes, but given what we’ve seen in this war so far, what makes us think that Russia could realistically take and hold anything more than the Donbas and the East bank of the Dneiper River in the South?

Recently Russia has not exhibited lots of realism in it's actions. This war never made any sense as far as anyone can tell. One thing that helps Ukraine is that it has lots of territory, so losing some of it doesn't take it out of the war. The Baltics are much smaller, so losing much territory hurts them a lot more.
IMHO Ukraine will keep fighting if Russia cuts them off from the Sea of Azov. Probably they will keep fighting if Russia attempts to keep the Kherson Oblast. The Ukraine needs these areas because they are critical to it's transportation network. As long as Ukraine fights, it is possible they will collapse and Russia gets it all. The opposite outcome is also possible. A war of attrition can actually defeat both parties. That is where we are right now IMHO. Negotiating a peace is going to be real hard. If Ukraine would give up Crimea and the Donbas while getting back everything else, that MIGHT work for them politically. Not sure it would for Putin. Also, the security assurances in terms of real troops are going to be expensive and "interesting".

---

Slovakia sent Ukraine their S300 missile defense battery some days ago it has just been reported. US will send Slovakia a Patriot battery. 

https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22881118/slov...raine.html

Slovakia's S300 is a relatively modern variant, the S-300PMU which may have a somewhat better radar and longer range missiles than most of Ukraine's systems. Only one battery though, Ukraine estimated to have 70-80 in service at the moment.

https://web.archive.org/web/201210291743...0_nato.htm

This is great news. Unfortunately as this war drags on attrition will become a greater problem. Do you (or anybody reading this) know if Ukraine has a Regimental radar like "Big Bird"? I can't find any reference saying they do, but given they still are running a Russian style integrated air defense it would sure be a "nice to have".

[Goose]

Maybe Russia is sucking so so hard because they are trying to convince NATO they don't actually need to increase their defense budgets. Poland could march on Moscow at this point if Russia didn't have nukes.

I will argue with you about Poland going to Moscow. Not that I think Russia is in "great shape", but there are lots of things to consider in that assertion. Doesn't matter, because Russia does have nukes, and that is a big deal. If Russia can tie NATO's hands by playing the nuclear threat card, NATO's conventional military superiority may not matter.

Russia will take many years to rebuild their officer corps and replenish equipment losses into anything that could remotely threaten a single NATO country let alone all of them.

If you are Estonia, do you bet your country on that? It is very easy to over-estimate Russia's capabilities. OTOH, under effective leadership they have done unexpectedly rapid improvement in the past. Fortunately, right now they seem to lack such a leader.

As has been said, the worst thing to be is a bully who can't back it up.

Russia getting Finland and Sweden to join NATO and Germany to reorient away from Russian gas and reconsider nuclear power is a massive own goal for Russia. If Xi realizes what a drain Putin will be for him over the next few years, Russia will be well and truly boned. At that point just a matter of the right enterprising colonel coming along.

I agree with lots of what you are saying. However, as the last 3 months have shown the opinions and actions in Germany and the EU in general are subject to rapid change. FWIW, Sweden will join NATO very reluctantly if they in fact do join. Lots of things going on here, and I can't claim to know the outcomes. Lots of politics that can go various directions too.

[Goose]

Maybe Russia is sucking so so hard because they are trying to convince NATO they don't actually need to increase their defense budgets. Poland could march on Moscow at this point if Russia didn't have nukes.

I will argue with you about Poland going to Moscow. Not that I think Russia is in "great shape", but there are lots of things to consider in that assertion. Doesn't matter, because Russia does have nukes, and that is a big deal. If Russia can tie NATO's hands by playing the nuclear threat card, NATO's conventional military superiority may not matter.

Russia will take many years to rebuild their officer corps and replenish equipment losses into anything that could remotely threaten a single NATO country let alone all of them.

If you are Estonia, do you bet your country on that? It is very easy to over-estimate Russia's capabilities. OTOH, under effective leadership they have done unexpectedly rapid improvement in the past. Fortunately, right now they seem to lack such a leader.

As has been said, the worst thing to be is a bully who can't back it up.

Russia getting Finland and Sweden to join NATO and Germany to reorient away from Russian gas and reconsider nuclear power is a massive own goal for Russia. If Xi realizes what a drain Putin will be for him over the next few years, Russia will be well and truly boned. At that point just a matter of the right enterprising colonel coming along.

