[81alum]

I wonder what the experts here think of this morning's NYT article on Russian fortifications.  The article seemed to me to be fairly balanced, pointing out the purpose and the potential weaknesses of this strategy.  The speed with which fortified lines can be constructed caught me by surprise--using modern equipment they laid down hundreds of miles of trenches, dragon's teeth, etc. in a couple of weeks.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022...raine.html

[81alum]

I wonder what the experts here think of this morning's NYT article on Russian fortifications.  The article seemed to me to be fairly balanced, pointing out the purpose and the potential weaknesses of this strategy.  The speed with which fortified lines can be constructed caught me by surprise--using modern equipment they laid down hundreds of miles of trenches, dragon's teeth, etc. in a couple of weeks.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022...raine.html

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/DanLamothe/status/1603165188525809666?s=20&t=x7ez_be-FkhwoQ4xh7k6mQ[/tweet]

Seems like this would be helpful.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/DanLamothe/status/1603165188525809666?s=20&t=x7ez_be-FkhwoQ4xh7k6mQ[/tweet]

Seems like this would be helpful.

BC

[Goose]

https://twitter.com/DanLamothe/status/16...oQ4xh7k6mQ
Seems like this would be helpful.

BC

Indeed it would. However, there are tons of issues (literally :-). These mod kits are known to work with various US bombs. Will they work with Soviet era bombs? Probably not out of the box, as the bomb characteristics affect the guidance software. There are no settings for Soviet bombs. So are we giving them the bombs too? If so, how do you attach them to non-standard hardpoints? The HARM was "easy" because it always uses an adapter anyway. Bombs don't.  It can be done, but it is much harder than it looks.

UPDATE: From Wikipedia

The store is mounted by locking the store's lugs with L-shaped suspension hooks in the rack. Depending on the mass of the store there can be a single lug or a number of lugs on the store separated by a certain distance. The distances are standardized. For NATO there is the 14-inch suspension for a lighter or 30-inch suspension for heavier stores. Depending on specific stores from 1000 lb upward 3 or 4 lugs can be used within the defined suspension range.[2] For Russian stores there is the standard 110 mm suspension for helicopters or the 250 mm suspension.[4]

Not compatible at all.

[Goose]

https://twitter.com/DanLamothe/status/16...oQ4xh7k6mQ
Seems like this would be helpful.

BC

Indeed it would. However, there are tons of issues (literally :-). These mod kits are known to work with various US bombs. Will they work with Soviet era bombs? Probably not out of the box, as the bomb characteristics affect the guidance software. There are no settings for Soviet bombs. So are we giving them the bombs too? If so, how do you attach them to non-standard hardpoints? The HARM was "easy" because it always uses an adapter anyway. Bombs don't.  It can be done, but it is much harder than it looks.

UPDATE: From Wikipedia

The store is mounted by locking the store's lugs with L-shaped suspension hooks in the rack. Depending on the mass of the store there can be a single lug or a number of lugs on the store separated by a certain distance. The distances are standardized. For NATO there is the 14-inch suspension for a lighter or 30-inch suspension for heavier stores. Depending on specific stores from 1000 lb upward 3 or 4 lugs can be used within the defined suspension range.[2] For Russian stores there is the standard 110 mm suspension for helicopters or the 250 mm suspension.[4]

Not compatible at all.

[gocard14]

Military costs will never make sense to me. 

A single patriot missle is over a million bucks. A new JDAM-ER with a range of up to 80km costs 10k. 

Edit: Reading a bit more I guess it comes from the JDAM essentially being a glider rather then rocket or jet powered. In that case, you have to figure the effective range depends on speed and altitude of the releasing platform, and given air denial you expect most of the planes will be operating at lower altitudes and hence shorter ranges. Still a nice addition though, if they can make the interoperability work you have to think it will really increase the effectiveness of air support

[gocard14]

Military costs will never make sense to me. 

A single patriot missle is over a million bucks. A new JDAM-ER with a range of up to 80km costs 10k. 

