[Goose]

https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/americ...r-ukraine/

Interesting article arguing that due to cheap and ubiquitous battlefield surveillance from drones strongly favors rapidly available precise long range fires and attrition over maneuver based warfare. 

It doesn’t take an extreme view and suggest abandoning combined arms maneuvers, but that NATO may want to shift focus more on long range fires over MBT/IFVs

It is indeed an interesting article. It often appears to be on both sides of any given issue. It does ignore an important political issue that made the "hedgehog" approach to NATO defense in Western Europe impossible. The FRG simply couldn't tell its people (voters) that they had to expect half their country (best case) to be occupied by Russians and the other half under extensive and continued bombardment by artillery and aircraft. A plan that drove the Russians back was the only politically viable one, even though many doubted it's feasibility at the time.

The presence of long-range fires isn't new. The ability of drones to "see" on the "other side of the hill" makes the defensive (counter-battery) capability more effective. It also makes it more difficult to concentrate forces for an offensive without them being taken under fire. The longer ranges of the current artillery increases their footprint greatly, but equally so the other sides. It puts at risk a lot more civilian targets, particularly in a fairly densely populated Europe.

However, the idea that "drones" are providing a fundamentally new capability is false. The war in the Ukraine has twisted some of the old assumptions around a bit due to the lack of viable air power on either side. What drones do for surveillance can (and has) been done by aircraft. Drones have the advantage there are no pilots at risk. They can also have longer loiter times. They have the disadvantage that they are generally slow and require electromagnetic "dominance" to work. NATO basically has always assumed it would fight under a US provided "aluminum overcast". As long as that is actually true, most of the enemy "defensive fires" won't last long. The article deals with none of that. It may be correct to question how well the US can execute a DEAD/SEAD operation to ensure the AO, but that is the plan, make no mistake.

That is not to say drones don't provide useful functions, both strategic and tactical. The necessity of providing both advanced drones and counter-drone technology is clear. Unfortunately, one more need to spend money. However, the ability to fight a modern war has to contain both offensive and defensive capability. I think the article agrees with this. The article does seem to argue that "defensive" capability in the form of long range fires is currently in the ascendant, based on what we see in Ukraine. I think that is a flawed conclusion that doesn't take into account the limitations of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians didn't have an effective combined arms striking force at the beginning of the war and they were fully aware of that fact. They are getting there, but it seems they don't think they are there yet. Russia thought they did, but it turned out to have severe problems in leadership, logistics, and equipment. Concluding that a combined arms offensive operation is therefore impossible in modern warfare isn't justified based on the performance of those two forces.

[Goose]

https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/americ...r-ukraine/

Interesting article arguing that due to cheap and ubiquitous battlefield surveillance from drones strongly favors rapidly available precise long range fires and attrition over maneuver based warfare. 

It doesn’t take an extreme view and suggest abandoning combined arms maneuvers, but that NATO may want to shift focus more on long range fires over MBT/IFVs

It is indeed an interesting article. It often appears to be on both sides of any given issue. It does ignore an important political issue that made the "hedgehog" approach to NATO defense in Western Europe impossible. The FRG simply couldn't tell its people (voters) that they had to expect half their country (best case) to be occupied by Russians and the other half under extensive and continued bombardment by artillery and aircraft. A plan that drove the Russians back was the only politically viable one, even though many doubted it's feasibility at the time.

The presence of long-range fires isn't new. The ability of drones to "see" on the "other side of the hill" makes the defensive (counter-battery) capability more effective. It also makes it more difficult to concentrate forces for an offensive without them being taken under fire. The longer ranges of the current artillery increases their footprint greatly, but equally so the other sides. It puts at risk a lot more civilian targets, particularly in a fairly densely populated Europe.

However, the idea that "drones" are providing a fundamentally new capability is false. The war in the Ukraine has twisted some of the old assumptions around a bit due to the lack of viable air power on either side. What drones do for surveillance can (and has) been done by aircraft. Drones have the advantage there are no pilots at risk. They can also have longer loiter times. They have the disadvantage that they are generally slow and require electromagnetic "dominance" to work. NATO basically has always assumed it would fight under a US provided "aluminum overcast". As long as that is actually true, most of the enemy "defensive fires" won't last long. The article deals with none of that. It may be correct to question how well the US can execute a DEAD/SEAD operation to ensure the AO, but that is the plan, make no mistake.

