[dabigv13]

Russian artillery is now firing ~20% of the shells it was firing in late 2022. Even areas of active offensives such as Bakhmut, Kreminna, Vuhledar are experiencing "shell hunger". Maybe China could provide enough to make a difference, but I'm skeptical they would send large quantities of artillery ammunition.

The Russian strategy of overwhelming artillery and meat grinder prisoner shock troops is already not working well, and will work less well as they run out of ammo and prisoner troops. Ukraine I'm sure is glad that Russia is wasting their combat potential before they have to absorb the Ukrainian offensive.

[dabigv13]

Russian artillery is now firing ~20% of the shells it was firing in late 2022. Even areas of active offensives such as Bakhmut, Kreminna, Vuhledar are experiencing "shell hunger". Maybe China could provide enough to make a difference, but I'm skeptical they would send large quantities of artillery ammunition.

The Russian strategy of overwhelming artillery and meat grinder prisoner shock troops is already not working well, and will work less well as they run out of ammo and prisoner troops. Ukraine I'm sure is glad that Russia is wasting their combat potential before they have to absorb the Ukrainian offensive.

[Goose]

Russian artillery is now firing ~20% of the shells it was firing in late 2022. Even areas of active offensives such as Bakhmut, Kreminna, Vuhledar are experiencing "shell hunger". Maybe China could provide enough to make a difference, but I'm skeptical they would send large quantities of artillery ammunition.

Totally agree that China will not provide much, if any, artillery ammunition. You just can't hide that kind of material support and the US/EU would react with tough sanctions. Bad for everybody and China gets no real benefit. Small important things they can "hide" is another matter.

It is also important to be aware that the large number of shells Russia fired earlier in this war often hit nothing. They have become smarter about their targeting. This accounts for much of the reduction. In fact, they send a bunch of convicts/conscripts out to provoke the Ukrainians into firing, thereby revealing their positions. They then shell the acquired targets. That said, nobody is swimming in excess artillery ammunition. The HIMARS effect has produced longer supply lines for Russia which constricts the rate the can move ammunition to the guns. Ukraine obviously has a limited supply of Russian era shells available and a limited number of NATO tubes. Both side's infantry complain about not enough fire support.

The Russian strategy of overwhelming artillery and meat grinder prisoner shock troops is already not working well, and will work less well as they run out of ammo and prisoner troops. Ukraine I'm sure is glad that Russia is wasting their combat potential before they have to absorb the Ukrainian offensive.

I too hope Russia is expending it's somewhat limited combat potential in less productive efforts. I am not very sure that a Ukrainian offensive is in the works "soon" or "in the spring". The combined arms/new equipment training that is going on is "only" going to yield a few thousand "trained" troops a month, best case. These troops will need to conduct further training and "shake out" their own organization to actually be able to execute a significant action. That is going to be May/June at best.

[Goose]

Russian artillery is now firing ~20% of the shells it was firing in late 2022. Even areas of active offensives such as Bakhmut, Kreminna, Vuhledar are experiencing "shell hunger". Maybe China could provide enough to make a difference, but I'm skeptical they would send large quantities of artillery ammunition.

Totally agree that China will not provide much, if any, artillery ammunition. You just can't hide that kind of material support and the US/EU would react with tough sanctions. Bad for everybody and China gets no real benefit. Small important things they can "hide" is another matter.

It is also important to be aware that the large number of shells Russia fired earlier in this war often hit nothing. They have become smarter about their targeting. This accounts for much of the reduction. In fact, they send a bunch of convicts/conscripts out to provoke the Ukrainians into firing, thereby revealing their positions. They then shell the acquired targets. That said, nobody is swimming in excess artillery ammunition. The HIMARS effect has produced longer supply lines for Russia which constricts the rate the can move ammunition to the guns. Ukraine obviously has a limited supply of Russian era shells available and a limited number of NATO tubes. Both side's infantry complain about not enough fire support.

The Russian strategy of overwhelming artillery and meat grinder prisoner shock troops is already not working well, and will work less well as they run out of ammo and prisoner troops. Ukraine I'm sure is glad that Russia is wasting their combat potential before they have to absorb the Ukrainian offensive.

I too hope Russia is expending it's somewhat limited combat potential in less productive efforts. I am not very sure that a Ukrainian offensive is in the works "soon" or "in the spring". The combined arms/new equipment training that is going on is "only" going to yield a few thousand "trained" troops a month, best case. These troops will need to conduct further training and "shake out" their own organization to actually be able to execute a significant action. That is going to be May/June at best.

[dabigv13]

Just as we talk about it, both WSJ and WaPo out with articles that China is considering sending artillery ammo.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...y-ukraine/

China is considering sending Russia lethal military aid in the form of artillery shells as President Vladimir Putin’s army rapidly depletes its supply of ammunition a year into his invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials said, a prospect that has alarmed those in the Biden administration who believe Beijing has the ability to transform the war’s trajectory.

I personally think it would have many negatives for China, and they would need to keep a lot for themselves as well for their own needs. These disclosures to the papers from anonymous US officials is certainly meant to scare off China and remind them of those negatives.

If China does jump in with both feet that could certainly prolong the conflict.

[dabigv13]

Just as we talk about it, both WSJ and WaPo out with articles that China is considering sending artillery ammo.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...y-ukraine/

China is considering sending Russia lethal military aid in the form of artillery shells as President Vladimir Putin’s army rapidly depletes its supply of ammunition a year into his invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials said, a prospect that has alarmed those in the Biden administration who believe Beijing has the ability to transform the war’s trajectory.

I personally think it would have many negatives for China, and they would need to keep a lot for themselves as well for their own needs. These disclosures to the papers from anonymous US officials is certainly meant to scare off China and remind them of those negatives.

