[TrumpCard]

Anyone have any thoughts on what would happen to a NATO unified front against Putin if Le Pen wins the French presidential election? Don't know much about her, other than that she is a right-winger who has been pro-Putin in the past.

Le Pen’s party is in the process of paying a € 12 million debt to a sanctioned Russian defense contractor. That might have flown in January, but not anymore. Let’s stop pretending that the election will be close. Polling shows her down double digits and sinking.

[TrumpCard]

Anyone have any thoughts on what would happen to a NATO unified front against Putin if Le Pen wins the French presidential election? Don't know much about her, other than that she is a right-winger who has been pro-Putin in the past.

Le Pen’s party is in the process of paying a € 12 million debt to a sanctioned Russian defense contractor. That might have flown in January, but not anymore. Let’s stop pretending that the election will be close. Polling shows her down double digits and sinking.

[BostonCard]

It will still be closer than 5 years ago.

Economist has a good webinar this morning on the Ukraine situation.  The question of what Russia could do about NATO expansion (and presumably anything else NATO does) was brought up.  Shawshank Joshi (defense correspondent) noted that 3/4 of Russias military strength was tied up fighting Ukraine. Russia can’t do anything about NaTO, full stop, in the short term. Obviously years from now, who knows. He indicated there will likely be consequences of Finland joining NATO such as increased militarization of Karelia. But right now you will see Russia making ineffective Sabre rattling noises, such as yesterdays ICBM launch or the video released of Russian soldiers on the border with Finland with a sign saying “Finland, that way”.

Russia has 3x the population and 10x the GDP of Ukraine, so Russia potentially would have the ability to marshall sufficient troops and resources to achieve its goal.

Only if it mobilizes for total war, rather than a “special military operation”. Do the Russian people believe that full mobilization is worth it for Ukraine?

BC

[BostonCard]

It will still be closer than 5 years ago.

Economist has a good webinar this morning on the Ukraine situation.  The question of what Russia could do about NATO expansion (and presumably anything else NATO does) was brought up.  Shawshank Joshi (defense correspondent) noted that 3/4 of Russias military strength was tied up fighting Ukraine. Russia can’t do anything about NaTO, full stop, in the short term. Obviously years from now, who knows. He indicated there will likely be consequences of Finland joining NATO such as increased militarization of Karelia. But right now you will see Russia making ineffective Sabre rattling noises, such as yesterdays ICBM launch or the video released of Russian soldiers on the border with Finland with a sign saying “Finland, that way”.

Russia has 3x the population and 10x the GDP of Ukraine, so Russia potentially would have the ability to marshall sufficient troops and resources to achieve its goal.

Only if it mobilizes for total war, rather than a “special military operation”. Do the Russian people believe that full mobilization is worth it for Ukraine?

BC

[Phogge]

In the "Patton" movie Old Blood and Guts is chastised once again by Beetle Smith after GSP Jr. commits some breech with German officials. In so many words Patton tells Ike's COS that "We're going to fight the mongoloid Russians anyway so why not do it while our troops are in Germany and rearm the Whermacht to help us."

Foresight.

[Phogge]

In the "Patton" movie Old Blood and Guts is chastised once again by Beetle Smith after GSP Jr. commits some breech with German officials. In so many words Patton tells Ike's COS that "We're going to fight the mongoloid Russians anyway so why not do it while our troops are in Germany and rearm the Whermacht to help us."

Foresight.

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/paulszoldra/status/1517672700126265344?s=21&t=nwbBD7k_4kYD_VFcs6tyqQ[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/paulszoldra/status/1517672700126265344?s=21&t=nwbBD7k_4kYD_VFcs6tyqQ[/tweet]

BC

[Goose]

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the point here, but I don't think you can infer how NATO would respond to an attack on Poland or another NATO country based on how it's responded to the invasion of Ukraine -- a non NATO country.

The hypothetical I am posing is what does NATO do if Russia tells Poland to stop allowing aid through Poland to Ukraine, and threatens that if the aid continues, Polish cities will be hit by missiles. The aid continues and Poland is hit by missiles. What happens from there? For the reasons outlined in my post, I don't believe a general Article 5 response is possible. So, what does NATO do in response?

Can't believe we're still talking about this dumb theoretical. If Russia attacks a NATO country, they are going to lose even harder than they are losing now. The US didn't respond to Pearl Harbor by giving in to the Japanese. Poland or any other country that gets attacked by a weak and rapidly weakening Russia is not going to be deterred in the slightest.

Sorry, but IMHO your comparison of Pearl Harbor to a strike by Russia to get Poland to stop aid flowing to Ukraine through Polish territory is totally mistaken. In one case Japan was declaring total war to the death on the USA. In the other, Putin will stop if Poland stops aiding Ukraine. The US had to fight. Poland does not. It won't lose one life or one inch of territory if it stops aid flowing to Ukraine. The US had no such option in the Pacific. The PI were hit the same day (International date line making it appear later). OTOH, Poland fighting the Russians alone won't go well, and is basically not an option. They would need help. The USA could fight Japan alone. Fortunately, we didn't have to do so.

