[Goose]

How can 1,000 soldiers surrounded at a single steel plant in Mariupol have sufficient fire control to prevent the Russians from traversing the entire southern region, while so many thousands of Russians attacking Bakhmut from every direction don’t have fire control over Ukraine’s escape routes?

The 1000 soldiers in a single steel plant didn't prevent the Russians from traversing the entire southern region. What they did do was deny the free use of the one and only major road from Rostov-on-Don/Donbas to anywhere to the south, like particularly Crimea and Kherson/Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Russia wanted/needed the ability to move large quantities of supplies, ordinance, troops and vehicles at will from Russia to points south, and visa versa. Russia could always "gun run" convoy's down the M14 if they were willing to absorb losses and if the vehicles were all armored to some extent. They would absorb losses and couldn't carry much. Thin skinned trucks and "commercial" vehicles had no chance. Russia wanted to provide logistics not to maybe 500 people, but rather tens of thousands. They couldn't do that without the M14.

Obviously what Russia could do is use secondary roads to bypass the blocked M14, but that made the trip much longer and slower. It also wasn't 100 percent reliable as not all those roads were secure at that point. The secondary roads also couldn't stand the heavy traffic and would fail. That is why Russia didn't just leave the 1000 Ukrainians to wither on the vine. They needed that road and the needed it ASAP. There were no substitutes.

Bakhmut proper OTOH has an infantry garrison of probably less than four companies at this point. They don't have "heavy" weapons, like 155mm howitzers. Before the bridge at Chasiv Yar was destroyed, Ukraine could bring in ammunition and supplies via IFVs and the like. They probably lost a few in the process, but it was viable. A lot of stuff was probably hand carried in by replacements. These types of efforts simply aren't worth the barrage of shells it takes to even attempt to stop them. The little dirt road involved is no M14, that is for sure. The destruction of the bridges probably means Ukraine has to either muster a major counter-attack (possible but very improbable IMO) or evacuate the town pretty quickly. The supply situation will dictate the timing. Everything now is being moved by hand. The Ukrainian infantry has proved time and again they can endure, but even they can't fight without ammunition.

---

How much of the decision to stay in Bakhmut was about depriving Russia of a PR win around the time of the 1-year anniversary of the invasion?

No way to know. IMO definitely the troops on the ground probably sent up overly optimistic situation reports because they didn't want to see themselves as the "weak link". That may have affected the decision making process. They were willing to DIP if that was required.

Did Ukraine accept the casualties to buy time to set of a second line of defense behind Bakhmut?

IMO no. The area is relatively open land where Ukraine has had a very long time to "fortify" a second line of defense. It is however true that any trench line in open country is easier to attack than an "urban" area with all the built-in obstacles (like buildings) the defense can use to advantage. That is one reason Ukraine holds onto built-up areas whenever possible. Moving around in a "city" is also easier than leaving your trench and crossing open country. Lots of reasons to defend there if you can.

https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/16324...bVTC5DVNgw

To quote Kenny Rogers, “know when to fold ‘em”

BC

Yep. We don't know the whole story, obviously, but it sure looks like that time is nigh.

[Goose]

How can 1,000 soldiers surrounded at a single steel plant in Mariupol have sufficient fire control to prevent the Russians from traversing the entire southern region, while so many thousands of Russians attacking Bakhmut from every direction don’t have fire control over Ukraine’s escape routes?

The 1000 soldiers in a single steel plant didn't prevent the Russians from traversing the entire southern region. What they did do was deny the free use of the one and only major road from Rostov-on-Don/Donbas to anywhere to the south, like particularly Crimea and Kherson/Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Russia wanted/needed the ability to move large quantities of supplies, ordinance, troops and vehicles at will from Russia to points south, and visa versa. Russia could always "gun run" convoy's down the M14 if they were willing to absorb losses and if the vehicles were all armored to some extent. They would absorb losses and couldn't carry much. Thin skinned trucks and "commercial" vehicles had no chance. Russia wanted to provide logistics not to maybe 500 people, but rather tens of thousands. They couldn't do that without the M14.

Obviously what Russia could do is use secondary roads to bypass the blocked M14, but that made the trip much longer and slower. It also wasn't 100 percent reliable as not all those roads were secure at that point. The secondary roads also couldn't stand the heavy traffic and would fail. That is why Russia didn't just leave the 1000 Ukrainians to wither on the vine. They needed that road and the needed it ASAP. There were no substitutes.

