10-19-2022, 08:54 AM
If you see the missiles Iran is supposedly providing Russia, ATACMS should be on their way to Ukraine as I type this.
Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine
If you see the missiles Iran is supposedly providing Russia, ATACMS should be on their way to Ukraine as I type this.
10-19-2022, 01:31 PM
I am going to revise slightly my previous comments regarding shooting down a Shahed-136 by fighter aircraft. It is indeed correct that a tail aspect or head on engagement with the cannon would be problematic because the Shahed-136 is quite "thin". Attacks from the side suffer from a similar problem. However, from above the Shahed-136 is a relatively easy target. It is 11 feet long and 8.2 feet wide (delta shaped). Attacking in a shallow dive should allow the fighter to take out the drone with it's cannon. If the fighter misses with the gun, just "flathat" the drone. Since it operates at low altitude that should knock it down, one way or another. Of course doing all this at night using infrared goggles would be harder.
The real problem is finding the drone and getting a fighter there in time. I don't know what the radar cross section of these drones is. The drone itself is made mostly from fiberglass it appears. There may be metal stiffeners in the structure. From the front and the rear, the visual cross section is minimal. The visual cross section from the top is pretty good, over 4 square meters. What that translates to radar wise I don't know. However, even if the Shahed-136 is as "stealthy" as a KH-101 (which it probably is not), it can be detected at approximately 80% of the radar horizon. The problem is that these drones fly so low that they are almost on you before you see them and are very quickly gone. If the don't come within about 30 km of your position on the ground, you don't see them at all. For that reason lots of them will get through any reasonably sized ground-based radar picket system.
An airborne early warning radar is the only possible way to reliably detect these drones. The radar is looking downwards from high altitude, so the radar horizon is "large". The target is moving (albeit not real fast), so digital MTI can be profitably used. The problem is Ukraine doesn't have this capability, and I don't think AWACS inside NATO territory can see far enough to protect Kiev. Odessa, yes. As I understand it we do not provide real-time target detection services to Ukraine. So, while I really wish Ukraine had ATACMS, I would suggest lending them an E-2D may be more useful right now. They will have to protect it to some extent, but it can operate well back in Ukrainian air space and do the job. Yes, training will be a problem, but without some kind of capability like this, I don't see how Ukraine can respond to these drone strikes no matter what weapons we give them. Not going to happen of course.
We are also supposedly providing a very large number of GLONASS jammers. While this will help, they also jam any Ukrainian systems in the same vicinity that use GLONASS. Not an unmixed blessing. Also, since the drones have a "backup" INS, they will still fly and explode somewhat "near" their target. How good the Iranian software actually is will be tested. Figuring out when not to trust your radio navigation can be tricky.
The real problem is finding the drone and getting a fighter there in time. I don't know what the radar cross section of these drones is. The drone itself is made mostly from fiberglass it appears. There may be metal stiffeners in the structure. From the front and the rear, the visual cross section is minimal. The visual cross section from the top is pretty good, over 4 square meters. What that translates to radar wise I don't know. However, even if the Shahed-136 is as "stealthy" as a KH-101 (which it probably is not), it can be detected at approximately 80% of the radar horizon. The problem is that these drones fly so low that they are almost on you before you see them and are very quickly gone. If the don't come within about 30 km of your position on the ground, you don't see them at all. For that reason lots of them will get through any reasonably sized ground-based radar picket system.
An airborne early warning radar is the only possible way to reliably detect these drones. The radar is looking downwards from high altitude, so the radar horizon is "large". The target is moving (albeit not real fast), so digital MTI can be profitably used. The problem is Ukraine doesn't have this capability, and I don't think AWACS inside NATO territory can see far enough to protect Kiev. Odessa, yes. As I understand it we do not provide real-time target detection services to Ukraine. So, while I really wish Ukraine had ATACMS, I would suggest lending them an E-2D may be more useful right now. They will have to protect it to some extent, but it can operate well back in Ukrainian air space and do the job. Yes, training will be a problem, but without some kind of capability like this, I don't see how Ukraine can respond to these drone strikes no matter what weapons we give them. Not going to happen of course.
We are also supposedly providing a very large number of GLONASS jammers. While this will help, they also jam any Ukrainian systems in the same vicinity that use GLONASS. Not an unmixed blessing. Also, since the drones have a "backup" INS, they will still fly and explode somewhat "near" their target. How good the Iranian software actually is will be tested. Figuring out when not to trust your radio navigation can be tricky.
I am going to revise slightly my previous comments regarding shooting down a Shahed-136 by fighter aircraft. It is indeed correct that a tail aspect or head on engagement with the cannon would be problematic because the Shahed-136 is quite "thin". Attacks from the side suffer from a similar problem. However, from above the Shahed-136 is a relatively easy target. It is 11 feet long and 8.2 feet wide (delta shaped). Attacking in a shallow dive should allow the fighter to take out the drone with it's cannon. If the fighter misses with the gun, just "flathat" the drone. Since it operates at low altitude that should knock it down, one way or another. Of course doing all this at night using infrared goggles would be harder.
