[Goose]

Even ISW now says that Ukraine is preparing to withdraw from Lysychansk. Major losses in the Donbas over the past few days.

Right thing to do. Unfortunate, but one can't let symbolism stand in the way of good tactics. Last thing Ukraine needs is a Verdun. Mariupol was a different case, as holding on there kept the M14 closed for a very long time.

It is really, really too bad that Ukraine did not have the counter-battery power to adequately attrit the Russian artillery. If we in the US haven't worked out a feasible plan with the Ukrainian military to do that by now, everybody should just stand down and avoid as much death as possible. That is not to say the plan can't fail, or need to be modified, but if no such (at least halfway reasonable) plan exists it is borderline criminal on our part to continue dribbling in military hardware that won't do the job.

It is not as if we didn't know Russia had lots of artillery and plenty of experience using it. We may have though the Russians weren't going to press on, but you must plan for the strategies that they would/could use to continue the war in the best way possible for them. They did press on, and Ukraine was not prepared to fight an artillery battle. That is our fault. We needed a plan for that and we didn't have one. We knew this in March and did not take the necessary steps. Ukraine was already asking for  MLRS/HIMARS because they could see it possibly coming. This is on us IMHO.

[Goose]

Even ISW now says that Ukraine is preparing to withdraw from Lysychansk. Major losses in the Donbas over the past few days.

Right thing to do. Unfortunate, but one can't let symbolism stand in the way of good tactics. Last thing Ukraine needs is a Verdun. Mariupol was a different case, as holding on there kept the M14 closed for a very long time.

It is really, really too bad that Ukraine did not have the counter-battery power to adequately attrit the Russian artillery. If we in the US haven't worked out a feasible plan with the Ukrainian military to do that by now, everybody should just stand down and avoid as much death as possible. That is not to say the plan can't fail, or need to be modified, but if no such (at least halfway reasonable) plan exists it is borderline criminal on our part to continue dribbling in military hardware that won't do the job.

It is not as if we didn't know Russia had lots of artillery and plenty of experience using it. We may have though the Russians weren't going to press on, but you must plan for the strategies that they would/could use to continue the war in the best way possible for them. They did press on, and Ukraine was not prepared to fight an artillery battle. That is our fault. We needed a plan for that and we didn't have one. We knew this in March and did not take the necessary steps. Ukraine was already asking for  MLRS/HIMARS because they could see it possibly coming. This is on us IMHO.

[Mick]

Snake Island to me is a puzzle. Why Russia wants it is a total mystery. It just seems to get Russians killed. It is almost like it is on a list somewhere and nobody dares question the list.

I think it has symbolic value. It's Ukraine's last possession in the Crimean Sea, right?  Maybe that's why they want those patrol boats.  Avoid mines, attack Russian assets in Crimea, perhaps?  And by having Snake Island, they have territorial waters 12 miles in all directions, yes?  Protects some shipping lanes?

[Mick]

Snake Island to me is a puzzle. Why Russia wants it is a total mystery. It just seems to get Russians killed. It is almost like it is on a list somewhere and nobody dares question the list.

I think it has symbolic value. It's Ukraine's last possession in the Crimean Sea, right?  Maybe that's why they want those patrol boats.  Avoid mines, attack Russian assets in Crimea, perhaps?  And by having Snake Island, they have territorial waters 12 miles in all directions, yes?  Protects some shipping lanes?

[Goose]

Snake Island to me is a puzzle. Why Russia wants it is a total mystery. It just seems to get Russians killed. It is almost like it is on a list somewhere and nobody dares question the list.

I think it has symbolic value. It's Ukraine's last possession in the Crimean Sea, right?  Maybe that's why they want those patrol boats.  Avoid mines, attack Russian assets in Crimea, perhaps?  And by having Snake Island, they have territorial waters 12 miles in all directions, yes?  Protects some shipping lanes?

Ukraine does not and has not possessed Snake Island since the "Russian ship, go **** yourself" day. They can't. It is totally exposed to Russian aviation against which they have no viable defense. They wouldn't last 5 minutes if they were attacked from the air. They know this. So it protects nothing for Ukraine. Why Ukraine would want it makes sense, as you point out, but they can't defend it.

The question is why Russia wants it. They can maybe, at great cost, defend it. So far, they haven't been able to do so. It has cost them a lot of men and ships that they can't replace. Yes, maybe it is a symbol, but at what cost? It gives them nothing they don't have already. Stupid.

[Goose]

Snake Island to me is a puzzle. Why Russia wants it is a total mystery. It just seems to get Russians killed. It is almost like it is on a list somewhere and nobody dares question the list.

I think it has symbolic value. It's Ukraine's last possession in the Crimean Sea, right?  Maybe that's why they want those patrol boats.  Avoid mines, attack Russian assets in Crimea, perhaps?  And by having Snake Island, they have territorial waters 12 miles in all directions, yes?  Protects some shipping lanes?

Ukraine does not and has not possessed Snake Island since the "Russian ship, go **** yourself" day. They can't. It is totally exposed to Russian aviation against which they have no viable defense. They wouldn't last 5 minutes if they were attacked from the air. They know this. So it protects nothing for Ukraine. Why Ukraine would want it makes sense, as you point out, but they can't defend it.