I agree with lots of what you are saying. However, as the last 3 months have shown the opinions and actions in Germany and the EU in general are subject to rapid change. FWIW, Sweden will join NATO very reluctantly if they in fact do join. Lots of things going on here, and I can't claim to know the outcomes. Lots of politics that can go various directions too.

[dabigv13]

I was being somewhat facetious about Poland marching on Moscow, but Russia has pulled all available manpower, even their cadets and instructors, to go to Ukraine. Their borders are not well defended by anything but their nuclear umbrella. They are not now, and won't be soon, a threat to anything but a part of eastern Ukraine.

If this was the 1910s like Russia is acting like, China, Finland, Poland would probably all be getting ideas.

[dabigv13]

I was being somewhat facetious about Poland marching on Moscow, but Russia has pulled all available manpower, even their cadets and instructors, to go to Ukraine. Their borders are not well defended by anything but their nuclear umbrella. They are not now, and won't be soon, a threat to anything but a part of eastern Ukraine.

If this was the 1910s like Russia is acting like, China, Finland, Poland would probably all be getting ideas.

[Goose]

I was being somewhat facetious about Poland marching on Moscow, but Russia has pulled all available manpower, even their cadets and instructors, to go to Ukraine. Their borders are not well defended by anything but their nuclear umbrella. They are not now, and won't be soon, a threat to anything but a part of eastern Ukraine.

I am pretty sure that the troops sitting on the Chinese border would beg to differ with you, as would those in Vlad and Petr.  Most of these defensive forces are not "available manpower" because they aren't very mobile. Some Naval Infantry from Petr did get a free trip towards Ukraine apparently, but it is a long train ride.

If this was the 1910s like Russia is acting like, China, Finland, Poland would probably all be getting ideas.

Maybe, but underestimating Russia is not a good idea. I think one thing we all must keep in mind is this Ukraine thing was probably planned (such as it was planned) from the top under a very strict security cordon. The guys who were actually called upon to execute it probably had no idea what they were supposed to do until they actually were called upon to do it. Nobody really got a chance to practice their part or to complain about obvious problems in the plan. Nobody got a chance to say "Yes, but what if the Ukrainians actually fight"? The Russian command organization is bad, but it is not this bad. The soldiers were undoubtedly told it was an exercise because the commanders themselves thought it was. Until it wasn't.

IMHO this war also show a weakness of the BTG organization. Look at https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmo...iore17.pdf I am not a great fan of the BCT concept that the US is now using either, but it is certainly more rational than the Russian organization. Fighting a "stand-up" conventional war should not be done with a BTG based organization, as Russia is finding out. Hopefully Ukraine can keep this war at a higher level of intensity which the BTGs cannot match. Grind them up.

Relying on Russia to actually repeat this debacle in the future would be doing exactly what the Russians did in the Ukraine, assuming the other side wouldn't/couldn't fight. Based on 2014, it was a good assumption. Don't make the same mistake. Russian troops fighting for a cause they believe in (defending Russia) will do just fine. Maybe not NATO standard, but just fine. Again, leadership matters. If the Russians can find a competent theater commander for Ukraine, look out. Fortunately, Putin will probably prevent that.

[Goose]

I was being somewhat facetious about Poland marching on Moscow, but Russia has pulled all available manpower, even their cadets and instructors, to go to Ukraine. Their borders are not well defended by anything but their nuclear umbrella. They are not now, and won't be soon, a threat to anything but a part of eastern Ukraine.

I am pretty sure that the troops sitting on the Chinese border would beg to differ with you, as would those in Vlad and Petr.  Most of these defensive forces are not "available manpower" because they aren't very mobile. Some Naval Infantry from Petr did get a free trip towards Ukraine apparently, but it is a long train ride.

If this was the 1910s like Russia is acting like, China, Finland, Poland would probably all be getting ideas.

Maybe, but underestimating Russia is not a good idea. I think one thing we all must keep in mind is this Ukraine thing was probably planned (such as it was planned) from the top under a very strict security cordon. The guys who were actually called upon to execute it probably had no idea what they were supposed to do until they actually were called upon to do it. Nobody really got a chance to practice their part or to complain about obvious problems in the plan. Nobody got a chance to say "Yes, but what if the Ukrainians actually fight"? The Russian command organization is bad, but it is not this bad. The soldiers were undoubtedly told it was an exercise because the commanders themselves thought it was. Until it wasn't.