The real problem is finding the drone and getting a fighter there in time. I don't know what the radar cross section of these drones is. The drone itself is made mostly from fiberglass it appears. There may be metal stiffeners in the structure. From the front and the rear, the visual cross section is minimal. The visual cross section from the top is pretty good, over 4 square meters. What that translates to radar wise I don't know. However, even if the Shahed-136 is as "stealthy" as a KH-101 (which it probably is not), it can be detected at approximately 80% of the radar horizon. The problem is that these drones fly so low that they are almost on you before you see them and are very quickly gone. If the don't come within about 30 km of your position on the ground, you don't see them at all. For that reason lots of them will get through any reasonably sized ground-based radar picket system.
An airborne early warning radar is the only possible way to reliably detect these drones. The radar is looking downwards from high altitude, so the radar horizon is "large". The target is moving (albeit not real fast), so digital MTI can be profitably used. The problem is Ukraine doesn't have this capability, and I don't think AWACS inside NATO territory can see far enough to protect Kiev. Odessa, yes. As I understand it we do not provide real-time target detection services to Ukraine. So, while I really wish Ukraine had ATACMS, I would suggest lending them an E-2D may be more useful right now. They will have to protect it to some extent, but it can operate well back in Ukrainian air space and do the job. Yes, training will be a problem, but without some kind of capability like this, I don't see how Ukraine can respond to these drone strikes no matter what weapons we give them. Not going to happen of course.
We are also supposedly providing a very large number of GLONASS jammers. While this will help, they also jam any Ukrainian systems in the same vicinity that use GLONASS. Not an unmixed blessing. Also, since the drones have a "backup" INS, they will still fly and explode somewhat "near" their target. How good the Iranian software actually is will be tested. Figuring out when not to trust your radio navigation can be tricky.
The real problem is finding the drone and getting a fighter there in time. I don't know what the radar cross section of these drones is. The drone itself is made mostly from fiberglass it appears. There may be metal stiffeners in the structure. From the front and the rear, the visual cross section is minimal. The visual cross section from the top is pretty good, over 4 square meters. What that translates to radar wise I don't know. However, even if the Shahed-136 is as "stealthy" as a KH-101 (which it probably is not), it can be detected at approximately 80% of the radar horizon. The problem is that these drones fly so low that they are almost on you before you see them and are very quickly gone. If the don't come within about 30 km of your position on the ground, you don't see them at all. For that reason lots of them will get through any reasonably sized ground-based radar picket system.
An airborne early warning radar is the only possible way to reliably detect these drones. The radar is looking downwards from high altitude, so the radar horizon is "large". The target is moving (albeit not real fast), so digital MTI can be profitably used. The problem is Ukraine doesn't have this capability, and I don't think AWACS inside NATO territory can see far enough to protect Kiev. Odessa, yes. As I understand it we do not provide real-time target detection services to Ukraine. So, while I really wish Ukraine had ATACMS, I would suggest lending them an E-2D may be more useful right now. They will have to protect it to some extent, but it can operate well back in Ukrainian air space and do the job. Yes, training will be a problem, but without some kind of capability like this, I don't see how Ukraine can respond to these drone strikes no matter what weapons we give them. Not going to happen of course.
We are also supposedly providing a very large number of GLONASS jammers. While this will help, they also jam any Ukrainian systems in the same vicinity that use GLONASS. Not an unmixed blessing. Also, since the drones have a "backup" INS, they will still fly and explode somewhat "near" their target. How good the Iranian software actually is will be tested. Figuring out when not to trust your radio navigation can be tricky.
10-19-2022, 05:49 PM
Some interesting footage of Ukrainian air defenses in action recently. The first is an old Soviet Osa short range air defense system taking out a drone, and the second an unspecified air defense missile system near a power plant taking out a Kh101 cruise missile.
Seeing 50 year old stuff still being effective is a hoot.
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1582876752648736768?s=20&t=V2om6UegZ59JyIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15828...yIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
Ukraine has put IRIS-T in use near Kiev. Publicly they stated the first system was going to Odessa. Do they have two systems now or maybe just disinformation?
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/158...4x_UHeN5ww[/tweet]
Seeing 50 year old stuff still being effective is a hoot.
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1582876752648736768?s=20&t=V2om6UegZ59JyIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15828...yIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
Ukraine has put IRIS-T in use near Kiev. Publicly they stated the first system was going to Odessa. Do they have two systems now or maybe just disinformation?
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/158...4x_UHeN5ww[/tweet]
Some interesting footage of Ukrainian air defenses in action recently. The first is an old Soviet Osa short range air defense system taking out a drone, and the second an unspecified air defense missile system near a power plant taking out a Kh101 cruise missile.
Seeing 50 year old stuff still being effective is a hoot.
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1582876752648736768?s=20&t=V2om6UegZ59JyIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15828...yIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
Ukraine has put IRIS-T in use near Kiev. Publicly they stated the first system was going to Odessa. Do they have two systems now or maybe just disinformation?
