[Mick]

Putin has shaken up his military leadership again. He replaced Gen. Sergei Surovikin as leader of his military in Ukraine with Gen. Valery Gerasimov. Surovikin will report to Gerasimov. Surovikin had been in charge only since October.

Russia shakes up military leadership again

[Mick]

Putin has shaken up his military leadership again. He replaced Gen. Sergei Surovikin as leader of his military in Ukraine with Gen. Valery Gerasimov. Surovikin will report to Gerasimov. Surovikin had been in charge only since October.

Russia shakes up military leadership again

[Goose]

Putin has shaken up his military leadership again. He replaced Gen. Sergei Surovikin as leader of his military in Ukraine with Gen. Valery Gerasimov. Surovikin will report to Gerasimov. Surovikin had been in charge only since October.

Russia shakes up military leadership again

There is enough to be depressed about in this war, eg the fact the war exists at all. That said, I believe the "West" (and the rest of the world for that matter) needs to face the possibility that Russia will be going through a period of at best instability and at worst who knows what. Even if Putin isn't deposed because he is losing/loses this war, he is not a young man.

There are also quite a few "power centers" in Russia that want to have much more power if not superseded Putin. The "manager/owner" of Wagner (Prigozhin) undoubtedly intends to expand his power in Russia. Whether he would challenge Putin directly or simply wait for him to quit/die is unknowable, but there is certainly palace intrigue going on there. The Russian Army has learned over the years to stay out of politics. They have their own "sphere of influence" and expect it to be respected in return for their support of "the center". When that respect is missing, nobody knows what will be the response but it probably won't be "constructive". They all hate Wagner, and it is mutual. There is of course a power struggle going on in the Russian military. The press trends to categorize this as "hawks" vs "doves", but it is much more complex than that. Every serving officer has to watch his back, and that is easier to do with "allies". However, you can't trust your allies very far, so there are all kinds of "working arrangements" between individuals that have nothing in common ideologically but want to survive and advance is a very messed up system. Kadyrov is also another "player". He probably realizes he can't ever be head of the Russian Federation, but he certainly can have a lot of power inside it. He also may decide he once again wants to rule an independent Chechnya. This may be his "price" for functioning as a kingmaker in Russia. Obviously there are many other "players" and even more people who are "want to be" players. Instability is the best result possible here, and much worse is certainly on the table.

As I have said previously, in Russia the one you really have to watch out for is somebody you never heard of that has quietly been lining up support under the radar and who will move quickly and effectively. Some obscure FSB Colonel for instance. All this instability in Russia will exist no matter how long the war in Ukraine goes on or who finally "wins" it. If Russia loses, things will happen quickly. If Russia doesn't give up but continues to fight and/or "wins", things will still happen. The Russian economy isn't going to recover quickly (if at all) and sanctions will continue to bite. It is going to be a mess, and I dearly hope the "Government" in Washington and also the rest of the "West" are preparing for every eventuality. It could get real messy real fast.

[Goose]

Putin has shaken up his military leadership again. He replaced Gen. Sergei Surovikin as leader of his military in Ukraine with Gen. Valery Gerasimov. Surovikin will report to Gerasimov. Surovikin had been in charge only since October.

Russia shakes up military leadership again

There is enough to be depressed about in this war, eg the fact the war exists at all. That said, I believe the "West" (and the rest of the world for that matter) needs to face the possibility that Russia will be going through a period of at best instability and at worst who knows what. Even if Putin isn't deposed because he is losing/loses this war, he is not a young man.

There are also quite a few "power centers" in Russia that want to have much more power if not superseded Putin. The "manager/owner" of Wagner (Prigozhin) undoubtedly intends to expand his power in Russia. Whether he would challenge Putin directly or simply wait for him to quit/die is unknowable, but there is certainly palace intrigue going on there. The Russian Army has learned over the years to stay out of politics. They have their own "sphere of influence" and expect it to be respected in return for their support of "the center". When that respect is missing, nobody knows what will be the response but it probably won't be "constructive". They all hate Wagner, and it is mutual. There is of course a power struggle going on in the Russian military. The press trends to categorize this as "hawks" vs "doves", but it is much more complex than that. Every serving officer has to watch his back, and that is easier to do with "allies". However, you can't trust your allies very far, so there are all kinds of "working arrangements" between individuals that have nothing in common ideologically but want to survive and advance is a very messed up system. Kadyrov is also another "player". He probably realizes he can't ever be head of the Russian Federation, but he certainly can have a lot of power inside it. He also may decide he once again wants to rule an independent Chechnya. This may be his "price" for functioning as a kingmaker in Russia. Obviously there are many other "players" and even more people who are "want to be" players. Instability is the best result possible here, and much worse is certainly on the table.