IMHO this war also show a weakness of the BTG organization. Look at https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmo...iore17.pdf I am not a great fan of the BCT concept that the US is now using either, but it is certainly more rational than the Russian organization. Fighting a "stand-up" conventional war should not be done with a BTG based organization, as Russia is finding out. Hopefully Ukraine can keep this war at a higher level of intensity which the BTGs cannot match. Grind them up.

Relying on Russia to actually repeat this debacle in the future would be doing exactly what the Russians did in the Ukraine, assuming the other side wouldn't/couldn't fight. Based on 2014, it was a good assumption. Don't make the same mistake. Russian troops fighting for a cause they believe in (defending Russia) will do just fine. Maybe not NATO standard, but just fine. Again, leadership matters. If the Russians can find a competent theater commander for Ukraine, look out. Fortunately, Putin will probably prevent that.

[TrumpCard]

For defending the Baltics, I’m assuming a NATO force so the burden is not all on the US. And in an ideal world, a NATO force that includes the Finnish and Swedish navies in the Baltic Sea. And again notionally, in a world with a lot more military spending than NATO currently commits so that an armored division is not such a disproportionate commitment. Yes, there are issues with supply lines and defense in the event of a conflict, but the point of such a forward based force is to deter through mutually assured destruction. Considering Estonia is probably within artillery range of the outskirts of St. Petersburg, I’d be a lot more worried as Russia than as NATO in that scenario. Obviously, it requires an enormous commitment, but we did that and a heck of a lot more in the Cold War.

[TrumpCard]

For defending the Baltics, I’m assuming a NATO force so the burden is not all on the US. And in an ideal world, a NATO force that includes the Finnish and Swedish navies in the Baltic Sea. And again notionally, in a world with a lot more military spending than NATO currently commits so that an armored division is not such a disproportionate commitment. Yes, there are issues with supply lines and defense in the event of a conflict, but the point of such a forward based force is to deter through mutually assured destruction. Considering Estonia is probably within artillery range of the outskirts of St. Petersburg, I’d be a lot more worried as Russia than as NATO in that scenario. Obviously, it requires an enormous commitment, but we did that and a heck of a lot more in the Cold War.

[cardcrimson]

People are right to criticize Europes reliance on Russian energy.

But we are reliant on China for other important products (as we recently saw with something as simple as face masks, although thankfully we werent in a conflict and they amped up production). 

We need to make sure our own house is in order…I am far from an expert on rare earths, electronics and pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and of course semiconductor fabs (with Taiwan clearly in China’s sites), but we need to learn from Europe’s predicament.

This will be expensive and uneconomic, and is probably best analyzed together with our allies, but it seems like an insurance policy we need to buy. That said, I think there is an advantage to having good trade relations with China, just not being dependent.

Excellent points all.

[cardcrimson]

People are right to criticize Europes reliance on Russian energy.

But we are reliant on China for other important products (as we recently saw with something as simple as face masks, although thankfully we werent in a conflict and they amped up production). 

We need to make sure our own house is in order…I am far from an expert on rare earths, electronics and pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and of course semiconductor fabs (with Taiwan clearly in China’s sites), but we need to learn from Europe’s predicament.

This will be expensive and uneconomic, and is probably best analyzed together with our allies, but it seems like an insurance policy we need to buy. That said, I think there is an advantage to having good trade relations with China, just not being dependent.

Excellent points all.

[triangle2]

People are right to criticize Europes reliance on Russian energy.



But we are reliant on China for other important products (as we recently saw with something as simple as face masks, although thankfully we werent in a conflict and they amped up production). 



We need to make sure our own house is in order…I am far from an expert on rare earths, electronics and pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and of course semiconductor fabs (with Taiwan clearly in China’s sites), but we need to learn from Europe’s predicament.




This will be expensive and uneconomic, and is probably best analyzed together with our allies, but it seems like an insurance policy we need to buy. That said, I think there is an advantage to having good trade relations with China, just not being dependent.

Excellent points all.

I have wondered whether Apple and other US based tech companies might be quietly looking at moving some manufacturing and chip production to safer ground, if only to hedge against future political instability vis a vis China. Singapore? Malaysia?