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/158...4x_UHeN5ww[/tweet]
Seeing 50 year old stuff still being effective is a hoot.
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1582876752648736768?s=20&t=V2om6UegZ59JyIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15828...yIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
Ukraine has put IRIS-T in use near Kiev. Publicly they stated the first system was going to Odessa. Do they have two systems now or maybe just disinformation?
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/158...4x_UHeN5ww[/tweet]
10-19-2022, 06:17 PM
(10-19-2022, 05:49 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some interesting footage of Ukrainian air defenses in action recently. The first is an old Soviet Osa short range air defense system taking out a drone, and the second an unspecified air defense missile system near a power plant taking out a Kh101 cruise missile.
Seeing 50 year old stuff still being effective is a hoot.
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1582876752648736768?s=20&t=V2om6UegZ59JyIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15828...yIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
Ukraine has put IRIS-T in use near Kiev. Publicly they stated the first system was going to Odessa. Do they have two systems now or maybe just disinformation?
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/158...4x_UHeN5ww[/tweet]
I just have to wonder how the Iranian weapons are getting to Russia. The land route seems unlikely so they must be flying them? If the means of transport could be identified, and one had very stealthy equipment the transport aircraft could be made to disappear.
(10-19-2022, 05:49 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some interesting footage of Ukrainian air defenses in action recently. The first is an old Soviet Osa short range air defense system taking out a drone, and the second an unspecified air defense missile system near a power plant taking out a Kh101 cruise missile.
Seeing 50 year old stuff still being effective is a hoot.
[Tweet]https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1582876752648736768?s=20&t=V2om6UegZ59JyIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/15828...yIMoGt7Z7A[/tweet]
Ukraine has put IRIS-T in use near Kiev. Publicly they stated the first system was going to Odessa. Do they have two systems now or maybe just disinformation?
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/158...4x_UHeN5ww[/tweet]
I just have to wonder how the Iranian weapons are getting to Russia. The land route seems unlikely so they must be flying them? If the means of transport could be identified, and one had very stealthy equipment the transport aircraft could be made to disappear.
10-19-2022, 06:55 PM
I don't think the Iranian drones are being shipped the long way through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Med Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Presumably, they are being shipped on, or over, the Caspian Sea, or maybe over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. If true, those shipments don't seem too vulnerable.
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
I don't think the Iranian drones are being shipped the long way through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Med Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Presumably, they are being shipped on, or over, the Caspian Sea, or maybe over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. If true, those shipments don't seem too vulnerable.
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
10-19-2022, 08:42 PM
Supposedly the drones are really loud. I wonder could surveillance microphones pick up and triangulate their positions? You would probably need some sort of signal processing to isolate the drone’s sound signature, but that sort of equipment is cheap. Blanket some otherwise quiet rural areas near Russian occupied territory with mic-equipped laptops and once the drones are deployed you can probably figure out their position and direction. You can probably reconfigure this system:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunfire_locator
BC
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunfire_locator
BC
Supposedly the drones are really loud. I wonder could surveillance microphones pick up and triangulate their positions? You would probably need some sort of signal processing to isolate the drone’s sound signature, but that sort of equipment is cheap. Blanket some otherwise quiet rural areas near Russian occupied territory with mic-equipped laptops and once the drones are deployed you can probably figure out their position and direction. You can probably reconfigure this system:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunfire_locator
BC
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gunfire_locator
BC
(10-19-2022, 06:55 PM)TrumpCard Wrote: I don't think the Iranian drones are being shipped the long way through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Med Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Presumably, they are being shipped on, or over, the Caspian Sea, or maybe over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. If true, those shipments don't seem too vulnerable.The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
(10-19-2022, 06:55 PM)TrumpCard Wrote: I don't think the Iranian drones are being shipped the long way through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Med Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Presumably, they are being shipped on, or over, the Caspian Sea, or maybe over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. If true, those shipments don't seem too vulnerable.The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
10-19-2022, 08:51 PM
(10-19-2022, 08:46 PM)Goose Wrote: The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
Well, Russia is violating a UN Security Council resolution that it approved, but trying to enforce it might be a challenge.
Your proposed solution aligns with what I said earlier: continued use of long range drones from Iran to attack Ukranian civilian infrastructure is all the justification we need to give Ukraine ATACMS.
we should also figure out where in Crimea the Iranian trainers/pilots are and make that the first target.
BC
(10-19-2022, 08:46 PM)Goose Wrote: The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
Well, Russia is violating a UN Security Council resolution that it approved, but trying to enforce it might be a challenge.
Your proposed solution aligns with what I said earlier: continued use of long range drones from Iran to attack Ukranian civilian infrastructure is all the justification we need to give Ukraine ATACMS.
we should also figure out where in Crimea the Iranian trainers/pilots are and make that the first target.