I am kind of surprised, frankly, by the reaction to this hypothetical. Right now, Ukraine looks like it has a shot to force at least a stalemate, if not better. Nothing is certain in war, but it is looking good. It is always advisable to put yourself in your opponent's place and ask "What can he do to defeat my operations?" That is what I am trying to do here. It would appear to me that Ukraine's ability to effectively resist relies on their ability to get supplied by NATO through Poland. Hungary won't do it, that is clear. It is also not as good communications and geography wise. Romania is even weaker that Poland, so what works on Poland would probably work on Romania. Romania also has Moldova in the way. So Poland is the key.

How can Russia get Poland to stop allowing supplies across it's territory? Invading Poland is out of the question because, if for no other reason, Russia doesn't have the troops. It is also very probable that NATO would respond by declaring war, Hungary be damned. So, as an alternative, threaten them with basically terrorist missile strikes on their cities. Poland isn't strong enough by itself to attack Russia in response, and they know it. If Poland continues to allow deliveries, hit a city with a few missiles. This isn't a "war". It is a "deterrence operation". Once that happens, what does NATO do and what does Poland do?

NATO is in a tough position. Declaring total war in response to "a few missiles" is a heavy lift. Germany is not ready to fight in any case. Most of the weaker NATO countries in Eastern Europe would be inclined to sit this one out. Hungary for sure, Bulgaria probably. Romania brings so little to the table it doesn't much matter. I don't think that Germany and the rest of the European states, except possibly the UK, would support a war under those conditions. Nobody is attacking them. Poland can stop the attacks on it by stopping aid to Ukraine. Is this worth a war to Belgium? I use the fact these nations are still using Russian gas as an indication of their ambivalence. A recession is too big a price to pay for Ukraine, but fighting a war (where your citizens will die, your cities will be damaged, and you will get a recession anyway) for aid to Ukraine isn't? Highly unlikely IMHO. Tell Poland to just grin and bear it or if necessary Poland can shut off aid to Ukraine. Why am I wrong?

If NATO is wise, they will prepare for this, because to me it looks like Putin may have to try something like this or accept a stalemate in Ukraine, which is probably political suicide for him. Some may argue NATO will call Putin's bluff and declare a war on Russia. I doubt that for reasons I have already stated. In any case Putin may doubt it too. He also may have no other good options.

[Goose]

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the point here, but I don't think you can infer how NATO would respond to an attack on Poland or another NATO country based on how it's responded to the invasion of Ukraine -- a non NATO country.

The hypothetical I am posing is what does NATO do if Russia tells Poland to stop allowing aid through Poland to Ukraine, and threatens that if the aid continues, Polish cities will be hit by missiles. The aid continues and Poland is hit by missiles. What happens from there? For the reasons outlined in my post, I don't believe a general Article 5 response is possible. So, what does NATO do in response?

Can't believe we're still talking about this dumb theoretical. If Russia attacks a NATO country, they are going to lose even harder than they are losing now. The US didn't respond to Pearl Harbor by giving in to the Japanese. Poland or any other country that gets attacked by a weak and rapidly weakening Russia is not going to be deterred in the slightest.

Sorry, but IMHO your comparison of Pearl Harbor to a strike by Russia to get Poland to stop aid flowing to Ukraine through Polish territory is totally mistaken. In one case Japan was declaring total war to the death on the USA. In the other, Putin will stop if Poland stops aiding Ukraine. The US had to fight. Poland does not. It won't lose one life or one inch of territory if it stops aid flowing to Ukraine. The US had no such option in the Pacific. The PI were hit the same day (International date line making it appear later). OTOH, Poland fighting the Russians alone won't go well, and is basically not an option. They would need help. The USA could fight Japan alone. Fortunately, we didn't have to do so.

I am kind of surprised, frankly, by the reaction to this hypothetical. Right now, Ukraine looks like it has a shot to force at least a stalemate, if not better. Nothing is certain in war, but it is looking good. It is always advisable to put yourself in your opponent's place and ask "What can he do to defeat my operations?" That is what I am trying to do here. It would appear to me that Ukraine's ability to effectively resist relies on their ability to get supplied by NATO through Poland. Hungary won't do it, that is clear. It is also not as good communications and geography wise. Romania is even weaker that Poland, so what works on Poland would probably work on Romania. Romania also has Moldova in the way. So Poland is the key.

How can Russia get Poland to stop allowing supplies across it's territory? Invading Poland is out of the question because, if for no other reason, Russia doesn't have the troops. It is also very probable that NATO would respond by declaring war, Hungary be damned. So, as an alternative, threaten them with basically terrorist missile strikes on their cities. Poland isn't strong enough by itself to attack Russia in response, and they know it. If Poland continues to allow deliveries, hit a city with a few missiles. This isn't a "war". It is a "deterrence operation". Once that happens, what does NATO do and what does Poland do?

NATO is in a tough position. Declaring total war in response to "a few missiles" is a heavy lift. Germany is not ready to fight in any case. Most of the weaker NATO countries in Eastern Europe would be inclined to sit this one out. Hungary for sure, Bulgaria probably. Romania brings so little to the table it doesn't much matter. I don't think that Germany and the rest of the European states, except possibly the UK, would support a war under those conditions. Nobody is attacking them. Poland can stop the attacks on it by stopping aid to Ukraine. Is this worth a war to Belgium? I use the fact these nations are still using Russian gas as an indication of their ambivalence. A recession is too big a price to pay for Ukraine, but fighting a war (where your citizens will die, your cities will be damaged, and you will get a recession anyway) for aid to Ukraine isn't? Highly unlikely IMHO. Tell Poland to just grin and bear it or if necessary Poland can shut off aid to Ukraine. Why am I wrong?