If China does jump in with both feet that could certainly prolong the conflict.

[fullmetal]

I don't think China will send significant amounts of ammunition to Russia. If anything, they will only send enough to convince Russia to give them a bulk discount on Russian oil/gas.  They'll acquire cheap energy while telling the US secretly that we shouldn't be upset since the quantities sent won't be an issue.  At least, that's my sense.

But if China wants to send a significant amount of military aid to Russia...well, at least that stuff isn't pointed toward Taiwan, which could be an even bigger geopolitical fracas (see: semiconductors).

[fullmetal]

I don't think China will send significant amounts of ammunition to Russia. If anything, they will only send enough to convince Russia to give them a bulk discount on Russian oil/gas.  They'll acquire cheap energy while telling the US secretly that we shouldn't be upset since the quantities sent won't be an issue.  At least, that's my sense.

But if China wants to send a significant amount of military aid to Russia...well, at least that stuff isn't pointed toward Taiwan, which could be an even bigger geopolitical fracas (see: semiconductors).

[TrumpCard]

I don't think China will send significant amounts of ammunition to Russia. If anything, they will only send enough to convince Russia to give them a bulk discount on Russian oil/gas.  They'll acquire cheap energy while telling the US secretly that we shouldn't be upset since the quantities sent won't be an issue.  At least, that's my sense.

But if China wants to send a significant amount of military aid to Russia...well, at least that stuff isn't pointed toward Taiwan, which could be an even bigger geopolitical fracas (see: semiconductors).

I don't see a silver lining if China sends significant military aid to Russia.  The fact that the ammo isn't available to target Taiwan is not a major factor because China I'm sure has and/or can produce plenty.  The fact that China would likely become a pariah, thereby reducing the barrier/downside to invading Taiwan, would be much more salient.  Let's hope this doesn't become reality.

[TrumpCard]

I don't think China will send significant amounts of ammunition to Russia. If anything, they will only send enough to convince Russia to give them a bulk discount on Russian oil/gas.  They'll acquire cheap energy while telling the US secretly that we shouldn't be upset since the quantities sent won't be an issue.  At least, that's my sense.

But if China wants to send a significant amount of military aid to Russia...well, at least that stuff isn't pointed toward Taiwan, which could be an even bigger geopolitical fracas (see: semiconductors).

I don't see a silver lining if China sends significant military aid to Russia.  The fact that the ammo isn't available to target Taiwan is not a major factor because China I'm sure has and/or can produce plenty.  The fact that China would likely become a pariah, thereby reducing the barrier/downside to invading Taiwan, would be much more salient.  Let's hope this doesn't become reality.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-war-r...03914.html

This BBC article I think is probably a good read on what is probable in the immediate future. It does say China is already supplying EAR-99 type materials, including semiconductors, to Russia. This is in many ways a "bigger deal" than artillery ammunition because it allows Russia to build precision deep strike weapons. We keep hoping Russia will run out of such weapons, and the sanctions we have in place are trying to force exactly that. If Russia can get all it needs from China, that isn't going to work and will allow Russia to continue wrecking havoc in Ukraine no matter what situation exists in the "ground war".

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-war-r...03914.html

This BBC article I think is probably a good read on what is probable in the immediate future. It does say China is already supplying EAR-99 type materials, including semiconductors, to Russia. This is in many ways a "bigger deal" than artillery ammunition because it allows Russia to build precision deep strike weapons. We keep hoping Russia will run out of such weapons, and the sanctions we have in place are trying to force exactly that. If Russia can get all it needs from China, that isn't going to work and will allow Russia to continue wrecking havoc in Ukraine no matter what situation exists in the "ground war".

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/condoleezza-r...55618.html

Unsurprisingly, I support the thoughts expressed in this article. The last paragraph is particularly on point IMO.

“I think the idea that you anticipate and therefore perhaps you start the training before it’s going to be necessary to send that equipment. The one thing we know, is that this war keeps evolving, and you have to try to evolve a little bit ahead of it,” Rice said.

As I have said for months, it is a good idea to train Ukrainian aviators to fly F-16s even though they may not ever get them. They have aviators with no aircraft, and they have recruits that want to fly. Training takes time and some of the candidates will undoubtedly "wash out". This should have started last summer, so that if/when the US/NATO does decide to supply aircraft they can be of immediate use and catch the Russians at a disadvantage.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/condoleezza-r...55618.html

Unsurprisingly, I support the thoughts expressed in this article. The last paragraph is particularly on point IMO.

“I think the idea that you anticipate and therefore perhaps you start the training before it’s going to be necessary to send that equipment. The one thing we know, is that this war keeps evolving, and you have to try to evolve a little bit ahead of it,” Rice said.

As I have said for months, it is a good idea to train Ukrainian aviators to fly F-16s even though they may not ever get them. They have aviators with no aircraft, and they have recruits that want to fly. Training takes time and some of the candidates will undoubtedly "wash out". This should have started last summer, so that if/when the US/NATO does decide to supply aircraft they can be of immediate use and catch the Russians at a disadvantage.

[BostonCard]

The economist has called Russia’s vaunted offensive a “damp squib”

https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02...damp-squib

The question is whether Ukraine can exploit this disarray. One scenario is a repeat of last summer, when Russia’s conquest of Severodonetsk, a town in Luhansk, came at such a high price in casualties that Ukraine was able to punch through Russia’s thinned-out lines in Kharkiv two months later. If Russia expends shells and manpower in pyrrhic victories in Donetsk, that could pave the way for a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring or early summer—bolstered by Western armour that is on the way.

Something I’ve been saying for some time. Btw, I had expected Bakhmut to have fallen already. I think it is a matter of time, but that Ukraine has been able to hold out for as long as it has is probably a victory, and means that Russia has had to expend even more resources to capture it.