Edit: Reading a bit more I guess it comes from the JDAM essentially being a glider rather then rocket or jet powered. In that case, you have to figure the effective range depends on speed and altitude of the releasing platform, and given air denial you expect most of the planes will be operating at lower altitudes and hence shorter ranges. Still a nice addition though, if they can make the interoperability work you have to think it will really increase the effectiveness of air support

[M T]

My question is what missiles were fired from where.  The closest Ukrainian-held territory is about 85km to the NNW on the north shore of the Dnipro.  The HIMARS are range-limited to less than 50 miles (80.5 km).   I saw another report suggesting they were Turkish TRLG-230 missiles, but their maximum range is 70 km.

If the Ukrainians had crossed the Dnipro to fire these missiles (or fired them from a boat), this seems like a very risky move with a precious resource, as they couldn't get far from where they were fired.

Something doesn't add up.

Maybe I was looking in the wrong spot.  Today's ISW interactive map shows a Ukrainian notch into Russian claimed/assessed territory south of Myrne, Zaporizha Oblast.  The south end of that notch is about 65 km from where the missiles hit.  The ISW map indicates the N/S road in that notch dead-ends into a road for which both directions are in what ISW indicates is Russian-assessed or -claimed territory.

If within the range, there is a E/W road totally in Ukrainian-controlled territory a bit north of there at Shcherbaky which is 78 km from the attacked location.  That seems a better spot for a launch.

[M T]

My question is what missiles were fired from where.  The closest Ukrainian-held territory is about 85km to the NNW on the north shore of the Dnipro.  The HIMARS are range-limited to less than 50 miles (80.5 km).   I saw another report suggesting they were Turkish TRLG-230 missiles, but their maximum range is 70 km.

If the Ukrainians had crossed the Dnipro to fire these missiles (or fired them from a boat), this seems like a very risky move with a precious resource, as they couldn't get far from where they were fired.

Something doesn't add up.

Maybe I was looking in the wrong spot.  Today's ISW interactive map shows a Ukrainian notch into Russian claimed/assessed territory south of Myrne, Zaporizha Oblast.  The south end of that notch is about 65 km from where the missiles hit.  The ISW map indicates the N/S road in that notch dead-ends into a road for which both directions are in what ISW indicates is Russian-assessed or -claimed territory.

If within the range, there is a E/W road totally in Ukrainian-controlled territory a bit north of there at Shcherbaky which is 78 km from the attacked location.  That seems a better spot for a launch.

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ianbremmer/status/1603093091245858816?s=20&t=x7ez_be-FkhwoQ4xh7k6mQ[/tweet]

The guy was a bona fide comedian in his day.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/ianbremmer/status/1603093091245858816?s=20&t=x7ez_be-FkhwoQ4xh7k6mQ[/tweet]

The guy was a bona fide comedian in his day.

BC

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/explainer-pat...39255.html

This article touches on what the Patriot can and cannot do for Ukraine. Lots of issues here are cited but not explored. In any case, it basically says that politically it is important but tactically it isn't.

Ukraine is proving once again that it is very hard to win a war when you are constrained in what you can attack and your opponent is not. Defending against missile attack has two parts. One part is shooting down the missiles when they are launched. The other part is denying your opponent the ability to launch these attacks. The latter can be done by destroying the launchers and/or by destroying  the ability to produce launchers and missiles. Ukraine has limited ability to do this mostly because Russia launches from areas Ukraine has no weapons to reach. As long as this is true, Ukraine will be in a bad spot.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/explainer-pat...39255.html

This article touches on what the Patriot can and cannot do for Ukraine. Lots of issues here are cited but not explored. In any case, it basically says that politically it is important but tactically it isn't.