That is not to say drones don't provide useful functions, both strategic and tactical. The necessity of providing both advanced drones and counter-drone technology is clear. Unfortunately, one more need to spend money. However, the ability to fight a modern war has to contain both offensive and defensive capability. I think the article agrees with this. The article does seem to argue that "defensive" capability in the form of long range fires is currently in the ascendant, based on what we see in Ukraine. I think that is a flawed conclusion that doesn't take into account the limitations of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. The Ukrainians didn't have an effective combined arms striking force at the beginning of the war and they were fully aware of that fact. They are getting there, but it seems they don't think they are there yet. Russia thought they did, but it turned out to have severe problems in leadership, logistics, and equipment. Concluding that a combined arms offensive operation is therefore impossible in modern warfare isn't justified based on the performance of those two forces.

[dabigv13]

Cool

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1609641212193177601?s=20&t=ZKwCNpaWgp5iy7dvxKoIrg[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

Cool

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1609641212193177601?s=20&t=ZKwCNpaWgp5iy7dvxKoIrg[/tweet]

[Mick]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-str...1672665144

Pho­tos of the site have since spread on Russ­ian so­cial me­dia. Sev­eral of the mil­i­tary blog­gers said the army had stored am­mu­ni­tion at the same lo­ca­tion that trig­gered a large ex­plo­sion lev­el­ing the build­ing. Mil­i­tary equip­ment placed right next to the build­ing “with­out the slight­est sign of dis­guise” was also de­stroyed, said Igor Girkin, a for­mer Russ­ian in­tel­li­gence of­fi­cer who com­manded ir­reg­u­lar Russ­ian forces in the area in 2014, on the so­cial-me­dia app Telegram.

Not a military guy, but storing munitions close to barracks sounds ill-advised.

BC

I'd say so.

Ukraine killed 'hundreds of Russian troops' in attack on barracks during Putin's New Year address

Separately, what are the odds that Putin's successor is the Wagner Group CEO?

Putin's feared mercenary army boss pal 'worse' than Vlad and 'could take over'

He's the Corrupt Person of the Year, says the OCCRP

https://www.occrp.org/en/poy/2022/

[Mick]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-str...1672665144

Pho­tos of the site have since spread on Russ­ian so­cial me­dia. Sev­eral of the mil­i­tary blog­gers said the army had stored am­mu­ni­tion at the same lo­ca­tion that trig­gered a large ex­plo­sion lev­el­ing the build­ing. Mil­i­tary equip­ment placed right next to the build­ing “with­out the slight­est sign of dis­guise” was also de­stroyed, said Igor Girkin, a for­mer Russ­ian in­tel­li­gence of­fi­cer who com­manded ir­reg­u­lar Russ­ian forces in the area in 2014, on the so­cial-me­dia app Telegram.

Not a military guy, but storing munitions close to barracks sounds ill-advised.

BC

I'd say so.

Ukraine killed 'hundreds of Russian troops' in attack on barracks during Putin's New Year address

Separately, what are the odds that Putin's successor is the Wagner Group CEO?

Putin's feared mercenary army boss pal 'worse' than Vlad and 'could take over'

He's the Corrupt Person of the Year, says the OCCRP

https://www.occrp.org/en/poy/2022/

[TrumpCard]

Take with a grain of salt, but Ukrainian sources are claiming that Ukraine used US-provided NASAMS to shoot down all 45 drones that Russia sent to attack on NYE.  

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...nKjtksAAAA

[TrumpCard]

Take with a grain of salt, but Ukrainian sources are claiming that Ukraine used US-provided NASAMS to shoot down all 45 drones that Russia sent to attack on NYE.  

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...nKjtksAAAA

[Goose]

Take with a grain of salt, but Ukrainian sources are claiming that Ukraine used US-provided NASAMS to shoot down all 45 drones that Russia sent to attack on NYE.  

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...nKjtksAAAA

It is entirely possible. If the Russians are attacking a "point" and the NASAMS is "near" that point, it can be done. These are the Iranian drones I believe. They fly low and aren't "big" radar targets, which is an advantage to them. However, they are real slow, so when NASAMS sees them, it can for sure hit them. The problem is 1) the AMRAAM missiles are "expensive" ($1,090,000 for AIN-120D), especially compared to the drones, and 2) the Ukrainians realize they need lots more NASAMS. The Ukrainians use the term "launchers" but the also need the radars, as the low flying drones just aren't visible at long distances, partly due to their low radar cross section, but mostly due to the radar horizon.