BC

[BostonCard]

The economist has called Russia’s vaunted offensive a “damp squib”

https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02...damp-squib

The question is whether Ukraine can exploit this disarray. One scenario is a repeat of last summer, when Russia’s conquest of Severodonetsk, a town in Luhansk, came at such a high price in casualties that Ukraine was able to punch through Russia’s thinned-out lines in Kharkiv two months later. If Russia expends shells and manpower in pyrrhic victories in Donetsk, that could pave the way for a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring or early summer—bolstered by Western armour that is on the way.

Something I’ve been saying for some time. Btw, I had expected Bakhmut to have fallen already. I think it is a matter of time, but that Ukraine has been able to hold out for as long as it has is probably a victory, and means that Russia has had to expend even more resources to capture it.

BC

[Goose]

The economist has called Russia’s vaunted offensive a “damp squib”

https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02...damp-squib

The question is whether Ukraine can exploit this disarray. One scenario is a repeat of last summer, when Russia’s conquest of Severodonetsk, a town in Luhansk, came at such a high price in casualties that Ukraine was able to punch through Russia’s thinned-out lines in Kharkiv two months later. If Russia expends shells and manpower in pyrrhic victories in Donetsk, that could pave the way for a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring or early summer—bolstered by Western armour that is on the way.

Something I’ve been saying for some time.  Btw, I had expected Bakhmut to have fallen already.  I think it is a matter of time, but that Ukraine has been able to hold out for as long as it has is probably a victory, and means that Russia has had to expend even more resources to capture it.

BC

IMO we haven't seen the Russian "offensive" yet. The fighting around Bakhmut is a continuation of what was going on before. The usage of convicts and untrained conscripts as cannon fodder indicates not desperation but conservation by Russia. I too expected Bakhmut to have fallen by now, and the fact it hasn't is a tribute to Ukraine. However, recently Russia has expanded the number of areas and the "width" of their efforts. They are also using formations of higher quality, like the 155 Naval Infantry at Vuhledar. Ukraine has so far successfully repelled these attacks as well, but it is a time-honored Russian tactic to expand the width of the battle area to allow their greater numbers room to operate, stretch the defense, and find a "soft" spot.

Russia has lots of uncommitted/not engaged troops in Ukraine. They have greatly reinforced the south with troops that right now are mostly standing around waiting for Ukraine to "do something". They also have lots of defensive resources in the Donbas that are not engaged. If Russia really wants an "offensive", you will see these troops committed. So  far, they aren't. It may be that Russia wants Ukraine to attack them and prefers to play defense. It also may be they intend to continue feeding forces into the fight until they find a hole.

The most probable explanation is that Russia is waiting for better weather and will exploit any failures in the Ukrainian defense, but Russia thinks a stalemate is OK for now. They think they can wear Ukraine out by constantly attacking and that eventually Ukraine will run out of morale. Russia has lots of combat power they aren't yet using. Ukraine understands this and that is why they have also been conservative so far in what they attempt. I don't think either side has yet "shown their hand".

[Goose]

The economist has called Russia’s vaunted offensive a “damp squib”

https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02...damp-squib

The question is whether Ukraine can exploit this disarray. One scenario is a repeat of last summer, when Russia’s conquest of Severodonetsk, a town in Luhansk, came at such a high price in casualties that Ukraine was able to punch through Russia’s thinned-out lines in Kharkiv two months later. If Russia expends shells and manpower in pyrrhic victories in Donetsk, that could pave the way for a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring or early summer—bolstered by Western armour that is on the way.

Something I’ve been saying for some time.  Btw, I had expected Bakhmut to have fallen already.  I think it is a matter of time, but that Ukraine has been able to hold out for as long as it has is probably a victory, and means that Russia has had to expend even more resources to capture it.

BC

IMO we haven't seen the Russian "offensive" yet. The fighting around Bakhmut is a continuation of what was going on before. The usage of convicts and untrained conscripts as cannon fodder indicates not desperation but conservation by Russia. I too expected Bakhmut to have fallen by now, and the fact it hasn't is a tribute to Ukraine. However, recently Russia has expanded the number of areas and the "width" of their efforts. They are also using formations of higher quality, like the 155 Naval Infantry at Vuhledar. Ukraine has so far successfully repelled these attacks as well, but it is a time-honored Russian tactic to expand the width of the battle area to allow their greater numbers room to operate, stretch the defense, and find a "soft" spot.

Russia has lots of uncommitted/not engaged troops in Ukraine. They have greatly reinforced the south with troops that right now are mostly standing around waiting for Ukraine to "do something". They also have lots of defensive resources in the Donbas that are not engaged. If Russia really wants an "offensive", you will see these troops committed. So  far, they aren't. It may be that Russia wants Ukraine to attack them and prefers to play defense. It also may be they intend to continue feeding forces into the fight until they find a hole.

The most probable explanation is that Russia is waiting for better weather and will exploit any failures in the Ukrainian defense, but Russia thinks a stalemate is OK for now. They think they can wear Ukraine out by constantly attacking and that eventually Ukraine will run out of morale. Russia has lots of combat power they aren't yet using. Ukraine understands this and that is why they have also been conservative so far in what they attempt. I don't think either side has yet "shown their hand".

[TrumpCard]

The daily battlefield updates are inscrutable to me. The diplomatic issues seem far more likely to affect the outcome of the war. China potentially breaking the sanctions regime is important. Same with the anticipated “peace proposal” from the big 3 in Western Europe. Both of those recent developments seem a bit ominous for Ukraine, but if the battlefield is poker, then the diplomacy table may involve some cloak and dagger.