Ukraine is proving once again that it is very hard to win a war when you are constrained in what you can attack and your opponent is not. Defending against missile attack has two parts. One part is shooting down the missiles when they are launched. The other part is denying your opponent the ability to launch these attacks. The latter can be done by destroying the launchers and/or by destroying  the ability to produce launchers and missiles. Ukraine has limited ability to do this mostly because Russia launches from areas Ukraine has no weapons to reach. As long as this is true, Ukraine will be in a bad spot.

[OutsiderFan]

This is why I continue to lament the notion of making Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. It's just totally outrageous that Russia gets to do whatever it wants short of nuclear weapons, and Ukraine has to be careful not to cross a myriad of lines. It's nice that Ukraine has developed some capacity to strike inside Russia with whatever it can rig together, but it would be far more useful if Ukraine were given long-range weapons to do this more effectively.

I agree the Patriot Missile system is more political statement than actual battlefield difference maker, but to me, it's only useful if Russia takes it as "now we're sending Patriot Systems, but pull any more shit, and we might send more long-range capability to F you up," type of message.

On a related note, I'm really bothered by the news media constantly asking if this aid or that aid to Ukraine will "provoke Russia," as if invading a sovereign nation against international law, and committing a laundry list of war crimes isn't enough, and the rest of the world should GAF what Russia thinks or might do in response to anything that happens to it henceforth.

[OutsiderFan]

This is why I continue to lament the notion of making Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. It's just totally outrageous that Russia gets to do whatever it wants short of nuclear weapons, and Ukraine has to be careful not to cross a myriad of lines. It's nice that Ukraine has developed some capacity to strike inside Russia with whatever it can rig together, but it would be far more useful if Ukraine were given long-range weapons to do this more effectively.

I agree the Patriot Missile system is more political statement than actual battlefield difference maker, but to me, it's only useful if Russia takes it as "now we're sending Patriot Systems, but pull any more shit, and we might send more long-range capability to F you up," type of message.

On a related note, I'm really bothered by the news media constantly asking if this aid or that aid to Ukraine will "provoke Russia," as if invading a sovereign nation against international law, and committing a laundry list of war crimes isn't enough, and the rest of the world should GAF what Russia thinks or might do in response to anything that happens to it henceforth.

[81alum]

This is why I continue to lament the notion of making Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. It's just totally outrageous that Russia gets to do whatever it wants short of nuclear weapons, and Ukraine has to be careful not to cross a myriad of lines. It's nice that Ukraine has developed some capacity to strike inside Russia with whatever it can rig together, but it would be far more useful if Ukraine were given long-range weapons to do this more effectively.

I agree the Patriot Missile system is more political statement than actual battlefield difference maker, but to me, it's only useful if Russia takes it as "now we're sending Patriot Systems, but pull any more shit, and we might send more long-range capability to F you up," type of message.

On a related note, I'm really bothered by the news media constantly asking if this aid or that aid to Ukraine will "provoke Russia," as if invading a sovereign nation against international law, and committing a laundry list of war crimes isn't enough, and the rest of the world should GAF what Russia thinks or might do in response to anything that happens to it henceforth.

Of course it is outrageous.  But is there any doubt that Ukraine would get whatever it wanted, including boots-on-the-ground from some western nations, if Russia had no nuclear weapons?  The reticence is all about differing levels of willingness to risk nuclear escalation.  I'm not suggesting that I know the threshold at which Russia would nuke something, but it seems to me that uncertainty over that prospect is solely responsible for keeping aid to Ukraine down to half-steps, as opposed to a Desert Storm response.

The terrible consequence of this, of course, is that it further inspires N Korea, Iran, and probably many others to seek their own nuclear arsenals.  Having nukes really seems to work--at least so long as you don't actually use them.

Another way of thinking about it....what would the response have been to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait if the world was sure he had nuclear weapons at that time?

[81alum]

This is why I continue to lament the notion of making Ukraine fight with one hand tied behind its back. It's just totally outrageous that Russia gets to do whatever it wants short of nuclear weapons, and Ukraine has to be careful not to cross a myriad of lines. It's nice that Ukraine has developed some capacity to strike inside Russia with whatever it can rig together, but it would be far more useful if Ukraine were given long-range weapons to do this more effectively.