[Goose]

Take with a grain of salt, but Ukrainian sources are claiming that Ukraine used US-provided NASAMS to shoot down all 45 drones that Russia sent to attack on NYE.  

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...nKjtksAAAA

It is entirely possible. If the Russians are attacking a "point" and the NASAMS is "near" that point, it can be done. These are the Iranian drones I believe. They fly low and aren't "big" radar targets, which is an advantage to them. However, they are real slow, so when NASAMS sees them, it can for sure hit them. The problem is 1) the AMRAAM missiles are "expensive" ($1,090,000 for AIN-120D), especially compared to the drones, and 2) the Ukrainians realize they need lots more NASAMS. The Ukrainians use the term "launchers" but the also need the radars, as the low flying drones just aren't visible at long distances, partly due to their low radar cross section, but mostly due to the radar horizon.

[TrumpCard]

Take with a grain of salt, but Ukrainian sources are claiming that Ukraine used US-provided NASAMS to shoot down all 45 drones that Russia sent to attack on NYE.  

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...nKjtksAAAA

It is entirely possible. If the Russians are attacking a "point" and the NASAMS is "near" that point, it can be done. These are the Iranian drones I believe. They fly low and aren't "big" radar targets, which is an advantage to them. However, they are real slow, so when NASAMS sees them, it can for sure hit them. The problem is 1) the AMRAAM missiles are "expensive" ($1,090,000 for AIN-120D), especially compared to the drones, and 2) the Ukrainians realize they need lots more NASAMS. The Ukrainians use the term "launchers" but the also need the radars, as the low flying drones just aren't visible at long distances, partly due to their low radar cross section, but mostly due to the radar horizon.

Now that the Russians know where Ukraine has its NASAMS stationed, wouldn't the obvious move for the Russians be to attack different areas with their drones?  Does Ukraine have a counter for that anytime prior to the receipt of the next six NASAMS?

[TrumpCard]

Take with a grain of salt, but Ukrainian sources are claiming that Ukraine used US-provided NASAMS to shoot down all 45 drones that Russia sent to attack on NYE.  

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status...nKjtksAAAA

It is entirely possible. If the Russians are attacking a "point" and the NASAMS is "near" that point, it can be done. These are the Iranian drones I believe. They fly low and aren't "big" radar targets, which is an advantage to them. However, they are real slow, so when NASAMS sees them, it can for sure hit them. The problem is 1) the AMRAAM missiles are "expensive" ($1,090,000 for AIN-120D), especially compared to the drones, and 2) the Ukrainians realize they need lots more NASAMS. The Ukrainians use the term "launchers" but the also need the radars, as the low flying drones just aren't visible at long distances, partly due to their low radar cross section, but mostly due to the radar horizon.

Now that the Russians know where Ukraine has its NASAMS stationed, wouldn't the obvious move for the Russians be to attack different areas with their drones?  Does Ukraine have a counter for that anytime prior to the receipt of the next six NASAMS?

[M T]

If the drones are coming from a few launch points, and IF they follow more-or-less direct paths, then a picket of radars forward of the likely targets can negate the low elevation advantage. Or, of course, an airborne radar can see a larger area (are the drones low cross-section when viewed from above?).

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary.  At low elevation, could these drones be hit by machine gun fire?  Would a picket of machine guns spaced at a half-mile or so be able to take them out, if there were radars tracking them?  Can machine guns be aimed automatically at a tracked drone?

[M T]

If the drones are coming from a few launch points, and IF they follow more-or-less direct paths, then a picket of radars forward of the likely targets can negate the low elevation advantage. Or, of course, an airborne radar can see a larger area (are the drones low cross-section when viewed from above?).

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary.  At low elevation, could these drones be hit by machine gun fire?  Would a picket of machine guns spaced at a half-mile or so be able to take them out, if there were radars tracking them?  Can machine guns be aimed automatically at a tracked drone?

[Goose]

Now that the Russians know where Ukraine has its NASAMS stationed, wouldn't the obvious move for the Russians be to attack different areas with their drones?  Does Ukraine have a counter for that anytime prior to the receipt of the next six NASAMS?

To a large extent they are already attacking "everywhere", but there are certain high value targets like the city of Kiev (electricity grid and government infrastructure) that the Russians want to hit and the Ukrainians want to defend. NASAMS is designed to do exactly that. The NASAMS has to move around a bit to avoid being targeted itself. The next 6 NASAMS will help, but that is "just" six more points that Ukraine can defend. Everywhere else is still up for grabs, and there are LOTS of strategically important places in every country. NASAMS can't defend them all (8 to be exact).

