[Goose]

Interesting Goose, I wonder if their placements suggest two things, 1: they are there to project power, not actually fight. 2: since this is the only area Russia has making any advances, minimal as they are, Russia is trying to double down in hopes they make a big breakthrough… either way, assuming large amounts of troops aren’t going to the northern Luhansk region, we could see some significant progress for Ukraine in that region…

I think Russia may not want to commit the 3rd corps until it has trained a bit and exhibits some ability to fight. This unit was cobbled together real fast from a hodgepodge of sources and probably is not able to able to do much, at least not yet. This may actually be a good idea by the Russian command in the face of many difficulties. Put them in a "quiet" sector until they are "blooded" and ready to execute combat operations. Shades of the 106th infantry division (although they fought well for a brand-new unit and were pretty well trained). OTOH if this unit actually is forced to fight, even defensively, by the Ukrainian advances it could fold immediately. It is probably more of a gamble than Russia really wants to take, but it is the army they have, not the army they want to have.

Reports from various sources saying Russia is likely to withdraw from Lyman soon, as Ukraine is beginning to encircle the town. It is remarkable how many cities took months for Russia to take, and now Russian defenses in those cities collapse in days/weeks.

Indeed. It also appears that the Russians were prepared to withdraw from positions Kharkiv Oblast well before Ukraine actually cut the GLOCS. Although they left a lot of material, the number of POWs appears to be relatively "small". The Russians were very thin and they ran very fast, which kept that number down. While the old saw about "the moral is to the physical as 3 to 1" has some merit, I think 1) Russia is out of troops. They can't man the defenses of cities like Lyman with enough troops to hold them, and they can't risk the losses it would take to try, and 2) the Russian troops are not fighting for anything. They don't want to die in Ukraine for nothing led by officers that they don't respect while not getting paid. They aren't going to fight to the end and the Russian command knows this.

Even when Russia was advancing in Ukraine they were not utilizing infantry and armor aggressively to drive Ukraine back. They used artillery to grind the Ukrainians down until they had to leave and then inched ahead. Even doing that the Russians still suffered significantly. In some ways one wonders if the Russian high command isn't actually trying to just minimize losses in a war they realize they aren't going to win.

[Goose]

Interesting Goose, I wonder if their placements suggest two things, 1: they are there to project power, not actually fight. 2: since this is the only area Russia has making any advances, minimal as they are, Russia is trying to double down in hopes they make a big breakthrough… either way, assuming large amounts of troops aren’t going to the northern Luhansk region, we could see some significant progress for Ukraine in that region…

I think Russia may not want to commit the 3rd corps until it has trained a bit and exhibits some ability to fight. This unit was cobbled together real fast from a hodgepodge of sources and probably is not able to able to do much, at least not yet. This may actually be a good idea by the Russian command in the face of many difficulties. Put them in a "quiet" sector until they are "blooded" and ready to execute combat operations. Shades of the 106th infantry division (although they fought well for a brand-new unit and were pretty well trained). OTOH if this unit actually is forced to fight, even defensively, by the Ukrainian advances it could fold immediately. It is probably more of a gamble than Russia really wants to take, but it is the army they have, not the army they want to have.

Reports from various sources saying Russia is likely to withdraw from Lyman soon, as Ukraine is beginning to encircle the town. It is remarkable how many cities took months for Russia to take, and now Russian defenses in those cities collapse in days/weeks.

Indeed. It also appears that the Russians were prepared to withdraw from positions Kharkiv Oblast well before Ukraine actually cut the GLOCS. Although they left a lot of material, the number of POWs appears to be relatively "small". The Russians were very thin and they ran very fast, which kept that number down. While the old saw about "the moral is to the physical as 3 to 1" has some merit, I think 1) Russia is out of troops. They can't man the defenses of cities like Lyman with enough troops to hold them, and they can't risk the losses it would take to try, and 2) the Russian troops are not fighting for anything. They don't want to die in Ukraine for nothing led by officers that they don't respect while not getting paid. They aren't going to fight to the end and the Russian command knows this.