I agree the Patriot Missile system is more political statement than actual battlefield difference maker, but to me, it's only useful if Russia takes it as "now we're sending Patriot Systems, but pull any more shit, and we might send more long-range capability to F you up," type of message.

On a related note, I'm really bothered by the news media constantly asking if this aid or that aid to Ukraine will "provoke Russia," as if invading a sovereign nation against international law, and committing a laundry list of war crimes isn't enough, and the rest of the world should GAF what Russia thinks or might do in response to anything that happens to it henceforth.

Of course it is outrageous.  But is there any doubt that Ukraine would get whatever it wanted, including boots-on-the-ground from some western nations, if Russia had no nuclear weapons?  The reticence is all about differing levels of willingness to risk nuclear escalation.  I'm not suggesting that I know the threshold at which Russia would nuke something, but it seems to me that uncertainty over that prospect is solely responsible for keeping aid to Ukraine down to half-steps, as opposed to a Desert Storm response.

The terrible consequence of this, of course, is that it further inspires N Korea, Iran, and probably many others to seek their own nuclear arsenals.  Having nukes really seems to work--at least so long as you don't actually use them.

Another way of thinking about it....what would the response have been to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait if the world was sure he had nuclear weapons at that time?

[TrumpCard]

as if . . . the rest of the world should GAF what Russia thinks or might do in response to anything that happens to it henceforth.

I was with you all the way until this bit from the end.

[TrumpCard]

as if . . . the rest of the world should GAF what Russia thinks or might do in response to anything that happens to it henceforth.

I was with you all the way until this bit from the end.

[Goose]

Another way of thinking about it....what would the response have been to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait if the world was sure he had nuclear weapons at that time?

Not much different. Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to deliver nuclear weapon reliably anywhere outside of the immediate area, if that. North Korea fully understands this. That is why they have worked so hard to develop a credible delivery system. Russia OTOH has the ability to reliably deliver fusion weapons (a much more damaging weapon class) anywhere on the planet in large numbers. These numbers could (probably would) bring on a "Nuclear winter". Nobody could reasonably expect to "win" that war. While it is horrible that N. Korea has a nuclear capability, it is nothing at all compared to Russia. A nuclear exchange between the US and Russia would be many orders of magnitude worse. The downside of this magnitude simply can't be ignored, like it or not.

[Goose]

Another way of thinking about it....what would the response have been to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait if the world was sure he had nuclear weapons at that time?

Not much different. Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to deliver nuclear weapon reliably anywhere outside of the immediate area, if that. North Korea fully understands this. That is why they have worked so hard to develop a credible delivery system. Russia OTOH has the ability to reliably deliver fusion weapons (a much more damaging weapon class) anywhere on the planet in large numbers. These numbers could (probably would) bring on a "Nuclear winter". Nobody could reasonably expect to "win" that war. While it is horrible that N. Korea has a nuclear capability, it is nothing at all compared to Russia. A nuclear exchange between the US and Russia would be many orders of magnitude worse. The downside of this magnitude simply can't be ignored, like it or not.

[81alum]

Another way of thinking about it....what would the response have been to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait if the world was sure he had nuclear weapons at that time?

Not much different. Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to deliver nuclear weapon reliably anywhere outside of the immediate area, if that. North Korea fully understands this. That is why they have worked so hard to develop a credible delivery system. Russia OTOH has the ability to reliably deliver fusion weapons (a much more damaging weapon class) anywhere on the planet in large numbers. These numbers could (probably would) bring on a "Nuclear winter". Nobody could reasonably expect to "win" that war. While it is horrible that N. Korea has a nuclear capability, it is nothing at all compared to Russia. A nuclear exchange between the US and Russia would be many orders of magnitude worse. The downside of this magnitude simply can't be ignored, like it or not.