The question is why Russia wants it. They can maybe, at great cost, defend it. So far, they haven't been able to do so. It has cost them a lot of men and ships that they can't replace. Yes, maybe it is a symbol, but at what cost? It gives them nothing they don't have already. Stupid.

[BostonCard]

This video sheds some light on the strategic importance of Snake Island.

https://www.wsj.com/video/series/wsj-exp...jem10point

Basically, for Russia, it makes it easier to blockade Odessa and the remaining Ukrainian ports.  To be fair, they don’t need Snake Island to do it.

BC

[BostonCard]

This video sheds some light on the strategic importance of Snake Island.

https://www.wsj.com/video/series/wsj-exp...jem10point

Basically, for Russia, it makes it easier to blockade Odessa and the remaining Ukrainian ports.  To be fair, they don’t need Snake Island to do it.

BC

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-retre...47937.html

Right thing to do. Politically difficult, but necessary. Lets hope there is a plan being executed to stop and roll back the Russian "creeping barrage" across Eastern Ukraine.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-retre...47937.html

Right thing to do. Politically difficult, but necessary. Lets hope there is a plan being executed to stop and roll back the Russian "creeping barrage" across Eastern Ukraine.

[dabigv13]

HIMARS in action!

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/PatriotGor/status/15...3EqTXiY1wQ[/tweet]

I'm not so pessimistic as Goose. It took Russia two months of focusing their combat power to take tens of miles of front line and some small towns, barely reducing Ukraine's significant salient in the Donbas, and smashing up lots of their best gear and troops to do it. And all the while Ukraine has been advancing, slowly but still, in the more important north and south. 

It's going to be a long war. If we didn't "dribble in" military aid (in actuality, provide more aid to an individual state since WW2) I suspect there would be a lot more Buchas and Irpins. There's no simple way of just stopping this war that avoids less bloodshed.

[dabigv13]

HIMARS in action!

[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/PatriotGor/status/15...3EqTXiY1wQ[/tweet]

I'm not so pessimistic as Goose. It took Russia two months of focusing their combat power to take tens of miles of front line and some small towns, barely reducing Ukraine's significant salient in the Donbas, and smashing up lots of their best gear and troops to do it. And all the while Ukraine has been advancing, slowly but still, in the more important north and south. 

It's going to be a long war. If we didn't "dribble in" military aid (in actuality, provide more aid to an individual state since WW2) I suspect there would be a lot more Buchas and Irpins. There's no simple way of just stopping this war that avoids less bloodshed.

[OutsiderFan]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/CanadianUkrain1/status/1540319670884089856[/tweet]

[OutsiderFan]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/CanadianUkrain1/status/1540319670884089856[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Don't buy it. Belarus is not mobilized. Their president has already resisted mobilization. Pretty sure that account is a fraud too, but maybe it's a different Canadian falsely claiming to be fighting in Ukraine that I'm thinking of.

[dabigv13]

Don't buy it. Belarus is not mobilized. Their president has already resisted mobilization. Pretty sure that account is a fraud too, but maybe it's a different Canadian falsely claiming to be fighting in Ukraine that I'm thinking of.

[Goose]

This video sheds some light on the strategic importance of Snake Island.

https://www.wsj.com/video/series/wsj-exp...jem10point

Basically, for Russia, it makes it easier to blockade Odessa and the remaining Ukrainian ports.  To be fair, they don’t need Snake Island to do it.

BC

BC, I think the WSJ article sheds little if any light on the "strategic importance" of Snake Island. The only place they discuss that at all is the possibility of installing a Tombstone/Gravestone radar on the island. Otherwise, they talk about the battle for Russia to defend the island and how messy that has been. As they point out, the Tor and Pantsir currently there are short range defensive systems. Ukraine has repeatedly destroyed Tors on the island and there is no reason to expect they can't do so again. That is why the WSJ "experts" said it was extremely unlikely Russia would install a "valuable" surveillance radar on the island.

You can't hide a surveillance radar in a revetment. It's antenna has to see the horizon. The Tor also can't hit what it can't illuminate. Probably that is why the Tor and Pantsir left their revetments during the attacks. They were blind there. They are also extremely vulnerable to drone strikes, as we have seen. None of the present or hypothesized systems have any anti-ship capability. Commercial ships could sail right by them unless and until that changes. On top of that, Snake Island has virtually no fresh water. You have to bring that and absolutely everything else you need in by ship, month after month. Those ships have gone boom a lot. So far, it is unclear Russia can even defend Snake Island, let alone use it for anything.

Snake island is 200 km by air from Odesa. Kherson is 145 km. Other areas fully under Russian air supremacy are even closer. Clearly Russia does not control the air around Snake Island. For Odesa, Snake Island is hard to see having any importance at all. The one scenario Snake Island has value is if Russia intends a landing in the area of Ust-Dunaisk or slightly northward. In that case using Snake Island as a radar picket and air defense location would make sense. Russia did go to some trouble to destroy the railroad from Odesa to that area. They also have been messing around in Moldova and certainly Transnistria. However, making Snake Island strong enough to even defend itself is dubious, and Russia doesn't have the sea control to just run convoys there at will. Hard to see that happening, but it does keep Ukraine worrying about it.