Bakhmut proper OTOH has an infantry garrison of probably less than four companies at this point. They don't have "heavy" weapons, like 155mm howitzers. Before the bridge at Chasiv Yar was destroyed, Ukraine could bring in ammunition and supplies via IFVs and the like. They probably lost a few in the process, but it was viable. A lot of stuff was probably hand carried in by replacements. These types of efforts simply aren't worth the barrage of shells it takes to even attempt to stop them. The little dirt road involved is no M14, that is for sure. The destruction of the bridges probably means Ukraine has to either muster a major counter-attack (possible but very improbable IMO) or evacuate the town pretty quickly. The supply situation will dictate the timing. Everything now is being moved by hand. The Ukrainian infantry has proved time and again they can endure, but even they can't fight without ammunition.

---

How much of the decision to stay in Bakhmut was about depriving Russia of a PR win around the time of the 1-year anniversary of the invasion?

No way to know. IMO definitely the troops on the ground probably sent up overly optimistic situation reports because they didn't want to see themselves as the "weak link". That may have affected the decision making process. They were willing to DIP if that was required.

Did Ukraine accept the casualties to buy time to set of a second line of defense behind Bakhmut?

IMO no. The area is relatively open land where Ukraine has had a very long time to "fortify" a second line of defense. It is however true that any trench line in open country is easier to attack than an "urban" area with all the built-in obstacles (like buildings) the defense can use to advantage. That is one reason Ukraine holds onto built-up areas whenever possible. Moving around in a "city" is also easier than leaving your trench and crossing open country. Lots of reasons to defend there if you can.

https://twitter.com/ralee85/status/16324...bVTC5DVNgw

To quote Kenny Rogers, “know when to fold ‘em”

BC

Yep. We don't know the whole story, obviously, but it sure looks like that time is nigh.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-air-...49043.html

Welcome the Russian JDAM to the war. This weapon isn't hypersonic. It isn't even supersonic by itself, but as the US has shown over many, many years it is a cheap and very effective munition when you have air superiority. Not flashy, but very dangerous. These weapons are also much easier to make than cruise missiles. Ukraine is right. They need an air force, or else all the rest is moot. I guess we can hope Russia can't build many of these weapons, and that may be true. However, I wouldn't count on it.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-air-...49043.html

Welcome the Russian JDAM to the war. This weapon isn't hypersonic. It isn't even supersonic by itself, but as the US has shown over many, many years it is a cheap and very effective munition when you have air superiority. Not flashy, but very dangerous. These weapons are also much easier to make than cruise missiles. Ukraine is right. They need an air force, or else all the rest is moot. I guess we can hope Russia can't build many of these weapons, and that may be true. However, I wouldn't count on it.

[TrumpCard]

The headlines in the NYT today report that Ukraine reclaimed territory near Bakhmut this weekend and that the top Ukrainian generals want to stay there. Obviously, that seems contrary to the hypothesis advanced here and most pro-western sources in the media in recent weeks. Contrary-to-conventional-wisdom developments like this continue to lead me to believe that we know extraordinarily little about the details of the war in Ukraine.

[TrumpCard]

The headlines in the NYT today report that Ukraine reclaimed territory near Bakhmut this weekend and that the top Ukrainian generals want to stay there. Obviously, that seems contrary to the hypothesis advanced here and most pro-western sources in the media in recent weeks. Contrary-to-conventional-wisdom developments like this continue to lead me to believe that we know extraordinarily little about the details of the war in Ukraine.

[81alum]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

[81alum]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

[BostonCard]

The headlines in the NYT today report that Ukraine reclaimed territory near Bakhmut this weekend and that the top Ukrainian generals want to stay there. Obviously, that seems contrary to the hypothesis advanced here and most pro-western sources in the media in recent weeks. Contrary-to-conventional-wisdom developments like this continue to lead me to believe that we know extraordinarily little about the details of the war in Ukraine.

Supposedly, Wagner's Boss (Yevgeny Prigozhin) is accusing the Russian military of not providing ammunition.  There's been a bit of a pissing match between Wagner and the Russian military, though that was supposed to have been resolved.  Still, given the comments, you do wonder if this is a bit of an attempt to find a scapegoat if things don't go as planned.



I still think that the most likely outcome is that Ukraine withdraws and Russia captures Bakhmut, but your point about "contrary-to-conventional wisdom developments" is very well taken.


EDIT to add link: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64859780

But Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin says his army's lack of ammunition could be "ordinary bureaucracy or a betrayal".

BC

[BostonCard]

The headlines in the NYT today report that Ukraine reclaimed territory near Bakhmut this weekend and that the top Ukrainian generals want to stay there. Obviously, that seems contrary to the hypothesis advanced here and most pro-western sources in the media in recent weeks. Contrary-to-conventional-wisdom developments like this continue to lead me to believe that we know extraordinarily little about the details of the war in Ukraine.

