[newguy]

i think it's quite possible that the Russian Army will be able to take and hold Mariupol and the rest of the Donbass.
but even so, because of all the sanctions placed on the Russian banking system, there will likely be a major recession, layoffs, high unemployment, food shortages, and massive food inflation.  
this will lead to a hungry and unhappy populace, which in the long run, is Putin's worst nightmare.

[newguy]

i think it's quite possible that the Russian Army will be able to take and hold Mariupol and the rest of the Donbass.
but even so, because of all the sanctions placed on the Russian banking system, there will likely be a major recession, layoffs, high unemployment, food shortages, and massive food inflation.  
this will lead to a hungry and unhappy populace, which in the long run, is Putin's worst nightmare.

[dabigv13]

Really awesome news that I hope is true, UK supposedly sending Harpoon antiship missiles to Ukraine, amongst other equipment. Considering the land based system is just the ship based launchers on the back of a truck I never saw why it wouldn't be feasible.

Now, the source is the Daily Mail, so take with a grain of salt. 

I hope they have a drone they can fly out to get the footage when Russia's black sea fleet gets messed up.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article...ps-up.html

[dabigv13]

Really awesome news that I hope is true, UK supposedly sending Harpoon antiship missiles to Ukraine, amongst other equipment. Considering the land based system is just the ship based launchers on the back of a truck I never saw why it wouldn't be feasible.

Now, the source is the Daily Mail, so take with a grain of salt. 

I hope they have a drone they can fly out to get the footage when Russia's black sea fleet gets messed up.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article...ps-up.html

[Goose]

Russia and other belligerents just need to *think* article v will be used and that the risk isn’t worth testing it out for it to be effective.  But it needs to be a credible threat.

Certainly agree. However, if Russia can set the rules up (as it appears they have right now) that one can't attack Russian territory without provoking a nuclear response, it greatly affects the ability of NATO to respond and the credibility of that response. This is particularly true in the Baltics where 1) the loss of a relative small amount of Polish territory isolates them from supply and reinforcement, and 2) the entire area is surrounded by an air defense system that sits totally on Russian territory (and therefore can't be targeted). Of course, to any sane person starting such a war makes no sense. Control of the Baltics isn't essential to Russia, in fact probably not all that useful to them. Unfortunately, if Putin is "successful" in Ukraine, it is not certain he won't continue his irrational behavior.

But I think it is given that recent wars have turned the advantage in favor of a defender.  The days of blitzing an opponent and rolling into a city with tanks is over; the only way, I think, to win an offensive war is going to be with a finely coordinated combined arms effort.

The days of blitzing an opponent and rolling tanks into a city that is defended never existed, See Leningrad and Stalingrad, Cherbourg, and Berlin. For local relevance, Königsberg. The German blitzkriegs worked by rapidly cutting the lines of communication and forcing the enemy forces to fall back or outright destroying the defensive forces in the field. They didn't attack the Maginot line. If a nation is willing to have a Stalingrad, they can hold out in the cities. There is a high price to pay in so doing and if you lose the war anyway, it doesn't help you. Whatever forces you commit to defending the cities are not usable elsewhere and will be combat ineffective subsequently even if they hold out successfully. If you can't evacuate them (and realistically, in most cases you can't) many civilians will die. Often a very tough choice to make.

As far as the idea that recent wars have turned the advantage to the defender, I think one has to be very careful with that idea. First of all, listen to President Zelensky. Ukraine has been at war for 8 years. We here in the West just don't get that. They were ready to fight and were already in one. It was just a matter of where Russia wanted to fight. Russia was fine back in 2014 as long as they were operating with the benefit of surprise and lots of local support. They still have that in some areas of the Donbas. However, once Ukraine got it's act together Russia was unable to take over the remaining 2/3 of the Donbas. This latest war is Putin attempting to finish Ukraine off. His army is ill suited to do that. The more I consider what is in https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmo...iore17.pdf the more clear this becomes. The Russian army has reorganized itself based on "lessons learned" fighting against insurgents and in places where they have local support of irregular forces. That isn't what they are doing now and it shows. This reorg (if it had worked) would have let them "do more with less", as it concentrates the striking power in a relatively small number of people. Predictably, when this works it works great. However, if the initial strike fails, the BTG becomes effectively useless. Instead of "two up, one back" the BTG is "one up, nobody back". If this organization worked, you can effectively multiply your army size by three without getting more trained professional troops. Against an inferior opponent that is not well organized, this can work well. Against a "near peer", it won't work. They will counter-attack on several fronts which the BTG can't repel because they are "all in" on what they initially planned. Nothing new here folks.

The defensive in war always has had some advantages. However, the "correlation of forces" often overcomes these advantages. Two very big factors that are often overlooked (because they are so hard to measure) are 1) The willingness of the troops to fight and 2) the ability of the political and military leadership to effectively lead. IMHO there is no question that the Russian troops (and probably their officers) don't want this fight and that Russia has been hit by the Zelensky bomb. Zelensky also appears to have a competent general staff behind him. Putin may too, but he apparently bypasses them.