[triangle2]

People are right to criticize Europes reliance on Russian energy.



But we are reliant on China for other important products (as we recently saw with something as simple as face masks, although thankfully we werent in a conflict and they amped up production). 



We need to make sure our own house is in order…I am far from an expert on rare earths, electronics and pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and of course semiconductor fabs (with Taiwan clearly in China’s sites), but we need to learn from Europe’s predicament.




This will be expensive and uneconomic, and is probably best analyzed together with our allies, but it seems like an insurance policy we need to buy. That said, I think there is an advantage to having good trade relations with China, just not being dependent.

Excellent points all.

I have wondered whether Apple and other US based tech companies might be quietly looking at moving some manufacturing and chip production to safer ground, if only to hedge against future political instability vis a vis China. Singapore? Malaysia?

[Goose]

For defending the Baltics, I’m assuming a NATO force so the burden is not all on the US. And in an ideal world, a NATO force that includes the Finnish and Swedish navies in the Baltic Sea. And again notionally, in a world with a lot more military spending than NATO currently commits so that an armored division is not such a disproportionate commitment. Yes, there are issues with supply lines and defense in the event of a conflict, but the point of such a forward based force is to deter through mutually assured destruction. Considering Estonia is probably within artillery range of the outskirts of St. Petersburg, I’d be a lot more worried as Russia than as NATO in that scenario. Obviously, it requires an enormous commitment, but we did that and a heck of a lot more in the Cold War.

OK, I get the idea you are thinking of a world where NATO is a lot stronger in manpower. I still absolutely guarantee you NATO isn't putting an armored division in the Baltics. In Poland, quite probably. Some forward units in the Baltics, yes. It is just too easy to get cut off there. You may be familiar with the "forward defense" argument that existed in NATO near the end of the cold war. Both Britain and The US were dead set against it for tactical reasons. We eventually ended up doing it, at least on paper, because the GDR absolutely insisted on it. However, the Baltics aren't Germany and don't bring the benefits.
I am not sure if by mutually assured destruction you are referring to nuclear war or whether you mean the idea that if the US has troops in a country and any of them get killed the US is committed to the war. In either case, having some troops as "hostages" in the Baltics is what we are doing now. Placing an entire division in a tactically compromised position isn't needed to do that.
We also will be in a "He who defends everywhere defends nowhere" situation, as we were in the cold war. Our situation is also potentially both better and worse against Russia. I imagine you have seen the articles on the internet pointing out how the flat, not easily defended plain of Europe gets wider as you go East. During the cold war, NATO had to defend the Fulda gap. That was more than big enough even with the forces available during the cold war. Now NATO will have to defend from the top of Finland to the Sea of Marmara. OUCH! That is not a good tradeoff, especially considering many of the countries involved are not military giants. Germany really found this out the hard way as their lines got longer and longer North-South as they advanced further into Russia. If Russia wants to attack, they can chose the place for their maximum advantage.
On the other hand, Russia needs to defend that entire region as well. One of the reasons Russia wanted the Warsaw Pact nations was that defending on the client states Western border would be a much shorter line. For this reason, NATO is well advised to rely on a mobile force that can respond to attacks where they happen. (Which requires air superiority, just to be clear) We don't have enough troops to defend the whole front in depth even with maximal efforts. Back in the cold war days, the Russians had more troops than they do now. But even they can't defend the entire border.
The "full scale war" scenario will only happen as a result of a major miscalculation by Russia. However, one can see Russia attempting to "pick off" the Baltics because Putin has some fantasy that they should be part of Russia. NATO needs to figure out how to counter that. Similarly, Russia may feel they need part of Finland to protect the access to the Baltic Sea. Make a plan for this, but base it on tactical considerations only.

[Goose]

For defending the Baltics, I’m assuming a NATO force so the burden is not all on the US. And in an ideal world, a NATO force that includes the Finnish and Swedish navies in the Baltic Sea. And again notionally, in a world with a lot more military spending than NATO currently commits so that an armored division is not such a disproportionate commitment. Yes, there are issues with supply lines and defense in the event of a conflict, but the point of such a forward based force is to deter through mutually assured destruction. Considering Estonia is probably within artillery range of the outskirts of St. Petersburg, I’d be a lot more worried as Russia than as NATO in that scenario. Obviously, it requires an enormous commitment, but we did that and a heck of a lot more in the Cold War.