Supposedly, Wagner's Boss (Yevgeny Prigozhin) is accusing the Russian military of not providing ammunition.  There's been a bit of a pissing match between Wagner and the Russian military, though that was supposed to have been resolved.  Still, given the comments, you do wonder if this is a bit of an attempt to find a scapegoat if things don't go as planned.



I still think that the most likely outcome is that Ukraine withdraws and Russia captures Bakhmut, but your point about "contrary-to-conventional wisdom developments" is very well taken.


EDIT to add link: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64859780

But Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin says his army's lack of ammunition could be "ordinary bureaucracy or a betrayal".

BC

[Goose]

Verdun is an interesting comparison. There are more differences than similarities between Bakhmut and Verdun regarding why the battle was fought. It is clear that the Russians actually do want to take Bakhmut. The Germans OTOH specifically did NOT want to take Verdun. Verdun was chosen for it's symbolic value. It had no real strategic significance. The Germans knew that the French would defend Verdun at all costs and beyond. Verdun also lacked good communications with the rest of the French forces, being supplied by a single road. That road was also in a valley, so the Germans could fire down onto it. The plan was to put enough pressure on the French that they would have to keep feeding forces into the meat grinder, but not so many forces that Germany would suffer anywhere near the same attrition. Unfortunately for the Germans, their Generals simply couldn't help but fight to "win". Even more so the troops. So, while France did loose disproportionately more men, it wasn't nearly as big a delta as originally planed or expected.

I do somewhat fear that Ukraine is playing the role of the Germans here. They didn't plan this battle in Bakhmut. It has no great significance in the history of Ukraine. Russia blundered into a meat grinder and didn't have the sense to stop. Now however, I do worry that Ukraine can't "let go". They may be repeating the German mistake at Verdun of thinking they actually needed to win this battle, when in reality the attrition of Russian forces was the win, not holding a meaningless town.

That is not to say that I think I know better than the guys planning Ukraine's strategy. They may know what they are doing. It is however very easy to want to continue a battle to ensure your "comrades have not died in vain". Hopefully, everybody is still keeping the eye on the "prize". One article I have see makes me wonder a bit. https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-sol...41199.html
The guys on the front lines always have a local, parochial point of view. However, hearing about National Guard troops being committed with no battle experience is a bit concerning. Possibly both Russia and Ukraine are running a training operation as well as ongoing battles, and choices have to be made that aren't optimal.

[Goose]

Verdun is an interesting comparison. There are more differences than similarities between Bakhmut and Verdun regarding why the battle was fought. It is clear that the Russians actually do want to take Bakhmut. The Germans OTOH specifically did NOT want to take Verdun. Verdun was chosen for it's symbolic value. It had no real strategic significance. The Germans knew that the French would defend Verdun at all costs and beyond. Verdun also lacked good communications with the rest of the French forces, being supplied by a single road. That road was also in a valley, so the Germans could fire down onto it. The plan was to put enough pressure on the French that they would have to keep feeding forces into the meat grinder, but not so many forces that Germany would suffer anywhere near the same attrition. Unfortunately for the Germans, their Generals simply couldn't help but fight to "win". Even more so the troops. So, while France did loose disproportionately more men, it wasn't nearly as big a delta as originally planed or expected.

I do somewhat fear that Ukraine is playing the role of the Germans here. They didn't plan this battle in Bakhmut. It has no great significance in the history of Ukraine. Russia blundered into a meat grinder and didn't have the sense to stop. Now however, I do worry that Ukraine can't "let go". They may be repeating the German mistake at Verdun of thinking they actually needed to win this battle, when in reality the attrition of Russian forces was the win, not holding a meaningless town.

That is not to say that I think I know better than the guys planning Ukraine's strategy. They may know what they are doing. It is however very easy to want to continue a battle to ensure your "comrades have not died in vain". Hopefully, everybody is still keeping the eye on the "prize". One article I have see makes me wonder a bit. https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-sol...41199.html
The guys on the front lines always have a local, parochial point of view. However, hearing about National Guard troops being committed with no battle experience is a bit concerning. Possibly both Russia and Ukraine are running a training operation as well as ongoing battles, and choices have to be made that aren't optimal.

[martyup]

Verdun today.  Many of those fallen soldiers are still there.  War is stupid.

[martyup]

Verdun today.  Many of those fallen soldiers are still there.  War is stupid.