Even when Russia was advancing in Ukraine they were not utilizing infantry and armor aggressively to drive Ukraine back. They used artillery to grind the Ukrainians down until they had to leave and then inched ahead. Even doing that the Russians still suffered significantly. In some ways one wonders if the Russian high command isn't actually trying to just minimize losses in a war they realize they aren't going to win.

[BostonCard]

If you are an Economist subscriber, this article does a nice job of laying out “what’s next”.  I thought it interesting that Zelensky wanted to attack through Zaporizia to Mariupol to cut the Russian troops in half (ballsy), but was persuaded by his generals that it was bordering on reckless.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09...aines-army

BC

[BostonCard]

If you are an Economist subscriber, this article does a nice job of laying out “what’s next”.  I thought it interesting that Zelensky wanted to attack through Zaporizia to Mariupol to cut the Russian troops in half (ballsy), but was persuaded by his generals that it was bordering on reckless.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/09...aines-army

BC

[dabigv13]

That recent NY times article indicated the US judged the southern offensive would have too many casualties and a lower chance of success so the Kharkiv one was gamed out and judged to be superior.

The southern offensive will probably still be coming at some point, and all the captured Russian materiel from Kharkiv will help.

[dabigv13]

That recent NY times article indicated the US judged the southern offensive would have too many casualties and a lower chance of success so the Kharkiv one was gamed out and judged to be superior.

The southern offensive will probably still be coming at some point, and all the captured Russian materiel from Kharkiv will help.

[Goose]

That recent NY times article indicated the US judged the southern offensive would have too many casualties and a lower chance of success so the Kharkiv one was gamed out and judged to be superior.

The southern offensive will probably still be coming at some point, and all the captured Russian materiel from Kharkiv will help.

The "southern offensive" is a broad entity. There are versions that includes Marioupl to Kherson, Melitopol to Kherson, Nova Kakhovka to Kherson, and the smallest alternative which is Kherson and the rest of the right bank to the Black Sea. There are also "hybrid" options that include some of the above. In the near term I think Kherson is definitely the immediate target but it will be a slower slog for many reasons. I HOPE Nova Kakhovka is also involved, because if it isn't Russia has a clear counterattack route that doesn't involve an opposed river crossing. We shall see. I think it is pretty clear that a very wide area southern offensive was always risky and probably beyond Ukraine's ability. Glad it worked out the way it did.

[Goose]

That recent NY times article indicated the US judged the southern offensive would have too many casualties and a lower chance of success so the Kharkiv one was gamed out and judged to be superior.

The southern offensive will probably still be coming at some point, and all the captured Russian materiel from Kharkiv will help.

The "southern offensive" is a broad entity. There are versions that includes Marioupl to Kherson, Melitopol to Kherson, Nova Kakhovka to Kherson, and the smallest alternative which is Kherson and the rest of the right bank to the Black Sea. There are also "hybrid" options that include some of the above. In the near term I think Kherson is definitely the immediate target but it will be a slower slog for many reasons. I HOPE Nova Kakhovka is also involved, because if it isn't Russia has a clear counterattack route that doesn't involve an opposed river crossing. We shall see. I think it is pretty clear that a very wide area southern offensive was always risky and probably beyond Ukraine's ability. Glad it worked out the way it did.

[Goose]

We often hear references to everybody's desire to see the destruction of the Kerch Bridge. That bridge carries a railway link and a road link from Russia proper into Crimea. Getting rid of that would be great. However, it is also true that the city of Melitopol contains a road and rail link to Russia proper via the "land bridge" to Rostov-on-Don. This link is far easier for Russia to use than the Kerch Bridge because it is much nearer the major population centers of Russia. There is literally nothing between Rostov-on-Don and the Kerch Bridge. For that reason, Melitopol serves a similar function in the south to Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast. That is why it is a prime objective for Ukraine. However, it is much tougher nut than Kupiansk and it will be a while before it is a realistic immediate objective. It is also true that Ukrainian partisans blew up an important bridge on the rail line from Melitopol toward Crimea. I assume that has been fixed but I don't know that.