As I have said previously, in Russia the one you really have to watch out for is somebody you never heard of that has quietly been lining up support under the radar and who will move quickly and effectively. Some obscure FSB Colonel for instance. All this instability in Russia will exist no matter how long the war in Ukraine goes on or who finally "wins" it. If Russia loses, things will happen quickly. If Russia doesn't give up but continues to fight and/or "wins", things will still happen. The Russian economy isn't going to recover quickly (if at all) and sanctions will continue to bite. It is going to be a mess, and I dearly hope the "Government" in Washington and also the rest of the "West" are preparing for every eventuality. It could get real messy real fast.

[TrumpCard]

Goose, Stanford polisci professor (and frm US Ambassador to Russia) Michael McFaul just wrote a response to your post about the devil we know (Putin) versus the one we don't:  https://michaelmcfaul.substack.com/p/no-...medium=web.  Obviously fertile ground for debate, it's difficult to assess the truth "on the ground," and even what we know to be true today might not be true tomorrow.  But nevertheless an interesting response to your point.

[TrumpCard]

Goose, Stanford polisci professor (and frm US Ambassador to Russia) Michael McFaul just wrote a response to your post about the devil we know (Putin) versus the one we don't:  https://michaelmcfaul.substack.com/p/no-...medium=web.  Obviously fertile ground for debate, it's difficult to assess the truth "on the ground," and even what we know to be true today might not be true tomorrow.  But nevertheless an interesting response to your point.

[dabigv13]

In my reading, I don't think McFaul's main point and Goose's are in opposition. If I could summarize briefly, McFaul is arguing that a Putin fall from power would be an opportunity. Goose is arguing that it is a possibility, and that the West needs to plan for it.

I think both are correct. However I would caution that no amount of planning can truly predict all contingencies. The US predicted the 2022 invasion after all but not nearly how the war would proceed as a close at hand example.

If Putin falls, that is probably better than him staying in power. How good it ends up being may have some input from how the West responds, but the US will only have a limited ability to shape things.

[dabigv13]

In my reading, I don't think McFaul's main point and Goose's are in opposition. If I could summarize briefly, McFaul is arguing that a Putin fall from power would be an opportunity. Goose is arguing that it is a possibility, and that the West needs to plan for it.

I think both are correct. However I would caution that no amount of planning can truly predict all contingencies. The US predicted the 2022 invasion after all but not nearly how the war would proceed as a close at hand example.

If Putin falls, that is probably better than him staying in power. How good it ends up being may have some input from how the West responds, but the US will only have a limited ability to shape things.

[Goose]

In my reading, I don't think McFaul's main point and Goose's are in opposition. If I could summarize briefly, McFaul is arguing that a Putin fall from power would be an opportunity. Goose is arguing that it is a possibility, and that the West needs to plan for it.

I think both are correct. However I would caution that no amount of planning can truly predict all contingencies. The US predicted the 2022 invasion after all but not nearly how the war would proceed as a close at hand example.

If Putin falls, that is probably better than him staying in power. How good it ends up being may have some input from how the West responds, but the US will only have a limited ability to shape things.

I agree with what you say here. I would add that while I agree with McFaul's main point I disagree with lots of his analysis. He argues that a change of government by force is impossible because 1) the people who might lead such an action do not have wide popular support and 2) the army wouldn't let it happen. Obviously he fails to consider that 1) the army (or a large part of it) may be the instrument that intends to change the government and 2) the army, if called upon to defend Putin, may simply not do it, and 3) if the army does chose to defend Putin they may decide he is no longer necessary and replace him.