[GK3]

Verdun is an interesting comparison. There are more differences than similarities between Bakhmut and Verdun regarding why the battle was fought. It is clear that the Russians actually do want to take Bakhmut. The Germans OTOH specifically did NOT want to take Verdun. Verdun was chosen for it's symbolic value. It had no real strategic significance. The Germans knew that the French would defend Verdun at all costs and beyond. Verdun also lacked good communications with the rest of the French forces, being supplied by a single road. That road was also in a valley, so the Germans could fire down onto it. The plan was to put enough pressure on the French that they would have to keep feeding forces into the meat grinder, but not so many forces that Germany would suffer anywhere near the same attrition. Unfortunately for the Germans, their Generals simply couldn't help but fight to "win". Even more so the troops. So, while France did loose disproportionately more men, it wasn't nearly as big a delta as originally planed or expected.

I do somewhat fear that Ukraine is playing the role of the Germans here. They didn't plan this battle in Bakhmut. It has no great significance in the history of Ukraine. Russia blundered into a meat grinder and didn't have the sense to stop. Now however, I do worry that Ukraine can't "let go". They may be repeating the German mistake at Verdun of thinking they actually needed to win this battle, when in reality the attrition of Russian forces was the win, not holding a meaningless town.

That is not to say that I think I know better than the guys planning Ukraine's strategy. They may know what they are doing. It is however very easy to want to continue a battle to ensure your "comrades have not died in vain". Hopefully, everybody is still keeping the eye on the "prize". One article I have see makes me wonder a bit. https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-sol...41199.html
The guys on the front lines always have a local, parochial point of view. However, hearing about National Guard troops being committed with no battle experience is a bit concerning. Possibly both Russia and Ukraine are running a training operation as well as ongoing battles, and choices have to be made that aren't optimal.

History is full of battles fought only because the Generals could, not because they had to fight the battle.  The US Military has had its shares of such stupidity.  The operations in the A Sau Valley in  Vietnam are a good example such stupidity on our part.

[GK3]

Verdun is an interesting comparison. There are more differences than similarities between Bakhmut and Verdun regarding why the battle was fought. It is clear that the Russians actually do want to take Bakhmut. The Germans OTOH specifically did NOT want to take Verdun. Verdun was chosen for it's symbolic value. It had no real strategic significance. The Germans knew that the French would defend Verdun at all costs and beyond. Verdun also lacked good communications with the rest of the French forces, being supplied by a single road. That road was also in a valley, so the Germans could fire down onto it. The plan was to put enough pressure on the French that they would have to keep feeding forces into the meat grinder, but not so many forces that Germany would suffer anywhere near the same attrition. Unfortunately for the Germans, their Generals simply couldn't help but fight to "win". Even more so the troops. So, while France did loose disproportionately more men, it wasn't nearly as big a delta as originally planed or expected.

I do somewhat fear that Ukraine is playing the role of the Germans here. They didn't plan this battle in Bakhmut. It has no great significance in the history of Ukraine. Russia blundered into a meat grinder and didn't have the sense to stop. Now however, I do worry that Ukraine can't "let go". They may be repeating the German mistake at Verdun of thinking they actually needed to win this battle, when in reality the attrition of Russian forces was the win, not holding a meaningless town.

That is not to say that I think I know better than the guys planning Ukraine's strategy. They may know what they are doing. It is however very easy to want to continue a battle to ensure your "comrades have not died in vain". Hopefully, everybody is still keeping the eye on the "prize". One article I have see makes me wonder a bit. https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-sol...41199.html
The guys on the front lines always have a local, parochial point of view. However, hearing about National Guard troops being committed with no battle experience is a bit concerning. Possibly both Russia and Ukraine are running a training operation as well as ongoing battles, and choices have to be made that aren't optimal.

History is full of battles fought only because the Generals could, not because they had to fight the battle.  The US Military has had its shares of such stupidity.  The operations in the A Sau Valley in  Vietnam are a good example such stupidity on our part.

[gocard14]

CNN reporting 5:1 Russian to Ukrainian losses in Bakhmut. If true (and still ongoing) it would certainly make Ukraine want to keep it going as long as possible. 

https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news...82fb3b6888

If 5/1 is only KIA then I would expect it be a bit worse for casualties as I expect Ukraine has more wounded per KIA then Russia.

[gocard14]

CNN reporting 5:1 Russian to Ukrainian losses in Bakhmut. If true (and still ongoing) it would certainly make Ukraine want to keep it going as long as possible. 

https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news...82fb3b6888

If 5/1 is only KIA then I would expect it be a bit worse for casualties as I expect Ukraine has more wounded per KIA then Russia.

[Goose]

History is full of battles fought only because the Generals could, not because they had to fight the battle.  The US Military has had its shares of such stupidity.  The operations in the A Sau Valley in  Vietnam are a good example such stupidity on our part.

As bad as the A Sầu Valley was, I think the Palau's in WWII was worse. That battle was only fought because nobody had the courage to say what literally everybody was thinking. It was obvious the Japanese troops marooned on those islands had no ability to affect the invasion of the Philippines. Just leave them there.