[Goose]

This video sheds some light on the strategic importance of Snake Island.

https://www.wsj.com/video/series/wsj-exp...jem10point

Basically, for Russia, it makes it easier to blockade Odessa and the remaining Ukrainian ports.  To be fair, they don’t need Snake Island to do it.

BC

BC, I think the WSJ article sheds little if any light on the "strategic importance" of Snake Island. The only place they discuss that at all is the possibility of installing a Tombstone/Gravestone radar on the island. Otherwise, they talk about the battle for Russia to defend the island and how messy that has been. As they point out, the Tor and Pantsir currently there are short range defensive systems. Ukraine has repeatedly destroyed Tors on the island and there is no reason to expect they can't do so again. That is why the WSJ "experts" said it was extremely unlikely Russia would install a "valuable" surveillance radar on the island.

You can't hide a surveillance radar in a revetment. It's antenna has to see the horizon. The Tor also can't hit what it can't illuminate. Probably that is why the Tor and Pantsir left their revetments during the attacks. They were blind there. They are also extremely vulnerable to drone strikes, as we have seen. None of the present or hypothesized systems have any anti-ship capability. Commercial ships could sail right by them unless and until that changes. On top of that, Snake Island has virtually no fresh water. You have to bring that and absolutely everything else you need in by ship, month after month. Those ships have gone boom a lot. So far, it is unclear Russia can even defend Snake Island, let alone use it for anything.

Snake island is 200 km by air from Odesa. Kherson is 145 km. Other areas fully under Russian air supremacy are even closer. Clearly Russia does not control the air around Snake Island. For Odesa, Snake Island is hard to see having any importance at all. The one scenario Snake Island has value is if Russia intends a landing in the area of Ust-Dunaisk or slightly northward. In that case using Snake Island as a radar picket and air defense location would make sense. Russia did go to some trouble to destroy the railroad from Odesa to that area. They also have been messing around in Moldova and certainly Transnistria. However, making Snake Island strong enough to even defend itself is dubious, and Russia doesn't have the sea control to just run convoys there at will. Hard to see that happening, but it does keep Ukraine worrying about it.

[Goose]

I'm not so pessimistic as Goose. It took Russia two months of focusing their combat power to take tens of miles of front line and some small towns, barely reducing Ukraine's significant salient in the Donbas, and smashing up lots of their best gear and troops to do it. And all the while Ukraine has been advancing, slowly but still, in the more important north and south. 


It's going to be a long war. If we didn't "dribble in" military aid (in actuality, provide more aid to an individual state since WW2) I suspect there would be a lot more Buchas and Irpins. There's no simple way of just stopping this war that avoids less bloodshed.

Naturally, I would say I am being realistic, not pessimistic :-). I am with Dabigv13 in that I believe that Ukraine really needs to win, mostly for themselves but also for "the West". This is an existential struggle for Ukraine. They were attacked. They had to fight or surrender. For us in the US, it is a "war of choice" in so far as it is a war for us. Our troops aren't getting killed. However, I strongly believe that we have a moral obligation to be upfront with Ukraine about what we will and won't do. We need to have a mutual plan that will plausibly end in Ukraine retaining it's territorial integrity. Obviously that is the goal the Ukraine has stated.

Since the beginning of this war my posts on this board have stressed the necessity of the US giving Ukraine what it needs to win, and if we can't do that we should tell them so. What I see us actually doing is responding to events as they happen instead of creating a plan to control events. Obviously Ukraine has been asking for HIMARS for a long time. My first post on that subject was on March 16th. On Feb 24th Russia controlled 60% of Luhansk. They now arguably control 97% of it. That is not a trivial gain for them. Ukraine has fought valiantly and inflicted heavy casualties on Russia in the process. It has been an expensive advance for Russia, but it has also been an expensive defensive battle for Ukraine. Ukraine became increasingly more strident in their request for long range weapons to counter Russian artillery superiority. Finally in late June they got what they should have had in early April. Lots of Ukrainians died that didn't have to, or at least could have died to better effect.

This was entirely predictable. Our actions have not, IMHO, made sense. Did we actually think that they didn't need long range weapons? If we are willing to give them now, why not then? If it turned out they didn't need them, what was the harm? If we feared what Putin would do, why do we not fear it now? In war, if you are constantly reacting to what the enemy does, you lose. Always.

Is there a plan in place that realistically could neutralize Russia's ability to continue this artillery based advance? I don't know, but given our countries actions, I fear the answer is no. I am sure that there are many such plans that COULD work, but is there one being implemented? Do both we and the Ukraine know what the plan is, or are we leaving Ukraine to kind of twist in the wind waiting to see what we will actually give them while they improvise something to defeat Russia? If so, we are behaving irresponsibly IMHO.

Ukraine may believe that at the end of the day we are going to do some particular action that will "save" them, and we have no intention of doing so. They may make decisions differently if they fully understand that. On the other hand, if we hold off aid that we actually intend to give later, Ukraine (and our DoD) will make decisions inappropriate to the "real" situation. Either way, irresponsible.

[Goose]

I'm not so pessimistic as Goose. It took Russia two months of focusing their combat power to take tens of miles of front line and some small towns, barely reducing Ukraine's significant salient in the Donbas, and smashing up lots of their best gear and troops to do it. And all the while Ukraine has been advancing, slowly but still, in the more important north and south. 