Ukraine and the "West" need a much cheaper and more easily deployed system to take out these drones. It has to work at night which pretty much rules out "simple" optical guidance. We almost had one. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAVAIR_Spike. The problem was the EO guidance system wouldn't work well at night. This effort was not pursued. IMO that was a mistake. You can shoot down one of these Ukrainian drones with a machine gun. The problem is you have to see it soon enough and aim well enough. A small, cheap guided missile can solve the aim well enough problem. Seeing the drone at night is the remaining problem.

[Goose]

Now that the Russians know where Ukraine has its NASAMS stationed, wouldn't the obvious move for the Russians be to attack different areas with their drones?  Does Ukraine have a counter for that anytime prior to the receipt of the next six NASAMS?

To a large extent they are already attacking "everywhere", but there are certain high value targets like the city of Kiev (electricity grid and government infrastructure) that the Russians want to hit and the Ukrainians want to defend. NASAMS is designed to do exactly that. The NASAMS has to move around a bit to avoid being targeted itself. The next 6 NASAMS will help, but that is "just" six more points that Ukraine can defend. Everywhere else is still up for grabs, and there are LOTS of strategically important places in every country. NASAMS can't defend them all (8 to be exact).

Ukraine and the "West" need a much cheaper and more easily deployed system to take out these drones. It has to work at night which pretty much rules out "simple" optical guidance. We almost had one. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAVAIR_Spike. The problem was the EO guidance system wouldn't work well at night. This effort was not pursued. IMO that was a mistake. You can shoot down one of these Ukrainian drones with a machine gun. The problem is you have to see it soon enough and aim well enough. A small, cheap guided missile can solve the aim well enough problem. Seeing the drone at night is the remaining problem.

[BostonCard]

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary. 

The cost of the drone is not the comparator, it is the cost of the damage caused by the drone.

BC

[BostonCard]

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary. 

The cost of the drone is not the comparator, it is the cost of the damage caused by the drone.

BC

[Goose]

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary. 

The cost of the drone is not the comparator, it is the cost of the damage caused by the drone.

BC

While I understand your point, it isn't the whole story, unfortunately. If Russia can inflict disproportionate costs upon Ukraine that Ukraine (or it's supporters) cannot sustain, Russia wins. If Russia can afford to spend 36K or so to cost the West 1 million dollars, eventually we run out of money. It would never come to that however, because long before we reached that point, we would quit supplying missiles. That probably would occur not because of the cost but rather our inability to build them fast enough.

Ukraine proudly pointed out they are the only nation to have tactically reloaded NASAMS while under attack. That's great, but to shoot down those drones cost 48 million dollars, give or take. It did preserve Ukrainian infrastructure that in some ways is literally priceless, because the transformers etc. needed to replace it are simply not available off the shelf. While they are being built, Ukrainians die due to lack of services (like heat). However, we can't build 48 AMRAAMS a day. It is probable Iran can build 48 of their drones a day. This situation is not sustainable. One day, Ukraine is out of AMRAAMS. Then what?

[Goose]

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary. 

The cost of the drone is not the comparator, it is the cost of the damage caused by the drone.

BC

While I understand your point, it isn't the whole story, unfortunately. If Russia can inflict disproportionate costs upon Ukraine that Ukraine (or it's supporters) cannot sustain, Russia wins. If Russia can afford to spend 36K or so to cost the West 1 million dollars, eventually we run out of money. It would never come to that however, because long before we reached that point, we would quit supplying missiles. That probably would occur not because of the cost but rather our inability to build them fast enough.

Ukraine proudly pointed out they are the only nation to have tactically reloaded NASAMS while under attack. That's great, but to shoot down those drones cost 48 million dollars, give or take. It did preserve Ukrainian infrastructure that in some ways is literally priceless, because the transformers etc. needed to replace it are simply not available off the shelf. While they are being built, Ukrainians die due to lack of services (like heat). However, we can't build 48 AMRAAMS a day. It is probable Iran can build 48 of their drones a day. This situation is not sustainable. One day, Ukraine is out of AMRAAMS. Then what?

[dabigv13]

Gepard (German automatic cannon air defense vehicle) engaging an Iranian drone

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1610445048188993536?s=20&t=bmsWkO_fukf55MyYbGkXXg[/tweet]

This is definitely a more cost effective way of dealing with cheap drones than using NASAMS, though of course Ukraine only has a limited number of Gepards as well.