[Goose]

We often hear references to everybody's desire to see the destruction of the Kerch Bridge. That bridge carries a railway link and a road link from Russia proper into Crimea. Getting rid of that would be great. However, it is also true that the city of Melitopol contains a road and rail link to Russia proper via the "land bridge" to Rostov-on-Don. This link is far easier for Russia to use than the Kerch Bridge because it is much nearer the major population centers of Russia. There is literally nothing between Rostov-on-Don and the Kerch Bridge. For that reason, Melitopol serves a similar function in the south to Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast. That is why it is a prime objective for Ukraine. However, it is much tougher nut than Kupiansk and it will be a while before it is a realistic immediate objective. It is also true that Ukrainian partisans blew up an important bridge on the rail line from Melitopol toward Crimea. I assume that has been fixed but I don't know that.

[BostonCard]

this is what was reported in the Economist article…

There are other options, too. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, had originally wanted his army to mount an ambitious offensive through Zaporizhia province that would cut Russian forces in Ukraine into two, slice through Russia’s so-called land bridge to Crimea and eventually recapture Mariupol, the port city which lies on the southern edge of Donbas. Ukrainian generals, and Western advisors, persuaded him that Ukraine did not have sufficient units for such a bold attack, and that it would be reckless.

BC

[BostonCard]

this is what was reported in the Economist article…

There are other options, too. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, had originally wanted his army to mount an ambitious offensive through Zaporizhia province that would cut Russian forces in Ukraine into two, slice through Russia’s so-called land bridge to Crimea and eventually recapture Mariupol, the port city which lies on the southern edge of Donbas. Ukrainian generals, and Western advisors, persuaded him that Ukraine did not have sufficient units for such a bold attack, and that it would be reckless.

BC

[BostonCard]

“Lyshychansk” is trending on Twitter, but I can’t find anything definitive.

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1571469084235030532?s=21&t=psIAkAZutXj6CAMre5LhDQ[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

“Lyshychansk” is trending on Twitter, but I can’t find anything definitive.

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1571469084235030532?s=21&t=psIAkAZutXj6CAMre5LhDQ[/tweet]

BC

[Treefence]

“Lyshychansk” is trending on Twitter, but I can’t find anything definitive.

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1571469084235030532?s=21&t=psIAkAZutXj6CAMre5LhDQ[/tweet]

BC

There was one person, Neil Hauter who said a Ukrainian source of his told him the city was liberated, but without an evidence.  I think they might be fighting close to the town, but it seems highly unlikely it's been liberated yet.

---

It looks like Ukraine is back in the Luhansk Oblast after taking back Bilohorivka.  I think they took this town about a week ago, but Russians took it back.  Assuming they don't lose this footing, that would mean every Oblast, except Crimea, has some Ukrainian military presence.  Hopefully soon enough Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts will be completely liberated too.

[Treefence]

“Lyshychansk” is trending on Twitter, but I can’t find anything definitive.

---

[tweet]https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1571469084235030532?s=21&t=psIAkAZutXj6CAMre5LhDQ[/tweet]

BC

There was one person, Neil Hauter who said a Ukrainian source of his told him the city was liberated, but without an evidence.  I think they might be fighting close to the town, but it seems highly unlikely it's been liberated yet.

---

It looks like Ukraine is back in the Luhansk Oblast after taking back Bilohorivka.  I think they took this town about a week ago, but Russians took it back.  Assuming they don't lose this footing, that would mean every Oblast, except Crimea, has some Ukrainian military presence.  Hopefully soon enough Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts will be completely liberated too.

[BostonCard]

There’s also a video of Ukrainian soldiers on the outskirts (supposedly geolocated to about 5 miles outside the town).

BC

[BostonCard]

There’s also a video of Ukrainian soldiers on the outskirts (supposedly geolocated to about 5 miles outside the town).

BC

[Treefence]

There’s also a video of Ukrainian soldiers on the outskirts (supposedly geolocated to about 5 miles outside the town).

BC

That would make sense, I'm assuming they are coming from the Belohorivka area, which is just over 5 miles away.