One only needs to look at what happened when Gorbachev was the victim of a coup. The military pretty much set that one out, effectively not supporting either side. The coup leaders supposedly had "special" security troops who would do their bidding, but the rank-and-file wouldn't fire on fellow Russians. Basically, the military didn't know who would win so they figured it was safer to do nothing. Today, if Wagner tried to take over "the state", the military would fight Wagner like mad, not for Putin's sake but for their own. If they won, Putin would be replaced. The military is unfortunately in the middle of a war and would be hard pressed to do much very quickly. Wagner may not have the staying power, but they can move fast and not wait for "orders". At some point, the military may decide Putin intends to put Wagner in charge of or on an equal footing to the military. If that happens, they fight. If for some reason general disorder breaks out in Russia, the military will probably behave like 1917. Some will try to support the government, some will look for a "war lord" to work for, but most will walk home.

As far as nobody having enough popular support goes, Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler all took over their nation without anything close to a "majority". Russians have lot of experience with surviving. They "support" whoever is in front of them at the moment. If that person delivers economic prosperity, they might actually get a bit of loyalty. If that ceases or never happens, forget it.

It is entirely possible there will be a relatively peaceful change in government in Russia. At the end of the day, Russia may get a more humane and more effective government. OTOH process of getting there could be quite problematic and violent. One must remember Ukraine and Belarus are not part of the Russian Federation today in large part because they expected lots of financial support from Germany and the US, like East Germany, Poland and the Baltic States received. That didn't happen. If there is contention for control in Moscow, what the West does, or is expected to, will matter a lot.

[Goose]

In my reading, I don't think McFaul's main point and Goose's are in opposition. If I could summarize briefly, McFaul is arguing that a Putin fall from power would be an opportunity. Goose is arguing that it is a possibility, and that the West needs to plan for it.

I think both are correct. However I would caution that no amount of planning can truly predict all contingencies. The US predicted the 2022 invasion after all but not nearly how the war would proceed as a close at hand example.

If Putin falls, that is probably better than him staying in power. How good it ends up being may have some input from how the West responds, but the US will only have a limited ability to shape things.

I agree with what you say here. I would add that while I agree with McFaul's main point I disagree with lots of his analysis. He argues that a change of government by force is impossible because 1) the people who might lead such an action do not have wide popular support and 2) the army wouldn't let it happen. Obviously he fails to consider that 1) the army (or a large part of it) may be the instrument that intends to change the government and 2) the army, if called upon to defend Putin, may simply not do it, and 3) if the army does chose to defend Putin they may decide he is no longer necessary and replace him.

One only needs to look at what happened when Gorbachev was the victim of a coup. The military pretty much set that one out, effectively not supporting either side. The coup leaders supposedly had "special" security troops who would do their bidding, but the rank-and-file wouldn't fire on fellow Russians. Basically, the military didn't know who would win so they figured it was safer to do nothing. Today, if Wagner tried to take over "the state", the military would fight Wagner like mad, not for Putin's sake but for their own. If they won, Putin would be replaced. The military is unfortunately in the middle of a war and would be hard pressed to do much very quickly. Wagner may not have the staying power, but they can move fast and not wait for "orders". At some point, the military may decide Putin intends to put Wagner in charge of or on an equal footing to the military. If that happens, they fight. If for some reason general disorder breaks out in Russia, the military will probably behave like 1917. Some will try to support the government, some will look for a "war lord" to work for, but most will walk home.

As far as nobody having enough popular support goes, Lenin, Mussolini, and Hitler all took over their nation without anything close to a "majority". Russians have lot of experience with surviving. They "support" whoever is in front of them at the moment. If that person delivers economic prosperity, they might actually get a bit of loyalty. If that ceases or never happens, forget it.

It is entirely possible there will be a relatively peaceful change in government in Russia. At the end of the day, Russia may get a more humane and more effective government. OTOH process of getting there could be quite problematic and violent. One must remember Ukraine and Belarus are not part of the Russian Federation today in large part because they expected lots of financial support from Germany and the US, like East Germany, Poland and the Baltic States received. That didn't happen. If there is contention for control in Moscow, what the West does, or is expected to, will matter a lot.