OK, I get the idea you are thinking of a world where NATO is a lot stronger in manpower. I still absolutely guarantee you NATO isn't putting an armored division in the Baltics. In Poland, quite probably. Some forward units in the Baltics, yes. It is just too easy to get cut off there. You may be familiar with the "forward defense" argument that existed in NATO near the end of the cold war. Both Britain and The US were dead set against it for tactical reasons. We eventually ended up doing it, at least on paper, because the GDR absolutely insisted on it. However, the Baltics aren't Germany and don't bring the benefits.
I am not sure if by mutually assured destruction you are referring to nuclear war or whether you mean the idea that if the US has troops in a country and any of them get killed the US is committed to the war. In either case, having some troops as "hostages" in the Baltics is what we are doing now. Placing an entire division in a tactically compromised position isn't needed to do that.
We also will be in a "He who defends everywhere defends nowhere" situation, as we were in the cold war. Our situation is also potentially both better and worse against Russia. I imagine you have seen the articles on the internet pointing out how the flat, not easily defended plain of Europe gets wider as you go East. During the cold war, NATO had to defend the Fulda gap. That was more than big enough even with the forces available during the cold war. Now NATO will have to defend from the top of Finland to the Sea of Marmara. OUCH! That is not a good tradeoff, especially considering many of the countries involved are not military giants. Germany really found this out the hard way as their lines got longer and longer North-South as they advanced further into Russia. If Russia wants to attack, they can chose the place for their maximum advantage.
On the other hand, Russia needs to defend that entire region as well. One of the reasons Russia wanted the Warsaw Pact nations was that defending on the client states Western border would be a much shorter line. For this reason, NATO is well advised to rely on a mobile force that can respond to attacks where they happen. (Which requires air superiority, just to be clear) We don't have enough troops to defend the whole front in depth even with maximal efforts. Back in the cold war days, the Russians had more troops than they do now. But even they can't defend the entire border.
The "full scale war" scenario will only happen as a result of a major miscalculation by Russia. However, one can see Russia attempting to "pick off" the Baltics because Putin has some fantasy that they should be part of Russia. NATO needs to figure out how to counter that. Similarly, Russia may feel they need part of Finland to protect the access to the Baltic Sea. Make a plan for this, but base it on tactical considerations only.

[Leftcoast]

"I have wondered whether Apple and other US based tech companies might be quietly looking at moving some manufacturing and chip production to safer ground, if only to hedge against future political instability vis a vis China. Singapore? Malaysia?"

======================================================

I can speak to a piece of this.  Most US electronics companies such as the one where I work follow an outsourced model.  They no longer have significant investments in very expensive manufacturing technology but instead leverage companies such as Jabil/HonHai/Celestica/Inventec to make their products following their specific design "recipes".  (Think Bills of Material/Approved Vendors List/Detailed Process Instructions).  These ODMs aren't only in China, most have significant sites outside of China in places such as Malyasia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and recently India.  Those sites have been DELUGED with move requests over the last 4 years as companies flee tariffs raised on Chinese imports.  

So ... yes, the move away from a China-only strategy has started and will gain steam as political tensions heat up and more manufacturing capacity comes on line.

Keep your expectations tempered however.  First, China itself is a hug.e market and the world's top companies will want to maintain the access that comes with an investment there.  Secondly, many component manufacturers (2nd/3rd level suppliers) remain in China and there is a heck of a lot of manufacturing in China dwarfing the new capacity coming on line. Finally, there were reasons China made sense - accessible workforce, management, friendly business climates, and access to raw material.  Many alternate sites lack some of these. Many have their own instabilities to weight.

I'll leave with this, are we really against an interconnected world?  I'm inclined to believe that countries are far less willing to risk war with their biggest trading partners and globalization has a bias for peace. Using commerce to bind potential belligerents is not an altogether bad idea.  Until lately I've been far more worried about North Korea than China. I actually still am but my China optimism is more nuance since Xi Jinping's nationalistic/authoritarian tendencies became more obvious. Still think of how far China has come compared to late 70s.

[Leftcoast]

"I have wondered whether Apple and other US based tech companies might be quietly looking at moving some manufacturing and chip production to safer ground, if only to hedge against future political instability vis a vis China. Singapore? Malaysia?"