Well my counterfactual, hypothetical thought experiment...suppose he was known to have nuclear weapons and the capability of delivering them reliably as far away as Israel?  Would our response have been the same?  To risk the utter destruction of Israel for the liberation of Kuwait? 

Having nukes always changes the calculus of the other side, and having a LOT of nukes as Russia has, changes the calculus in the way you expertly describe.  This puts US Foreign policy with respect to Ukraine in a kind of moral dilemma:  we must balance doing the just thing (helping Ukraine) with the risk of enormous harm to civilization.  Given that war is littered with miscalculations and irrational decisions, the risk of nuclear escalation  has to be taken seriously, and that puts a different cast on the war in Ukraine than on our much more vigorous response in Desert Storm.

Have we been too timid?  Probably.  But we could probably keeping saying so right up to the tipping point, and we can't afford to be wrong even once.

[81alum]

Another way of thinking about it....what would the response have been to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait if the world was sure he had nuclear weapons at that time?

Not much different. Saddam Hussein did not have the ability to deliver nuclear weapon reliably anywhere outside of the immediate area, if that. North Korea fully understands this. That is why they have worked so hard to develop a credible delivery system. Russia OTOH has the ability to reliably deliver fusion weapons (a much more damaging weapon class) anywhere on the planet in large numbers. These numbers could (probably would) bring on a "Nuclear winter". Nobody could reasonably expect to "win" that war. While it is horrible that N. Korea has a nuclear capability, it is nothing at all compared to Russia. A nuclear exchange between the US and Russia would be many orders of magnitude worse. The downside of this magnitude simply can't be ignored, like it or not.

Well my counterfactual, hypothetical thought experiment...suppose he was known to have nuclear weapons and the capability of delivering them reliably as far away as Israel?  Would our response have been the same?  To risk the utter destruction of Israel for the liberation of Kuwait? 

Having nukes always changes the calculus of the other side, and having a LOT of nukes as Russia has, changes the calculus in the way you expertly describe.  This puts US Foreign policy with respect to Ukraine in a kind of moral dilemma:  we must balance doing the just thing (helping Ukraine) with the risk of enormous harm to civilization.  Given that war is littered with miscalculations and irrational decisions, the risk of nuclear escalation  has to be taken seriously, and that puts a different cast on the war in Ukraine than on our much more vigorous response in Desert Storm.

Have we been too timid?  Probably.  But we could probably keeping saying so right up to the tipping point, and we can't afford to be wrong even once.

[Goose]

Well my counterfactual, hypothetical thought experiment...suppose he was known to have nuclear weapons and the capability of delivering them reliably as far away as Israel?  Would our response have been the same?  To risk the utter destruction of Israel for the liberation of Kuwait?

A good thought experiment. You are correct that when the other side has nuclear capability, one always has to take that into account. On the other hand, nuclear blackmail can't be tolerated or it would be used continually. I think that we would have indeed liberated Kuwait, but I think we would also have made it clear to Saddam if he so much as twitched in the direction of Israel (or anywhere else in that footprint), we would turn Iraq into a glass parking lot. We would also point out Israel might not even wait for him to twitch, so he better be real, real, careful.

Having nukes always changes the calculus of the other side, and having a LOT of nukes as Russia has, changes the calculus in the way you expertly describe.  This puts US Foreign policy with respect to Ukraine in a kind of moral dilemma:  we must balance doing the just thing (helping Ukraine) with the risk of enormous harm to civilization.  Given that war is littered with miscalculations and irrational decisions, the risk of nuclear escalation  has to be taken seriously, and that puts a different cast on the war in Ukraine than on our much more vigorous response in Desert Storm.



Have we been too timid?  Probably.  But we could probably keeping saying so right up to the tipping point, and we can't afford to be wrong even once.

Absolutely agree, well stated. It ain't an easy problem. I just wish I had confidence all the NATO nations had thought this through BEFORE the war started. Politicians (and probably most people) tend to shy away from difficult problems that have no real good solution until the problem simply can't be ignored. Then they often do ill thought out things. Let's hope this isn't one of those times.

