[GK3]

Decapitation strike aimed at Russian southern command...the amount of intelligence gathering that went into confirming a meeting of senior staff must have been intense.  (I assume Russian staff officers figured out pretty quickly after Year One that Ukraine liked to pick off generals.)  Well done.

We will never know for sure, but I wouldn't be surprised if there aren't a lot of networks of spies in Crimea.  A lot of military forces in that area were originally Ukrainian, then many were pressured into witching sides back in 2014.  While I'm sure most of them are true traitors, I'm guessing Ukraine has communication networks with many in that area.  It was somewhat rumored that someone leaked this information due to not being paid, but that seems like more of a convenient lie.  Hopefully we know more soon, as to how many high level officers were killed, but I personally hope some of those former Ukrainian admiral turncoats were among the rubble...

I think you can bet your house on that, but you may have a hard time proving it.  Same languages, same clothes, high degree of familiarity with the region and I am sure they have their hands on the local documents now in use and have had their forgers busy. A dangerous occupation but one that I believe is paying big benefits.

---

 If there's a case for significant strategic benefit within a reasonable timeframe, someone in the Pentagon is probably working on it.

I wish I shared your optimism. The Pentagon hasn't exactly exerted much leadership in what should be done. Political considerations may play a role in that, but also it isn't something that we really have a history of doing. What department is supposed to do this?

I think you are right once again.  If the military is working on something like this without civilian overhead approval, it is a VERY black project, most likely being done far from the Pentagon.  If they were doing it with Whitehouse OK it would leak out since no one at the Whitehouse can keep a secret IMHO.

[GK3]

Decapitation strike aimed at Russian southern command...the amount of intelligence gathering that went into confirming a meeting of senior staff must have been intense.  (I assume Russian staff officers figured out pretty quickly after Year One that Ukraine liked to pick off generals.)  Well done.

We will never know for sure, but I wouldn't be surprised if there aren't a lot of networks of spies in Crimea.  A lot of military forces in that area were originally Ukrainian, then many were pressured into witching sides back in 2014.  While I'm sure most of them are true traitors, I'm guessing Ukraine has communication networks with many in that area.  It was somewhat rumored that someone leaked this information due to not being paid, but that seems like more of a convenient lie.  Hopefully we know more soon, as to how many high level officers were killed, but I personally hope some of those former Ukrainian admiral turncoats were among the rubble...

I think you can bet your house on that, but you may have a hard time proving it.  Same languages, same clothes, high degree of familiarity with the region and I am sure they have their hands on the local documents now in use and have had their forgers busy. A dangerous occupation but one that I believe is paying big benefits.

---

 If there's a case for significant strategic benefit within a reasonable timeframe, someone in the Pentagon is probably working on it.

I wish I shared your optimism. The Pentagon hasn't exactly exerted much leadership in what should be done. Political considerations may play a role in that, but also it isn't something that we really have a history of doing. What department is supposed to do this?

I think you are right once again.  If the military is working on something like this without civilian overhead approval, it is a VERY black project, most likely being done far from the Pentagon.  If they were doing it with Whitehouse OK it would leak out since no one at the Whitehouse can keep a secret IMHO.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/erdogan-turke...27283.html

Let's hope this is a "real" commitment by Erdoğan. We are already much later than originally expected. I also fear that once they get the F-16s, something else will come up. Hungary now probably remains a problem, which was not originally expected. Unclear what can be done to "fix" that issue.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/erdogan-turke...27283.html

Let's hope this is a "real" commitment by Erdoğan. We are already much later than originally expected. I also fear that once they get the F-16s, something else will come up. Hungary now probably remains a problem, which was not originally expected. Unclear what can be done to "fix" that issue.

[fullmetal]

I feel like a notional analysis of every potential asset transfer to Ukraine wouldn't be out of line, and such an analysis might include the Cobra. 

Reports of Sokolov surviving the Black Sea Fleet HQ strike are surfacing, but I wouldn't put it past Russia to release old footage or deepfaked footage to keep up appearances.

[fullmetal]

I feel like a notional analysis of every potential asset transfer to Ukraine wouldn't be out of line, and such an analysis might include the Cobra. 

Reports of Sokolov surviving the Black Sea Fleet HQ strike are surfacing, but I wouldn't put it past Russia to release old footage or deepfaked footage to keep up appearances.

[dabigv13]

Interesting and well argued article on attrition versus maneuver, with a nice peppering of historical analogues to consider.

The author-

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He previously served at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center

.