If NATO is wise, they will prepare for this, because to me it looks like Putin may have to try something like this or accept a stalemate in Ukraine, which is probably political suicide for him. Some may argue NATO will call Putin's bluff and declare a war on Russia. I doubt that for reasons I have already stated. In any case Putin may doubt it too. He also may have no other good options.

[BostonCard]

I don’t think it is at all that crazy. If Russia threatens Poland, the United States can give public assurances to Poland that it will help defend Poland. The United States can start moving troops from Germany to Poland, which Poland has wanted, and beef up Poland’s missile defenses, which threatens Russia. We can hit Russian troops in Ukraine. We can hit Kaliningrad. Russia has 75% of its combat forces with its hands full in Ukraine, short of provoking a global thermonuclear war, it can lob missiles and that’s about it. It is extremely vulnerable. A gamble that if it attacks Poland that Poland will back off is exceedingly reckless, and the most likely outcome is that it guarantees Russian troops are humiliated in Ukraine, in Syria, in Georgia, in Belarus, etc. they are super exposed and in a position of weakness; they would be nuts to attack Poland.

I really don’t know why you think it is that that a reckless attack by Russia on a NATO country will be met by indifference given that the attack on Ukraine, a non-NATO country, has basically provoked a fairly unified response that is just one step short of actaually engaging the Russians in combat.

BC

[BostonCard]

I don’t think it is at all that crazy. If Russia threatens Poland, the United States can give public assurances to Poland that it will help defend Poland. The United States can start moving troops from Germany to Poland, which Poland has wanted, and beef up Poland’s missile defenses, which threatens Russia. We can hit Russian troops in Ukraine. We can hit Kaliningrad. Russia has 75% of its combat forces with its hands full in Ukraine, short of provoking a global thermonuclear war, it can lob missiles and that’s about it. It is extremely vulnerable. A gamble that if it attacks Poland that Poland will back off is exceedingly reckless, and the most likely outcome is that it guarantees Russian troops are humiliated in Ukraine, in Syria, in Georgia, in Belarus, etc. they are super exposed and in a position of weakness; they would be nuts to attack Poland.

I really don’t know why you think it is that that a reckless attack by Russia on a NATO country will be met by indifference given that the attack on Ukraine, a non-NATO country, has basically provoked a fairly unified response that is just one step short of actaually engaging the Russians in combat.

BC

[Goose]

Canada is sending M777 howitzers and guided Excalibur shells.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ukraine...-1.6427762

France is sending CAESAR howitzers.

https://defence-blog.com/france-to-send-...o-ukraine/

Both are very modern and advanced arty pieces. We don't know what type exactly US is sending,

Yes we do, as I posted yesterday, they are M777s.
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Storie...y-meeting/
The Dutch (German designed) PzH 2000s being supplied are also very capable and self propelled. They have a higher rate of fire than the others mentioned here, and much better crew protection.

It is worth noting that the 144,000 rounds being sent with the US weapons represents 2000 rounds per cannon or about 3 weeks "normal" usage in a medium theater of operations. Resupply is a necessity, obviously. It is also true that the NATO weapons have different round type options than the Russian 152 mm howitzers the Ukrainians are familiar with have. We don't know the "mix" of the 144,000 rounds, so it is hard to know the usage rates. Probably they are not all HE, some are M982.

though it will be a lot more numerous at least than what France and Canada are. But if Ukraine has parity with tanks, parity at least in troop numbers, perhaps more capable artillery, and still no Russian air superiority, well their Donbas offensive is pretty much over. Holding the land bridge to Crimea may be a tall order as well.

I think the tank parity is questionable, but Ukraine is undoubtedly in better shape than they were. I would appreciate any references you have on this subject. Clearly, in terms of number of tanks in inventory, Russia has many more tanks than Ukraine. In terms of how many tanks they have available, crewed, and running in Ukraine, that may be another story. Russia has had significant tank losses in the battle so far. So has Ukraine, but not nearly as bad. Both countries suffer from the fact the Russian tanks carry their ammunition in the turret with no blowout panels. A hit usually kills the crew too. Ukraine has received shipments of tanks, many of which were storage. It is improbable they are all runners. It is even more improbable that they have that many trained crews doing nothing and available for the new tanks. Learning to operate a tank well takes time. Of course, for all we know both sides may be using marginally trained conscripts/volunteers.

[Goose]

Canada is sending M777 howitzers and guided Excalibur shells.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ukraine...-1.6427762

France is sending CAESAR howitzers.

https://defence-blog.com/france-to-send-...o-ukraine/

Both are very modern and advanced arty pieces. We don't know what type exactly US is sending,

Yes we do, as I posted yesterday, they are M777s.
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Storie...y-meeting/
The Dutch (German designed) PzH 2000s being supplied are also very capable and self propelled. They have a higher rate of fire than the others mentioned here, and much better crew protection.