[TrumpCard]

The daily battlefield updates are inscrutable to me. The diplomatic issues seem far more likely to affect the outcome of the war. China potentially breaking the sanctions regime is important. Same with the anticipated “peace proposal” from the big 3 in Western Europe. Both of those recent developments seem a bit ominous for Ukraine, but if the battlefield is poker, then the diplomacy table may involve some cloak and dagger.

[dabigv13]

The economist has called Russia’s vaunted offensive a “damp squib”

https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02...damp-squib

The question is whether Ukraine can exploit this disarray. One scenario is a repeat of last summer, when Russia’s conquest of Severodonetsk, a town in Luhansk, came at such a high price in casualties that Ukraine was able to punch through Russia’s thinned-out lines in Kharkiv two months later. If Russia expends shells and manpower in pyrrhic victories in Donetsk, that could pave the way for a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring or early summer—bolstered by Western armour that is on the way.

Something I’ve been saying for some time.  Btw, I had expected Bakhmut to have fallen already.  I think it is a matter of time, but that Ukraine has been able to hold out for as long as it has is probably a victory, and means that Russia has had to expend even more resources to capture it.

BC

IMO we haven't seen the Russian "offensive" yet. The fighting around Bakhmut is a continuation of what was going on before. The usage of convicts and untrained conscripts as cannon fodder indicates not desperation but conservation by Russia. I too expected Bakhmut to have fallen by now, and the fact it hasn't is a tribute to Ukraine. However, recently Russia has expanded the number of areas and the "width" of their efforts. They are also using formations of higher quality, like the 155 Naval Infantry at Vuhledar. Ukraine has so far successfully repelled these attacks as well, but it is a time-honored Russian tactic to expand the width of the battle area to allow their greater numbers room to operate, stretch the defense, and find a "soft" spot.

Russia has lots of uncommitted/not engaged troops in Ukraine. They have greatly reinforced the south with troops that right now are mostly standing around waiting for Ukraine to "do something". They also have lots of defensive resources in the Donbas that are not engaged. If Russia really wants an "offensive", you will see these troops committed. So  far, they aren't. It may be that Russia wants Ukraine to attack them and prefers to play defense. It also may be they intend to continue feeding forces into the fight until they find a hole.

The most probable explanation is that Russia is waiting for better weather and will exploit any failures in the Ukrainian defense, but Russia thinks a stalemate is OK for now. They think they can wear Ukraine out by constantly attacking and that eventually Ukraine will run out of morale. Russia has lots of combat power they aren't yet using. Ukraine understands this and that is why they have also been conservative so far in what they attempt. I don't think either side has yet "shown their hand".

This is at odds with what most of the analysts of the war are saying. Russia's offensive started weeks ago. It just doesn't look like much because they haven't accomplished much. The reason they have mobilized "standing around" is because they know those troops would be less than useless in any offensive operation. 

Recent assaults have involved Marines and GRU spetznaz, though their elite status is probably not really applicable, as their original force has been decimated.

Russia is not waiting to show their hand, their hand just sucks.

[dabigv13]

The economist has called Russia’s vaunted offensive a “damp squib”

https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/02...damp-squib

The question is whether Ukraine can exploit this disarray. One scenario is a repeat of last summer, when Russia’s conquest of Severodonetsk, a town in Luhansk, came at such a high price in casualties that Ukraine was able to punch through Russia’s thinned-out lines in Kharkiv two months later. If Russia expends shells and manpower in pyrrhic victories in Donetsk, that could pave the way for a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring or early summer—bolstered by Western armour that is on the way.

Something I’ve been saying for some time.  Btw, I had expected Bakhmut to have fallen already.  I think it is a matter of time, but that Ukraine has been able to hold out for as long as it has is probably a victory, and means that Russia has had to expend even more resources to capture it.

BC

IMO we haven't seen the Russian "offensive" yet. The fighting around Bakhmut is a continuation of what was going on before. The usage of convicts and untrained conscripts as cannon fodder indicates not desperation but conservation by Russia. I too expected Bakhmut to have fallen by now, and the fact it hasn't is a tribute to Ukraine. However, recently Russia has expanded the number of areas and the "width" of their efforts. They are also using formations of higher quality, like the 155 Naval Infantry at Vuhledar. Ukraine has so far successfully repelled these attacks as well, but it is a time-honored Russian tactic to expand the width of the battle area to allow their greater numbers room to operate, stretch the defense, and find a "soft" spot.

Russia has lots of uncommitted/not engaged troops in Ukraine. They have greatly reinforced the south with troops that right now are mostly standing around waiting for Ukraine to "do something". They also have lots of defensive resources in the Donbas that are not engaged. If Russia really wants an "offensive", you will see these troops committed. So  far, they aren't. It may be that Russia wants Ukraine to attack them and prefers to play defense. It also may be they intend to continue feeding forces into the fight until they find a hole.

The most probable explanation is that Russia is waiting for better weather and will exploit any failures in the Ukrainian defense, but Russia thinks a stalemate is OK for now. They think they can wear Ukraine out by constantly attacking and that eventually Ukraine will run out of morale. Russia has lots of combat power they aren't yet using. Ukraine understands this and that is why they have also been conservative so far in what they attempt. I don't think either side has yet "shown their hand".

This is at odds with what most of the analysts of the war are saying. Russia's offensive started weeks ago. It just doesn't look like much because they haven't accomplished much. The reason they have mobilized "standing around" is because they know those troops would be less than useless in any offensive operation. 

Recent assaults have involved Marines and GRU spetznaz, though their elite status is probably not really applicable, as their original force has been decimated.

Russia is not waiting to show their hand, their hand just sucks.

[Goose]

This is at odds with what most of the analysts of the war are saying. Russia's offensive started weeks ago. It just doesn't look like much because they haven't accomplished much. The reason they have mobilized "standing around" is because they know those troops would be less than useless in any offensive operation.