BC
10-19-2022, 09:35 PM
(10-19-2022, 08:46 PM)Goose Wrote:(10-19-2022, 06:55 PM)TrumpCard Wrote: I don't think the Iranian drones are being shipped the long way through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Med Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Presumably, they are being shipped on, or over, the Caspian Sea, or maybe over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. If true, those shipments don't seem too vulnerable.The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
In addition we can let it be known that there will no longer be any restrictions on using long range fires to strike targets within Russian borders. After all, they are already striking “Russian territory”, so what’s the difference?
Also if we happened to let the Israelis know any relevant intelligence about Irans drone production and they happened to do something, that would be a shame.
(10-19-2022, 08:46 PM)Goose Wrote:(10-19-2022, 06:55 PM)TrumpCard Wrote: I don't think the Iranian drones are being shipped the long way through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Med Sea, Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Presumably, they are being shipped on, or over, the Caspian Sea, or maybe over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. If true, those shipments don't seem too vulnerable.The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
In addition we can let it be known that there will no longer be any restrictions on using long range fires to strike targets within Russian borders. After all, they are already striking “Russian territory”, so what’s the difference?
Also if we happened to let the Israelis know any relevant intelligence about Irans drone production and they happened to do something, that would be a shame.
10-19-2022, 09:38 PM
(10-19-2022, 08:51 PM)BostonCard Wrote:While I think we basically agree, my approach doesn't care about what Russia uses the drones to target. The fact they are hitting civilian infrastructure certainly outrages many people here. However, attacking only "military" targets shouldn't give them a pass. Like for like.(10-19-2022, 08:46 PM)Goose Wrote: The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
Well, Russia is violating a UN Security Council resolution that it approved, but trying to enforce it might be a challenge.
Your proposed solution aligns with what I said earlier: continued use of long range drones from Iran to attack Ukranian civilian infrastructure is all the justification we need to give Ukraine ATACMS.
I also think we have to be a bit realistic in our outrage about Russian activities. Russia started a war of aggression. It is in no way a "just war" on their part. However, as we all know the US and the allies bombed civilian infrastructure in both Germany and Japan. Even in the first gulf war the US took out the entire Iraqi electrical grid (in one night). We considered that justified. It is clear that Russia is also targeting infrastructure (e.g. schools) that have no military value. These are not accidents, and are arguably war crimes. It is difficult to argue that blowing up railroad and power grid targets is in the same class. These targets enable Ukraine make war, as they did Germany in WW II. One can argue that any destruction caused by an "unjust war" is a war crime, but so far that hasn't ever been done to my knowledge.
Quote:we should also figure out where in Crimea the Iranian trainers/pilots are and make that the first target.Good plan!
BC
(10-19-2022, 08:51 PM)BostonCard Wrote:While I think we basically agree, my approach doesn't care about what Russia uses the drones to target. The fact they are hitting civilian infrastructure certainly outrages many people here. However, attacking only "military" targets shouldn't give them a pass. Like for like.(10-19-2022, 08:46 PM)Goose Wrote: The US and NATO are now to some degree being hoisted on their on petard. We claim immunity from Russian action while weapons are in transit via NATO countries. We also concede that Ukraine (and NATO) cannot attack on "Russian territory". We can't do anything to Iran that we wouldn't let Russia do to Poland. Really cuts down on our options.
One thing we can do is tell Russia that for any Iranian weapon they use that has a published range of X km, we will feel free to deliver weapons to Ukraine with equal range. Given that Iran claims the Shahed-136 has a published range of several hundred (actually thousand, but who cares?) km, ATACMS is now "like for like". They get Shahed-136s from Iran, Ukraine gets ATACMS from us.
Well, Russia is violating a UN Security Council resolution that it approved, but trying to enforce it might be a challenge.
Your proposed solution aligns with what I said earlier: continued use of long range drones from Iran to attack Ukranian civilian infrastructure is all the justification we need to give Ukraine ATACMS.
I also think we have to be a bit realistic in our outrage about Russian activities. Russia started a war of aggression. It is in no way a "just war" on their part. However, as we all know the US and the allies bombed civilian infrastructure in both Germany and Japan. Even in the first gulf war the US took out the entire Iraqi electrical grid (in one night). We considered that justified. It is clear that Russia is also targeting infrastructure (e.g. schools) that have no military value. These are not accidents, and are arguably war crimes. It is difficult to argue that blowing up railroad and power grid targets is in the same class. These targets enable Ukraine make war, as they did Germany in WW II. One can argue that any destruction caused by an "unjust war" is a war crime, but so far that hasn't ever been done to my knowledge.
Quote:we should also figure out where in Crimea the Iranian trainers/pilots are and make that the first target.Good plan!