[dabigv13]

Gepard (German automatic cannon air defense vehicle) engaging an Iranian drone

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1610445048188993536?s=20&t=bmsWkO_fukf55MyYbGkXXg[/tweet]

This is definitely a more cost effective way of dealing with cheap drones than using NASAMS, though of course Ukraine only has a limited number of Gepards as well.

[Goose]

Gepard (German automatic cannon air defense vehicle) engaging an Iranian drone

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16104...5MyYbGkXXg

This is definitely a more cost effective way of dealing with cheap drones than using NASAMS, though of course Ukraine only has a limited number of Gepards as well.

Indeed it is more cost effective. It is also true that Germany has lots of Gepards in storage they could provide. It would help a lot and not actually cost too much. Getting them to do it is the issue. The ammunition is also a bit of a problem due to the Swiss connection. That may be a limiting factor as well.

The Gepard's radar unfortunately isn't very "good", partly due to obsolescence, partly due to the fact it needed to be highly mobile, but mostly due to the fact the original weapons range (it's guns) is pretty limited. This means it has a smaller protection footprint than an NASAMS, but it is also smaller and cheaper. If Russia were actually operating an air force, the Gepards would be missile magnets, but since they aren't, it is a viable weapons system.

[Goose]

Gepard (German automatic cannon air defense vehicle) engaging an Iranian drone

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/16104...5MyYbGkXXg

This is definitely a more cost effective way of dealing with cheap drones than using NASAMS, though of course Ukraine only has a limited number of Gepards as well.

Indeed it is more cost effective. It is also true that Germany has lots of Gepards in storage they could provide. It would help a lot and not actually cost too much. Getting them to do it is the issue. The ammunition is also a bit of a problem due to the Swiss connection. That may be a limiting factor as well.

The Gepard's radar unfortunately isn't very "good", partly due to obsolescence, partly due to the fact it needed to be highly mobile, but mostly due to the fact the original weapons range (it's guns) is pretty limited. This means it has a smaller protection footprint than an NASAMS, but it is also smaller and cheaper. If Russia were actually operating an air force, the Gepards would be missile magnets, but since they aren't, it is a viable weapons system.

[BostonCard]

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary. 

The cost of the drone is not the comparator, it is the cost of the damage caused by the drone.

BC

While I understand your point, it isn't the whole story, unfortunately. If Russia can inflict disproportionate costs upon Ukraine that Ukraine (or it's supporters) cannot sustain, Russia wins. If Russia can afford to spend 36K or so to cost the West 1 million dollars, eventually we run out of money. It would never come to that however, because long before we reached that point, we would quit supplying missiles. That probably would occur not because of the cost but rather our inability to build them fast enough.

Ukraine proudly pointed out they are the only nation to have tactically reloaded NASAMS while under attack. That's great, but to shoot down those drones cost 48 million dollars, give or take. It did preserve Ukrainian infrastructure that in some ways is literally priceless, because the transformers etc. needed to replace it are simply not available off the shelf. While they are being built, Ukrainians die due to lack of services (like heat). However, we can't build 48 AMRAAMS a day. It is probable Iran can build 48 of their drones a day. This situation is not sustainable. One day, Ukraine is out of AMRAAMS. Then what?

Points are well taken, but I am talking about the calculus of using a million dollar missile to take out a $100,000 drone (or whatever it costs).  The alternative to not taking it out is that it can cause more than a million dollars of damage, so you use the missile.

Long term, though, you are right, it is not sustainable, which is why the drones are so effective, even if they are not.  The damage they cause far exceeds the cost of replacement, even if they are shot down.

BC

[BostonCard]

It seems defense against the drones with a much more expensive missiles can only be temporary. 

The cost of the drone is not the comparator, it is the cost of the damage caused by the drone.

BC

While I understand your point, it isn't the whole story, unfortunately. If Russia can inflict disproportionate costs upon Ukraine that Ukraine (or it's supporters) cannot sustain, Russia wins. If Russia can afford to spend 36K or so to cost the West 1 million dollars, eventually we run out of money. It would never come to that however, because long before we reached that point, we would quit supplying missiles. That probably would occur not because of the cost but rather our inability to build them fast enough.

Ukraine proudly pointed out they are the only nation to have tactically reloaded NASAMS while under attack. That's great, but to shoot down those drones cost 48 million dollars, give or take. It did preserve Ukrainian infrastructure that in some ways is literally priceless, because the transformers etc. needed to replace it are simply not available off the shelf. While they are being built, Ukrainians die due to lack of services (like heat). However, we can't build 48 AMRAAMS a day. It is probable Iran can build 48 of their drones a day. This situation is not sustainable. One day, Ukraine is out of AMRAAMS. Then what?