It's going to be a long war. If we didn't "dribble in" military aid (in actuality, provide more aid to an individual state since WW2) I suspect there would be a lot more Buchas and Irpins. There's no simple way of just stopping this war that avoids less bloodshed.

Naturally, I would say I am being realistic, not pessimistic :-). I am with Dabigv13 in that I believe that Ukraine really needs to win, mostly for themselves but also for "the West". This is an existential struggle for Ukraine. They were attacked. They had to fight or surrender. For us in the US, it is a "war of choice" in so far as it is a war for us. Our troops aren't getting killed. However, I strongly believe that we have a moral obligation to be upfront with Ukraine about what we will and won't do. We need to have a mutual plan that will plausibly end in Ukraine retaining it's territorial integrity. Obviously that is the goal the Ukraine has stated.

Since the beginning of this war my posts on this board have stressed the necessity of the US giving Ukraine what it needs to win, and if we can't do that we should tell them so. What I see us actually doing is responding to events as they happen instead of creating a plan to control events. Obviously Ukraine has been asking for HIMARS for a long time. My first post on that subject was on March 16th. On Feb 24th Russia controlled 60% of Luhansk. They now arguably control 97% of it. That is not a trivial gain for them. Ukraine has fought valiantly and inflicted heavy casualties on Russia in the process. It has been an expensive advance for Russia, but it has also been an expensive defensive battle for Ukraine. Ukraine became increasingly more strident in their request for long range weapons to counter Russian artillery superiority. Finally in late June they got what they should have had in early April. Lots of Ukrainians died that didn't have to, or at least could have died to better effect.

This was entirely predictable. Our actions have not, IMHO, made sense. Did we actually think that they didn't need long range weapons? If we are willing to give them now, why not then? If it turned out they didn't need them, what was the harm? If we feared what Putin would do, why do we not fear it now? In war, if you are constantly reacting to what the enemy does, you lose. Always.

Is there a plan in place that realistically could neutralize Russia's ability to continue this artillery based advance? I don't know, but given our countries actions, I fear the answer is no. I am sure that there are many such plans that COULD work, but is there one being implemented? Do both we and the Ukraine know what the plan is, or are we leaving Ukraine to kind of twist in the wind waiting to see what we will actually give them while they improvise something to defeat Russia? If so, we are behaving irresponsibly IMHO.

Ukraine may believe that at the end of the day we are going to do some particular action that will "save" them, and we have no intention of doing so. They may make decisions differently if they fully understand that. On the other hand, if we hold off aid that we actually intend to give later, Ukraine (and our DoD) will make decisions inappropriate to the "real" situation. Either way, irresponsible.

[dabigv13]

Do you have any evidence that the US is not being up front with Ukrainian leadership about what they can and will provide in near or long term? I don't think that's the case.

[dabigv13]

Do you have any evidence that the US is not being up front with Ukrainian leadership about what they can and will provide in near or long term? I don't think that's the case.

[Goose]

Do you have any evidence that the US is not being up front with Ukrainian leadership about what they can and will provide in near or long term? I don't think that's the case.

I don't think the US is intentionally deceiving anybody, except possibly themselves. There is indisputable evidence that Ukraine had repeatedly requested HIMARS which they did not get for months. As far as I know the US never told Ukraine (or anybody else) "Yes, you will get them the end of June because...". No reason exists for that delay other than indecision and lack of planning on our part as far as I can see, thus the question I posed in my response. Ukraine certainly did not behave as if they thought it was an agreed upon item. Obviously the delay had consequences to the Ukraine, or at least they seem to think these weapons will make a difference. I agree with this belief. As a bit of a rant, I think this is just plain unprofessional and irresponsible on our part. You lose wars when your decision cycle is too long. We are not under the stress Ukraine is. We should be clear on what we can do and how that will win the war. If we can't figure that out then we have no business being involved at all.

I find https://www.yahoo.com/news/analysis-russ...51828.html interesting and timely. However, I really doubt that 8 HIMARS and "a few" M270s will be enough to change the course of the war. If more are already agreed to and Ukraine knows this, fine, but right now I have zero confidence we have really thought this through based on our previous behavior.

[Goose]

Do you have any evidence that the US is not being up front with Ukrainian leadership about what they can and will provide in near or long term? I don't think that's the case.

I don't think the US is intentionally deceiving anybody, except possibly themselves. There is indisputable evidence that Ukraine had repeatedly requested HIMARS which they did not get for months. As far as I know the US never told Ukraine (or anybody else) "Yes, you will get them the end of June because...". No reason exists for that delay other than indecision and lack of planning on our part as far as I can see, thus the question I posed in my response. Ukraine certainly did not behave as if they thought it was an agreed upon item. Obviously the delay had consequences to the Ukraine, or at least they seem to think these weapons will make a difference. I agree with this belief. As a bit of a rant, I think this is just plain unprofessional and irresponsible on our part. You lose wars when your decision cycle is too long. We are not under the stress Ukraine is. We should be clear on what we can do and how that will win the war. If we can't figure that out then we have no business being involved at all.