It is worth noting that the 144,000 rounds being sent with the US weapons represents 2000 rounds per cannon or about 3 weeks "normal" usage in a medium theater of operations. Resupply is a necessity, obviously. It is also true that the NATO weapons have different round type options than the Russian 152 mm howitzers the Ukrainians are familiar with have. We don't know the "mix" of the 144,000 rounds, so it is hard to know the usage rates. Probably they are not all HE, some are M982.

though it will be a lot more numerous at least than what France and Canada are. But if Ukraine has parity with tanks, parity at least in troop numbers, perhaps more capable artillery, and still no Russian air superiority, well their Donbas offensive is pretty much over. Holding the land bridge to Crimea may be a tall order as well.

I think the tank parity is questionable, but Ukraine is undoubtedly in better shape than they were. I would appreciate any references you have on this subject. Clearly, in terms of number of tanks in inventory, Russia has many more tanks than Ukraine. In terms of how many tanks they have available, crewed, and running in Ukraine, that may be another story. Russia has had significant tank losses in the battle so far. So has Ukraine, but not nearly as bad. Both countries suffer from the fact the Russian tanks carry their ammunition in the turret with no blowout panels. A hit usually kills the crew too. Ukraine has received shipments of tanks, many of which were storage. It is improbable they are all runners. It is even more improbable that they have that many trained crews doing nothing and available for the new tanks. Learning to operate a tank well takes time. Of course, for all we know both sides may be using marginally trained conscripts/volunteers.

[BostonCard]

A lot of Russian tanks are unusable. Their reported numbers were always inflated, and included a lot of tanks that were parked and poorly maintained.

Here’s the source for the estimate that Ukraine has more tanks.

https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-now-more-...29192.html

Ukraine now has more tanks on the ground than Russia does, a senior US defense official told The Washington Post.

"Right now, the Ukrainians have more tanks in Ukraine than the Russians do … and they certainly have the purview to use them," the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told The Post.

BC

[BostonCard]

A lot of Russian tanks are unusable. Their reported numbers were always inflated, and included a lot of tanks that were parked and poorly maintained.

Here’s the source for the estimate that Ukraine has more tanks.

https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-now-more-...29192.html

Ukraine now has more tanks on the ground than Russia does, a senior US defense official told The Washington Post.

"Right now, the Ukrainians have more tanks in Ukraine than the Russians do … and they certainly have the purview to use them," the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told The Post.

BC

[OutsiderFan]

Using basic logic, the escalating support the west is giving Ukraine suggests military and diplomatic leaders know they are already at war against Russia as well. And, my guess is NATO knows Russia's plans because western intelligence knows where Putin is taking his morning dump.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/BBCHARDtalk/status/1517518505997914113[/tweet]

[OutsiderFan]

Using basic logic, the escalating support the west is giving Ukraine suggests military and diplomatic leaders know they are already at war against Russia as well. And, my guess is NATO knows Russia's plans because western intelligence knows where Putin is taking his morning dump.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/BBCHARDtalk/status/1517518505997914113[/tweet]

[Goose]

A lot of Russian tanks are unusable.  Their reported numbers were always inflated, and included a lot of tanks that were parked and poorly maintained.

Here’s the source for the estimate that Ukraine has more tanks.

https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-now-more-...29192.html

Ukraine now has more tanks on the ground than Russia does, a senior US defense official told The Washington Post.

"Right now, the Ukrainians have more tanks in Ukraine than the Russians do … and they certainly have the purview to use them," the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told The Post.

BC

Yes, I had seen that. Here is the next paragraph.
"Insider was unable to independently verify this claim, and it is unclear exactly how many tanks both Russia and Ukraine have eight weeks into the war."

Even this article itself casts doubt on the anonymous assertion, so I assumed there were better sources somewhere. I agree that it is unclear exactly how many tanks either side has at this point. It is even more unclear how many of those tanks (on both sides) are "runners" and how many of them have crews. In WW II the limitation was almost always the crews, not the tanks. The US and the UK had scads of tanks, but attrition would cut the number of crews. Replacing the tanks was easy, replacing the crews was hard. What is clear is that Ukraine has recently received a large number of tanks from storage in other countries. How many operational crewed tanks that translates to is not clear.

[Goose]

A lot of Russian tanks are unusable.  Their reported numbers were always inflated, and included a lot of tanks that were parked and poorly maintained.

Here’s the source for the estimate that Ukraine has more tanks.

https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-now-more-...29192.html

Ukraine now has more tanks on the ground than Russia does, a senior US defense official told The Washington Post.

"Right now, the Ukrainians have more tanks in Ukraine than the Russians do … and they certainly have the purview to use them," the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told The Post.

BC

Yes, I had seen that. Here is the next paragraph.
"Insider was unable to independently verify this claim, and it is unclear exactly how many tanks both Russia and Ukraine have eight weeks into the war."

Even this article itself casts doubt on the anonymous assertion, so I assumed there were better sources somewhere. I agree that it is unclear exactly how many tanks either side has at this point. It is even more unclear how many of those tanks (on both sides) are "runners" and how many of them have crews. In WW II the limitation was almost always the crews, not the tanks. The US and the UK had scads of tanks, but attrition would cut the number of crews. Replacing the tanks was easy, replacing the crews was hard. What is clear is that Ukraine has recently received a large number of tanks from storage in other countries. How many operational crewed tanks that translates to is not clear.

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/iAmTheWarax/status/1517695804097630208?s=20&t=AOTtmCirAFX3JBlHMxq0ig[/tweet]

Lol

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/iAmTheWarax/status/1517695804097630208?s=20&t=AOTtmCirAFX3JBlHMxq0ig[/tweet]

Lol

[Goose]

Using basic logic, the escalating support the west is giving Ukraine suggests military and diplomatic leaders know they are already at war against Russia as well.