The problem with that analysis is that many of the units engaged in the current operation have exactly those recently mobilized units prominently present, as Ukraine points out all the time. Obviously that isn't an impediment to using them. The fact they are not employing lots of them is clearly a question mark, given that they do others. Russia has also been training units both in Belarus and in the south, attempting to get better combat performance out of them. When those 10,000 (Ukrainian estimate) Russian troops being trained aren't in Belarus anymore, then the offensive has started. Until that happens, it hasn't :-).

Recent assaults have involved Marines and GRU spetznaz, though their elite status is probably not really applicable, as their original force has been decimated.

True, although they still may be "elite" compared to the rest of the Russian forces. They are however fixing in place lots of Ukrainian defenders, which could be their main purpose.

Russia is not waiting to show their hand, their hand just sucks.

I think their hand sucks too. However, while everybody is worried about the "Russian Offensive", IMO Russia is accomplishing several objectives. First, they have regained the initiative in the Donbas. They had lost it in the summer/fall. This is a "win" for them. They are dictating the "where and when" of the war. Second, they are preventing Ukraine from freeing up assets that can be used for offensive operations. Ukraine is waiting for a blow that perhaps will not/can not be delivered. Third, it is gaining time for Russia to train the manpower it does have to be effective. They are clearly trying to do that. How successful they will be at that is TBD.

It is probable that Russia will increase the tempo of operations as the weather improves. If Ukraine falters anywhere, Russia will try to exploit it. If we see Russia pulling in the currently held in reserve units, it means they think they have found it. The question remains as to what uncommitted combat power Ukraine is generating. The units being trained by the US/NATO, the new armored strength, etc. could have many uses. However, we have been down this path before where Ukraine was supposedly generating new offensive formations. It didn't really materialize. My fear is that in the event the numbers involved may be just to few to do the job. Ukraine's hand actually sucks too.

Russia clearly believes that their larger manpower reserves will eventually prevail, and all they have to do is keep the pressure on. Ukraine will eventually make a mistake that Russia can exploit or the West will tire of it all and force Ukraine to negotiate at a severe disadvantage. Unfortunately, they may be correct. OTOH, Ukraine may be able to exploit a Russian mistake like they did in Kherson city and around Kupiansk. Russia has installed a "defense in depth" to guard against that problem, but it does require lots of troops. Maybe they don't have enough. It also remains to be seen if Russia can maintain the initiative indefinitely. Their attempts to "wear down" Ukraine rely on that. The Russians may not be able to do so. Right now, they are doing a pretty good job. It is also just possible that Russia will launch an all-out offensive effort when they think they have enough trained troops. I think Ukraine hopes for that, because they think they can defeat it. I think Russia knows that and will try to wait Ukraine out and force them to attack.

[Goose]

This is at odds with what most of the analysts of the war are saying. Russia's offensive started weeks ago. It just doesn't look like much because they haven't accomplished much. The reason they have mobilized "standing around" is because they know those troops would be less than useless in any offensive operation.

The problem with that analysis is that many of the units engaged in the current operation have exactly those recently mobilized units prominently present, as Ukraine points out all the time. Obviously that isn't an impediment to using them. The fact they are not employing lots of them is clearly a question mark, given that they do others. Russia has also been training units both in Belarus and in the south, attempting to get better combat performance out of them. When those 10,000 (Ukrainian estimate) Russian troops being trained aren't in Belarus anymore, then the offensive has started. Until that happens, it hasn't :-).

Recent assaults have involved Marines and GRU spetznaz, though their elite status is probably not really applicable, as their original force has been decimated.

True, although they still may be "elite" compared to the rest of the Russian forces. They are however fixing in place lots of Ukrainian defenders, which could be their main purpose.

Russia is not waiting to show their hand, their hand just sucks.

I think their hand sucks too. However, while everybody is worried about the "Russian Offensive", IMO Russia is accomplishing several objectives. First, they have regained the initiative in the Donbas. They had lost it in the summer/fall. This is a "win" for them. They are dictating the "where and when" of the war. Second, they are preventing Ukraine from freeing up assets that can be used for offensive operations. Ukraine is waiting for a blow that perhaps will not/can not be delivered. Third, it is gaining time for Russia to train the manpower it does have to be effective. They are clearly trying to do that. How successful they will be at that is TBD.

It is probable that Russia will increase the tempo of operations as the weather improves. If Ukraine falters anywhere, Russia will try to exploit it. If we see Russia pulling in the currently held in reserve units, it means they think they have found it. The question remains as to what uncommitted combat power Ukraine is generating. The units being trained by the US/NATO, the new armored strength, etc. could have many uses. However, we have been down this path before where Ukraine was supposedly generating new offensive formations. It didn't really materialize. My fear is that in the event the numbers involved may be just to few to do the job. Ukraine's hand actually sucks too.

Russia clearly believes that their larger manpower reserves will eventually prevail, and all they have to do is keep the pressure on. Ukraine will eventually make a mistake that Russia can exploit or the West will tire of it all and force Ukraine to negotiate at a severe disadvantage. Unfortunately, they may be correct. OTOH, Ukraine may be able to exploit a Russian mistake like they did in Kherson city and around Kupiansk. Russia has installed a "defense in depth" to guard against that problem, but it does require lots of troops. Maybe they don't have enough. It also remains to be seen if Russia can maintain the initiative indefinitely. Their attempts to "wear down" Ukraine rely on that. The Russians may not be able to do so. Right now, they are doing a pretty good job. It is also just possible that Russia will launch an all-out offensive effort when they think they have enough trained troops. I think Ukraine hopes for that, because they think they can defeat it. I think Russia knows that and will try to wait Ukraine out and force them to attack.