Verdun was fought for a reason. It almost worked for the Germans, and after Verdun the French army was a brittle instrument. The Palau's had no effect on the Japanese plans or actions, as those troops had already been written off. Then again, there is no limit on stupidity.

[Goose]

History is full of battles fought only because the Generals could, not because they had to fight the battle.  The US Military has had its shares of such stupidity.  The operations in the A Sau Valley in  Vietnam are a good example such stupidity on our part.

As bad as the A Sầu Valley was, I think the Palau's in WWII was worse. That battle was only fought because nobody had the courage to say what literally everybody was thinking. It was obvious the Japanese troops marooned on those islands had no ability to affect the invasion of the Philippines. Just leave them there.

Verdun was fought for a reason. It almost worked for the Germans, and after Verdun the French army was a brittle instrument. The Palau's had no effect on the Japanese plans or actions, as those troops had already been written off. Then again, there is no limit on stupidity.

[Goose]

The US has announced the arrival of JDAM-ERs in Ukraine. So far, it is a limited number sufficient for "only a few" missions. Whether Ukraine has aircraft configured with appropriate adapters at this point is unknown. Ukraine has not announced using these munitions yet, although they may use them and not say so for quite a while. My guess is that this shipment is to allow "proof of concept", with more to follow if/when Ukraine gets things working. The weapons apparently have been in country for about three weeks.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/wi...in-ukraine

The article is worth a read IMO because it confirms the tactics that would be used to maximize survivability of the strike aircraft while still obtaining significant range. If these weapons are actually the 2000 lb class, they can wreck even well built concrete fortifications. Since it is improbable that the munitions are completely integrated into the MIGs electronics (such as they are), it is going to take more skill by the Ukrainians to maximize the weapons performance than would be required of NATO pilots. That said, even minimal operational capability will "go a long way".

[Goose]

The US has announced the arrival of JDAM-ERs in Ukraine. So far, it is a limited number sufficient for "only a few" missions. Whether Ukraine has aircraft configured with appropriate adapters at this point is unknown. Ukraine has not announced using these munitions yet, although they may use them and not say so for quite a while. My guess is that this shipment is to allow "proof of concept", with more to follow if/when Ukraine gets things working. The weapons apparently have been in country for about three weeks.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/wi...in-ukraine

The article is worth a read IMO because it confirms the tactics that would be used to maximize survivability of the strike aircraft while still obtaining significant range. If these weapons are actually the 2000 lb class, they can wreck even well built concrete fortifications. Since it is improbable that the munitions are completely integrated into the MIGs electronics (such as they are), it is going to take more skill by the Ukrainians to maximize the weapons performance than would be required of NATO pilots. That said, even minimal operational capability will "go a long way".

[gocard14]

The US has announced the arrival of JDAM-ERs in Ukraine. So far, it is a limited number sufficient for "only a few" missions. Whether Ukraine has aircraft configured with appropriate adapters at this point is unknown. Ukraine has not announced using these munitions yet, although they may use them and not say so for quite a while. My guess is that this shipment is to allow "proof of concept", with more to follow if/when Ukraine gets things working. The weapons apparently have been in country for about three weeks.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/wi...in-ukraine

The article is worth a read IMO because it confirms the tactics that would be used to maximize survivability of the strike aircraft while still obtaining significant range. If these weapons are actually the 2000 lb class, they can wreck even well built concrete fortifications. Since it is improbable that the munitions are completely integrated into the MIGs electronics (such as they are), it is going to take more skill by the Ukrainians to maximize the weapons performance than would be required of NATO pilots. That said, even minimal operational capability will "go a long way".

Speaking of Jury rigging western weapons onto Migs, apparently AMRAAMs may be next?

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/07...s-00085877

[gocard14]

The US has announced the arrival of JDAM-ERs in Ukraine. So far, it is a limited number sufficient for "only a few" missions. Whether Ukraine has aircraft configured with appropriate adapters at this point is unknown. Ukraine has not announced using these munitions yet, although they may use them and not say so for quite a while. My guess is that this shipment is to allow "proof of concept", with more to follow if/when Ukraine gets things working. The weapons apparently have been in country for about three weeks.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/wi...in-ukraine

The article is worth a read IMO because it confirms the tactics that would be used to maximize survivability of the strike aircraft while still obtaining significant range. If these weapons are actually the 2000 lb class, they can wreck even well built concrete fortifications. Since it is improbable that the munitions are completely integrated into the MIGs electronics (such as they are), it is going to take more skill by the Ukrainians to maximize the weapons performance than would be required of NATO pilots. That said, even minimal operational capability will "go a long way".