BC
10-19-2022, 11:18 PM
[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1577509007094431745?s=61&t=VMG2QOlsNeKOWcUb7KtZ0Q[/tweet]
Russia’s population is 144 million, so this represents 0.5%
BC
Russia’s population is 144 million, so this represents 0.5%
BC
[tweet]https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/1577509007094431745?s=61&t=VMG2QOlsNeKOWcUb7KtZ0Q[/tweet]
Russia’s population is 144 million, so this represents 0.5%
BC
Russia’s population is 144 million, so this represents 0.5%
BC
(10-19-2022, 10:30 PM)M T Wrote: Aren’t power stations in Russia like for like tatgets?Indeed they are, and if Ukraine had "indigenous" weapons with which to strike them, they could. It is probable that in at least one case, they did. However, this war has created a set of "constraints" designed to prevent it from becoming NATO vs Russia. For instance, the US has decided that giving fully combat ready MIGs from NATO countries to Ukraine is not permissible, but disassembling them and sending them to Ukraine to be reassembled is fine. Similarly, we place constraints on the M777 and HIMARS preventing them from striking Russia. Does any of this "make sense" from a military or "reality" point of view? No, but from a political point of view it apparently does. Like for like applies inside Ukraine, but not elsewhere because we have adopted that constraint.
One interesting question could be "If a weapon is manufactured under license in Ukraine, is it "indigenous" enough to strike on Russian territory?". This is going to matter pretty soon because supposedly Russia plans to manufacture Iranian designed drones in Russia. In that case, how do you know the drone was manufactured in Russia and not Iran? "Trust me, the ATACMS that just blew up the Kerch strait bridge was :assembled in Odessa". Unfortunately, these "rules" really aren't mutually agreed, so it is a recipe for lots of problems and a wider war, It is also a fracture line between "the west" and Ukraine. So far, the world has got through it, but how long that will remain true is an open question.
(10-19-2022, 10:30 PM)M T Wrote: Aren’t power stations in Russia like for like tatgets?Indeed they are, and if Ukraine had "indigenous" weapons with which to strike them, they could. It is probable that in at least one case, they did. However, this war has created a set of "constraints" designed to prevent it from becoming NATO vs Russia. For instance, the US has decided that giving fully combat ready MIGs from NATO countries to Ukraine is not permissible, but disassembling them and sending them to Ukraine to be reassembled is fine. Similarly, we place constraints on the M777 and HIMARS preventing them from striking Russia. Does any of this "make sense" from a military or "reality" point of view? No, but from a political point of view it apparently does. Like for like applies inside Ukraine, but not elsewhere because we have adopted that constraint.
One interesting question could be "If a weapon is manufactured under license in Ukraine, is it "indigenous" enough to strike on Russian territory?". This is going to matter pretty soon because supposedly Russia plans to manufacture Iranian designed drones in Russia. In that case, how do you know the drone was manufactured in Russia and not Iran? "Trust me, the ATACMS that just blew up the Kerch strait bridge was :assembled in Odessa". Unfortunately, these "rules" really aren't mutually agreed, so it is a recipe for lots of problems and a wider war, It is also a fracture line between "the west" and Ukraine. So far, the world has got through it, but how long that will remain true is an open question.
Quote:Does any of this "make sense" from a military or "reality" point of view? No, but from a political point of view it apparently does. Like for like applies inside Ukraine, but not elsewhere because we have adopted that constraint.
Worth pointing out that this perhaps overcautious policy has gotten Ukraine through 8 months of war, with Russia literally hemorrhaging men and equipment and on retreat, with no wider NATO or US involvement, a great success.
Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure is more akin to the terror bombing of WW2 than to militarily useful strikes. I doubt it is of much value to Ukraine to respond in kind for the most part because any long distance weapons used for those missions would probably be better served against more military targets, IE air defense sites, command and control, artillery, ammo or fuel dumps, would all be more important targets than a power station. Russia is most likely targeting power infrastructure with their long range weapons more than Ukraine because they don't have as good real time targeting information for more militarily useful targets, and power stations can't move around.
Ukraine has struck power stations in Belgorod, but I'm not certain which munitions were used.
(This post was last modified: 10-20-2022, 07:48 AM by dabigv13.)
Quote:Does any of this "make sense" from a military or "reality" point of view? No, but from a political point of view it apparently does. Like for like applies inside Ukraine, but not elsewhere because we have adopted that constraint.
Worth pointing out that this perhaps overcautious policy has gotten Ukraine through 8 months of war, with Russia literally hemorrhaging men and equipment and on retreat, with no wider NATO or US involvement, a great success.
Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure is more akin to the terror bombing of WW2 than to militarily useful strikes. I doubt it is of much value to Ukraine to respond in kind for the most part because any long distance weapons used for those missions would probably be better served against more military targets, IE air defense sites, command and control, artillery, ammo or fuel dumps, would all be more important targets than a power station. Russia is most likely targeting power infrastructure with their long range weapons more than Ukraine because they don't have as good real time targeting information for more militarily useful targets, and power stations can't move around.
Ukraine has struck power stations in Belgorod, but I'm not certain which munitions were used.