One un-answered question about NATO is the ability of the politicians to get the public to accept the hard choices required to fight a war in Europe. Given that the EU is still using Russian gas, there is reason to believe the answer is "no". Even if this isn't true, the perception that NATO won't fight is a dangerous one to allow any doubt about. IMHO, the willingness to fight is not obviously present.

 And if the Russians couldn’t pull it off against their next door neighbor, it seems exceedingly unlikely that they would be able to pull it off against NATO, even the somewhat isolated Baltics, especially, as seems likely, if Finland and possibly Sweden join.

The defensive advantage means that Russia almost certainly can’t pull off an offensive war against NATO without, god help us, deploying nuclear weapons.  It also means that NATO probably successfully attack Russia if it wanted to either.

BC

Missing something in that last sentence. I do agree Russia would probably be at a big disadvantage attacking in the Baltics with their current structure. However, NATO has some significant tactical problems there that may more than cancel the Russian problems out. If Putin survives this fiasco and Ukraine ends up falling apart, I pretty much expect we will find out eventually. Russia will also probably reorganize their military, realizing what they did was stupid. Hopefully, Putin doesn't survive.

[Goose]

Russia and other belligerents just need to *think* article v will be used and that the risk isn’t worth testing it out for it to be effective.  But it needs to be a credible threat.

Certainly agree. However, if Russia can set the rules up (as it appears they have right now) that one can't attack Russian territory without provoking a nuclear response, it greatly affects the ability of NATO to respond and the credibility of that response. This is particularly true in the Baltics where 1) the loss of a relative small amount of Polish territory isolates them from supply and reinforcement, and 2) the entire area is surrounded by an air defense system that sits totally on Russian territory (and therefore can't be targeted). Of course, to any sane person starting such a war makes no sense. Control of the Baltics isn't essential to Russia, in fact probably not all that useful to them. Unfortunately, if Putin is "successful" in Ukraine, it is not certain he won't continue his irrational behavior.

But I think it is given that recent wars have turned the advantage in favor of a defender.  The days of blitzing an opponent and rolling into a city with tanks is over; the only way, I think, to win an offensive war is going to be with a finely coordinated combined arms effort.

The days of blitzing an opponent and rolling tanks into a city that is defended never existed, See Leningrad and Stalingrad, Cherbourg, and Berlin. For local relevance, Königsberg. The German blitzkriegs worked by rapidly cutting the lines of communication and forcing the enemy forces to fall back or outright destroying the defensive forces in the field. They didn't attack the Maginot line. If a nation is willing to have a Stalingrad, they can hold out in the cities. There is a high price to pay in so doing and if you lose the war anyway, it doesn't help you. Whatever forces you commit to defending the cities are not usable elsewhere and will be combat ineffective subsequently even if they hold out successfully. If you can't evacuate them (and realistically, in most cases you can't) many civilians will die. Often a very tough choice to make.

As far as the idea that recent wars have turned the advantage to the defender, I think one has to be very careful with that idea. First of all, listen to President Zelensky. Ukraine has been at war for 8 years. We here in the West just don't get that. They were ready to fight and were already in one. It was just a matter of where Russia wanted to fight. Russia was fine back in 2014 as long as they were operating with the benefit of surprise and lots of local support. They still have that in some areas of the Donbas. However, once Ukraine got it's act together Russia was unable to take over the remaining 2/3 of the Donbas. This latest war is Putin attempting to finish Ukraine off. His army is ill suited to do that. The more I consider what is in https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmo...iore17.pdf the more clear this becomes. The Russian army has reorganized itself based on "lessons learned" fighting against insurgents and in places where they have local support of irregular forces. That isn't what they are doing now and it shows. This reorg (if it had worked) would have let them "do more with less", as it concentrates the striking power in a relatively small number of people. Predictably, when this works it works great. However, if the initial strike fails, the BTG becomes effectively useless. Instead of "two up, one back" the BTG is "one up, nobody back". If this organization worked, you can effectively multiply your army size by three without getting more trained professional troops. Against an inferior opponent that is not well organized, this can work well. Against a "near peer", it won't work. They will counter-attack on several fronts which the BTG can't repel because they are "all in" on what they initially planned. Nothing new here folks.

The defensive in war always has had some advantages. However, the "correlation of forces" often overcomes these advantages. Two very big factors that are often overlooked (because they are so hard to measure) are 1) The willingness of the troops to fight and 2) the ability of the political and military leadership to effectively lead. IMHO there is no question that the Russian troops (and probably their officers) don't want this fight and that Russia has been hit by the Zelensky bomb. Zelensky also appears to have a competent general staff behind him. Putin may too, but he apparently bypasses them.