[BostonCard]

It looks like the Russians have captured Soledar.  We will see what this portends for Bakhmut but  Russia does surround it on three sides.  Might be time to withdraw and regroup.

BC

[BostonCard]

It looks like the Russians have captured Soledar.  We will see what this portends for Bakhmut but  Russia does surround it on three sides.  Might be time to withdraw and regroup.

BC

[Goose]

It looks like the Russians have captured Soledar.  We will see what this portends for Bakhmut but  Russia does surround it on three sides.  Might be time to withdraw and regroup.

BC

Yes, although I am pretty sure Ukraine will stay until the last possible moment. It is also not impossible they have a surprise in the works. Obviously I don't know that, but it has been obvious for at least a month that Russia wasn't giving up on Bakhmut. One way to respond would be to put pressure on the flanks of that offensive. Maybe that is possible, maybe it isn't. If not, it isn't the end of the world. Politically it will be a Russian victory. Militarily it would change almost nothing.

[Goose]

It looks like the Russians have captured Soledar.  We will see what this portends for Bakhmut but  Russia does surround it on three sides.  Might be time to withdraw and regroup.

BC

Yes, although I am pretty sure Ukraine will stay until the last possible moment. It is also not impossible they have a surprise in the works. Obviously I don't know that, but it has been obvious for at least a month that Russia wasn't giving up on Bakhmut. One way to respond would be to put pressure on the flanks of that offensive. Maybe that is possible, maybe it isn't. If not, it isn't the end of the world. Politically it will be a Russian victory. Militarily it would change almost nothing.

[TrumpCard]

ISW says that Russia “overexaggerated” the importance of the loss of Soledad and that the loss of Soledar does not portend an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut. Does that imply a view from ISW that the loss of Bakhmut would be somewhat significant?

[TrumpCard]

ISW says that Russia “overexaggerated” the importance of the loss of Soledad and that the loss of Soledar does not portend an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut. Does that imply a view from ISW that the loss of Bakhmut would be somewhat significant?

[Goose]

ISW says that Russia “overexaggerated” the importance of the loss of Soledad and that the loss of Soledar does not portend an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut. Does that imply a view from ISW that the loss of Bakhmut would be somewhat significant?

I don't think so. The perception by many is/was that the fall of Soledar makes the further defense of Bakhmut essentially impossible. There are obviously those who don't think that is the case, and ISW is IMO just supporting that view. As I said, I don't think Ukraine will evacuate Bakhmut unless/until they really believe they must.

[Goose]

ISW says that Russia “overexaggerated” the importance of the loss of Soledad and that the loss of Soledar does not portend an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut. Does that imply a view from ISW that the loss of Bakhmut would be somewhat significant?

I don't think so. The perception by many is/was that the fall of Soledar makes the further defense of Bakhmut essentially impossible. There are obviously those who don't think that is the case, and ISW is IMO just supporting that view. As I said, I don't think Ukraine will evacuate Bakhmut unless/until they really believe they must.

[BostonCard]

LOL, Wagner and the Russian defense ministry are fighting over who gets credit for capturing Soledar.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1614095904331415557?s=46&t=37qKOIyR80jrRz0BIjjfXQ[/tweet]

BC

[BostonCard]

LOL, Wagner and the Russian defense ministry are fighting over who gets credit for capturing Soledar.

[tweet]https://twitter.com/thestudyofwar/status/1614095904331415557?s=46&t=37qKOIyR80jrRz0BIjjfXQ[/tweet]

BC

[dabigv13]

Sunak confirms Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine. Have not seen any definite number but 10 or 12 seems to be the ballpark figure.

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-64274755

There may be more coming however as UK has plans to retire some. 


[Tweet]https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/1614314596860411904?s=20&t=U9y01TxOm3PYMUcPxxk8HQ[/tweet]

Jack Watling with an article highlighting the importance of support vehicles, not just tanks.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/j...n-the-road

[dabigv13]

Sunak confirms Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine. Have not seen any definite number but 10 or 12 seems to be the ballpark figure.