[gocard14]

This is at odds with what most of the analysts of the war are saying. Russia's offensive started weeks ago. It just doesn't look like much because they haven't accomplished much. The reason they have mobilized "standing around" is because they know those troops would be less than useless in any offensive operation.

The problem with that analysis is that many of the units engaged in the current operation have exactly those recently mobilized units prominently present, as Ukraine points out all the time. Obviously that isn't an impediment to using them. The fact they are not employing lots of them is clearly a question mark, given that they do others. Russia has also been training units both in Belarus and in the south, attempting to get better combat performance out of them. When those 10,000 (Ukrainian estimate) Russian troops being trained aren't in Belarus anymore, then the offensive has started. Until that happens, it hasn't :-).

Recent assaults have involved Marines and GRU spetznaz, though their elite status is probably not really applicable, as their original force has been decimated.

True, although they still may be "elite" compared to the rest of the Russian forces. They are however fixing in place lots of Ukrainian defenders, which could be their main purpose.

Russia is not waiting to show their hand, their hand just sucks.

I think their hand sucks too. However, while everybody is worried about the "Russian Offensive", IMO Russia is accomplishing several objectives. First, they have regained the initiative in the Donbas. They had lost it in the summer/fall. This is a "win" for them. They are dictating the "where and when" of the war. Second, they are preventing Ukraine from freeing up assets that can be used for offensive operations. Ukraine is waiting for a blow that perhaps will not/can not be delivered. Third, it is gaining time for Russia to train the manpower it does have to be effective. They are clearly trying to do that. How successful they will be at that is TBD.

It is probable that Russia will increase the tempo of operations as the weather improves. If Ukraine falters anywhere, Russia will try to exploit it. If we see Russia pulling in the currently held in reserve units, it means they think they have found it. The question remains as to what uncommitted combat power Ukraine is generating. The units being trained by the US/NATO, the new armored strength, etc. could have many uses. However, we have been down this path before where Ukraine was supposedly generating new offensive formations. It didn't really materialize. My fear is that in the event the numbers involved may be just to few to do the job. Ukraine's hand actually sucks too.

Russia clearly believes that their larger manpower reserves will eventually prevail, and all they have to do is keep the pressure on. Ukraine will eventually make a mistake that Russia can exploit or the West will tire of it all and force Ukraine to negotiate at a severe disadvantage. Unfortunately, they may be correct. OTOH, Ukraine may be able to exploit a Russian mistake like they did in Kherson city and around Kupiansk. Russia has installed a "defense in depth" to guard against that problem, but it does require lots of troops. Maybe they don't have enough. It also remains to be seen if Russia can maintain the initiative indefinitely. Their attempts to "wear down" Ukraine rely on that. The Russians may not be able to do so. Right now, they are doing a pretty good job. It is also just possible that Russia will launch an all-out offensive effort when they think they have enough trained troops. I think Ukraine hopes for that, because they think they can defeat it. I think Russia knows that and will try to wait Ukraine out and force them to attack.

I agree the key question on the Ukrainian side is how much of their forces (especially their higher quality/armored units) are committed to maintain the current level of defense. If the answer is almost all, then clearly they are in trouble given the number of Russian reserves.

If, on the other hand, they are maintaining their defense and bleeding Russian manpower/equipment while fighting with one hand behind their back and the other hand prepares for offensive operations, that bodes very well. The fact that we see little evidence of the Bradleys, Stryker's, CV 90s (not to mention tanks) being deployed on the front lines suggests this is the case.

[gocard14]

This is at odds with what most of the analysts of the war are saying. Russia's offensive started weeks ago. It just doesn't look like much because they haven't accomplished much. The reason they have mobilized "standing around" is because they know those troops would be less than useless in any offensive operation.

The problem with that analysis is that many of the units engaged in the current operation have exactly those recently mobilized units prominently present, as Ukraine points out all the time. Obviously that isn't an impediment to using them. The fact they are not employing lots of them is clearly a question mark, given that they do others. Russia has also been training units both in Belarus and in the south, attempting to get better combat performance out of them. When those 10,000 (Ukrainian estimate) Russian troops being trained aren't in Belarus anymore, then the offensive has started. Until that happens, it hasn't :-).

Recent assaults have involved Marines and GRU spetznaz, though their elite status is probably not really applicable, as their original force has been decimated.

True, although they still may be "elite" compared to the rest of the Russian forces. They are however fixing in place lots of Ukrainian defenders, which could be their main purpose.

Russia is not waiting to show their hand, their hand just sucks.

I think their hand sucks too. However, while everybody is worried about the "Russian Offensive", IMO Russia is accomplishing several objectives. First, they have regained the initiative in the Donbas. They had lost it in the summer/fall. This is a "win" for them. They are dictating the "where and when" of the war. Second, they are preventing Ukraine from freeing up assets that can be used for offensive operations. Ukraine is waiting for a blow that perhaps will not/can not be delivered. Third, it is gaining time for Russia to train the manpower it does have to be effective. They are clearly trying to do that. How successful they will be at that is TBD.

It is probable that Russia will increase the tempo of operations as the weather improves. If Ukraine falters anywhere, Russia will try to exploit it. If we see Russia pulling in the currently held in reserve units, it means they think they have found it. The question remains as to what uncommitted combat power Ukraine is generating. The units being trained by the US/NATO, the new armored strength, etc. could have many uses. However, we have been down this path before where Ukraine was supposedly generating new offensive formations. It didn't really materialize. My fear is that in the event the numbers involved may be just to few to do the job. Ukraine's hand actually sucks too.