(10-20-2022, 07:30 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:I agree. NATO has navigated the political minefield successfully and coupled with Ukrainian skill and courage has pretty much created an untenable situation for Russia. However, Russia is adapting and trying to fix that problem. Russia also has the advantage that NATO cannot adapt in a way that involves direct involvement. It has been tricky and is going to get trickier. For that reason, I think we do need to demonstrate to Russia that if they bring in new long range weapons from outside of Russia, Ukraine can do the same. Iran is already sanctioned severely, so it is improbable that further sanctions will reduce the weapons flow from there. Iran has missiles that can do even more damage than the drones Russia is already employing. We need to make that source of supply costly, IMHO.Quote:Does any of this "make sense" from a military or "reality" point of view? No, but from a political point of view it apparently does. Like for like applies inside Ukraine, but not elsewhere because we have adopted that constraint.
Worth pointing out that this perhaps overcautious policy has gotten Ukraine through 8 months of war, with Russia literally hemorrhaging men and equipment and on retreat, with no wider NATO or US involvement, a great success.
Quote:Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure is more akin to the terror bombing of WW2 than to militarily useful strikes. I doubt it is of much value to Ukraine to respond in kind for the most part because any long distance weapons used for those missions would probably be better served against more military targets, IE air defense sites, command and control, artillery, ammo or fuel dumps, would all be more important targets than a power station. Russia is most likely targeting power infrastructure with their long range weapons more than Ukraine because they don't have as good real time targeting information for more militarily useful targets, and power stations can't move around.I don't totally agree with you here. It is undoubtedly true that Ukraine can't destroy Russia's entire power grid, but it is not true that destroying that grid around their borders is not militarily useful. If warehouses have no lights it is very detrimental to logistics. If the traffic lights don't work, that really can cause delays. The cell phone system in most places can't operate very long without power. Most importantly in both Ukraine and Russia, if there is no power there are no trains. Some low traffic areas are not electric, but all main lines are. We have discussed repeatedly how important rail transport is to both sides. IMHO it is a demonstration of Russian incompetence that the power grid wasn't taken out on day 1. We certainly did that in Iraq. Terror bombing this is most definitely not. Russia does plenty of that too, but the two things are not equal.
Quote:Ukraine has struck power stations in Belgorod, but I'm not certain which munitions were used.Did they ever officially own up to that? I am sure they did it, but I am not sure they admitted it. I am willing to bet heavily that however it was done it didn't involve HIMARS or other NATO supplied weapons. Getting sideways with NATO just isn't worth it.
(10-20-2022, 07:30 AM)dabigv13 Wrote:I agree. NATO has navigated the political minefield successfully and coupled with Ukrainian skill and courage has pretty much created an untenable situation for Russia. However, Russia is adapting and trying to fix that problem. Russia also has the advantage that NATO cannot adapt in a way that involves direct involvement. It has been tricky and is going to get trickier. For that reason, I think we do need to demonstrate to Russia that if they bring in new long range weapons from outside of Russia, Ukraine can do the same. Iran is already sanctioned severely, so it is improbable that further sanctions will reduce the weapons flow from there. Iran has missiles that can do even more damage than the drones Russia is already employing. We need to make that source of supply costly, IMHO.Quote:Does any of this "make sense" from a military or "reality" point of view? No, but from a political point of view it apparently does. Like for like applies inside Ukraine, but not elsewhere because we have adopted that constraint.
Worth pointing out that this perhaps overcautious policy has gotten Ukraine through 8 months of war, with Russia literally hemorrhaging men and equipment and on retreat, with no wider NATO or US involvement, a great success.
Quote:Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure is more akin to the terror bombing of WW2 than to militarily useful strikes. I doubt it is of much value to Ukraine to respond in kind for the most part because any long distance weapons used for those missions would probably be better served against more military targets, IE air defense sites, command and control, artillery, ammo or fuel dumps, would all be more important targets than a power station. Russia is most likely targeting power infrastructure with their long range weapons more than Ukraine because they don't have as good real time targeting information for more militarily useful targets, and power stations can't move around.I don't totally agree with you here. It is undoubtedly true that Ukraine can't destroy Russia's entire power grid, but it is not true that destroying that grid around their borders is not militarily useful. If warehouses have no lights it is very detrimental to logistics. If the traffic lights don't work, that really can cause delays. The cell phone system in most places can't operate very long without power. Most importantly in both Ukraine and Russia, if there is no power there are no trains. Some low traffic areas are not electric, but all main lines are. We have discussed repeatedly how important rail transport is to both sides. IMHO it is a demonstration of Russian incompetence that the power grid wasn't taken out on day 1. We certainly did that in Iraq. Terror bombing this is most definitely not. Russia does plenty of that too, but the two things are not equal.
Quote:Ukraine has struck power stations in Belgorod, but I'm not certain which munitions were used.Did they ever officially own up to that? I am sure they did it, but I am not sure they admitted it. I am willing to bet heavily that however it was done it didn't involve HIMARS or other NATO supplied weapons. Getting sideways with NATO just isn't worth it.