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-64274755

There may be more coming however as UK has plans to retire some. 


[Tweet]https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/1614314596860411904?s=20&t=U9y01TxOm3PYMUcPxxk8HQ[/tweet]

Jack Watling with an article highlighting the importance of support vehicles, not just tanks.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/j...n-the-road

[BostonCard]

Looks like the cost of accession for Sweden and Finland is 40 F-16s to Turkey.

BC

[BostonCard]

Looks like the cost of accession for Sweden and Finland is 40 F-16s to Turkey.

BC

[dabigv13]

More on that- 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...eden-nato/

The Biden administration is preparing to ask Congress to approve a $20 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, and a separate sale of F-35s to Greece, in a proposal already facing significant scrutiny on Capitol Hill, said congressional aides familiar with the matter.

...


Some U.S. lawmakers are expected to require that Turkey commit to ratify Finland and Sweden’s NATO entry as a condition for advancing any F-16 sale, said the congressional aides. News of the proposed sale was reported earlier by the Wall Street Journal.

Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Friday he would oppose the sale unless Erdogan takes several steps he supports.

...

The separate sale of F-35s to Athens could serve to ease the concerns of Greek leaders, and their backers in Congress, given the long-standing tension between Greece and Turkey, who have quarreled over the island of Cyprus among other issues. The details of the sale have already been submitted to the relevant congressional committees for informal review, the aides said.

....

The Biden administration, seeking to illustrate its cooperation with Congress, appears unlikely to resort to the unusual measure the Trump administration took in 2019 to get around legislative opposition to the sale of arms to Persian Gulf countries. At the time, Trump invoked his emergency authority to sidestep Congress and complete 22 arms deals sought by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries, despite lawmakers’ objections.

Hopefully it all works itself out. But IMHO if Congress blocks this and thereby Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO is blocked, then Biden should invoke emergency authority. This is far more of a valid reason than selling more weapons to Saudi Arabia to bomb Yemen.

[dabigv13]

More on that- 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...eden-nato/

The Biden administration is preparing to ask Congress to approve a $20 billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, and a separate sale of F-35s to Greece, in a proposal already facing significant scrutiny on Capitol Hill, said congressional aides familiar with the matter.

...


Some U.S. lawmakers are expected to require that Turkey commit to ratify Finland and Sweden’s NATO entry as a condition for advancing any F-16 sale, said the congressional aides. News of the proposed sale was reported earlier by the Wall Street Journal.

Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Friday he would oppose the sale unless Erdogan takes several steps he supports.

...

The separate sale of F-35s to Athens could serve to ease the concerns of Greek leaders, and their backers in Congress, given the long-standing tension between Greece and Turkey, who have quarreled over the island of Cyprus among other issues. The details of the sale have already been submitted to the relevant congressional committees for informal review, the aides said.

....

The Biden administration, seeking to illustrate its cooperation with Congress, appears unlikely to resort to the unusual measure the Trump administration took in 2019 to get around legislative opposition to the sale of arms to Persian Gulf countries. At the time, Trump invoked his emergency authority to sidestep Congress and complete 22 arms deals sought by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries, despite lawmakers’ objections.

Hopefully it all works itself out. But IMHO if Congress blocks this and thereby Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO is blocked, then Biden should invoke emergency authority. This is far more of a valid reason than selling more weapons to Saudi Arabia to bomb Yemen.

[Goose]

I think I previously mentioned that "the bribe" was going to require some action from the US :-). The somewhat bad news is that this 40 F-16 "deal" was already offered as a bribe. Its value has already been fully "discounted" by Erdoğan. There will probably be more to come, and I am pretty sure Erdoğan expects this to be a done deal going into the elections. That means it has to happen before June, probably well before. There is more to be done by the US I fear. Exactly what is TBD. Unfortunately, the existing very public problems with extraditions that Erdoğan wants and Sweden can't legally deliver is making the "price" go up. The bad PR is exactly what Erdoğan doesn't want and can potentially tie his hands, at least from his perspective. If everybody had kept their mouths shut, Sweden was in. That didn't happen, and that could be very, very bad. Don't underestimate the political considerations for Erdoğan. He isn't always rational.