Russia clearly believes that their larger manpower reserves will eventually prevail, and all they have to do is keep the pressure on. Ukraine will eventually make a mistake that Russia can exploit or the West will tire of it all and force Ukraine to negotiate at a severe disadvantage. Unfortunately, they may be correct. OTOH, Ukraine may be able to exploit a Russian mistake like they did in Kherson city and around Kupiansk. Russia has installed a "defense in depth" to guard against that problem, but it does require lots of troops. Maybe they don't have enough. It also remains to be seen if Russia can maintain the initiative indefinitely. Their attempts to "wear down" Ukraine rely on that. The Russians may not be able to do so. Right now, they are doing a pretty good job. It is also just possible that Russia will launch an all-out offensive effort when they think they have enough trained troops. I think Ukraine hopes for that, because they think they can defeat it. I think Russia knows that and will try to wait Ukraine out and force them to attack.

I agree the key question on the Ukrainian side is how much of their forces (especially their higher quality/armored units) are committed to maintain the current level of defense. If the answer is almost all, then clearly they are in trouble given the number of Russian reserves.

If, on the other hand, they are maintaining their defense and bleeding Russian manpower/equipment while fighting with one hand behind their back and the other hand prepares for offensive operations, that bodes very well. The fact that we see little evidence of the Bradleys, Stryker's, CV 90s (not to mention tanks) being deployed on the front lines suggests this is the case.

[Goose]

I agree the key question on the Ukrainian side is how much of their forces (especially their higher quality/armored units) are committed to maintain the current level of defense. If the answer is almost all, then clearly they are in trouble given the number of Russian reserves.


If, on the other hand, they are maintaining their defense and bleeding Russian manpower/equipment while fighting with one hand behind their back and the other hand prepares for offensive operations, that bodes very well. The fact that we see little evidence of the Bradleys, Stryker's, CV 90s (not to mention tanks) being deployed on the front lines suggests this is the case.

You wouldn't see them there in any case. Ukraine is clearly fighting a defensive battle in that area and would only used a mobile striking force as either a fire brigade to contain a breakthrough (which Russia hasn't yet accomplished) or as a counter-attacking force designed to generate their own breakthrough. In general, it isn't good tank country (as Russia keeps proving). Armor is generally an offensive weapon or a defensive weapon against other armor. Mobility isn't an asset unless you are moving. Ukraine isn't at the moment.

IMO you are correct that if Ukraine is building an offensive force that is uncommitted and substantial, that can be a very good thing and make a big difference. It is unclear they are doing that, which is fine. What the Russians don't know is a weapon in itself. That said, an armored brigade by itself isn't going to be enough to take back Crimea, or probably even the rest of Kherson Oblast. That is the quantity of equipment Ukraine is apparently getting.
 
It remains to be seen what the totality of this independent force will be, in so far as it exists. It will almost certainly be deployed in the south (IMO), not the Donbas because there is too much vegetation there and because the more vulnerable area that will hurt Russia the most is in the south. If Ukraine is to "win" this war, that is where it has to be. If Russia just gives up, that is another case.

[Goose]

I agree the key question on the Ukrainian side is how much of their forces (especially their higher quality/armored units) are committed to maintain the current level of defense. If the answer is almost all, then clearly they are in trouble given the number of Russian reserves.


If, on the other hand, they are maintaining their defense and bleeding Russian manpower/equipment while fighting with one hand behind their back and the other hand prepares for offensive operations, that bodes very well. The fact that we see little evidence of the Bradleys, Stryker's, CV 90s (not to mention tanks) being deployed on the front lines suggests this is the case.

You wouldn't see them there in any case. Ukraine is clearly fighting a defensive battle in that area and would only used a mobile striking force as either a fire brigade to contain a breakthrough (which Russia hasn't yet accomplished) or as a counter-attacking force designed to generate their own breakthrough. In general, it isn't good tank country (as Russia keeps proving). Armor is generally an offensive weapon or a defensive weapon against other armor. Mobility isn't an asset unless you are moving. Ukraine isn't at the moment.

IMO you are correct that if Ukraine is building an offensive force that is uncommitted and substantial, that can be a very good thing and make a big difference. It is unclear they are doing that, which is fine. What the Russians don't know is a weapon in itself. That said, an armored brigade by itself isn't going to be enough to take back Crimea, or probably even the rest of Kherson Oblast. That is the quantity of equipment Ukraine is apparently getting.
 
It remains to be seen what the totality of this independent force will be, in so far as it exists. It will almost certainly be deployed in the south (IMO), not the Donbas because there is too much vegetation there and because the more vulnerable area that will hurt Russia the most is in the south. If Ukraine is to "win" this war, that is where it has to be. If Russia just gives up, that is another case.

[TreesAndBirds]

Report of Russia recruiting Palestinians in Lebanese refugee camps and Syrian troops to fight in Ukraine. 

Assuming it’s true, its further evidence of Russian manpower shortage. But concerning as more mercenaries for Ukraine to face, and those who survive will come back to a volatile part of the world with more military experience.

https://themedialine.org/top-stories/exclusive-putin-reportedly-paying-palestinians-from-lebanese-camps-to-fight-in-ukraine/

[TreesAndBirds]

Report of Russia recruiting Palestinians in Lebanese refugee camps and Syrian troops to fight in Ukraine. 

Assuming it’s true, its further evidence of Russian manpower shortage. But concerning as more mercenaries for Ukraine to face, and those who survive will come back to a volatile part of the world with more military experience.

https://themedialine.org/top-stories/exclusive-putin-reportedly-paying-palestinians-from-lebanese-camps-to-fight-in-ukraine/

[TrumpCard]

The DefMon twitter account published a map today showing the gains/losses since the beginning of the year.  I don't vouch for its precise accuracy, but in the big picture I think it's roughly accurate and consistent with other sources.  It shows how small the change has been on the front lines over the past 2 months.  And that's about the same as the gains/losses since pre-Thanksgiving because I did not read about much territory changing hands in December either.  Even when Ukraine eventually withdraws from Bahkmut, I don't think Russia will gain enough territory to make a material difference along any metric.  Things can change quickly, but for the moment, the front line mostly does appear to be a stalemate.