One un-answered question about NATO is the ability of the politicians to get the public to accept the hard choices required to fight a war in Europe. Given that the EU is still using Russian gas, there is reason to believe the answer is "no". Even if this isn't true, the perception that NATO won't fight is a dangerous one to allow any doubt about. IMHO, the willingness to fight is not obviously present.

 And if the Russians couldn’t pull it off against their next door neighbor, it seems exceedingly unlikely that they would be able to pull it off against NATO, even the somewhat isolated Baltics, especially, as seems likely, if Finland and possibly Sweden join.

The defensive advantage means that Russia almost certainly can’t pull off an offensive war against NATO without, god help us, deploying nuclear weapons.  It also means that NATO probably successfully attack Russia if it wanted to either.

BC

Missing something in that last sentence. I do agree Russia would probably be at a big disadvantage attacking in the Baltics with their current structure. However, NATO has some significant tactical problems there that may more than cancel the Russian problems out. If Putin survives this fiasco and Ukraine ends up falling apart, I pretty much expect we will find out eventually. Russia will also probably reorganize their military, realizing what they did was stupid. Hopefully, Putin doesn't survive.

[TrumpCard]

Really awesome news that I hope is true, UK supposedly sending Harpoon antiship missiles to Ukraine, amongst other equipment. Considering the land based system is just the ship based launchers on the back of a truck I never saw why it wouldn't be feasible.

Now, the source is the Daily Mail, so take with a grain of salt. 

I hope they have a drone they can fly out to get the footage when Russia's black sea fleet gets messed up.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article...ps-up.html

Confirmed. Quote here on Politico from a British official:

https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-prime...ussia/amp/

[TrumpCard]

Really awesome news that I hope is true, UK supposedly sending Harpoon antiship missiles to Ukraine, amongst other equipment. Considering the land based system is just the ship based launchers on the back of a truck I never saw why it wouldn't be feasible.

Now, the source is the Daily Mail, so take with a grain of salt. 

I hope they have a drone they can fly out to get the footage when Russia's black sea fleet gets messed up.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article...ps-up.html

Confirmed. Quote here on Politico from a British official:

https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-prime...ussia/amp/

[Mick]

i think it's quite possible that the Russian Army will be able to take and hold Mariupol and the rest of the Donbass.
but even so, because of all the sanctions placed on the Russian banking system, there will likely be a major recession, layoffs, high unemployment, food shortages, and massive food inflation.  
this will lead to a hungry and unhappy populace, which in the long run, is Putin's worst nightmare.

I honestly thought that Putin, like every and any other narcissistic dictator, didn't give two sxxts about the residents of his country. Is he really concerned about a hungry, unhappy populace?

[Mick]

i think it's quite possible that the Russian Army will be able to take and hold Mariupol and the rest of the Donbass.
but even so, because of all the sanctions placed on the Russian banking system, there will likely be a major recession, layoffs, high unemployment, food shortages, and massive food inflation.  
this will lead to a hungry and unhappy populace, which in the long run, is Putin's worst nightmare.

I honestly thought that Putin, like every and any other narcissistic dictator, didn't give two sxxts about the residents of his country. Is he really concerned about a hungry, unhappy populace?

[BostonCard]

Similar to Article V, the idea that an attack on Russian territory will provoke a nuclear response is a threat, not a rule, and it is only as real as it is credible.  I hope we never find out, of course, but a Russia that attacks a NATO country should not expect military targets such as air defenses, that support the attack to be “off limits”, and were it to happen there will be much discussion about whether the tactical benefits are worth the risks of nuclear annihilation (bearing in mind that it would be impossible to eliminate risk, but that even a small risk may not be worth it).  My guess is that NATO’s chance to save the Baltics will rely on establishing air superiority (if not supremacy) and command of the seas to negate Russia’s advantage on land, and that thus some attacks on Russian soil will be an inevitable consequence.

BC

[BostonCard]

Similar to Article V, the idea that an attack on Russian territory will provoke a nuclear response is a threat, not a rule, and it is only as real as it is credible.  I hope we never find out, of course, but a Russia that attacks a NATO country should not expect military targets such as air defenses, that support the attack to be “off limits”, and were it to happen there will be much discussion about whether the tactical benefits are worth the risks of nuclear annihilation (bearing in mind that it would be impossible to eliminate risk, but that even a small risk may not be worth it).  My guess is that NATO’s chance to save the Baltics will rely on establishing air superiority (if not supremacy) and command of the seas to negate Russia’s advantage on land, and that thus some attacks on Russian soil will be an inevitable consequence.

BC

[Goose]

Similar to Article V, the idea that an attack on Russian territory will provoke a nuclear response is a threat, not a rule, and it is only as real as it is credible.  I hope we never find out, of course, but a Russia that attacks a NATO country should not expect military targets such as air defenses, that support the attack to be “off limits”, and were it to happen there will be much discussion about whether the tactical benefits are worth the risks of nuclear annihilation (bearing in mind that it would be impossible to eliminate risk, but that even a small risk may not be worth it).