[Goose]

I think I previously mentioned that "the bribe" was going to require some action from the US :-). The somewhat bad news is that this 40 F-16 "deal" was already offered as a bribe. Its value has already been fully "discounted" by Erdoğan. There will probably be more to come, and I am pretty sure Erdoğan expects this to be a done deal going into the elections. That means it has to happen before June, probably well before. There is more to be done by the US I fear. Exactly what is TBD. Unfortunately, the existing very public problems with extraditions that Erdoğan wants and Sweden can't legally deliver is making the "price" go up. The bad PR is exactly what Erdoğan doesn't want and can potentially tie his hands, at least from his perspective. If everybody had kept their mouths shut, Sweden was in. That didn't happen, and that could be very, very bad. Don't underestimate the political considerations for Erdoğan. He isn't always rational.

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1614392083229429760?s=20&t=9k8RekT_8FU5KWl88U9AwQ[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

[Tweet]https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1614392083229429760?s=20&t=9k8RekT_8FU5KWl88U9AwQ[/tweet]

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/repaired-germ...54757.html

This doesn't mean Germany isn't going to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine soon. It does however make clear that if Germany does so, these tanks will be coming from active Bundeswehr units. There is no "tank reserve" as such, which should give every German (and probably all NATO) members pause. The 350 tanks are (maybe) adequate (with some spares) for about 1.5 Pz/Pzg divisions, which is about what Germany has. The UK has some tanks to spare mostly because it is downsizing (again). The AOTR is a distant memory. The US is in better shape. We do have a tank reserve that is relatively modern and contains "serviceable" units to some extent. However, our tanks are "different" from what Ukraine is used to and are gas hogs.

The idea that one can give a new tank to an armored unit and that unit can become proficient in it's use quickly, i.e. 90 days or less, is a fantasy. There is a war on in Ukraine, which means they do what they have to do, but while we deride Russia for sending troops into battle with no training, sending an armored formation into battle that has only had it's weapons for 90 days isn't a lot better. If there are only "a few" newbies in a formation who are not well trained, you might get away with it, but if it is everybody, mistakes will be made and some of them may be big ones.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/repaired-germ...54757.html

This doesn't mean Germany isn't going to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine soon. It does however make clear that if Germany does so, these tanks will be coming from active Bundeswehr units. There is no "tank reserve" as such, which should give every German (and probably all NATO) members pause. The 350 tanks are (maybe) adequate (with some spares) for about 1.5 Pz/Pzg divisions, which is about what Germany has. The UK has some tanks to spare mostly because it is downsizing (again). The AOTR is a distant memory. The US is in better shape. We do have a tank reserve that is relatively modern and contains "serviceable" units to some extent. However, our tanks are "different" from what Ukraine is used to and are gas hogs.

The idea that one can give a new tank to an armored unit and that unit can become proficient in it's use quickly, i.e. 90 days or less, is a fantasy. There is a war on in Ukraine, which means they do what they have to do, but while we deride Russia for sending troops into battle with no training, sending an armored formation into battle that has only had it's weapons for 90 days isn't a lot better. If there are only "a few" newbies in a formation who are not well trained, you might get away with it, but if it is everybody, mistakes will be made and some of them may be big ones.

[TrumpCard]

I’m not convinced the F-16 demand from Turkey is such a problem. If Turkey is an important ally, then we should be happy to sell them some fighter jets. Win-win proposition. And if that’s the condition for Nordic accession, then it’s 4 wins. We’ll see if there’s more to the deal. It might be in Erdogan’s interest to lock up the sale and not try to hold out for so much that it drags on beyond the election

[TrumpCard]

I’m not convinced the F-16 demand from Turkey is such a problem. If Turkey is an important ally, then we should be happy to sell them some fighter jets. Win-win proposition. And if that’s the condition for Nordic accession, then it’s 4 wins. We’ll see if there’s more to the deal. It might be in Erdogan’s interest to lock up the sale and not try to hold out for so much that it drags on beyond the election

[dabigv13]

The idea that one can give a new tank to an armored unit and that unit can become proficient in it's use quickly, i.e. 90 days or less, is a fantasy. There is a war on in Ukraine, which means they do what they have to do, but while we deride Russia for sending troops into battle with no training, sending an armored formation into battle that has only had it's weapons for 90 days isn't a lot better.