[Treefence]

There’s also a video of Ukrainian soldiers on the outskirts (supposedly geolocated to about 5 miles outside the town).

BC

That would make sense, I'm assuming they are coming from the Belohorivka area, which is just over 5 miles away.

[BostonCard]

Scuttlebug is that Russia will announce the annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1572051032666144768?s=46&t=oxdbq6AofGJFNPpElMwlQA[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

Scuttlebug is that Russia will announce the annexation of Luhansk and Donetsk.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1572051032666144768?s=46&t=oxdbq6AofGJFNPpElMwlQA[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-move...1663675647

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-move...1663675647

BC

[Treefence]

Putin was expected to start his speech a half hour ago, but it's been delayed.  I think the general theory is that various regions will hold sham referendums to announce they are joining Russia, which will allow Russia to mobilize conscripts into the region.  It's a somewhat half measure, but we will know more once it is official.  I think Russia wants to have their green conscript soldiers taking over occupation duty, and allow more professional soldiers to hold the front lines and try to advance.  I'm not sure if this has a major effect on the war, but who knows honestly.  I do think this is a direct result of the Kharkiv counter offensive, and also note that Kharkiv is not one of the regions that will hold a sham referendum.

[Treefence]

Putin was expected to start his speech a half hour ago, but it's been delayed.  I think the general theory is that various regions will hold sham referendums to announce they are joining Russia, which will allow Russia to mobilize conscripts into the region.  It's a somewhat half measure, but we will know more once it is official.  I think Russia wants to have their green conscript soldiers taking over occupation duty, and allow more professional soldiers to hold the front lines and try to advance.  I'm not sure if this has a major effect on the war, but who knows honestly.  I do think this is a direct result of the Kharkiv counter offensive, and also note that Kharkiv is not one of the regions that will hold a sham referendum.

[Leftcoast]

Won't he also draw a line in the sand and accuse the US/NATO of sending weapons to Ukraine that are now being used to attack "Russia".  (IE the newly incorporated Ukraininean territories)

I don't think the US/NATO will care but it could be a pretext for attacking supply depots in NATO countries used to ship materiel to Ukraine and thereby broaden the conflict.  Scary stuff.

[Leftcoast]

Won't he also draw a line in the sand and accuse the US/NATO of sending weapons to Ukraine that are now being used to attack "Russia".  (IE the newly incorporated Ukraininean territories)

I don't think the US/NATO will care but it could be a pretext for attacking supply depots in NATO countries used to ship materiel to Ukraine and thereby broaden the conflict.  Scary stuff.

[Mick]

I wonder why the Russians haven't used biological or chemical weapons yet? Seems to me that it's something the Russians would do, as a fundamentally outlaw, terrorist-supporting, torture-supporting regime.

Biological weapons threat evolving, experts say - Roll Call

[Mick]

I wonder why the Russians haven't used biological or chemical weapons yet? Seems to me that it's something the Russians would do, as a fundamentally outlaw, terrorist-supporting, torture-supporting regime.

Biological weapons threat evolving, experts say - Roll Call

[TrumpCard]

AFAIK, NATO has no direct involvement in the Donbas territory that Putin supposedly is going to annex. I don’t understand the logic that the annexation is a pretext for saying that NATO now attacking Russian territory. If Putin wants to say that NATO is involved, his case for that proposition is just as good now as it will be after any annexation. Moreover, given Putin’s control over information, if he wanted to say NATO was involved, he could get away with it regardless of the truth of the statement. I think the annexation is bad - don’t get me wrong. I just don’t see the particular connection that’s worrying you.

[TrumpCard]

AFAIK, NATO has no direct involvement in the Donbas territory that Putin supposedly is going to annex. I don’t understand the logic that the annexation is a pretext for saying that NATO now attacking Russian territory. If Putin wants to say that NATO is involved, his case for that proposition is just as good now as it will be after any annexation. Moreover, given Putin’s control over information, if he wanted to say NATO was involved, he could get away with it regardless of the truth of the statement. I think the annexation is bad - don’t get me wrong. I just don’t see the particular connection that’s worrying you.