I am not so sure about "basic logic" in this situation. Basic logic would suggest this whole situation would never happen. That said, if the West and Russia are engaged in a war, it is certainly a proxy war. If it weren't USAFE would have eliminated the Russian supply convoys around Kiev in about the three hours they estimated it would take. It is also certainly an asymmetric war in that Russia has troops in contact and the West does not. That is a very big deal. The West very much doesn't want Ukraine to be defeated, but at present has limited tactical risk and no "skin" in the game. It is unclear how far the West will go in increasing that risk. Russia is certainly "more in". For them, the tactical and strategic options available are much more limited and potentially risky (both to them and the world).

And, my guess is NATO knows Russia's plans because western intelligence knows where Putin is taking his morning dump.

Unfortunately, no. The two reasons for this are 1) The decision making in Russia has become so concentrated it is difficult to get any information. Putin is in a bubble that is kind of a "black hole". Another way to look at it is that even high level Russians don't know what the war aims/strategy actually is, let alone Western intelligence agencies. We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

[Goose]

Using basic logic, the escalating support the west is giving Ukraine suggests military and diplomatic leaders know they are already at war against Russia as well.

I am not so sure about "basic logic" in this situation. Basic logic would suggest this whole situation would never happen. That said, if the West and Russia are engaged in a war, it is certainly a proxy war. If it weren't USAFE would have eliminated the Russian supply convoys around Kiev in about the three hours they estimated it would take. It is also certainly an asymmetric war in that Russia has troops in contact and the West does not. That is a very big deal. The West very much doesn't want Ukraine to be defeated, but at present has limited tactical risk and no "skin" in the game. It is unclear how far the West will go in increasing that risk. Russia is certainly "more in". For them, the tactical and strategic options available are much more limited and potentially risky (both to them and the world).

And, my guess is NATO knows Russia's plans because western intelligence knows where Putin is taking his morning dump.

Unfortunately, no. The two reasons for this are 1) The decision making in Russia has become so concentrated it is difficult to get any information. Putin is in a bubble that is kind of a "black hole". Another way to look at it is that even high level Russians don't know what the war aims/strategy actually is, let alone Western intelligence agencies. We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

[lex24]

Using basic logic, the escalating support the west is giving Ukraine suggests military and diplomatic leaders know they are already at war against Russia as well.

I am not so sure about "basic logic" in this situation. Basic logic would suggest this whole situation would never happen. That said, if the West and Russia are engaged in a war, it is certainly a proxy war. If it weren't USAFE would have eliminated the Russian supply convoys around Kiev in about the three hours they estimated it would take. It is also certainly an asymmetric war in that Russia has troops in contact and the West does not. That is a very big deal. The West very much doesn't want Ukraine to be defeated, but at present has limited tactical risk and no "skin" in the game. It is unclear how far the West will go in increasing that risk. Russia is certainly "more in". For them, the tactical and strategic options available are much more limited and potentially risky (both to them and the world).

And, my guess is NATO knows Russia's plans because western intelligence knows where Putin is taking his morning dump.

Unfortunately, no. The two reasons for this are 1) The decision making in Russia has become so concentrated it is difficult to get any information. Putin is in a bubble that is kind of a "black hole". Another way to look at it is that even high level Russians don't know what the war aims/strategy actually is, let alone Western intelligence agencies. We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

I could say something, but I think it violates the Terry Rule. So, I’ll keep my thought hidden in my glove, also called a Mitt……..

[lex24]

Using basic logic, the escalating support the west is giving Ukraine suggests military and diplomatic leaders know they are already at war against Russia as well.

I am not so sure about "basic logic" in this situation. Basic logic would suggest this whole situation would never happen. That said, if the West and Russia are engaged in a war, it is certainly a proxy war. If it weren't USAFE would have eliminated the Russian supply convoys around Kiev in about the three hours they estimated it would take. It is also certainly an asymmetric war in that Russia has troops in contact and the West does not. That is a very big deal. The West very much doesn't want Ukraine to be defeated, but at present has limited tactical risk and no "skin" in the game. It is unclear how far the West will go in increasing that risk. Russia is certainly "more in". For them, the tactical and strategic options available are much more limited and potentially risky (both to them and the world).

And, my guess is NATO knows Russia's plans because western intelligence knows where Putin is taking his morning dump.

Unfortunately, no. The two reasons for this are 1) The decision making in Russia has become so concentrated it is difficult to get any information. Putin is in a bubble that is kind of a "black hole". Another way to look at it is that even high level Russians don't know what the war aims/strategy actually is, let alone Western intelligence agencies. We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

I could say something, but I think it violates the Terry Rule. So, I’ll keep my thought hidden in my glove, also called a Mitt……..

[Goose]

 We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

I could say something, but I think it violates the Terry Rule.  So, I’ll keep my thought hidden in my glove, also called a Mitt……..