======================================================

I can speak to a piece of this.  Most US electronics companies such as the one where I work follow an outsourced model.  They no longer have significant investments in very expensive manufacturing technology but instead leverage companies such as Jabil/HonHai/Celestica/Inventec to make their products following their specific design "recipes".  (Think Bills of Material/Approved Vendors List/Detailed Process Instructions).  These ODMs aren't only in China, most have significant sites outside of China in places such as Malyasia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and recently India.  Those sites have been DELUGED with move requests over the last 4 years as companies flee tariffs raised on Chinese imports.  

So ... yes, the move away from a China-only strategy has started and will gain steam as political tensions heat up and more manufacturing capacity comes on line.

Keep your expectations tempered however.  First, China itself is a hug.e market and the world's top companies will want to maintain the access that comes with an investment there.  Secondly, many component manufacturers (2nd/3rd level suppliers) remain in China and there is a heck of a lot of manufacturing in China dwarfing the new capacity coming on line. Finally, there were reasons China made sense - accessible workforce, management, friendly business climates, and access to raw material.  Many alternate sites lack some of these. Many have their own instabilities to weight.

I'll leave with this, are we really against an interconnected world?  I'm inclined to believe that countries are far less willing to risk war with their biggest trading partners and globalization has a bias for peace. Using commerce to bind potential belligerents is not an altogether bad idea.  Until lately I've been far more worried about North Korea than China. I actually still am but my China optimism is more nuance since Xi Jinping's nationalistic/authoritarian tendencies became more obvious. Still think of how far China has come compared to late 70s.

[Goose]

I leave with this, are we really against an interconnected world?  I'm inclined to believe that countries are far less willing to risk war with their biggest trading partners and using commerce to bind potential belligerents is not an altogether bad idea.  Until lately I've been far more worried about North Korea than China.

I am not against an interconnected world at all. I do think that having multiple sources for components is a good idea when possible. Sometimes it is just not possible because of patent protections or particular materials not being generally available. All companies and nations have to ask themselves what level of risk is associated with their source of critical items. Autarky is not possible in today's world, but getting all of a critical component from any one country is a "bad" idea, both because of politically driven actions and simple commercial greed. You will get price gouged eventually. Also, trading with the US is risky. We may sanction you at any time and then you can't buy what you need from us.
Unfortunately I think the record on belligerents being bound together by commerce is mixed at best. All the European countries are bound together by commerce yet they have fought each other regularly. Germany and the UK were big trading partners at the start of both WW I and WW II. Naturally colonies have rebelled against the "mother country" with which they traded a lot (sometimes exclusively), but that is a different case.

[Goose]

I leave with this, are we really against an interconnected world?  I'm inclined to believe that countries are far less willing to risk war with their biggest trading partners and using commerce to bind potential belligerents is not an altogether bad idea.  Until lately I've been far more worried about North Korea than China.

I am not against an interconnected world at all. I do think that having multiple sources for components is a good idea when possible. Sometimes it is just not possible because of patent protections or particular materials not being generally available. All companies and nations have to ask themselves what level of risk is associated with their source of critical items. Autarky is not possible in today's world, but getting all of a critical component from any one country is a "bad" idea, both because of politically driven actions and simple commercial greed. You will get price gouged eventually. Also, trading with the US is risky. We may sanction you at any time and then you can't buy what you need from us.
Unfortunately I think the record on belligerents being bound together by commerce is mixed at best. All the European countries are bound together by commerce yet they have fought each other regularly. Germany and the UK were big trading partners at the start of both WW I and WW II. Naturally colonies have rebelled against the "mother country" with which they traded a lot (sometimes exclusively), but that is a different case.

[TreesAndBirds]

“I’ll leave with this, are we really against an interconnected world?  I'm inclined to believe that countries are far less willing to risk war with their biggest trading partners and globalization has a bias for peace.  Using commerce to bind potential belligerents is not an altogether bad idea.  Until lately I've been far more worried about North Korea than China.  I actually still am but my China optimism is more nuance since Xi Jinping's nationalistic/authoritarian tendencies became more obvious.  Still think of how far China has come compared to late 70s.”
[/quote]

LC…Your point is a good one. I am not against an interconnected world, including with countries that arent our friends. I just dont want to be dependent on them for crucial products. As with most things in life, its grey and its hard to know where to draw the line. I have no problem getting 20% of an important product from China, just not 80%. 