Speaking of Jury rigging western weapons onto Migs, apparently AMRAAMs may be next?

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/07...s-00085877

[Goose]

Speaking of Jury rigging western weapons onto Migs, apparently AMRAAMs may be next?


https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/07...s-00085877

I would be amazed if this works. We have to be real here. The HARM has been less than a game changer in Ukraine because they have to be fired either as a pre-planned mission or in "sic em" mode where the HARM acquires it's own target. The Ukrainians can't designate a target from their RWR and tell the missile "kill this threat". This is the best way to defend the aircraft. "sic em" mode might kill something but not what is about to kill the launch aircraft. Probably it won't acquire and will hit nothing. It is also very vulnerable to ECCM in this mode, false targets and the like.

We don't know about JDAMs yet, but for sure the high precision operations require good interface to the aircraft avionics. It is very nice, especially in "pop-up" mode when the airframe can fly the maneuver for you or at least gives you a "green light" to let the bombs go. Yes, you can do all this "by hand" but you have to be real good to make it work at maximum ranges. How that will work  in "real life Ukraine" is TBD.

The AMRAAM is essentially useless if it doesn't have at least an initial steer from the launch platform in terms of where the target is and when to "go active". That is the interface to the radar that the article talks about. Ideally, the AMRAAM also gets "mid course corrections" from the launch platform, which requires a data link. The NASAMS systems of course has all these capabilities. The MIGs of course do not, and something will have to be "jury rigged" to do it. Ukraine never had any R77 missiles (developed after fall of Soviet Union), so their MIGs don't even have that interface that could possibly be employed. An AMRAAM is a BVR missile. It's organic radar has no chance of acquiring a target at long range. It needs to be steered to relatively close range by the launch platform. That doesn't require continuous data updates, but it does require at a bare minimum a good initial "firing solution". I think it might be easier to just train the pilot to fly an F-16 than figuring out how to make this work :-).

[Goose]

Speaking of Jury rigging western weapons onto Migs, apparently AMRAAMs may be next?


https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/07...s-00085877

I would be amazed if this works. We have to be real here. The HARM has been less than a game changer in Ukraine because they have to be fired either as a pre-planned mission or in "sic em" mode where the HARM acquires it's own target. The Ukrainians can't designate a target from their RWR and tell the missile "kill this threat". This is the best way to defend the aircraft. "sic em" mode might kill something but not what is about to kill the launch aircraft. Probably it won't acquire and will hit nothing. It is also very vulnerable to ECCM in this mode, false targets and the like.

We don't know about JDAMs yet, but for sure the high precision operations require good interface to the aircraft avionics. It is very nice, especially in "pop-up" mode when the airframe can fly the maneuver for you or at least gives you a "green light" to let the bombs go. Yes, you can do all this "by hand" but you have to be real good to make it work at maximum ranges. How that will work  in "real life Ukraine" is TBD.

The AMRAAM is essentially useless if it doesn't have at least an initial steer from the launch platform in terms of where the target is and when to "go active". That is the interface to the radar that the article talks about. Ideally, the AMRAAM also gets "mid course corrections" from the launch platform, which requires a data link. The NASAMS systems of course has all these capabilities. The MIGs of course do not, and something will have to be "jury rigged" to do it. Ukraine never had any R77 missiles (developed after fall of Soviet Union), so their MIGs don't even have that interface that could possibly be employed. An AMRAAM is a BVR missile. It's organic radar has no chance of acquiring a target at long range. It needs to be steered to relatively close range by the launch platform. That doesn't require continuous data updates, but it does require at a bare minimum a good initial "firing solution". I think it might be easier to just train the pilot to fly an F-16 than figuring out how to make this work :-).

[TrumpCard]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

Querry whether this is straightforward and clear-eyed, but Zelenskyy's statement today suggests he disagrees with the premise that Bakhmut has little strategic significance: https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ze...tsk-oblast

[TrumpCard]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

Querry whether this is straightforward and clear-eyed, but Zelenskyy's statement today suggests he disagrees with the premise that Bakhmut has little strategic significance: https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ze...tsk-oblast

[Goose]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

Querry whether this is straightforward and clear-eyed, but Zelenskyy's statement today suggests he disagrees with the premise that Bakhmut has little strategic significance: https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ze...tsk-oblast

Quoting from the article cited:

"This is tactical for us… after Bakhmut, they could go further. They could go to Kramatorsk, they could go to Sloviansk," Zelensky said in an interview from Kyiv. "That's why our guys are standing there."

That statement is true as far as it goes. However, the Ukrainians could stand behind Bakhmut and still block the way. Granted, defending from a built-up area is easier than in an open field. It is also true that giving up Bakhmut brings Sloviansk/Kramatorsk notionally within Russian artillery range. However, a few km one way or another isn't going to make that much difference.