[dabigv13]

If Russia uses an NBC (nuke/bio/chem) weapon, it will definitely increase NATO involvement and decrease Russian support from their present allies. Would likely also freak out a lot of people in Russia, some of whom may be in a position to force out Putin.

Russia also doesn't have many great targets for those weapons, apart from cities and causing civilian terror. Ya think poor morale troops with bad equipment are going to advance over a radiated or gassed area and hold it?

I guessed many months ago that when Ukraine turned the tide, Russia would try to annex their gains, call it Russian territory and thus under their nuclear umbrella, and say neener neener to the Ukrainians. I guessed back then and am even more certain now that Ukraine and NATO don't really GAF about Putin's hollow threats.

[dabigv13]

If Russia uses an NBC (nuke/bio/chem) weapon, it will definitely increase NATO involvement and decrease Russian support from their present allies. Would likely also freak out a lot of people in Russia, some of whom may be in a position to force out Putin.

Russia also doesn't have many great targets for those weapons, apart from cities and causing civilian terror. Ya think poor morale troops with bad equipment are going to advance over a radiated or gassed area and hold it?

I guessed many months ago that when Ukraine turned the tide, Russia would try to annex their gains, call it Russian territory and thus under their nuclear umbrella, and say neener neener to the Ukrainians. I guessed back then and am even more certain now that Ukraine and NATO don't really GAF about Putin's hollow threats.

[Goose]

The main reason Putin wants to annex these Ukrainian areas so hastily is to allow him to send conscripts there without their consent. How much that will actually help his manpower problem I don't know but it should be "significant". These conscripts probably are not able to fight very well but they can (in theory) function as LOC troops. Putin may be opening a can of worms for himself in that even LOC troops can get killed. While the Russian "contract soldiers" are often from rural areas that "nobody cares about", conscripts are from a broader demographic. That certainly should draw more attention to this "war" and maybe not to Putin's benefit.

The "referendums" are very stupid IMHO. Nobody in the world will actually think they are legitimate expressions of popular will. Nations that are pro-Ukraine will say they are a sham, and nations that are beholden to Russia will say they are legitimate. Neither group will actually think they are legitimate. Putin should just declare these areas part of Russia "by acclimation" and leave it at that. I suspect that if there actually is a vote that it will be violently disrupted in many areas, further demonstrating they are a sham and that Russia cannot ensure the safety of the populace in these areas.

The draconian laws against surrender and refusing to fight can be interpreted two ways. One way is that this is a sop to the "hawks" who think Putin is too soft and not doing enough. Another way is that these two activities are actually perceived as causing significant problems for the Russian military. Obviously, Russia (and the US) already have serious punishments for dereliction of duty and desertion in the face of the enemy. However, these laws only operate at full strength in a declared war. Putin hasn't got that so he needed new laws. We already know Russia has been shooting troops who run. How widespread that activity is I don't know. Enforcing these new laws could create quite a controversy in Russia. How do you decide if a surrender was "justified", and who decides?

[Goose]

The main reason Putin wants to annex these Ukrainian areas so hastily is to allow him to send conscripts there without their consent. How much that will actually help his manpower problem I don't know but it should be "significant". These conscripts probably are not able to fight very well but they can (in theory) function as LOC troops. Putin may be opening a can of worms for himself in that even LOC troops can get killed. While the Russian "contract soldiers" are often from rural areas that "nobody cares about", conscripts are from a broader demographic. That certainly should draw more attention to this "war" and maybe not to Putin's benefit.

The "referendums" are very stupid IMHO. Nobody in the world will actually think they are legitimate expressions of popular will. Nations that are pro-Ukraine will say they are a sham, and nations that are beholden to Russia will say they are legitimate. Neither group will actually think they are legitimate. Putin should just declare these areas part of Russia "by acclimation" and leave it at that. I suspect that if there actually is a vote that it will be violently disrupted in many areas, further demonstrating they are a sham and that Russia cannot ensure the safety of the populace in these areas.