10-20-2022, 10:43 AM
Taking out power infrastructure can be militarily useful as you point out, however the way Russia has been haphazardly doing so, in various rear cities with small amounts of drones and cruise missiles, leads me to think the intent is more civilian terror as opposed to targeting of logistics in a militarily useful way.
To me that would look more like focused, recurrent, heavy strikes on power infrastructure in the most operationally important areas, which is not really what the Russian drone/missile campaign has looked like.
To me that would look more like focused, recurrent, heavy strikes on power infrastructure in the most operationally important areas, which is not really what the Russian drone/missile campaign has looked like.
Taking out power infrastructure can be militarily useful as you point out, however the way Russia has been haphazardly doing so, in various rear cities with small amounts of drones and cruise missiles, leads me to think the intent is more civilian terror as opposed to targeting of logistics in a militarily useful way.
To me that would look more like focused, recurrent, heavy strikes on power infrastructure in the most operationally important areas, which is not really what the Russian drone/missile campaign has looked like.
To me that would look more like focused, recurrent, heavy strikes on power infrastructure in the most operationally important areas, which is not really what the Russian drone/missile campaign has looked like.
10-20-2022, 11:13 AM
(10-20-2022, 10:43 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Taking out power infrastructure can be militarily useful as you point out, however the way Russia has been haphazardly doing so, in various rear cities with small amounts of drones and cruise missiles, leads me to think the intent is more civilian terror as opposed to targeting of logistics in a militarily useful way.I think you are correct about that. It isn't a focused, recurrent and directed strike like one would expect. I am interpolating a lot here, but I think the new Russian command is embedding a real military action inside the civilian terror action because they can't get Putin to agree with their desired "real" plan otherwise. It is very late in the day to be doing this, but I simply don't believe that everyone in the Russian military is a fool. There are enough such fools, apparently starting with the CIC, that the real soldiers must "write straight with crooked lines".
To me that would look more like focused, recurrent, heavy strikes on power infrastructure in the most operationally important areas, which is not really what the Russian drone/missile campaign has looked like.
Similarly, I am pretty sure that the Russian military leadership has been telling Putin that he needed to evacuate Kherson for at least two months, if not longer. Supposedly he won't let them do that. This type of behavior by a dictator who is in a militarily difficult situation isn't unprecedented. It usually turns out badly for said dictator, but not always. Lets hope Kherson is the "typical" case.
(10-20-2022, 10:43 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Taking out power infrastructure can be militarily useful as you point out, however the way Russia has been haphazardly doing so, in various rear cities with small amounts of drones and cruise missiles, leads me to think the intent is more civilian terror as opposed to targeting of logistics in a militarily useful way.I think you are correct about that. It isn't a focused, recurrent and directed strike like one would expect. I am interpolating a lot here, but I think the new Russian command is embedding a real military action inside the civilian terror action because they can't get Putin to agree with their desired "real" plan otherwise. It is very late in the day to be doing this, but I simply don't believe that everyone in the Russian military is a fool. There are enough such fools, apparently starting with the CIC, that the real soldiers must "write straight with crooked lines".
To me that would look more like focused, recurrent, heavy strikes on power infrastructure in the most operationally important areas, which is not really what the Russian drone/missile campaign has looked like.
Similarly, I am pretty sure that the Russian military leadership has been telling Putin that he needed to evacuate Kherson for at least two months, if not longer. Supposedly he won't let them do that. This type of behavior by a dictator who is in a militarily difficult situation isn't unprecedented. It usually turns out badly for said dictator, but not always. Lets hope Kherson is the "typical" case.
10-20-2022, 11:46 AM
(This post was last modified: 10-20-2022, 11:47 AM by BostonCard.)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/dsupervilleap/status/1583156576692510720?s=46&t=1bSmBu3fybLa__l6vHR-DA[/tweet]
A few things…
Again, this can be justification for furthering our involvement. Not to say that we should establish a no-fly zone, but we should start hinting about it. Also, the nuclear deal is dead anyways, but Iran should know that we cannot negotiate with them while they are a party to this war. And third, maybe the Saudis should revisit their stance on cutting oil production, but regardless, the sooner we can wean ourselves from stuff that comes out of the ground in despotic regimes, the better.
And, again, it would be a real shame if whatever base in Crimea being used by the Iranians were to be hit by an ATACMS.
BC
A few things…
Again, this can be justification for furthering our involvement. Not to say that we should establish a no-fly zone, but we should start hinting about it. Also, the nuclear deal is dead anyways, but Iran should know that we cannot negotiate with them while they are a party to this war. And third, maybe the Saudis should revisit their stance on cutting oil production, but regardless, the sooner we can wean ourselves from stuff that comes out of the ground in despotic regimes, the better.
And, again, it would be a real shame if whatever base in Crimea being used by the Iranians were to be hit by an ATACMS.