I find https://www.yahoo.com/news/analysis-russ...51828.html interesting and timely. However, I really doubt that 8 HIMARS and "a few" M270s will be enough to change the course of the war. If more are already agreed to and Ukraine knows this, fine, but right now I have zero confidence we have really thought this through based on our previous behavior.

[dabigv13]

Of course Ukraine will publicly call for the maximum. But we don't have 300 HIMARS to give them. Would the ultimate outcome be a lot different if they had ~20 HIMARS/ M270s a month earlier? Would Ukraine have been able to spare people to train on these systems earlier in March or April? I'm sure there was plenty of behind the scenes discussion with NATO allies on this issue- maybe Germany or France or another major ally was against this sort of transfer earlier and needed some convincing.

Lack of planning or indecision could be an explanation why they didn't get HIMARS sooner, but I think there are plenty of other plausible explanations.

"We aren't giving them weapons fast enough to really make a difference so we should probably just stop entirely" smells wrong to me.

[dabigv13]

Of course Ukraine will publicly call for the maximum. But we don't have 300 HIMARS to give them. Would the ultimate outcome be a lot different if they had ~20 HIMARS/ M270s a month earlier? Would Ukraine have been able to spare people to train on these systems earlier in March or April? I'm sure there was plenty of behind the scenes discussion with NATO allies on this issue- maybe Germany or France or another major ally was against this sort of transfer earlier and needed some convincing.

Lack of planning or indecision could be an explanation why they didn't get HIMARS sooner, but I think there are plenty of other plausible explanations.

"We aren't giving them weapons fast enough to really make a difference so we should probably just stop entirely" smells wrong to me.

[Goose]

Of course Ukraine will publicly call for the maximum. But we don't have 300 HIMARS to give them. Would the ultimate outcome be a lot different if they had ~20 HIMARS/ M270s a month earlier?

We indeed don't have 300 HIMARS to give them. We could undoubtedly muster a couple of hundred M270s. Would the ultimate outcome have been a lot different if they had what we could give them two months earlier? I don't know, but I do know this. If the answer is no, it wouldn't have mattered, it is equally true it won't matter now. Under those circumstances, we have yet to find a viable way for Ukraine to win. THAT is the problem. If we are going to "help", we need a way to help that will work, or at least that we think will work. Otherwise, we are just proving we are ineffective in helping Ukraine and probably convincing the EU that is the case. Not to mention we are seeing a bunch of brave Ukrainians get killed in a situation we think is hopeless. Am I concerned that we and the Ukraine don't have a plan to win? Yes I am. Just blundering along to the next battle isn't going to do it. Russia has found something that "works" for them. Not pretty, but it works. The Ukraine (and the US) needs a plan to counter this simple fact.

My personal belief is that Ukraine is doomed if they insist on matching the Russians weapon for weapon. We don't have enough weapons or the right kind of weapons to do that. We need to help them develop the combat power to dictate the battle space at places of their choosing. Some of the offensives in Kherson Oblast are baby steps in that direction. Having a large number of M270s/HIMARS that you can concentrate in an offensive thrust can allow you to get on the Russians GLOCs and you can tear them up. All the morale and leadership problems the Russians have then crash down upon them. Their troops don't know what to do, have no leaders, and are running out of fuel, food and bullets. "Hell on Wheels" returns. You overrun their confused artillery. Their logistics troops are not equipped to fight and don't expect to do so. They die in droves. The surrenders start. That is how this ends if Ukraine is to win, IMHO.

I could be wrong. Their could be other ways. Ukraine could also get lucky and Putin dies. However, I wouldn't count on that. The fact we are now delivering weapons that Ukraine said they needed in March makes one doubt this has been thought out however. 

Would Ukraine have been able to spare people to train on these systems earlier in March or April?

We just trained 60 guys. I am absolutely positive Ukraine could have provided 60 troops (not even a full company) to learn the system back in March. If the actual requirement is 200 M270s in Ukraine, the sooner the training started, the sooner they could have used those 200 units in battle. We wasted about 2 months by not moving sooner. I could recite "For want of a nail...", but I think that is obvious.

I'm sure there was plenty of behind the scenes discussion with NATO allies on this issue- maybe Germany or France or another major ally was against this sort of transfer earlier and needed some convincing.

Lack of planning or indecision could be an explanation why they didn't get HIMARS sooner, but I think there are plenty of other plausible explanations.

Sure there are. It could be allies balked. It could be lots of things. Coalition warfare is a bitch. That said, I am pretty sure the US and Poland could have made it happen if we wanted to. We have to ask ourselves if we can accept these delays and still win. I would be happier if we had a great plan that was delayed by political constraints, but not much happier. You lose wars that way. However, it has been my experience that indecision and unwillingness to take responsibility is often a characteristic of the civilian military relationship in the US these days. I would bet on that, if I had to chose.

"We aren't giving them weapons fast enough to really make a difference so we should probably just stop entirely" smells wrong to me.

If what you are doing is inadequate (and will fail) even in your own opinion, why is it a "good thing" to continue doing it? I for one would say make a plan that you think works and that you can execute, then execute it with speed and violence. If you can't do that, for whatever reason, involving yourself any further just underscores your inability to help and is betraying Ukraine's trust in you. To me, doing the latter would be really wrong. Are we doing that? I don't know but there are lots of signs that point that way IMHO.