The draconian laws against surrender and refusing to fight can be interpreted two ways. One way is that this is a sop to the "hawks" who think Putin is too soft and not doing enough. Another way is that these two activities are actually perceived as causing significant problems for the Russian military. Obviously, Russia (and the US) already have serious punishments for dereliction of duty and desertion in the face of the enemy. However, these laws only operate at full strength in a declared war. Putin hasn't got that so he needed new laws. We already know Russia has been shooting troops who run. How widespread that activity is I don't know. Enforcing these new laws could create quite a controversy in Russia. How do you decide if a surrender was "justified", and who decides?

[TrumpCard]

I guessed back then and am even more certain now that Ukraine and NATO don't really GAF about Putin's hollow threats.

I would think you're right Ukraine is willing to call this bluff.  The alternative is to fold and have the population enslaved/exterminated/etc.

NATO is a group of 30 countries with divergent internal politics.  I don't think it's reasonable to generalize that all NATO countries hold the same view on this issue.  

To the extent you're talking about the US' view, I think it's helpful to pinpoint the person(s) making the decision.  Although DoD and the IC would have input on this, ultimately, the decision is Biden's alone.  He's shown throughout his presidency that he has a strong tendency to want to avoid military conflict.  He pulled out of Afghanistan on an accelerated schedule.  (It doesn't matter that it was a schedule that his predecessor arranged; Biden could have altered it if he were adamant.)  He's been pursuing the Iran Nuclear Deal reboot for nearly 2 years and has repeatedly argued that rebooting the deal will improve US security.  In in the Russia/Ukraine War, Biden has been cautious to avoid escalation at every step, often calling out his own caution.  He would name exactly what he was doing and that he was doing it in the name of caution.  For better or worse, Biden is not the type to not GAF.

[TrumpCard]

I guessed back then and am even more certain now that Ukraine and NATO don't really GAF about Putin's hollow threats.

I would think you're right Ukraine is willing to call this bluff.  The alternative is to fold and have the population enslaved/exterminated/etc.

NATO is a group of 30 countries with divergent internal politics.  I don't think it's reasonable to generalize that all NATO countries hold the same view on this issue.  

To the extent you're talking about the US' view, I think it's helpful to pinpoint the person(s) making the decision.  Although DoD and the IC would have input on this, ultimately, the decision is Biden's alone.  He's shown throughout his presidency that he has a strong tendency to want to avoid military conflict.  He pulled out of Afghanistan on an accelerated schedule.  (It doesn't matter that it was a schedule that his predecessor arranged; Biden could have altered it if he were adamant.)  He's been pursuing the Iran Nuclear Deal reboot for nearly 2 years and has repeatedly argued that rebooting the deal will improve US security.  In in the Russia/Ukraine War, Biden has been cautious to avoid escalation at every step, often calling out his own caution.  He would name exactly what he was doing and that he was doing it in the name of caution.  For better or worse, Biden is not the type to not GAF.

[dabigv13]

Biden has been appropriately cautious, but he has increased aid in spite of vague Russian nuclear threats. He has given Ukraine targeting info for Russian generals and high value targets, including in previously annexed Crimea.

Biden I'm sure cares about escalation risk, but I don't think he finds Russia's threats very credible at this point and considering the US policy is very loudly declared that even previously occupied Crimea/Donbas should be reclaimed I doubt any other Russian threats will alter US policy.

If Putin actually drops a tactical nuke then we'll see, but I think it's a very unlikely possibility for reasons I outlined above.

[dabigv13]

Biden has been appropriately cautious, but he has increased aid in spite of vague Russian nuclear threats. He has given Ukraine targeting info for Russian generals and high value targets, including in previously annexed Crimea.

Biden I'm sure cares about escalation risk, but I don't think he finds Russia's threats very credible at this point and considering the US policy is very loudly declared that even previously occupied Crimea/Donbas should be reclaimed I doubt any other Russian threats will alter US policy.

If Putin actually drops a tactical nuke then we'll see, but I think it's a very unlikely possibility for reasons I outlined above.