That discussion will have to take place in advance, because if Russia acts in the Baltics, hours will matter and days are just not available to decide what NATO can and will do. If this discussion happens and NATO makes a joint statement to Russia saying we will do what it takes if they attack the Baltics, that will help. If NATO remains mute on that subject, the risk goes way up IMHO. Hopefully, Putin will be gone and it won't matter near as much.

My guess is that NATO’s chance to save the Baltics will rely on establishing air superiority (if not supremacy) and command of the seas to negate Russia’s advantage on land, and that thus some attacks on Russian soil will be an inevitable consequence.

BC

Totally agree about air superiority and about requiring attacks on Russian soil. FWIW, nobody will get command of the sea in the Eastern Baltic. There are too many anti-ship missiles on both sides to allow a surface ship any chance of making it through that area. If Finland and Sweden are in NATO, it just becomes harder for Russia. Russia already has major missile capabilities in that area. NATO has significant submarine assets available in the area. Strangely, Russia does not any more. Russia certainly and NATO probably has the ability to mine just about anyplace in the Baltic. There are also many high speed missile boats on both sides that would be used to strike any ships the land based missiles missed, although those missile boats are quite vulnerable from the air. NATO has not figured out what to do with the Baltic Sea. During the cold war, Denmark had the responsibility to close the the Skagerrak with mines and artillery. That was it. It was assumed that nobody would really be using the Baltic much after a war started. They no longer have that responsibility. NATO now thinks it could keep the Western Baltic open, but that is a maybe. The Eastern Baltic nobody wants to talk about.

[Goose]

Similar to Article V, the idea that an attack on Russian territory will provoke a nuclear response is a threat, not a rule, and it is only as real as it is credible.  I hope we never find out, of course, but a Russia that attacks a NATO country should not expect military targets such as air defenses, that support the attack to be “off limits”, and were it to happen there will be much discussion about whether the tactical benefits are worth the risks of nuclear annihilation (bearing in mind that it would be impossible to eliminate risk, but that even a small risk may not be worth it).

That discussion will have to take place in advance, because if Russia acts in the Baltics, hours will matter and days are just not available to decide what NATO can and will do. If this discussion happens and NATO makes a joint statement to Russia saying we will do what it takes if they attack the Baltics, that will help. If NATO remains mute on that subject, the risk goes way up IMHO. Hopefully, Putin will be gone and it won't matter near as much.

My guess is that NATO’s chance to save the Baltics will rely on establishing air superiority (if not supremacy) and command of the seas to negate Russia’s advantage on land, and that thus some attacks on Russian soil will be an inevitable consequence.

BC

Totally agree about air superiority and about requiring attacks on Russian soil. FWIW, nobody will get command of the sea in the Eastern Baltic. There are too many anti-ship missiles on both sides to allow a surface ship any chance of making it through that area. If Finland and Sweden are in NATO, it just becomes harder for Russia. Russia already has major missile capabilities in that area. NATO has significant submarine assets available in the area. Strangely, Russia does not any more. Russia certainly and NATO probably has the ability to mine just about anyplace in the Baltic. There are also many high speed missile boats on both sides that would be used to strike any ships the land based missiles missed, although those missile boats are quite vulnerable from the air. NATO has not figured out what to do with the Baltic Sea. During the cold war, Denmark had the responsibility to close the the Skagerrak with mines and artillery. That was it. It was assumed that nobody would really be using the Baltic much after a war started. They no longer have that responsibility. NATO now thinks it could keep the Western Baltic open, but that is a maybe. The Eastern Baltic nobody wants to talk about.

[BostonCard]

The gulf of Finland is 50 miles across from Talinn to Helsinki, which is why if the effect of the Ukraine war is to drive Finland to NATO, it will have been a colossal mistake for Russia, never mind if Sweden joins and the entrance to the Baltic is controlled by NATO.  That is why Russia keeps its Baltic fleet in Kaliningrad, but Kaliningrad is completely surrounded by NATO members.

BC

[BostonCard]

The gulf of Finland is 50 miles across from Talinn to Helsinki, which is why if the effect of the Ukraine war is to drive Finland to NATO, it will have been a colossal mistake for Russia, never mind if Sweden joins and the entrance to the Baltic is controlled by NATO.  That is why Russia keeps its Baltic fleet in Kaliningrad, but Kaliningrad is completely surrounded by NATO members.

BC

[newguy]

i think it's quite possible that the Russian Army will be able to take and hold Mariupol and the rest of the Donbass.
but even so, because of all the sanctions placed on the Russian banking system, there will likely be a major recession, layoffs, high unemployment, food shortages, and massive food inflation.  
this will lead to a hungry and unhappy populace, which in the long run, is Putin's worst nightmare.