[Goose]

Of course Ukraine will publicly call for the maximum. But we don't have 300 HIMARS to give them. Would the ultimate outcome be a lot different if they had ~20 HIMARS/ M270s a month earlier?

We indeed don't have 300 HIMARS to give them. We could undoubtedly muster a couple of hundred M270s. Would the ultimate outcome have been a lot different if they had what we could give them two months earlier? I don't know, but I do know this. If the answer is no, it wouldn't have mattered, it is equally true it won't matter now. Under those circumstances, we have yet to find a viable way for Ukraine to win. THAT is the problem. If we are going to "help", we need a way to help that will work, or at least that we think will work. Otherwise, we are just proving we are ineffective in helping Ukraine and probably convincing the EU that is the case. Not to mention we are seeing a bunch of brave Ukrainians get killed in a situation we think is hopeless. Am I concerned that we and the Ukraine don't have a plan to win? Yes I am. Just blundering along to the next battle isn't going to do it. Russia has found something that "works" for them. Not pretty, but it works. The Ukraine (and the US) needs a plan to counter this simple fact.

My personal belief is that Ukraine is doomed if they insist on matching the Russians weapon for weapon. We don't have enough weapons or the right kind of weapons to do that. We need to help them develop the combat power to dictate the battle space at places of their choosing. Some of the offensives in Kherson Oblast are baby steps in that direction. Having a large number of M270s/HIMARS that you can concentrate in an offensive thrust can allow you to get on the Russians GLOCs and you can tear them up. All the morale and leadership problems the Russians have then crash down upon them. Their troops don't know what to do, have no leaders, and are running out of fuel, food and bullets. "Hell on Wheels" returns. You overrun their confused artillery. Their logistics troops are not equipped to fight and don't expect to do so. They die in droves. The surrenders start. That is how this ends if Ukraine is to win, IMHO.

I could be wrong. Their could be other ways. Ukraine could also get lucky and Putin dies. However, I wouldn't count on that. The fact we are now delivering weapons that Ukraine said they needed in March makes one doubt this has been thought out however. 

Would Ukraine have been able to spare people to train on these systems earlier in March or April?

We just trained 60 guys. I am absolutely positive Ukraine could have provided 60 troops (not even a full company) to learn the system back in March. If the actual requirement is 200 M270s in Ukraine, the sooner the training started, the sooner they could have used those 200 units in battle. We wasted about 2 months by not moving sooner. I could recite "For want of a nail...", but I think that is obvious.

I'm sure there was plenty of behind the scenes discussion with NATO allies on this issue- maybe Germany or France or another major ally was against this sort of transfer earlier and needed some convincing.

Lack of planning or indecision could be an explanation why they didn't get HIMARS sooner, but I think there are plenty of other plausible explanations.

Sure there are. It could be allies balked. It could be lots of things. Coalition warfare is a bitch. That said, I am pretty sure the US and Poland could have made it happen if we wanted to. We have to ask ourselves if we can accept these delays and still win. I would be happier if we had a great plan that was delayed by political constraints, but not much happier. You lose wars that way. However, it has been my experience that indecision and unwillingness to take responsibility is often a characteristic of the civilian military relationship in the US these days. I would bet on that, if I had to chose.

"We aren't giving them weapons fast enough to really make a difference so we should probably just stop entirely" smells wrong to me.

If what you are doing is inadequate (and will fail) even in your own opinion, why is it a "good thing" to continue doing it? I for one would say make a plan that you think works and that you can execute, then execute it with speed and violence. If you can't do that, for whatever reason, involving yourself any further just underscores your inability to help and is betraying Ukraine's trust in you. To me, doing the latter would be really wrong. Are we doing that? I don't know but there are lots of signs that point that way IMHO.

[dabigv13]

If you asked a Ukrainian if we should give them billions of dollars worth of military aid, or just not get involved because we can't give them 10 times that amount, they would probably assume you were a Russian.

Lots of brave Ukrainians are dying, so we should not involve ourselves. Head scratcher, to me.

[dabigv13]

If you asked a Ukrainian if we should give them billions of dollars worth of military aid, or just not get involved because we can't give them 10 times that amount, they would probably assume you were a Russian.

Lots of brave Ukrainians are dying, so we should not involve ourselves. Head scratcher, to me.

[Goose]

If you asked a Ukrainian if we should give them billions of dollars worth of military aid, or just not get involved because we can't give them 10 times that amount, they would probably assume you were a Russian.

Lots of brave Ukrainians are dying, so we should not involve ourselves. Head scratcher, to me.

I understand you point. I agree that the Ukrainian government will take any help it can get. However, it isn't a matter of X or 10X. It is "enough" or "not enough". There are two issues here IMHO. First, do we have a way forward where Ukraine wins if we give them X, for some X, and second, are we willing and able to give them that X. If we think the answer to either of these questions is no, we need to tell Ukraine that and stop. If, OTOH, the answers to both questions are yes, we need to be sure to make that happen.  I happen to believe the answers are probably yes, but we have to stop dithering. It isn't going to be easy. It may require Ukraine just hanging on until they have developed the necessary striking power.