Points are well taken, but I am talking about the calculus of using a million dollar missile to take out a $100,000 drone (or whatever it costs).  The alternative to not taking it out is that it can cause more than a million dollars of damage, so you use the missile.

Long term, though, you are right, it is not sustainable, which is why the drones are so effective, even if they are not.  The damage they cause far exceeds the cost of replacement, even if they are shot down.

BC

[Goose]

The alternative to not taking it out is that it can cause more than a million dollars of damage, so you use the missile.



BC

Agree, and that can be true if the actual dollar cost that the drone causes isn't more than a million dollars in immediate monetary damage. First, you can't really know what the drone's target is. The dollar cost of not shooting is unknown. It could be zero, but it also could be "a lot". Second, destroying a transformer may be "only" a 100K problem, but if you can't get the transformer for months, the cost to peoples lives may be far greater. It makes sense to do it, but Ukraine and the West need a better answer.

[Goose]

The alternative to not taking it out is that it can cause more than a million dollars of damage, so you use the missile.



BC

Agree, and that can be true if the actual dollar cost that the drone causes isn't more than a million dollars in immediate monetary damage. First, you can't really know what the drone's target is. The dollar cost of not shooting is unknown. It could be zero, but it also could be "a lot". Second, destroying a transformer may be "only" a 100K problem, but if you can't get the transformer for months, the cost to peoples lives may be far greater. It makes sense to do it, but Ukraine and the West need a better answer.

[dabigv13]

The NYT has an article from today on this very issue of cost of interceptors versus cost of drones.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/world...rones.html

The Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that Moscow has increasingly been relying on since October are relatively uncomplicated devices and fairly cheap, while the array of weapons used to shoot them out of the sky can be much pricier, according to experts. The self-destructing drones can cost as little as $20,000 to produce, while the cost of firing a surface-to-air missile can range from $140,000 for a Soviet-era S-300 to $500,000 for a missile from an American NASAMS.

....

For now, Moscow has changed how it is using the drones it already has in hand.

Russian forces have increasingly been launching their explosive drones at night and low along the Dnipro River, making it harder for Ukraine to detect them, according to Yurii Ihnat, the spokesman for the Ukrainian air force, who was speaking on Ukrainian radio.

Of course the "cost" of an S-300 missile may be 140k but since they aren't being made anymore by Ukraine at least, they are probably worth much much more than that. The relative dollar cost is not really so much the issue when we compare drones vs interceptors. The US and the west broadly has a much healthier economic base to afford these things, it's more a question of manufacturing capacity and political will. The Iranian drones may only cost 20k to produce (wonder where that number even comes from, does Shahed Industries have a catalog?), but there is some upper limit on Iranian/Russian procurement of necessary components and manufacturing throughput. Since these drones have many Western components, it may be hard to really ramp up production.

[dabigv13]

The NYT has an article from today on this very issue of cost of interceptors versus cost of drones.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/world...rones.html

The Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that Moscow has increasingly been relying on since October are relatively uncomplicated devices and fairly cheap, while the array of weapons used to shoot them out of the sky can be much pricier, according to experts. The self-destructing drones can cost as little as $20,000 to produce, while the cost of firing a surface-to-air missile can range from $140,000 for a Soviet-era S-300 to $500,000 for a missile from an American NASAMS.

....

For now, Moscow has changed how it is using the drones it already has in hand.

Russian forces have increasingly been launching their explosive drones at night and low along the Dnipro River, making it harder for Ukraine to detect them, according to Yurii Ihnat, the spokesman for the Ukrainian air force, who was speaking on Ukrainian radio.

Of course the "cost" of an S-300 missile may be 140k but since they aren't being made anymore by Ukraine at least, they are probably worth much much more than that. The relative dollar cost is not really so much the issue when we compare drones vs interceptors. The US and the west broadly has a much healthier economic base to afford these things, it's more a question of manufacturing capacity and political will. The Iranian drones may only cost 20k to produce (wonder where that number even comes from, does Shahed Industries have a catalog?), but there is some upper limit on Iranian/Russian procurement of necessary components and manufacturing throughput. Since these drones have many Western components, it may be hard to really ramp up production.