Dunno about that, I think it is a lot better.

Not an expert but I'd much rather have a Ukrainian volunteer unit with modern western equipment that they only received brief training on, than a Russian prison unit with early Soviet stuff who undoubtedly received even less training.

And we should credit the numerous times in the past year Ukraine has rapidly deployed new equipment to good use with training that is a fraction of western peacetime standards.

Related-
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/auto_glam/status/161...JqAGUAAKDA
[/tweet]

[dabigv13]

The idea that one can give a new tank to an armored unit and that unit can become proficient in it's use quickly, i.e. 90 days or less, is a fantasy. There is a war on in Ukraine, which means they do what they have to do, but while we deride Russia for sending troops into battle with no training, sending an armored formation into battle that has only had it's weapons for 90 days isn't a lot better.

Dunno about that, I think it is a lot better.

Not an expert but I'd much rather have a Ukrainian volunteer unit with modern western equipment that they only received brief training on, than a Russian prison unit with early Soviet stuff who undoubtedly received even less training.

And we should credit the numerous times in the past year Ukraine has rapidly deployed new equipment to good use with training that is a fraction of western peacetime standards.

Related-
[Tweet]
https://twitter.com/auto_glam/status/161...JqAGUAAKDA
[/tweet]

[Goose]

I’m not convinced the F-16 demand from Turkey is such a problem. If Turkey is an important ally, then we should be happy to sell them some fighter jets. Win-win proposition. And if that’s the condition for Nordic accession, then it’s 4 wins. We’ll see if there’s more to the deal. It might be in Erdogan’s interest to lock up the sale and not try to hold out for so much that it drags on beyond the election

As I said, Erdogan fully expects this to be wrapped up well before the election. From his point of view it is a "done deal", and if we don't come through it will be a political "black eye" for him. He won't be at all happy in that case and NATO will undoubtedly not get his cooperation. The only questions remaining are 1) what else he is going to try and extract for the "yes" vote, and 2) will the failure of Sweden to extradite the people Erdogan wants become such a political red line to him that he won't go along until he gets what he wants? Before Sweden's supreme court decision, I think there was almost no chance Erdogan would be a problem. If the Swedes had just stalled until after the election, IMO it would have worked. They didn't, and that could be an issue that takes this thing off the rails.

Most of Europe doesn't care at all one way or the other about the F-16s. The one country that does is Greece, and nothing anybody else says or does will change that. The real problem is the US congress. Several "important" members don't like Erdogan's behavior and want to "punish" him. This is understandable but also problematic in the current situation. The administration may have to spend a lot of political capital to either win a vote in congress or to do it unilaterally. Lets hope something can be worked out.

[Goose]

I’m not convinced the F-16 demand from Turkey is such a problem. If Turkey is an important ally, then we should be happy to sell them some fighter jets. Win-win proposition. And if that’s the condition for Nordic accession, then it’s 4 wins. We’ll see if there’s more to the deal. It might be in Erdogan’s interest to lock up the sale and not try to hold out for so much that it drags on beyond the election

As I said, Erdogan fully expects this to be wrapped up well before the election. From his point of view it is a "done deal", and if we don't come through it will be a political "black eye" for him. He won't be at all happy in that case and NATO will undoubtedly not get his cooperation. The only questions remaining are 1) what else he is going to try and extract for the "yes" vote, and 2) will the failure of Sweden to extradite the people Erdogan wants become such a political red line to him that he won't go along until he gets what he wants? Before Sweden's supreme court decision, I think there was almost no chance Erdogan would be a problem. If the Swedes had just stalled until after the election, IMO it would have worked. They didn't, and that could be an issue that takes this thing off the rails.

Most of Europe doesn't care at all one way or the other about the F-16s. The one country that does is Greece, and nothing anybody else says or does will change that. The real problem is the US congress. Several "important" members don't like Erdogan's behavior and want to "punish" him. This is understandable but also problematic in the current situation. The administration may have to spend a lot of political capital to either win a vote in congress or to do it unilaterally. Lets hope something can be worked out.