OTOH, if we can't or won't do what our best guess says we need to, or if Ukraine can't do what we think is required, we are just prolonging a losing war that will have very bad repercussions both for Ukraine and for us. We have a habit recently of going into wars of choice and then deciding that this is too hard or that this really isn't in our critical national interest. I don't want this to be another one of those. If we aren't all "in", we should be "out". You may not agree.

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/catastrophe-p...00357.html Very interesting that the UK is going to train 10K Ukrainian troops over 3 months. If that is part of the plan, I would expect the US could also train a significant number of troops. I do like the wording:

This comes just in time, as the Ukrainian army needs to be replenished, with not just cooks and academics who volunteered to fight, but with professional soldiers. And the UK will train them for us.

Unfortunate this effort is only beginning now. Three months from now the weather will start to change for the worse in Ukraine, making offensive activity significantly more difficult. However, it does rain a lot all summer so maybe not that big a difference. Looks like hanging on for a while (next spring?) may be in the cards for Ukraine. Russia is undoubtedly also training troops, but probably troops who really don't want to be there.
https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status...06711.html shows what Ukraine has been dealing with. Looks a lot like https://www.sciencephoto.com/media/91198...photograph

[Goose]

If you asked a Ukrainian if we should give them billions of dollars worth of military aid, or just not get involved because we can't give them 10 times that amount, they would probably assume you were a Russian.

Lots of brave Ukrainians are dying, so we should not involve ourselves. Head scratcher, to me.

I understand you point. I agree that the Ukrainian government will take any help it can get. However, it isn't a matter of X or 10X. It is "enough" or "not enough". There are two issues here IMHO. First, do we have a way forward where Ukraine wins if we give them X, for some X, and second, are we willing and able to give them that X. If we think the answer to either of these questions is no, we need to tell Ukraine that and stop. If, OTOH, the answers to both questions are yes, we need to be sure to make that happen.  I happen to believe the answers are probably yes, but we have to stop dithering. It isn't going to be easy. It may require Ukraine just hanging on until they have developed the necessary striking power.

OTOH, if we can't or won't do what our best guess says we need to, or if Ukraine can't do what we think is required, we are just prolonging a losing war that will have very bad repercussions both for Ukraine and for us. We have a habit recently of going into wars of choice and then deciding that this is too hard or that this really isn't in our critical national interest. I don't want this to be another one of those. If we aren't all "in", we should be "out". You may not agree.

UPDATE: https://www.yahoo.com/news/catastrophe-p...00357.html Very interesting that the UK is going to train 10K Ukrainian troops over 3 months. If that is part of the plan, I would expect the US could also train a significant number of troops. I do like the wording:

This comes just in time, as the Ukrainian army needs to be replenished, with not just cooks and academics who volunteered to fight, but with professional soldiers. And the UK will train them for us.

Unfortunate this effort is only beginning now. Three months from now the weather will start to change for the worse in Ukraine, making offensive activity significantly more difficult. However, it does rain a lot all summer so maybe not that big a difference. Looks like hanging on for a while (next spring?) may be in the cards for Ukraine. Russia is undoubtedly also training troops, but probably troops who really don't want to be there.
https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status...06711.html shows what Ukraine has been dealing with. Looks a lot like https://www.sciencephoto.com/media/91198...photograph

[TrumpCard]

For a couple of months, the media consistently characterized the battle in the Donbas as a likely stalemate or a grinding advance. It no longer feels that way. I hate to say it, but it’s starting to feel like a route. ISW reporting that 800-2000 Ukrainian troops appear to be trapped in a cauldron around Hirske.  At this point, I hope Ukraine can prevent Russia from taking more than “just” the Donbas before cold weather sinks in and defense becomes easier.

[TrumpCard]

For a couple of months, the media consistently characterized the battle in the Donbas as a likely stalemate or a grinding advance. It no longer feels that way. I hate to say it, but it’s starting to feel like a route. ISW reporting that 800-2000 Ukrainian troops appear to be trapped in a cauldron around Hirske.  At this point, I hope Ukraine can prevent Russia from taking more than “just” the Donbas before cold weather sinks in and defense becomes easier.

[dabigv13]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...of-forces/

This article is relatively more optimistic.

We have a habit recently of going into wars of choice and then deciding that this is too hard or that this really isn't in our critical national interest. I don't want this to be another one of those. If we aren't all "in", we should be "out". You may not agree.

Definitely don't agree. If we're out Ukraine is boned. If we're as "in" as we have been, Ukraine has a pretty good chance at stopping the Russian advance and likely regaining some territory. This isnt a US war of choice, and if the US is going to be global power it can't sit this out. So we should be as "in" as possible for a non-ally state on the border with a nuclear rival, and I think the current administration has done a pretty good job of providing timely and effective aid without directly endangering American lives, or overpromising what we can't deliver.

Maybe the US and NATO have correctly predicted that Russian strength is culminating, and steadily increasing supplies of military aid and training enable a Ukrainian counterattack in a few months. But I imagine if that were to pan out you just will say we should have done all that same aid, just 2 months earlier.

[dabigv13]

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...of-forces/

This article is relatively more optimistic.