We will see what Ukraine does. There is logic to defending as far forward as possible. The question is whether Bakhmut is "possible" any more, and what the alternatives are. Ukraine better have a "Plan B" in case it is not.

[Goose]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

Querry whether this is straightforward and clear-eyed, but Zelenskyy's statement today suggests he disagrees with the premise that Bakhmut has little strategic significance: https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ze...tsk-oblast

Quoting from the article cited:

"This is tactical for us… after Bakhmut, they could go further. They could go to Kramatorsk, they could go to Sloviansk," Zelensky said in an interview from Kyiv. "That's why our guys are standing there."

That statement is true as far as it goes. However, the Ukrainians could stand behind Bakhmut and still block the way. Granted, defending from a built-up area is easier than in an open field. It is also true that giving up Bakhmut brings Sloviansk/Kramatorsk notionally within Russian artillery range. However, a few km one way or another isn't going to make that much difference.

We will see what Ukraine does. There is logic to defending as far forward as possible. The question is whether Bakhmut is "possible" any more, and what the alternatives are. Ukraine better have a "Plan B" in case it is not.

[TrumpCard]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

Querry whether this is straightforward and clear-eyed, but Zelenskyy's statement today suggests he disagrees with the premise that Bakhmut has little strategic significance: https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ze...tsk-oblast

Quoting from the article cited:

"This is tactical for us… after Bakhmut, they could go further. They could go to Kramatorsk, they could go to Sloviansk," Zelensky said in an interview from Kyiv. "That's why our guys are standing there."

That statement is true as far as it goes. However, the Ukrainians could stand behind Bakhmut and still block the way. Granted, defending from a built-up area is easier than in an open field. It is also true that giving up Bakhmut brings Sloviansk/Kramatorsk notionally within Russian artillery range. However, a few km one way or another isn't going to make that much difference.

We will see what Ukraine does. There is logic to defending as far forward as possible. The question is whether Bakhmut is "possible" any more, and what the alternatives are. Ukraine better have a "Plan B" in case it is not.

Anyone know how to read this is a way that doesn't suggest Ukrainian troops in the Bakhmut area are screwed?  It's not just that Ukraine appears to be heavily outnumbered.  It's also that the geo-located positions of Ukrainian troops don't suggest an easy escape route.
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16335...00/photo/1

[TrumpCard]

Perhaps some of our military history buffs here can find the most analogous historical battles to the battle of Bakhmut.  The obvious comparison to Verdun has its limitations--Verdun actually seemed to have been of some strategic value.  But it was at least a battle fought for deliberate attrition, as Bahkmut seems to be.

When in the past have so many lives been spent, seemingly willingly by both sides, on a piece of territory of so little strategic significance?

Querry whether this is straightforward and clear-eyed, but Zelenskyy's statement today suggests he disagrees with the premise that Bakhmut has little strategic significance: https://kyivindependent.com/news-feed/ze...tsk-oblast

Quoting from the article cited:

"This is tactical for us… after Bakhmut, they could go further. They could go to Kramatorsk, they could go to Sloviansk," Zelensky said in an interview from Kyiv. "That's why our guys are standing there."

That statement is true as far as it goes. However, the Ukrainians could stand behind Bakhmut and still block the way. Granted, defending from a built-up area is easier than in an open field. It is also true that giving up Bakhmut brings Sloviansk/Kramatorsk notionally within Russian artillery range. However, a few km one way or another isn't going to make that much difference.

We will see what Ukraine does. There is logic to defending as far forward as possible. The question is whether Bakhmut is "possible" any more, and what the alternatives are. Ukraine better have a "Plan B" in case it is not.

Anyone know how to read this is a way that doesn't suggest Ukrainian troops in the Bakhmut area are screwed?  It's not just that Ukraine appears to be heavily outnumbered.  It's also that the geo-located positions of Ukrainian troops don't suggest an easy escape route.
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16335...00/photo/1

[BostonCard]

There's a river separating Ukraine's positions in the West from Russia's positions in the East and Ukraine has blown up the bridge connecting them, so it will be hard to pursue.  But yeah, the map suggests that the time to evacuate is nigh!

BC

[BostonCard]

There's a river separating Ukraine's positions in the West from Russia's positions in the East and Ukraine has blown up the bridge connecting them, so it will be hard to pursue.  But yeah, the map suggests that the time to evacuate is nigh!

BC

[TrumpCard]

There's a river separating Ukraine's positions in the West from Russia's positions in the East and Ukraine has blown up the bridge connecting them, so it will be hard to pursue.  But yeah, the map suggests that the time to evacuate is nigh!