I honestly thought that Putin, like every and any other narcissistic dictator, didn't give two sxxts about the residents of his country. Is he really concerned about a hungry, unhappy populace?

fair point.  and it's hard to know how long it will take for the sanctions to really take their toll.  
if Russia descends into chaos, then it's possible that those around Putin will act collectively and put some limits on his power.  but it's nearly impossible to estimate the probability of that happening.

[newguy]

i think it's quite possible that the Russian Army will be able to take and hold Mariupol and the rest of the Donbass.
but even so, because of all the sanctions placed on the Russian banking system, there will likely be a major recession, layoffs, high unemployment, food shortages, and massive food inflation.  
this will lead to a hungry and unhappy populace, which in the long run, is Putin's worst nightmare.

I honestly thought that Putin, like every and any other narcissistic dictator, didn't give two sxxts about the residents of his country. Is he really concerned about a hungry, unhappy populace?

fair point.  and it's hard to know how long it will take for the sanctions to really take their toll.  
if Russia descends into chaos, then it's possible that those around Putin will act collectively and put some limits on his power.  but it's nearly impossible to estimate the probability of that happening.

[Goose]

The gulf of Finland is 50 miles across from Talinn to Helsinki, which is why if the effect of the Ukraine war is to drive Finland to NATO, it will have been a colossal mistake for Russia, never mind if Sweden joins and the entrance to the Baltic is controlled by NATO.

Why so BC? Nobody is going to be running ships in the Gulf of Finland as long as Tallinn is NATO and St. Petersburg and points to the West are Russian. It will be a no-go zone anyway. If Tallinn is taken by Russia, it might matter. One also has to consider that Finland is already as "associated state" of NATO. I think there are lots of NATO folks that actually prefer that. Finland isn't joining because it wants to send troops to Romania in the event of war or to keep Tallinn free. For many decades Finland survived just fine with the Baltic states as part of the Soviet Union. While that isn't their preference, it isn't of itself fatal.

Finland is joining NATO to deter Russia from attacking it and to obtain help if Russia does. For many, many years both Finland and Sweden have concentrated on defensive armaments and systems to make attacking them just too expensive (they hoped). So far, it has worked, but now there is a fear it won't. That doesn't mean that Finland and Sweden add a lot to NATO's offensive power. They have been in the recent past my customers and I have great respect for their capabilities, but their mind set is not on projecting power. I would not want to be attacking them. They are very good in many respects. They bring some useful capabilities to NATO. They also bring very large liabilities.

That is why Russia keeps its Baltic fleet in Kaliningrad, but Kaliningrad is completely surrounded by NATO members.

BC

Indeed, and worse still Kaliningrad dominates the Baltic Sea in that region with anti-ship missiles and GMCs of various descriptions. Sweden is prepared to contest ownership of these waters to prevent/hinder their use by Russia to attach Sweden, but Sweden in the past has never developed the power to do more than that. 5 Visbys just won't cut it. The pinching out of Kaliningrad will be a NATO priority, but if Russia intends to take the Baltics, the schwerpunkt will be the Suwalki corridor. Look at https://cepa.org/the-suwalki-corridor/. If Russia succeeds there, it is probably game over in the Baltics. If, OTOH NATO can hold the Suwalki corridor and pinch out Kaliningrad, or bomb it to helplessness NATO can control the Baltic sea as far East as Riga (air power issues aside), which is all we need. This is true whether Sweden and Finland fight or not. It is only necessary that they don't fall to Russia while this is all going on.

[Goose]

The gulf of Finland is 50 miles across from Talinn to Helsinki, which is why if the effect of the Ukraine war is to drive Finland to NATO, it will have been a colossal mistake for Russia, never mind if Sweden joins and the entrance to the Baltic is controlled by NATO.

Why so BC? Nobody is going to be running ships in the Gulf of Finland as long as Tallinn is NATO and St. Petersburg and points to the West are Russian. It will be a no-go zone anyway. If Tallinn is taken by Russia, it might matter. One also has to consider that Finland is already as "associated state" of NATO. I think there are lots of NATO folks that actually prefer that. Finland isn't joining because it wants to send troops to Romania in the event of war or to keep Tallinn free. For many decades Finland survived just fine with the Baltic states as part of the Soviet Union. While that isn't their preference, it isn't of itself fatal.

Finland is joining NATO to deter Russia from attacking it and to obtain help if Russia does. For many, many years both Finland and Sweden have concentrated on defensive armaments and systems to make attacking them just too expensive (they hoped). So far, it has worked, but now there is a fear it won't. That doesn't mean that Finland and Sweden add a lot to NATO's offensive power. They have been in the recent past my customers and I have great respect for their capabilities, but their mind set is not on projecting power. I would not want to be attacking them. They are very good in many respects. They bring some useful capabilities to NATO. They also bring very large liabilities.

That is why Russia keeps its Baltic fleet in Kaliningrad, but Kaliningrad is completely surrounded by NATO members.