[Goose]

Well my counterfactual, hypothetical thought experiment...suppose he was known to have nuclear weapons and the capability of delivering them reliably as far away as Israel?  Would our response have been the same?  To risk the utter destruction of Israel for the liberation of Kuwait?

A good thought experiment. You are correct that when the other side has nuclear capability, one always has to take that into account. On the other hand, nuclear blackmail can't be tolerated or it would be used continually. I think that we would have indeed liberated Kuwait, but I think we would also have made it clear to Saddam if he so much as twitched in the direction of Israel (or anywhere else in that footprint), we would turn Iraq into a glass parking lot. We would also point out Israel might not even wait for him to twitch, so he better be real, real, careful.

Having nukes always changes the calculus of the other side, and having a LOT of nukes as Russia has, changes the calculus in the way you expertly describe.  This puts US Foreign policy with respect to Ukraine in a kind of moral dilemma:  we must balance doing the just thing (helping Ukraine) with the risk of enormous harm to civilization.  Given that war is littered with miscalculations and irrational decisions, the risk of nuclear escalation  has to be taken seriously, and that puts a different cast on the war in Ukraine than on our much more vigorous response in Desert Storm.



Have we been too timid?  Probably.  But we could probably keeping saying so right up to the tipping point, and we can't afford to be wrong even once.

Absolutely agree, well stated. It ain't an easy problem. I just wish I had confidence all the NATO nations had thought this through BEFORE the war started. Politicians (and probably most people) tend to shy away from difficult problems that have no real good solution until the problem simply can't be ignored. Then they often do ill thought out things. Let's hope this isn't one of those times.

[gocard14]

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/15/world...tagon.html

Looks like the pentagon agrees with Goose’s assessment that the Ukrainians need more training in combined arms maneuvers. Hopefully this training is in sufficient numbers to make a big impact.

[gocard14]

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/15/world...tagon.html

Looks like the pentagon agrees with Goose’s assessment that the Ukrainians need more training in combined arms maneuvers. Hopefully this training is in sufficient numbers to make a big impact.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/melitopol-lib...00991.html

Lots of this has been said before, but it does appear that Melitopol has become at least a very plausible "next step" for Ukraine. While they have had the railroad link from Donbas to Crimea under their HIMARS footprint for a while, they are now apparently targeting doing the same with the M14 in the Melitopol area. Having it in the HIMARS footprint doesn't mean that they "control" the route by fire, because the HIMARS presence isn't "continuous". However, it does mean Russia will pay a significant price to use it. Obviously the goal is to get it under a 155mm footprint which can pretty much close the route. At that point, Russia will again have some hard choices to make. Presumably Russia is going to do all they can to make sure that doesn't happen. We shall see.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/melitopol-lib...00991.html

Lots of this has been said before, but it does appear that Melitopol has become at least a very plausible "next step" for Ukraine. While they have had the railroad link from Donbas to Crimea under their HIMARS footprint for a while, they are now apparently targeting doing the same with the M14 in the Melitopol area. Having it in the HIMARS footprint doesn't mean that they "control" the route by fire, because the HIMARS presence isn't "continuous". However, it does mean Russia will pay a significant price to use it. Obviously the goal is to get it under a 155mm footprint which can pretty much close the route. At that point, Russia will again have some hard choices to make. Presumably Russia is going to do all they can to make sure that doesn't happen. We shall see.

[TrumpCard]

The article from The New Voice of Ukraine seems to acknowledge on its face that Melitopol is an aspirational target. Lots of quotes to Ukrainian sources about why it would be great to take. Not as much evidence that it’s a plausible target absent the provision of longer-range weapons to Ukraine.

[TrumpCard]

The article from The New Voice of Ukraine seems to acknowledge on its face that Melitopol is an aspirational target. Lots of quotes to Ukrainian sources about why it would be great to take. Not as much evidence that it’s a plausible target absent the provision of longer-range weapons to Ukraine.