[TrumpCard]

The DefMon twitter account published a map today showing the gains/losses since the beginning of the year.  I don't vouch for its precise accuracy, but in the big picture I think it's roughly accurate and consistent with other sources.  It shows how small the change has been on the front lines over the past 2 months.  And that's about the same as the gains/losses since pre-Thanksgiving because I did not read about much territory changing hands in December either.  Even when Ukraine eventually withdraws from Bahkmut, I don't think Russia will gain enough territory to make a material difference along any metric.  Things can change quickly, but for the moment, the front line mostly does appear to be a stalemate.

[Goose]

The DefMon twitter account published a map today showing the gains/losses since the beginning of the year.  I don't vouch for its precise accuracy, but in the big picture I think it's roughly accurate and consistent with other sources.  It shows how small the change has been on the front lines over the past 2 months.  And that's about the same as the gains/losses since pre-Thanksgiving because I did not read about much territory changing hands in December either.  Even when Ukraine eventually withdraws from Bahkmut, I don't think Russia will gain enough territory to make a material difference along any metric.  Things can change quickly, but for the moment, the front line mostly does appear to be a stalemate.

You are correct that the front is not and has not been fluid. In theory, as things warm up and the mud season begins the front should be even less fluid for a while. After that period, both sides will be expected to "do something". Ukraine is clearly getting training and arms that should position them to do some damage. How much and exactly when is yet to be seen. I am guessing Ukraine's timeline might be late May/early June, not the end of rasputitsa. Russia OTOH is also training and organizing. They may plan some offensives as preemptive measures against Ukraine and/or the typical Russian "attack everywhere, find a soft spot, reinforce success". Putin may yet be forced to declare a general mobilization if he can't make anything happen by June.

[Goose]

The DefMon twitter account published a map today showing the gains/losses since the beginning of the year.  I don't vouch for its precise accuracy, but in the big picture I think it's roughly accurate and consistent with other sources.  It shows how small the change has been on the front lines over the past 2 months.  And that's about the same as the gains/losses since pre-Thanksgiving because I did not read about much territory changing hands in December either.  Even when Ukraine eventually withdraws from Bahkmut, I don't think Russia will gain enough territory to make a material difference along any metric.  Things can change quickly, but for the moment, the front line mostly does appear to be a stalemate.

You are correct that the front is not and has not been fluid. In theory, as things warm up and the mud season begins the front should be even less fluid for a while. After that period, both sides will be expected to "do something". Ukraine is clearly getting training and arms that should position them to do some damage. How much and exactly when is yet to be seen. I am guessing Ukraine's timeline might be late May/early June, not the end of rasputitsa. Russia OTOH is also training and organizing. They may plan some offensives as preemptive measures against Ukraine and/or the typical Russian "attack everywhere, find a soft spot, reinforce success". Putin may yet be forced to declare a general mobilization if he can't make anything happen by June.

[OutsiderFan]

Bakhmut is hardly worth saving anymore given how destroyed it is. It's almost like Ukraine is only defending the territory because it is a meat grinder for Wagner (Russian) forces that it is happy to grind down. I'm assuming Ukraine is losing far fewer fighters than Russia is and the trade-off will be taken until Ukraine is deploying tanks and other armored fighting vehicles to launch its Spring offensive.

[OutsiderFan]

Bakhmut is hardly worth saving anymore given how destroyed it is. It's almost like Ukraine is only defending the territory because it is a meat grinder for Wagner (Russian) forces that it is happy to grind down. I'm assuming Ukraine is losing far fewer fighters than Russia is and the trade-off will be taken until Ukraine is deploying tanks and other armored fighting vehicles to launch its Spring offensive.

[BostonCard]

Bakhmut is hardly worth saving anymore given how destroyed it is. It's almost like Ukraine is only defending the territory because it is a meat grinder for Wagner (Russian) forces that it is happy to grind down.

This much has been clear for some time.  There is a slight psychological benefit to Russia from capturing Bakhmut, but Ukraine has been much better at "doing the math" about how long to bleed the Russians before withdrawing.  I think they will withdraw soon, but they've held out longer than I expected.

BC

[BostonCard]

Bakhmut is hardly worth saving anymore given how destroyed it is. It's almost like Ukraine is only defending the territory because it is a meat grinder for Wagner (Russian) forces that it is happy to grind down.

This much has been clear for some time.  There is a slight psychological benefit to Russia from capturing Bakhmut, but Ukraine has been much better at "doing the math" about how long to bleed the Russians before withdrawing.  I think they will withdraw soon, but they've held out longer than I expected.

BC

[BostonCard]

More on

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world...74f24220a2

In the extended battle, both sides sent tanks into the fray, rumbling over dirt roads and maneuvering around tree lines, with the Russians thrusting forward in columns and the Ukrainians maneuvering defensively, firing from a distance or from hiding places as Russian columns came into their sights.

When it was over, not only had Russia failed to capture Vuhledar, but it also had made the same mistake that cost Moscow hundreds of tanks earlier in the war: advancing columns into ambushes.

What is stunning to me is that this is the kind of mistake you should never make twice.

BC

[BostonCard]

More on

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world...74f24220a2

In the extended battle, both sides sent tanks into the fray, rumbling over dirt roads and maneuvering around tree lines, with the Russians thrusting forward in columns and the Ukrainians maneuvering defensively, firing from a distance or from hiding places as Russian columns came into their sights.

When it was over, not only had Russia failed to capture Vuhledar, but it also had made the same mistake that cost Moscow hundreds of tanks earlier in the war: advancing columns into ambushes.

What is stunning to me is that this is the kind of mistake you should never make twice.

BC