BC

Indeed, and worse still Kaliningrad dominates the Baltic Sea in that region with anti-ship missiles and GMCs of various descriptions. Sweden is prepared to contest ownership of these waters to prevent/hinder their use by Russia to attach Sweden, but Sweden in the past has never developed the power to do more than that. 5 Visbys just won't cut it. The pinching out of Kaliningrad will be a NATO priority, but if Russia intends to take the Baltics, the schwerpunkt will be the Suwalki corridor. Look at https://cepa.org/the-suwalki-corridor/. If Russia succeeds there, it is probably game over in the Baltics. If, OTOH NATO can hold the Suwalki corridor and pinch out Kaliningrad, or bomb it to helplessness NATO can control the Baltic sea as far East as Riga (air power issues aside), which is all we need. This is true whether Sweden and Finland fight or not. It is only necessary that they don't fall to Russia while this is all going on.

[bl82]

Not claiming to be knowledgeable about military matters, but still can't comprehend why Russia hasn't made a meaningful attempt to go after Odessa. Is it not possible to attack by sea? Is the only viable route an inland one westward from Mykolaiv?

[bl82]

Not claiming to be knowledgeable about military matters, but still can't comprehend why Russia hasn't made a meaningful attempt to go after Odessa. Is it not possible to attack by sea? Is the only viable route an inland one westward from Mykolaiv?

[cardcrimson]

Reorganizing the leadership (after failures and deaths, no doubt), Putin has named the general who led the bombing of Syria to lead the efforts in Ukraine. Not sure what it will actually mean for the Ukrainians, but I doubt this guy has any regard for civilians as evident of the tactics in Syria.

https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-ap...ine-2022-4

[cardcrimson]

Reorganizing the leadership (after failures and deaths, no doubt), Putin has named the general who led the bombing of Syria to lead the efforts in Ukraine. Not sure what it will actually mean for the Ukrainians, but I doubt this guy has any regard for civilians as evident of the tactics in Syria.

https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-ap...ine-2022-4

[dabigv13]

Pretty much all the most senior Russian generals have Syrian experience. So you're correct that he probably doesn't have much regard for civilian lives, but they didn't pick him just for that reason- Dornikov is a full general, the most senior of the regional commanders, and also with the most experience in Donbas where the next fight will be focused. Maybe it will help the Russians to have a unified command, but I think if they are successful it will be more because they have concentrated their forces into a small enough area that in spite of their atrocious logistics and combined arms operations might achieve some breakthroughs. 

-----

Russia doesn't have the manpower to take Odessa, and trying an amphibious assault would be very dicey for the Russians especially without controlling the eastern approaches from Mykolaiv. Amphibious assaults are always difficult, but the shore around Odessa is particularly difficult, with many inlets that would isolate a force trying to get off the beach. Surely it was an objective, but does not seem to be a realistic one for foreseeable future.

New antiship missiles will also make amphibious ops likely ruinous for the Russians. Harpoons have been reported by Daily Mail and Politico yesterday, though parsing this statement from NSA Jake Sullivan last week, I wonder:

So, let’s take coastal defense systems as an example. President Biden went to Brussels to talk to key Allies 11 days ago about how to get coastal defense systems to Ukraine, because there is not, at the moment, a good U.S. option.

Last week, the UK announced at the close of its donor conference that coastal defense systems would be provided to the Ukrainians. It is a good example how, working with Allies and partners, we are successfully responding to Ukraine’s requests.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room...-sullivan/

Could be that UK has some training/testing Harpoon batteries that they are sending, or could be referring to smaller, less powerful antiship missiles made by UK, the Sea Spear, which are more for taking out smaller patrol boats at much reduced range as compared to Harpoon. Hope it's the former, and as two sources have reported that while only internet chatter has focused on the Sea Spear, will say it seems more likely.

[dabigv13]

Pretty much all the most senior Russian generals have Syrian experience. So you're correct that he probably doesn't have much regard for civilian lives, but they didn't pick him just for that reason- Dornikov is a full general, the most senior of the regional commanders, and also with the most experience in Donbas where the next fight will be focused. Maybe it will help the Russians to have a unified command, but I think if they are successful it will be more because they have concentrated their forces into a small enough area that in spite of their atrocious logistics and combined arms operations might achieve some breakthroughs. 

-----

Russia doesn't have the manpower to take Odessa, and trying an amphibious assault would be very dicey for the Russians especially without controlling the eastern approaches from Mykolaiv. Amphibious assaults are always difficult, but the shore around Odessa is particularly difficult, with many inlets that would isolate a force trying to get off the beach. Surely it was an objective, but does not seem to be a realistic one for foreseeable future.

New antiship missiles will also make amphibious ops likely ruinous for the Russians. Harpoons have been reported by Daily Mail and Politico yesterday, though parsing this statement from NSA Jake Sullivan last week, I wonder:

So, let’s take coastal defense systems as an example. President Biden went to Brussels to talk to key Allies 11 days ago about how to get coastal defense systems to Ukraine, because there is not, at the moment, a good U.S. option.