[BostonCard]

Or, Ukrainian sources are talking a lot about Melitopol to get the Russians to commit lots of resources to prepare for an attack, while Ukrainians actually prepare to attack elsewhere.

BC

[BostonCard]

Or, Ukrainian sources are talking a lot about Melitopol to get the Russians to commit lots of resources to prepare for an attack, while Ukrainians actually prepare to attack elsewhere.

BC

[Goose]

Or, Ukrainian sources are talking a lot about Melitopol to get the Russians to commit lots of resources to prepare for an attack, while Ukrainians actually prepare to attack elsewhere.

BC

Or they are talking about Melitopol to fix the Russian troops there and will prepare to attack everywhere (like they pretty much always have) and will reinforce success. SSDD. It might work, but Ukraine is I think fast converging on the mirror image of Russia's original problem. Ukraine, like Russia, does not have enough troops to effectively garrison the whole country. Taking back a lot of territory that is not a strategic necessity for Russia thins the Ukrainians out while it concentrates the Russians. The Ukraine has to keep troops in the newly liberated land and try to help it recover. They get diluted that way.

FWIW that has been what saved Russia time and again in the past. Both Napoleon and Hitler took land they didn't need but had to defend. They didn't have the resources to do that. Ukraine has to avoid that mistake. Somewhere along the line Ukraine is going to have to make a strategic plan to damage the Russian military in a way that will force them to quit the war. Cutting the land bridge and threatening Crimea could do that. I can't think of anything else that would unless they can find some "lost" nuclear weapons someplace :-).

[Goose]

Or, Ukrainian sources are talking a lot about Melitopol to get the Russians to commit lots of resources to prepare for an attack, while Ukrainians actually prepare to attack elsewhere.

BC

Or they are talking about Melitopol to fix the Russian troops there and will prepare to attack everywhere (like they pretty much always have) and will reinforce success. SSDD. It might work, but Ukraine is I think fast converging on the mirror image of Russia's original problem. Ukraine, like Russia, does not have enough troops to effectively garrison the whole country. Taking back a lot of territory that is not a strategic necessity for Russia thins the Ukrainians out while it concentrates the Russians. The Ukraine has to keep troops in the newly liberated land and try to help it recover. They get diluted that way.

FWIW that has been what saved Russia time and again in the past. Both Napoleon and Hitler took land they didn't need but had to defend. They didn't have the resources to do that. Ukraine has to avoid that mistake. Somewhere along the line Ukraine is going to have to make a strategic plan to damage the Russian military in a way that will force them to quit the war. Cutting the land bridge and threatening Crimea could do that. I can't think of anything else that would unless they can find some "lost" nuclear weapons someplace :-).

[TrumpCard]

Some here have fretted that a scenario in which Russia is losing the war will lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.  I am among those people.  Here's a thought experiment for us:  

What difference does it make if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got HIMARS from the West or if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got ATACMS from the West?  If we're worried that ATACMS would allow Ukraine to win, then shouldn't we have been worried that HIMARS would do the same?  Or did we know that HIMARS was the weapons system needed to just keep Ukraine from being leveled entirely?  If the concern is that the West's help will put Russia against the ropes where Russia has no choice but to swing with some haymakers, then shouldn't the West's goal be to create another "frozen conflict" like the ones Russia has established in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc?  

That would be a very bad outcome for Ukraine, but would it actually be a bad outcome for the West, as long as there's a viable Ukrainian state that still provides a buffer between Russia and NATO?  Is it possible that NATO's apparent bumbling is really just NATO's thoughtful analysis of what's necessary to prevent Russia from marching onto Vienna or Budapest or Warsaw?

[TrumpCard]

Some here have fretted that a scenario in which Russia is losing the war will lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.  I am among those people.  Here's a thought experiment for us:  

What difference does it make if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got HIMARS from the West or if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got ATACMS from the West?  If we're worried that ATACMS would allow Ukraine to win, then shouldn't we have been worried that HIMARS would do the same?  Or did we know that HIMARS was the weapons system needed to just keep Ukraine from being leveled entirely?  If the concern is that the West's help will put Russia against the ropes where Russia has no choice but to swing with some haymakers, then shouldn't the West's goal be to create another "frozen conflict" like the ones Russia has established in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc?  