[Goose]

Of course the "cost" of an S-300 missile may be 140k but since they aren't being made anymore by Ukraine at least, they are probably worth much much more than that. The relative dollar cost is not really so much the issue when we compare drones vs interceptors. The US and the west broadly has a much healthier economic base to afford these things, it's more a question of manufacturing capacity and political will.

While I agree that manufacturing capacity and will are key, these things are not independent of cost. Many Americans may be quite willing to give Ukraine a lot of things, but if they are shooting 48 million dollars a day worth of missiles it is going to add up fast, like 1.4 billion a month. No danger of that though because we haven't given them enough missiles to do that. The capacity to produce issue is also tied to money. These missiles require skilled labor and complex support equipment to build, and increasing production requires more of both. The workers have to be trained and the equipment has to be procured and manufactured. This is neither cheap nor fast. These things all cost money, and getting that money will inevitably affect the "will" of many politicians.

The Iranian drones may only cost 20k to produce (wonder where that number even comes from, does Shahed Industries have a catalog?), but there is some upper limit on Iranian/Russian procurement of necessary components and manufacturing throughput. Since these drones have many Western components, it may be hard to really ramp up production.

The 20K cost of production is an estimate based on the components found in the drones that have been shot down and the known labor costs in Iran. We also kind of know that Russia is paying about 36K each for the drones, so that is a "reasonable" mark-up for Iran. These drones don't require particularly skilled labor to build and there are plenty of Iranians who would want the work and have the skills. The components like engines, warhead and fuselage materials are readily available in Iran, as either domestic manufacture or "dual use" materials that are easily imported. They already have "ramped up" production and have the capacity to continue to do so.

It is wise to consider that every drone Iran has built so far has been built with the "full Monty" of sanctions in place for quite a few years. They are already very skilled in getting electronic components into their country. This is partially because many other nations do not view Iran as a "pariah state" and trade with them without many safeguards. Get the chips into these countries and it is "no problem" the rest of the way. There are plenty of people that want that business, unfortunately. There are also lots of customs folks in may countries that either sympathize with Iran or can be bought. That isn't to say the sanctions don't bite, but rather that Iran has done a pretty good job of continuing a defense industry with them in place. Iran has supposedly just delivered another 2000 drones to Russia. If close to true, that indicates supply is not a problem.

The 500,000.00 number the NYT used for an AMRAAM is also possibly suspect. The unit cost of an AIM-120D is known to be about 1 million dollars. The NASAMS probably are equipped with AIM-120Cs, which were cheaper when originally built. What they cost today is probably hard to say. Most recent procurements are FMS which obscures the real cost/price of the items, but 500,000.00 is undoubtedly low.

[Goose]

Of course the "cost" of an S-300 missile may be 140k but since they aren't being made anymore by Ukraine at least, they are probably worth much much more than that. The relative dollar cost is not really so much the issue when we compare drones vs interceptors. The US and the west broadly has a much healthier economic base to afford these things, it's more a question of manufacturing capacity and political will.

While I agree that manufacturing capacity and will are key, these things are not independent of cost. Many Americans may be quite willing to give Ukraine a lot of things, but if they are shooting 48 million dollars a day worth of missiles it is going to add up fast, like 1.4 billion a month. No danger of that though because we haven't given them enough missiles to do that. The capacity to produce issue is also tied to money. These missiles require skilled labor and complex support equipment to build, and increasing production requires more of both. The workers have to be trained and the equipment has to be procured and manufactured. This is neither cheap nor fast. These things all cost money, and getting that money will inevitably affect the "will" of many politicians.

The Iranian drones may only cost 20k to produce (wonder where that number even comes from, does Shahed Industries have a catalog?), but there is some upper limit on Iranian/Russian procurement of necessary components and manufacturing throughput. Since these drones have many Western components, it may be hard to really ramp up production.

The 20K cost of production is an estimate based on the components found in the drones that have been shot down and the known labor costs in Iran. We also kind of know that Russia is paying about 36K each for the drones, so that is a "reasonable" mark-up for Iran. These drones don't require particularly skilled labor to build and there are plenty of Iranians who would want the work and have the skills. The components like engines, warhead and fuselage materials are readily available in Iran, as either domestic manufacture or "dual use" materials that are easily imported. They already have "ramped up" production and have the capacity to continue to do so.