BC

Sure.  There are a solid 12 blue dots that show troop positions that have plausible ways out of Dodge.  The two solo blue dots farthest to the north, the solo blue dot farthest to the east, and the blue dot farthest to the south look suicidal.  Eight more blue dots to the east of the red dotted line in in the eastern part of the city look to be in major trouble.  Three more blue dots in the northwestern corner also look to have limited escape routes.  

The question in my mind is whether these dots have a strong relationship to the quantity of troops.  If the marooned blue dots are a couple of stray soldiers setting signal fires because they're lost, then my concern is overblown.  But if those blue dots surrounded by red represent significant numbers of troops, then it seems like we're about to see some POWs or some higher casualty rates.

[TrumpCard]

There's a river separating Ukraine's positions in the West from Russia's positions in the East and Ukraine has blown up the bridge connecting them, so it will be hard to pursue.  But yeah, the map suggests that the time to evacuate is nigh!

BC

Sure.  There are a solid 12 blue dots that show troop positions that have plausible ways out of Dodge.  The two solo blue dots farthest to the north, the solo blue dot farthest to the east, and the blue dot farthest to the south look suicidal.  Eight more blue dots to the east of the red dotted line in in the eastern part of the city look to be in major trouble.  Three more blue dots in the northwestern corner also look to have limited escape routes.  

The question in my mind is whether these dots have a strong relationship to the quantity of troops.  If the marooned blue dots are a couple of stray soldiers setting signal fires because they're lost, then my concern is overblown.  But if those blue dots surrounded by red represent significant numbers of troops, then it seems like we're about to see some POWs or some higher casualty rates.

[Goose]

Anyone know how to read this is a way that doesn't suggest Ukrainian troops in the Bakhmut area are screwed?  It's not just that Ukraine appears to be heavily outnumbered.  It's also that the geo-located positions of Ukrainian troops don't suggest an easy escape route.
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16335...00/photo/1

IMO they can get out OK, subject to the fact that retreat is always the most difficult maneuver to execute. They still have one road (just barely), but they have plenty of area where they can just walk out. The basically have no vehicles anyway. Russia OTOH doesn't have any artillery in the two "horns" around Bakhmut, and for that matter Russia is using less artillery than ever in the area. I think casualty rates in Bakhmut are indeed very high, so a withdrawal may actually be less deadly than staying. The present situation is probably still "OK", but it could deteriorate real fast. Hopefully Ukraine has a plan and is not letting their hearts overcome their reason. So far, they have been good at that.

[Goose]

Anyone know how to read this is a way that doesn't suggest Ukrainian troops in the Bakhmut area are screwed?  It's not just that Ukraine appears to be heavily outnumbered.  It's also that the geo-located positions of Ukrainian troops don't suggest an easy escape route.
https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/16335...00/photo/1

IMO they can get out OK, subject to the fact that retreat is always the most difficult maneuver to execute. They still have one road (just barely), but they have plenty of area where they can just walk out. The basically have no vehicles anyway. Russia OTOH doesn't have any artillery in the two "horns" around Bakhmut, and for that matter Russia is using less artillery than ever in the area. I think casualty rates in Bakhmut are indeed very high, so a withdrawal may actually be less deadly than staying. The present situation is probably still "OK", but it could deteriorate real fast. Hopefully Ukraine has a plan and is not letting their hearts overcome their reason. So far, they have been good at that.

[BostonCard]

Remember also that these are geolocated positions.  I think for operational security, Ukraine is actively trying to minimize the number of geolocated positions (in fact, Russian tactics involve sending convicts into the meet grinder to get Ukraine to reveal its positions, which it then hits with artillery) so there are probably a fair number of "invisible" blue dots on that map.  The Russians, on the other hand, are eager to show that they are making progress, and therefore are a lot less careful about hiding their positions.  In fact, Pregozin broadcast a photo of himself in front of a monument in Eastern Bakhmut.  There was no operational benefit for that (I don't think), but it carried an important public relations benefits to himself and Wagner.

BC

[BostonCard]

Remember also that these are geolocated positions.  I think for operational security, Ukraine is actively trying to minimize the number of geolocated positions (in fact, Russian tactics involve sending convicts into the meet grinder to get Ukraine to reveal its positions, which it then hits with artillery) so there are probably a fair number of "invisible" blue dots on that map.  The Russians, on the other hand, are eager to show that they are making progress, and therefore are a lot less careful about hiding their positions.  In fact, Pregozin broadcast a photo of himself in front of a monument in Eastern Bakhmut.  There was no operational benefit for that (I don't think), but it carried an important public relations benefits to himself and Wagner.

BC