As you say, I think countries prefer not to attack their customers. But Europes ability to react to Russia in Ukraine is hampered by their dependence on Russian energy. I prefer we have more flexibility if China attacks Taiwan or elsewhere. And that China know we have the flexibility.

In recent decades I think our sourcing decisions have been driven almost entirely by economics. I think Ukraine has taught us that we need to factor in geo-politics also. I wish it werent so. 

Fwiw, I was a big fan of trade with China. I was one of the leads in opening our firm office there 15 years ago. I have been so disappointed by the direction Xi has taken China. I was wrong in how I thought they would evolve. 

Maybe more important than the broken agreement with Hong Kong, the building of artificial islands in international water, the treatment of the Uighurs etc, is the increased crackdown on dissent and the use of their media to foment dislike for the US among the population. If 75% of the Russian population can believe they are fighting Nazis, who knows what the Chinese might be convinced of in the future. That said, thats one of the reasons to stay interconnected….the more we interact with each other the harder it is to wrongly stereotype.

[TreesAndBirds]

“I’ll leave with this, are we really against an interconnected world?  I'm inclined to believe that countries are far less willing to risk war with their biggest trading partners and globalization has a bias for peace.  Using commerce to bind potential belligerents is not an altogether bad idea.  Until lately I've been far more worried about North Korea than China.  I actually still am but my China optimism is more nuance since Xi Jinping's nationalistic/authoritarian tendencies became more obvious.  Still think of how far China has come compared to late 70s.”
[/quote]

LC…Your point is a good one. I am not against an interconnected world, including with countries that arent our friends. I just dont want to be dependent on them for crucial products. As with most things in life, its grey and its hard to know where to draw the line. I have no problem getting 20% of an important product from China, just not 80%. 

As you say, I think countries prefer not to attack their customers. But Europes ability to react to Russia in Ukraine is hampered by their dependence on Russian energy. I prefer we have more flexibility if China attacks Taiwan or elsewhere. And that China know we have the flexibility.

In recent decades I think our sourcing decisions have been driven almost entirely by economics. I think Ukraine has taught us that we need to factor in geo-politics also. I wish it werent so. 

Fwiw, I was a big fan of trade with China. I was one of the leads in opening our firm office there 15 years ago. I have been so disappointed by the direction Xi has taken China. I was wrong in how I thought they would evolve. 

Maybe more important than the broken agreement with Hong Kong, the building of artificial islands in international water, the treatment of the Uighurs etc, is the increased crackdown on dissent and the use of their media to foment dislike for the US among the population. If 75% of the Russian population can believe they are fighting Nazis, who knows what the Chinese might be convinced of in the future. That said, thats one of the reasons to stay interconnected….the more we interact with each other the harder it is to wrongly stereotype.

[BostonCard]

Russia and other belligerents just need to *think* article v will be used and that the risk isn’t worth testing it out for it to be effective.  But it needs to be a credible threat.  But I think it is given that recent wars have turned the advantage in favor of a defender.  The days of blitzing an opponent and rolling into a city with tanks is over; the only way, I think, to win an offensive war is going to be with a finely coordinated combined arms effort.  And if the Russians couldn’t pull it off against their next door neighbor, it seems exceedingly unlikely that they would be able to pull it off against NATO, even the somewhat isolated Baltics, especially, as seems likely, if Finland and possibly Sweden join.

The defensive advantage means that Russia almost certainly can’t pull off an offensive war against NATO without, god help us, deploying nuclear weapons.  It also means that NATO probably successfully attack Russia if it wanted to either.

BC

[BostonCard]

Russia and other belligerents just need to *think* article v will be used and that the risk isn’t worth testing it out for it to be effective.  But it needs to be a credible threat.  But I think it is given that recent wars have turned the advantage in favor of a defender.  The days of blitzing an opponent and rolling into a city with tanks is over; the only way, I think, to win an offensive war is going to be with a finely coordinated combined arms effort.  And if the Russians couldn’t pull it off against their next door neighbor, it seems exceedingly unlikely that they would be able to pull it off against NATO, even the somewhat isolated Baltics, especially, as seems likely, if Finland and possibly Sweden join.

The defensive advantage means that Russia almost certainly can’t pull off an offensive war against NATO without, god help us, deploying nuclear weapons.  It also means that NATO probably successfully attack Russia if it wanted to either.

BC