It is wise to consider that every drone Iran has built so far has been built with the "full Monty" of sanctions in place for quite a few years. They are already very skilled in getting electronic components into their country. This is partially because many other nations do not view Iran as a "pariah state" and trade with them without many safeguards. Get the chips into these countries and it is "no problem" the rest of the way. There are plenty of people that want that business, unfortunately. There are also lots of customs folks in may countries that either sympathize with Iran or can be bought. That isn't to say the sanctions don't bite, but rather that Iran has done a pretty good job of continuing a defense industry with them in place. Iran has supposedly just delivered another 2000 drones to Russia. If close to true, that indicates supply is not a problem.

The 500,000.00 number the NYT used for an AMRAAM is also possibly suspect. The unit cost of an AIM-120D is known to be about 1 million dollars. The NASAMS probably are equipped with AIM-120Cs, which were cheaper when originally built. What they cost today is probably hard to say. Most recent procurements are FMS which obscures the real cost/price of the items, but 500,000.00 is undoubtedly low.

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1610468978119577601?s=46&t=5UZWNs6c7Prc7b1OzI6ZQw[/tweet]

Excuses, excuses.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1610468978119577601?s=46&t=5UZWNs6c7Prc7b1OzI6ZQw[/tweet]

Excuses, excuses.

BC

[BostonCard]

Putin couldn’t even get the weather to cooperate.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/chuckpfarrer/status/1610421962173730821?s=46&t=5UZWNs6c7Prc7b1OzI6ZQw[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

Putin couldn’t even get the weather to cooperate.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/chuckpfarrer/status/1610421962173730821?s=46&t=5UZWNs6c7Prc7b1OzI6ZQw[/tweet]

BC

[dabigv13]

Nice, these anti-armor top attack artillery shells are super cool. Also lol at the Russian tankers using Wikipedia to figure out what Ukraine is using to blow them up this time. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1610587347388862468?s=20&t=o8Ult8tOLNJH4cIc7ul-Vw[/tweet]

---

Also cool- France is sending the first Western "tanks" to Ukraine. They are armored, wheeled vehicles with a 105mm gun. Designed for reconnnaisance, though judging from how Ukraine has mostly deployed their armor, will likely see a lot of infantry direct fire support.

https://www.lemonde.fr/international/liv..._3210.html

Here is the Wikipedia link for any curious Russian tankers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMX-10_RC

[dabigv13]

Nice, these anti-armor top attack artillery shells are super cool. Also lol at the Russian tankers using Wikipedia to figure out what Ukraine is using to blow them up this time. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1610587347388862468?s=20&t=o8Ult8tOLNJH4cIc7ul-Vw[/tweet]

---

Also cool- France is sending the first Western "tanks" to Ukraine. They are armored, wheeled vehicles with a 105mm gun. Designed for reconnnaisance, though judging from how Ukraine has mostly deployed their armor, will likely see a lot of infantry direct fire support.

https://www.lemonde.fr/international/liv..._3210.html

Here is the Wikipedia link for any curious Russian tankers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMX-10_RC

[gocard14]

Nice, these anti-armor top attack artillery shells are super cool. Also lol at the Russian tankers using Wikipedia to figure out what Ukraine is using to blow them up this time. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1610587347388862468?s=20&t=o8Ult8tOLNJH4cIc7ul-Vw[/tweet]

---

Also cool- France is sending the first Western "tanks" to Ukraine. They are armored, wheeled vehicles with a 105mm gun. Designed for reconnnaisance, though judging from how Ukraine has mostly deployed their armor, will likely see a lot of infantry direct fire support.

https://www.lemonde.fr/international/liv..._3210.html

Here is the Wikipedia link for any curious Russian tankers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMX-10_RC

Nice to see some more armor heading Ukraine’s way. This is big on its own, but I suspect that it also opens the door to Bradley’s being sent next, which would probably have a much larger impact due to the number of them available.

[gocard14]

Nice, these anti-armor top attack artillery shells are super cool. Also lol at the Russian tankers using Wikipedia to figure out what Ukraine is using to blow them up this time. 

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1610587347388862468?s=20&t=o8Ult8tOLNJH4cIc7ul-Vw[/tweet]

---

Also cool- France is sending the first Western "tanks" to Ukraine. They are armored, wheeled vehicles with a 105mm gun. Designed for reconnnaisance, though judging from how Ukraine has mostly deployed their armor, will likely see a lot of infantry direct fire support.

https://www.lemonde.fr/international/liv..._3210.html

Here is the Wikipedia link for any curious Russian tankers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMX-10_RC

Nice to see some more armor heading Ukraine’s way. This is big on its own, but I suspect that it also opens the door to Bradley’s being sent next, which would probably have a much larger impact due to the number of them available.