We have a habit recently of going into wars of choice and then deciding that this is too hard or that this really isn't in our critical national interest. I don't want this to be another one of those. If we aren't all "in", we should be "out". You may not agree.

Definitely don't agree. If we're out Ukraine is boned. If we're as "in" as we have been, Ukraine has a pretty good chance at stopping the Russian advance and likely regaining some territory. This isnt a US war of choice, and if the US is going to be global power it can't sit this out. So we should be as "in" as possible for a non-ally state on the border with a nuclear rival, and I think the current administration has done a pretty good job of providing timely and effective aid without directly endangering American lives, or overpromising what we can't deliver.

Maybe the US and NATO have correctly predicted that Russian strength is culminating, and steadily increasing supplies of military aid and training enable a Ukrainian counterattack in a few months. But I imagine if that were to pan out you just will say we should have done all that same aid, just 2 months earlier.

[Goose]

For a couple of months, the media consistently characterized the battle in the Donbas as a likely stalemate or a grinding advance. It no longer feels that way. I hate to say it, but it’s starting to feel like a route. ISW reporting that 800-2000 Ukrainian troops appear to be trapped in a cauldron around Hirske.  At this point, I hope Ukraine can prevent Russia from taking more than “just” the Donbas before cold weather sinks in and defense becomes easier.

While losing lots of those troops would be bad, it wouldn't change the situation much. It is also true that the Donetsk Oblast is still partially in Ukrainian hands. Russia still has lots of fighting to do in the Donbas and their current tactics take time to implement. The Russian advance has been grinding and will continue to be that unless Ukraine's infantry morale collapses. For the next few months, keeping that morale up appears to be the most important objective.

Russia has learned from their previous efforts and are holding back their troops and being more "careful" than they were previously. (It is also because they have fewer troops and the troops aren't in a hurry to get shot at.) They can do that because their artillery can inflict significant casualties on the Ukrainian infantry while visa versa is generally not true. Russian casualties, while still significant, are going down. This is extremely demoralizing to the Ukrainian troops, because it makes it appear that death or defeat is inevitable, it is just a matter of time. Ukraine needs a story that can keep their troops going. I think they have that story in the more powerful precision weapons making a difference. However, that won't work forever. It has to start happening or things will get much easier for Russia. Previously we were hearing some noises from Ukrainian sources that there would be significant counter-offensives in June. Now we are hearing August. That's fine, but the troops have to remain confident in their leadership. Making projections you can't actually deliver on is not a good way to do that, so I hope that isn't the case.

[Goose]

For a couple of months, the media consistently characterized the battle in the Donbas as a likely stalemate or a grinding advance. It no longer feels that way. I hate to say it, but it’s starting to feel like a route. ISW reporting that 800-2000 Ukrainian troops appear to be trapped in a cauldron around Hirske.  At this point, I hope Ukraine can prevent Russia from taking more than “just” the Donbas before cold weather sinks in and defense becomes easier.

While losing lots of those troops would be bad, it wouldn't change the situation much. It is also true that the Donetsk Oblast is still partially in Ukrainian hands. Russia still has lots of fighting to do in the Donbas and their current tactics take time to implement. The Russian advance has been grinding and will continue to be that unless Ukraine's infantry morale collapses. For the next few months, keeping that morale up appears to be the most important objective.

Russia has learned from their previous efforts and are holding back their troops and being more "careful" than they were previously. (It is also because they have fewer troops and the troops aren't in a hurry to get shot at.) They can do that because their artillery can inflict significant casualties on the Ukrainian infantry while visa versa is generally not true. Russian casualties, while still significant, are going down. This is extremely demoralizing to the Ukrainian troops, because it makes it appear that death or defeat is inevitable, it is just a matter of time. Ukraine needs a story that can keep their troops going. I think they have that story in the more powerful precision weapons making a difference. However, that won't work forever. It has to start happening or things will get much easier for Russia. Previously we were hearing some noises from Ukrainian sources that there would be significant counter-offensives in June. Now we are hearing August. That's fine, but the troops have to remain confident in their leadership. Making projections you can't actually deliver on is not a good way to do that, so I hope that isn't the case.

[BostonCard]

This is the most optimistic take I’ve seen in a while.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...of-forces/

Hope it is a clear eyed assessment and not wishcasting.

The Russian military will soon exhaust its combat capabilities and be forced to bring its offensive in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region to a grinding halt, according to Western intelligence predictions and military experts.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/phillipspobrien/status/1540961275928350721?s=21&t=6UYb4bDqzga0n4nYU80Fbw[/tweet]

BC

---

Add: looks like Russian command structure has been re-jiggered, again.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1540998188236251136?s=21&t=6UYb4bDqzga0n4nYU80Fbw[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

This is the most optimistic take I’ve seen in a while.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...of-forces/

Hope it is a clear eyed assessment and not wishcasting.

The Russian military will soon exhaust its combat capabilities and be forced to bring its offensive in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region to a grinding halt, according to Western intelligence predictions and military experts.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/phillipspobrien/status/1540961275928350721?s=21&t=6UYb4bDqzga0n4nYU80Fbw[/tweet]

BC

---

Add: looks like Russian command structure has been re-jiggered, again.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1540998188236251136?s=21&t=6UYb4bDqzga0n4nYU80Fbw[/tweet]

BC