Last week, the UK announced at the close of its donor conference that coastal defense systems would be provided to the Ukrainians. It is a good example how, working with Allies and partners, we are successfully responding to Ukraine’s requests.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room...-sullivan/

Could be that UK has some training/testing Harpoon batteries that they are sending, or could be referring to smaller, less powerful antiship missiles made by UK, the Sea Spear, which are more for taking out smaller patrol boats at much reduced range as compared to Harpoon. Hope it's the former, and as two sources have reported that while only internet chatter has focused on the Sea Spear, will say it seems more likely.

[Goose]

Pretty much all the most senior Russian generals have Syrian experience. So you're correct that he probably doesn't have much regard for civilian lives, but they didn't pick him just for that reason- Dornikov is a full general, the most senior of the regional commanders, and also with the most experience in Donbas where the next fight will be focused. Maybe it will help the Russians to have a unified command, but I think if they are successful it will be more because they have concentrated their forces into a small enough area that in spite of their atrocious logistics and combined arms operations might achieve some breakthroughs. 

I think you are basically correct. I do expect having a single commander (who is not Putin) may reduce the number of tactical errors made by the Russians. That will help quite a bit. However, if the commander thinks this is Syria Part II, I think he will be sadly mistaken, and that could actually help Ukraine. In Syria, the rebels really didn't have unity of command, significant heavy weapons, or a credible air force/air defense. Ukraine has all of these. They can really make you pay, which the Syrian rebels couldn't.

-----

Russia doesn't have the manpower to take Odessa, and trying an amphibious assault would be very dicey for the Russians especially without controlling the eastern approaches from Mykolaiv. Amphibious assaults are always difficult, but the shore around Odessa is particularly difficult, with many inlets that would isolate a force trying to get off the beach. Surely it was an objective, but does not seem to be a realistic one for foreseeable future.

Totally agree. I think all along Russia was doing what we did in Kuwait. Put an amphibious force off the coast to fix the forces in place that are needed to defend against a landing. Then roll up said coast with an overland advance. The opponent can't move forces to defend against the advance because they are needed to defend against a landing. The amphibious force can then land behind the successful advance and reinforce it directly. Problem was the Ukraine stopped the coastal advance.

[Goose]

Pretty much all the most senior Russian generals have Syrian experience. So you're correct that he probably doesn't have much regard for civilian lives, but they didn't pick him just for that reason- Dornikov is a full general, the most senior of the regional commanders, and also with the most experience in Donbas where the next fight will be focused. Maybe it will help the Russians to have a unified command, but I think if they are successful it will be more because they have concentrated their forces into a small enough area that in spite of their atrocious logistics and combined arms operations might achieve some breakthroughs. 

I think you are basically correct. I do expect having a single commander (who is not Putin) may reduce the number of tactical errors made by the Russians. That will help quite a bit. However, if the commander thinks this is Syria Part II, I think he will be sadly mistaken, and that could actually help Ukraine. In Syria, the rebels really didn't have unity of command, significant heavy weapons, or a credible air force/air defense. Ukraine has all of these. They can really make you pay, which the Syrian rebels couldn't.

-----

Russia doesn't have the manpower to take Odessa, and trying an amphibious assault would be very dicey for the Russians especially without controlling the eastern approaches from Mykolaiv. Amphibious assaults are always difficult, but the shore around Odessa is particularly difficult, with many inlets that would isolate a force trying to get off the beach. Surely it was an objective, but does not seem to be a realistic one for foreseeable future.

Totally agree. I think all along Russia was doing what we did in Kuwait. Put an amphibious force off the coast to fix the forces in place that are needed to defend against a landing. Then roll up said coast with an overland advance. The opponent can't move forces to defend against the advance because they are needed to defend against a landing. The amphibious force can then land behind the successful advance and reinforce it directly. Problem was the Ukraine stopped the coastal advance.

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thedeaddistrict/status/1513183319218921475?s=21&t=HWPQwqeG7DBp0r_JajkmYw[/tweet]

Also, good piece from the Economist on where we are and where we are going…

https://www.economist.com/europe/ukraine...k/21808597

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thedeaddistrict/status/1513183319218921475?s=21&t=HWPQwqeG7DBp0r_JajkmYw[/tweet]

Also, good piece from the Economist on where we are and where we are going…

https://www.economist.com/europe/ukraine...k/21808597

BC

[Goose]

"World Bank: War to slash Ukraine GDP by 45%
The World Bank says Ukraine's economy will contract by 45.1% this year as a result of the Russian invasion.
Businesses in the country have been shut, exports have been slashed, and much of the country's productive capacity has been destroyed, the organisation explained in an impact assessment released on Sunday.
In particular the closure of Black Sea shipping from Ukraine has cut off 90% of the country's grain exports and half of its total exports, which is expected to have knock-on affects across the globe, but particularly in the Middle East and Northern Africa.
Russia's GDP will drop by 11.2% as a result of financial sanctions, the World Bank added."