BC
(This post was last modified: 10-20-2022, 11:47 AM by BostonCard.)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/dsupervilleap/status/1583156576692510720?s=46&t=1bSmBu3fybLa__l6vHR-DA[/tweet]
A few things…
Again, this can be justification for furthering our involvement. Not to say that we should establish a no-fly zone, but we should start hinting about it. Also, the nuclear deal is dead anyways, but Iran should know that we cannot negotiate with them while they are a party to this war. And third, maybe the Saudis should revisit their stance on cutting oil production, but regardless, the sooner we can wean ourselves from stuff that comes out of the ground in despotic regimes, the better.
And, again, it would be a real shame if whatever base in Crimea being used by the Iranians were to be hit by an ATACMS.
BC
A few things…
Again, this can be justification for furthering our involvement. Not to say that we should establish a no-fly zone, but we should start hinting about it. Also, the nuclear deal is dead anyways, but Iran should know that we cannot negotiate with them while they are a party to this war. And third, maybe the Saudis should revisit their stance on cutting oil production, but regardless, the sooner we can wean ourselves from stuff that comes out of the ground in despotic regimes, the better.
And, again, it would be a real shame if whatever base in Crimea being used by the Iranians were to be hit by an ATACMS.
BC
10-20-2022, 11:46 AM
Is there a set of drones that are designed to provide CAP against enemy drones? I'm not sure it makes sense, but it might. You could put up large number of such drones to patrol looking for other drones and to take action against them. Suppose you put up 50 or 100 drones to patrol a perimeter. Maybe they couldn't have powerful radars but you'd think optical & IR & audio sensors shouldn't be too heavy. If they could fly high, they could use gravity to help them intercept an enemy drone. One can imagine non-dynamic ways of disabling an enemy drone so they don't have to carry heavy weaponry or explosives.
Is there a set of drones that are designed to provide CAP against enemy drones? I'm not sure it makes sense, but it might. You could put up large number of such drones to patrol looking for other drones and to take action against them. Suppose you put up 50 or 100 drones to patrol a perimeter. Maybe they couldn't have powerful radars but you'd think optical & IR & audio sensors shouldn't be too heavy. If they could fly high, they could use gravity to help them intercept an enemy drone. One can imagine non-dynamic ways of disabling an enemy drone so they don't have to carry heavy weaponry or explosives.
10-20-2022, 12:11 PM
(10-20-2022, 11:46 AM)M T Wrote: Is there a set of drones that are designed to provide CAP against enemy drones? I'm not sure it makes sense, but it might. You could put up large number of such drones to patrol looking for other drones and to take action against them. Suppose you put up 50 or 100 drones to patrol a perimeter. Maybe they couldn't have powerful radars but you'd think optical & IR & audio sensors shouldn't be too heavy. If they could fly high, they could use gravity to help them intercept an enemy drone. One can imagine non-dynamic ways of disabling an enemy drone so they don't have to carry heavy weaponry or explosives.The problem is spatial volume. Even 100 drones is a drop of water in the ocean, assuming the threat can come in anywhere along the line of contact. They would need a sensor (IR or audio) that has a significant detection range, and getting that into a drone makes it big and expensive. You don't want such a thing to be an expendable. Also, the drone has to be fast enough to close with the target that it detected at a distance. That also makes it bigger and requires more fuel. Instead, the current approach is to use a recoverable detection drone with long range sensors and faster attack drones that can be tasked to run down the targets. These attack drones are launched on an "as needed" basis. You spread these attack drones all over the country. These attack drones need to be cheap and fast. This can work well but is still in the simulation stages. The opponent can defeat it by having their attacking drones change course often so that you can't predict their target or position at a given time. The attack drones run out of gas trying to catch it.
Lots of people have been working on this problem for a while. There is no off the shelf "solution".
(10-20-2022, 11:46 AM)M T Wrote: Is there a set of drones that are designed to provide CAP against enemy drones? I'm not sure it makes sense, but it might. You could put up large number of such drones to patrol looking for other drones and to take action against them. Suppose you put up 50 or 100 drones to patrol a perimeter. Maybe they couldn't have powerful radars but you'd think optical & IR & audio sensors shouldn't be too heavy. If they could fly high, they could use gravity to help them intercept an enemy drone. One can imagine non-dynamic ways of disabling an enemy drone so they don't have to carry heavy weaponry or explosives.The problem is spatial volume. Even 100 drones is a drop of water in the ocean, assuming the threat can come in anywhere along the line of contact. They would need a sensor (IR or audio) that has a significant detection range, and getting that into a drone makes it big and expensive. You don't want such a thing to be an expendable. Also, the drone has to be fast enough to close with the target that it detected at a distance. That also makes it bigger and requires more fuel. Instead, the current approach is to use a recoverable detection drone with long range sensors and faster attack drones that can be tasked to run down the targets. These attack drones are launched on an "as needed" basis. You spread these attack drones all over the country. These attack drones need to be cheap and fast. This can work well but is still in the simulation stages. The opponent can defeat it by having their attacking drones change course often so that you can't predict their target or position at a given time. The attack drones run out of gas trying to catch it.
Lots of people have been working on this problem for a while. There is no off the shelf "solution".
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