To be clear, my comments were not intended as a political statement. The US has many intelligence needs and can only allocate so many resources. The evaluation that China was more of a potential problem than Russia and required more resources was/is rational IMHO. Terrorism also has drawn resources it did not draw during the cold war. Those are just facts. Could the last 5 Presidents have done a "better job" of allocating intelligence resources? In hindsight, for sure, but intelligence is about foresight, and that is lots harder. Had I made a political statement, it would have been kind to no one.
EDIT: Oops, I forgot about our current president. He hasn't been there long enough to evaluate his allocation of intelligence resources. The 5 I am referring to are the 5 before him.

[Goose]

 We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

I could say something, but I think it violates the Terry Rule.  So, I’ll keep my thought hidden in my glove, also called a Mitt……..

To be clear, my comments were not intended as a political statement. The US has many intelligence needs and can only allocate so many resources. The evaluation that China was more of a potential problem than Russia and required more resources was/is rational IMHO. Terrorism also has drawn resources it did not draw during the cold war. Those are just facts. Could the last 5 Presidents have done a "better job" of allocating intelligence resources? In hindsight, for sure, but intelligence is about foresight, and that is lots harder. Had I made a political statement, it would have been kind to no one.
EDIT: Oops, I forgot about our current president. He hasn't been there long enough to evaluate his allocation of intelligence resources. The 5 I am referring to are the 5 before him.

[lex24]

 We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

I could say something, but I think it violates the Terry Rule.  So, I’ll keep my thought hidden in my glove, also called a Mitt……..

To be clear, my comments were not intended as a political statement. The US has many intelligence needs and can only allocate so many resources. The evaluation that China was more of a potential problem than Russia and required more resources was/is rational IMHO. Terrorism also has drawn resources it did not draw during the cold war. Those are just facts. Could the last 5 Presidents done a "better job" of allocating intelligence resources? In hindsight, for sure, but intelligence is about foresight, and that is lots harder. Had I made a political statement, it would have been kind to no one.

Relax. I was just having a bit of fun….But I think we have adequate resources and have had adequate resources to cover Russia and China. But I also think the Giants should have opened their payroll……

[lex24]

 We get satellite images and intercepted communications from which we try to piece things together and guess what Russia will do next. Little reliable human intelligence. 2) Russia fell of the table as an intelligence target in the mid 90s and hit the floor in the Obama administration. No priority, no money, and all the Russian experts retired. We know much less today than we did during the Cold War.

I could say something, but I think it violates the Terry Rule.  So, I’ll keep my thought hidden in my glove, also called a Mitt……..

To be clear, my comments were not intended as a political statement. The US has many intelligence needs and can only allocate so many resources. The evaluation that China was more of a potential problem than Russia and required more resources was/is rational IMHO. Terrorism also has drawn resources it did not draw during the cold war. Those are just facts. Could the last 5 Presidents done a "better job" of allocating intelligence resources? In hindsight, for sure, but intelligence is about foresight, and that is lots harder. Had I made a political statement, it would have been kind to no one.

Relax. I was just having a bit of fun….But I think we have adequate resources and have had adequate resources to cover Russia and China. But I also think the Giants should have opened their payroll……

[dabigv13]

US intelligence has been decisive in the Ukraine invasion, not sure why we are poo-pooing it here. The Hostomel assault for one was completely blown up because of it. More info will likely become clear as time goes on, but would not be surprised if many of Ukraine's statement victories had a big helping hand from US intel.

Need to move on from prewar conventional wisdom on things like Russian military capability and US intelligence capabilities re Russia. We have evidence now from the real deal.

[dabigv13]

US intelligence has been decisive in the Ukraine invasion, not sure why we are poo-pooing it here. The Hostomel assault for one was completely blown up because of it. More info will likely become clear as time goes on, but would not be surprised if many of Ukraine's statement victories had a big helping hand from US intel.

Need to move on from prewar conventional wisdom on things like Russian military capability and US intelligence capabilities re Russia. We have evidence now from the real deal.

[BostonCard]

There’s a difference between signal intelligence and human intelligence. Our services have been very good at tracking the Russians and deducing what they are going to be doing based on what we can see. But when you surround a country on three sides with deployed 150,000 troops it is not too hard to deduce what’s about to happen. We can see everything that’s going on in the battlefield, and because the Russians can’t figure out encrypted Comms, we can hear them as well.

What we can’t do well is know what Putin is thinking. But we’ve actually done surprisingly well even here, probably helped along by the fact that the upper echelons of Russian military and intelligence have very mixed feelings about the war. It is clear that someone (likely multiple someone’s) were talking.

But all of this is more a reflection of Russian failures than US sustained efforts. And he is right that successive presidents have prioritized elsewhere, because of threats from Al Qaida and ISIS, China, or wishcasting a better relationship with Russia (not partisan, three straight Presidents were drawn in by the lure that we could have better relationships with Russia).

And yet, even now, Ukraine is sadly less consequential economically and geopolitically than a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But China has made a career about studiously avoiding the pitfalls that have befallen Russia/Soviet Union, which is why Ukrainian success is so important.

BC

[BostonCard]

There’s a difference between signal intelligence and human intelligence. Our services have been very good at tracking the Russians and deducing what they are going to be doing based on what we can see. But when you surround a country on three sides with deployed 150,000 troops it is not too hard to deduce what’s about to happen. We can see everything that’s going on in the battlefield, and because the Russians can’t figure out encrypted Comms, we can hear them as well.

What we can’t do well is know what Putin is thinking. But we’ve actually done surprisingly well even here, probably helped along by the fact that the upper echelons of Russian military and intelligence have very mixed feelings about the war. It is clear that someone (likely multiple someone’s) were talking.