All in all, not great news. Just shows once again (if anyone doubted it) how insane this war is. For Ukraine, the economics are dire. They can hang on for a while through great courage, sacrifice,  and outside help, but at some point it just doesn't work. Ukraine needs a way to victory. This going on for years isn't feasible.
 
For Russia, 11.2% is bad but tolerable. Hopefully the sanctions will cause more substantial decreases in the near future. That said, the fact that the EU is still paying Russia a billion a day for gas just has to stop. If Europe is serious about helping Ukraine, this has to be done today. As I have said before, the US needs to pressure the EU (especially Germany) to cut off the money tap. The US also needs to do what is needed to allow the Europeans to do this, even if it means substantial pain here in the USA. Collective security also means collective responsibility. Somebody in the West needs to stand up and lead. Hopefully, it will be the US, because it seems improbable anybody else will.

[Goose]

"World Bank: War to slash Ukraine GDP by 45%
The World Bank says Ukraine's economy will contract by 45.1% this year as a result of the Russian invasion.
Businesses in the country have been shut, exports have been slashed, and much of the country's productive capacity has been destroyed, the organisation explained in an impact assessment released on Sunday.
In particular the closure of Black Sea shipping from Ukraine has cut off 90% of the country's grain exports and half of its total exports, which is expected to have knock-on affects across the globe, but particularly in the Middle East and Northern Africa.
Russia's GDP will drop by 11.2% as a result of financial sanctions, the World Bank added."


All in all, not great news. Just shows once again (if anyone doubted it) how insane this war is. For Ukraine, the economics are dire. They can hang on for a while through great courage, sacrifice,  and outside help, but at some point it just doesn't work. Ukraine needs a way to victory. This going on for years isn't feasible.
 
For Russia, 11.2% is bad but tolerable. Hopefully the sanctions will cause more substantial decreases in the near future. That said, the fact that the EU is still paying Russia a billion a day for gas just has to stop. If Europe is serious about helping Ukraine, this has to be done today. As I have said before, the US needs to pressure the EU (especially Germany) to cut off the money tap. The US also needs to do what is needed to allow the Europeans to do this, even if it means substantial pain here in the USA. Collective security also means collective responsibility. Somebody in the West needs to stand up and lead. Hopefully, it will be the US, because it seems improbable anybody else will.

[TrumpCard]

The situation in Ukraine is obviously dire, but this resilience is amazing:

https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndepende...ng2v8pAAAA

[TrumpCard]

The situation in Ukraine is obviously dire, but this resilience is amazing:

https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndepende...ng2v8pAAAA

[BostonCard]

Raise your hand if you had food being more available in Kiev than in Shanghai…

BC

[BostonCard]

Raise your hand if you had food being more available in Kiev than in Shanghai…

BC

[Goose]

The situation in Ukraine is obviously dire, but this resilience is amazing:

https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndepende...ng2v8pAAAA

Indeed it is. Ukraine is doing almost everything "right", even allowing for the fact we are getting the news as they wish it reported. Even that they are doing pretty well. There is a lot of momentum to this "civic regeneration" that is going on in Ukraine. If it is crowned with success, their nation could make a great leap forward in Europe, the EU(soon), and the world in general. Let's hope it will be and do what we can to help make it happen.

[Goose]

The situation in Ukraine is obviously dire, but this resilience is amazing:

https://mobile.twitter.com/KyivIndepende...ng2v8pAAAA

Indeed it is. Ukraine is doing almost everything "right", even allowing for the fact we are getting the news as they wish it reported. Even that they are doing pretty well. There is a lot of momentum to this "civic regeneration" that is going on in Ukraine. If it is crowned with success, their nation could make a great leap forward in Europe, the EU(soon), and the world in general. Let's hope it will be and do what we can to help make it happen.

[cardcrimson]

CBS's 60 Minutes just aired a 40 minute segment on Zelenskyy. Wow. A very powerful segment, indeed. The destruction and murder is beyond belief. . . .While appreciative of the support, Zelenskyy put forth a powerful argument for more, faster. I hope we respond accordingly.

Hadn't watched 60 Minutes for years, CBS happened to still be on after the Masters. Surprised by their perspective. Scott Pelley did an amazing job.

[cardcrimson]

CBS's 60 Minutes just aired a 40 minute segment on Zelenskyy. Wow. A very powerful segment, indeed. The destruction and murder is beyond belief. . . .While appreciative of the support, Zelenskyy put forth a powerful argument for more, faster. I hope we respond accordingly.

Hadn't watched 60 Minutes for years, CBS happened to still be on after the Masters. Surprised by their perspective. Scott Pelley did an amazing job.