[Goose]

The idea that one can give a new tank to an armored unit and that unit can become proficient in it's use quickly, i.e. 90 days or less, is a fantasy. There is a war on in Ukraine, which means they do what they have to do, but while we deride Russia for sending troops into battle with no training, sending an armored formation into battle that has only had it's weapons for 90 days isn't a lot better.

Dunno about that, I think it is a lot better.

Not an expert but I'd much rather have a Ukrainian volunteer unit with modern western equipment that they only received brief training on, than a Russian prison unit with early Soviet stuff who undoubtedly received even less training.

And we should credit the numerous times in the past year Ukraine has rapidly deployed new equipment to good use with training that is a fraction of western peacetime standards.

Related-

https://twitter.com/auto_glam/status/161...JqAGUAAKDA

I think it comes down to what those to groups you mention are being asked to do.  Up to now, we haven't seen any rapid combined arms operations from Ukraine. The Ukrainians up to now have received indirect fire weapons like the M777 and the HIMARS. They have done well with them, but these type of weapons don't require really close rapid cooperation with each other to survive. Tanks do. It is like a football team in that if an audible is called you have to know what to do. You have to know your "blitz pickups" etc. If you don't, bad things can happen even if the other team isn't all that good. If you have sabot in the gun and somebody yells "dismounts" on the radio, what do you do? You have to decide RTFN and know how to do it quickly. That takes practice, and you can't do much of that in 90 days if you are just learning how to drive the tank. The tanks are also cooperating with their supporting IFVs and infantry. You have to know what they will do and react accordingly. Experience has also demonstrated you can put a very well trained tank force together with a very well trained infantry force and have disastrous results because they have not operated and trained TOGETHER.

There is a war on, and Ukraine sometimes has to "make do". However, the new tanks they will be receiving are a limited resource. If they are on the wrong end of a 73 easting, there aren't any more tanks. The Russians do have more convicts. A few "bad plays" and that can happen.

By the way, why is the fire extinguisher missing in the picture of the IFV ramp being operated :-)?

[Goose]

The idea that one can give a new tank to an armored unit and that unit can become proficient in it's use quickly, i.e. 90 days or less, is a fantasy. There is a war on in Ukraine, which means they do what they have to do, but while we deride Russia for sending troops into battle with no training, sending an armored formation into battle that has only had it's weapons for 90 days isn't a lot better.

Dunno about that, I think it is a lot better.

Not an expert but I'd much rather have a Ukrainian volunteer unit with modern western equipment that they only received brief training on, than a Russian prison unit with early Soviet stuff who undoubtedly received even less training.

And we should credit the numerous times in the past year Ukraine has rapidly deployed new equipment to good use with training that is a fraction of western peacetime standards.

Related-

https://twitter.com/auto_glam/status/161...JqAGUAAKDA

I think it comes down to what those to groups you mention are being asked to do.  Up to now, we haven't seen any rapid combined arms operations from Ukraine. The Ukrainians up to now have received indirect fire weapons like the M777 and the HIMARS. They have done well with them, but these type of weapons don't require really close rapid cooperation with each other to survive. Tanks do. It is like a football team in that if an audible is called you have to know what to do. You have to know your "blitz pickups" etc. If you don't, bad things can happen even if the other team isn't all that good. If you have sabot in the gun and somebody yells "dismounts" on the radio, what do you do? You have to decide RTFN and know how to do it quickly. That takes practice, and you can't do much of that in 90 days if you are just learning how to drive the tank. The tanks are also cooperating with their supporting IFVs and infantry. You have to know what they will do and react accordingly. Experience has also demonstrated you can put a very well trained tank force together with a very well trained infantry force and have disastrous results because they have not operated and trained TOGETHER.

There is a war on, and Ukraine sometimes has to "make do". However, the new tanks they will be receiving are a limited resource. If they are on the wrong end of a 73 easting, there aren't any more tanks. The Russians do have more convicts. A few "bad plays" and that can happen.

By the way, why is the fire extinguisher missing in the picture of the IFV ramp being operated :-)?