But all of this is more a reflection of Russian failures than US sustained efforts. And he is right that successive presidents have prioritized elsewhere, because of threats from Al Qaida and ISIS, China, or wishcasting a better relationship with Russia (not partisan, three straight Presidents were drawn in by the lure that we could have better relationships with Russia).

And yet, even now, Ukraine is sadly less consequential economically and geopolitically than a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But China has made a career about studiously avoiding the pitfalls that have befallen Russia/Soviet Union, which is why Ukrainian success is so important.

BC

[Goose]

There’s a difference between signal intelligence and human intelligence. Our services have been very good at tracking the Russians and deducing what they are going to be doing based on what we can see. But when you surround a country on three sides with deployed 150,000 troops it is not too hard to deduce what’s about to happen.

Totally agree.

We can see everything that’s going on in the battlefield, and because the Russians can’t figure out encrypted Comms, we can hear them as well.

To be fair, the Russians are just as good (at times much better) than we are at encrypted comms. What they are not better at is building and distributing this technology to the troops. They are even worse at training the troops to use them. On top of that, communications security is so important to the Russians that adjacent units often don't have the comms keys to talk to each other (even when everything is working). They are expected to go through higher echelons to do that. As a result, they often take necessary "shortcuts".

What we can’t do well is know what Putin is thinking. But we’ve actually done surprisingly well even here, probably helped along by the fact that the upper echelons of Russian military and intelligence have very mixed feelings about the war. It is clear that someone (likely multiple someone’s) were talking.

For sure knowing what Putin is thinking is a problem, and he doesn't "share" much. As far as it being clear that "someone is talking", I am not so sure about that. If you can elaborate, that would be good. I think COMINT often gives third parties lots of information that wasn't intended to be. It is also very surprising what can be deduced by ORBAT details and comparisons to previous actions or training events. There was a time in the 90s when everybody and anything was for sale. That pretty much stopped because there were safer ways to make money and we also stopped buying. There are undoubtedly some "true believers" out there, but I strongly suspect any productive HUMINT sources are Mossad or Ukrainian GUR assets, not ours. Heck, I would even give the BND better odds.

But all of this is more a reflection of Russian failures than US sustained efforts. And he is right that successive presidents have prioritized elsewhere, because of threats from Al Qaida and ISIS, China, or wishcasting a better relationship with Russia (not partisan, three straight Presidents were drawn in by the lure that we could have better relationships with Russia).

Make it four. Bush the first was in that category IMHO. I exclude Trump only because I don't think he had an opinion on Intelligence collection and undoubtedly thought our relations with Russia were "perfect". Intelligence collection is not mutually exclusive of better relations. It often fosters it, as we find out our opponent isn't 10 feet tall and actually has no plan to invade our country.

And yet, even now, Ukraine is sadly less consequential economically and geopolitically than a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But China has made a career about studiously avoiding the pitfalls that have befallen Russia/Soviet Union, which is why Ukrainian success is so important.



BC

Not sure China casts its actions as avoiding Russia's errors, but they are indeed a different beast that we also don't understand. Ukrainian success is indeed important to our nation, the West, and to a peaceful world IMHO.

---

US intelligence has been decisive in the Ukraine invasion, not sure why we are poo-pooing it here. The Hostomel assault for one was completely blown up because of it.

Probably you are not aware of how ironic that statement is. You might want to read Intelligence in War by John Keegan. If you don't want to read it all, just read the chapter on Crete.

More info will likely become clear as time goes on, but would not be surprised if many of Ukraine's statement victories had a big helping hand from US intel.

Maybe, but I am pretty confident the real "facts" will not come out while I am still alive. These things generally have about a 30 year quiet window.

Need to move on from prewar conventional wisdom on things like Russian military capability and US intelligence capabilities re Russia. We have evidence now from the real deal.

I think you are arguing against yourself here a bit. The prewar conventional wisdom was the product of US intelligence re Russia (and Ukraine). The forecast was Ukraine as a country folds up but an insurgency goes on. We were preparing for the insurgency and a government in exile. We offered Zelenskyy a ride. Didn't turn out that way.

One of the most difficult things to predict is how well any given military organization will react and fight. You can get an idea by observing training and by observing similar actions, but it is far from an exact science. You need HUMINT that can actually talk to the troops and judge their "temperature". US Intelligence was in general wrong about Russia's ability to execute it's war plans because we didn't know how bad it's troops actually were. We also couldn't know how badly Russia would fail in motivating the troops so they would embrace the fight and how much that would affect their performance. Similarly, we didn't know how well and determined Ukraine's populace would fight. Probably nobody did. If Zelenskyy was just a good comedian, IMHO we wouldn't be even close to where we are now in Ukraine. And virtually nobody predicted that.

[Goose]

There’s a difference between signal intelligence and human intelligence. Our services have been very good at tracking the Russians and deducing what they are going to be doing based on what we can see. But when you surround a country on three sides with deployed 150,000 troops it is not too hard to deduce what’s about to happen.

Totally agree.

We can see everything that’s going on in the battlefield, and because the Russians can’t figure out encrypted Comms, we can hear them as well.