That would be a very bad outcome for Ukraine, but would it actually be a bad outcome for the West, as long as there's a viable Ukrainian state that still provides a buffer between Russia and NATO?  Is it possible that NATO's apparent bumbling is really just NATO's thoughtful analysis of what's necessary to prevent Russia from marching onto Vienna or Budapest or Warsaw?

[81alum]

Some here have fretted that a scenario in which Russia is losing the war will lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.  I am among those people.  Here's a thought experiment for us:  

What difference does it make if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got HIMARS from the West or if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got ATACMS from the West?  If we're worried that ATACMS would allow Ukraine to win, then shouldn't we have been worried that HIMARS would do the same?  Or did we know that HIMARS was the weapons system needed to just keep Ukraine from being leveled entirely?  If the concern is that the West's help will put Russia against the ropes where Russia has no choice but to swing with some haymakers, then shouldn't the West's goal be to create another "frozen conflict" like the ones Russia has established in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc?  

That would be a very bad outcome for Ukraine, but would it actually be a bad outcome for the West, as long as there's a viable Ukrainian state that still provides a buffer between Russia and NATO?  Is it possible that NATO's apparent bumbling is really just NATO's thoughtful analysis of what's necessary to prevent Russia from marching onto Vienna or Budapest or Warsaw?

I think some NATO countries would in fact be content with some kind of stalemate, and are becoming more willing to support a peace based upon the current map, which would of course reward Russian aggression.  I worry about statements Macron made about Russia's "legitimate security needs" for example.  So, yes, I think there are those who do not want either side to "win."

I think the most optimistic scenario is that the stalemate continues but Ukraine does well enough to continue to embarrass Putin, leading to his internal removal.  Russia would not "lose" but could extricate itself from Ukraine by throwing Vlad under the bus.  I'm not sure that is likely, however.  Hard to know which side is favored if the war drags on.  Putin thinks he is, that the West will inevitably grow impatient and the Ukrainian people grow cold.

[81alum]

Some here have fretted that a scenario in which Russia is losing the war will lead Russia to use nuclear weapons.  I am among those people.  Here's a thought experiment for us:  

What difference does it make if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got HIMARS from the West or if Russia is losing to Ukraine because Ukraine got ATACMS from the West?  If we're worried that ATACMS would allow Ukraine to win, then shouldn't we have been worried that HIMARS would do the same?  Or did we know that HIMARS was the weapons system needed to just keep Ukraine from being leveled entirely?  If the concern is that the West's help will put Russia against the ropes where Russia has no choice but to swing with some haymakers, then shouldn't the West's goal be to create another "frozen conflict" like the ones Russia has established in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc?  

That would be a very bad outcome for Ukraine, but would it actually be a bad outcome for the West, as long as there's a viable Ukrainian state that still provides a buffer between Russia and NATO?  Is it possible that NATO's apparent bumbling is really just NATO's thoughtful analysis of what's necessary to prevent Russia from marching onto Vienna or Budapest or Warsaw?

I think some NATO countries would in fact be content with some kind of stalemate, and are becoming more willing to support a peace based upon the current map, which would of course reward Russian aggression.  I worry about statements Macron made about Russia's "legitimate security needs" for example.  So, yes, I think there are those who do not want either side to "win."

I think the most optimistic scenario is that the stalemate continues but Ukraine does well enough to continue to embarrass Putin, leading to his internal removal.  Russia would not "lose" but could extricate itself from Ukraine by throwing Vlad under the bus.  I'm not sure that is likely, however.  Hard to know which side is favored if the war drags on.  Putin thinks he is, that the West will inevitably grow impatient and the Ukrainian people grow cold.