To be fair, the Russians are just as good (at times much better) than we are at encrypted comms. What they are not better at is building and distributing this technology to the troops. They are even worse at training the troops to use them. On top of that, communications security is so important to the Russians that adjacent units often don't have the comms keys to talk to each other (even when everything is working). They are expected to go through higher echelons to do that. As a result, they often take necessary "shortcuts".

What we can’t do well is know what Putin is thinking. But we’ve actually done surprisingly well even here, probably helped along by the fact that the upper echelons of Russian military and intelligence have very mixed feelings about the war. It is clear that someone (likely multiple someone’s) were talking.

For sure knowing what Putin is thinking is a problem, and he doesn't "share" much. As far as it being clear that "someone is talking", I am not so sure about that. If you can elaborate, that would be good. I think COMINT often gives third parties lots of information that wasn't intended to be. It is also very surprising what can be deduced by ORBAT details and comparisons to previous actions or training events. There was a time in the 90s when everybody and anything was for sale. That pretty much stopped because there were safer ways to make money and we also stopped buying. There are undoubtedly some "true believers" out there, but I strongly suspect any productive HUMINT sources are Mossad or Ukrainian GUR assets, not ours. Heck, I would even give the BND better odds.

But all of this is more a reflection of Russian failures than US sustained efforts. And he is right that successive presidents have prioritized elsewhere, because of threats from Al Qaida and ISIS, China, or wishcasting a better relationship with Russia (not partisan, three straight Presidents were drawn in by the lure that we could have better relationships with Russia).

Make it four. Bush the first was in that category IMHO. I exclude Trump only because I don't think he had an opinion on Intelligence collection and undoubtedly thought our relations with Russia were "perfect". Intelligence collection is not mutually exclusive of better relations. It often fosters it, as we find out our opponent isn't 10 feet tall and actually has no plan to invade our country.

And yet, even now, Ukraine is sadly less consequential economically and geopolitically than a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. But China has made a career about studiously avoiding the pitfalls that have befallen Russia/Soviet Union, which is why Ukrainian success is so important.



BC

Not sure China casts its actions as avoiding Russia's errors, but they are indeed a different beast that we also don't understand. Ukrainian success is indeed important to our nation, the West, and to a peaceful world IMHO.

---

US intelligence has been decisive in the Ukraine invasion, not sure why we are poo-pooing it here. The Hostomel assault for one was completely blown up because of it.

Probably you are not aware of how ironic that statement is. You might want to read Intelligence in War by John Keegan. If you don't want to read it all, just read the chapter on Crete.

More info will likely become clear as time goes on, but would not be surprised if many of Ukraine's statement victories had a big helping hand from US intel.

Maybe, but I am pretty confident the real "facts" will not come out while I am still alive. These things generally have about a 30 year quiet window.

Need to move on from prewar conventional wisdom on things like Russian military capability and US intelligence capabilities re Russia. We have evidence now from the real deal.

I think you are arguing against yourself here a bit. The prewar conventional wisdom was the product of US intelligence re Russia (and Ukraine). The forecast was Ukraine as a country folds up but an insurgency goes on. We were preparing for the insurgency and a government in exile. We offered Zelenskyy a ride. Didn't turn out that way.

One of the most difficult things to predict is how well any given military organization will react and fight. You can get an idea by observing training and by observing similar actions, but it is far from an exact science. You need HUMINT that can actually talk to the troops and judge their "temperature". US Intelligence was in general wrong about Russia's ability to execute it's war plans because we didn't know how bad it's troops actually were. We also couldn't know how badly Russia would fail in motivating the troops so they would embrace the fight and how much that would affect their performance. Similarly, we didn't know how well and determined Ukraine's populace would fight. Probably nobody did. If Zelenskyy was just a good comedian, IMHO we wouldn't be even close to where we are now in Ukraine. And virtually nobody predicted that.

[bl82]

Great Twitter thread on Russia-Ukraine by Michael Kofman that begins with:

"Without national mobilization, I think the Donbas is the last major offensive the Russian military can attempt given the current state & availability of forces. Whether it succeeds, or fails, the Russian military will be largely exhausted in terms of offensive potential."

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status...4293848065

[bl82]

Great Twitter thread on Russia-Ukraine by Michael Kofman that begins with:

"Without national mobilization, I think the Donbas is the last major offensive the Russian military can attempt given the current state & availability of forces. Whether it succeeds, or fails, the Russian military will be largely exhausted in terms of offensive potential."

https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status...4293848065

[slide]

Make it four. Bush the first was in that category IMHO. I exclude Trump only because I don't think he had an opinion on Intelligence collection and undoubtedly thought our relations with Russia were "perfect". Intelligence collection is not mutually exclusive of better relations. It often fosters it, as we find out our opponent isn't 10 feet tall and actually has no plan to invade our country.

your statement seems to be a very generous read given Trump's distaste for the intelligence community overall.  may be true on the collection but almost certainly wrong on the analytic part of intel.

[slide]

Make it four. Bush the first was in that category IMHO. I exclude Trump only because I don't think he had an opinion on Intelligence collection and undoubtedly thought our relations with Russia were "perfect". Intelligence collection is not mutually exclusive of better relations. It often fosters it, as we find out our opponent isn't 10 feet tall and actually has no plan to invade our country.

your statement seems to be a very generous read given Trump's distaste for the intelligence community overall.  may be true on the collection but almost certainly wrong on the analytic part of intel.