Sounds like he thinks the US has more to learn from Ukraine than vice versa.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting...l-context/

Today, at a much larger scale, the Ukrainian military is facing an enemy that impedes maneuver. As a result, the Ukrainian army is pursuing an attritional approach appropriate for the context of its fight. U.S. government sources, speaking anonymously to the media, have not appreciated the importance of Ukraine’s current situation. They have criticized the Ukrainian army for not conducting “combined arms maneuver.” One narrative is that some form of American training, with a bit more synchronization and air support, would cut through the minefields and drive the Russian military from their trenches.

Outsiders watching the conflict should have humility, especially when pushing U.S.-led training in combined arms maneuver as a panacea to any military problem. Context matters in war, and the U.S. military does not train to prevail in the context that Ukraine faces.
.....
The U.S. Army does not train for this type of attritional fight. Any commentator who thinks that Ukraine is failing due to insufficient training from the West in “combined arms maneuver” should observe an American brigade training rotation at a combat training center. Any of the failings found in Ukraine’s attack — such as the timing of a suppressive artillery barrage or vehicles not identifying a cleared lane through a minefield — I have personally observed with nearly every brigade training at the 30 rotations I have participated in at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center. While the combat training centers provide these brigades with superb training, they are not replicating the problem set experienced by the Ukrainian army (nor should they; they should replicate the context in which the U.S. military expects to fight).

The last time the U.S. Army exercised a division with all its subordinate elements in a force-on-force exercise was during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the last few years, U.S. Army Forces Command’s training guidance has prioritized training at the company level and below. The rare time when U.S. Army brigades train as a whole unit is when they deploy to a combat training center, which occurs approximately once every 18 months. At these training events, brigades face a reinforced battalion of opposing forces that are only notionally a part of a larger scenario. During training, opposing forces are not tied into a continuous defense in depth. They are thinly spread and provide attacking forces opportunities for enveloping or bypassing them. Opposing forces do not employ mines anywhere near the density faced by the Ukrainian military, they do not mass artillery with decisive effects (it is unproductive to wipe out a battalion after a few minutes of training an attack when it spent millions to come to the training), and they do not employ operational-level reserves for counterattacks.

Meanwhile, when working with the Army, the U.S. Air Force focuses on the corps-level deep fight against high-payoff targets. Some commentators think that American airpower would clear enemies from their trenches, but the Air Force has moved away from close air support and is not employed for such tasks during the Army’s simulated warfighter exercises. Furthermore, the Army is centralizing artillery in divisions to concentrate on the deep fight, so it is unclear how the United States would provide massed, sustained, and responsive fires during an attack on a large-scale trench system to achieve a breakthrough.
...
A further critique has been that “Ukraine hasn’t been able to master combined arms warfare at scale.” Instead of attempting a single, massed breakthrough, they are attacking along three axes in dispersed attacks. Soviet interwar theorists, such as Aleksandr Svechin and Vladimir Triandafillov, examined the difficulty of overcoming a continuous defense in depth. They recognized the value of multiple axes of attack to prevent an enemy from massing their operational reserves on a single breakthrough. They highlighted the Brusilov offensive in 1916 as an example of a broad front offensive with multiple breakthroughs that overwhelmed the Austro-Hungarian reserves. Ukraine is attempting a similar approach, which is even more appropriate given the contemporary threat of Russian unmanned aerial systems providing observation for concentrated artillery fires on any massing of Ukrainian forces.

....
The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

[dabigv13]

Interesting and well argued article on attrition versus maneuver, with a nice peppering of historical analogues to consider.

The author-

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He previously served at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center

.

Sounds like he thinks the US has more to learn from Ukraine than vice versa.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting...l-context/

Today, at a much larger scale, the Ukrainian military is facing an enemy that impedes maneuver. As a result, the Ukrainian army is pursuing an attritional approach appropriate for the context of its fight. U.S. government sources, speaking anonymously to the media, have not appreciated the importance of Ukraine’s current situation. They have criticized the Ukrainian army for not conducting “combined arms maneuver.” One narrative is that some form of American training, with a bit more synchronization and air support, would cut through the minefields and drive the Russian military from their trenches.

Outsiders watching the conflict should have humility, especially when pushing U.S.-led training in combined arms maneuver as a panacea to any military problem. Context matters in war, and the U.S. military does not train to prevail in the context that Ukraine faces.
.....
The U.S. Army does not train for this type of attritional fight. Any commentator who thinks that Ukraine is failing due to insufficient training from the West in “combined arms maneuver” should observe an American brigade training rotation at a combat training center. Any of the failings found in Ukraine’s attack — such as the timing of a suppressive artillery barrage or vehicles not identifying a cleared lane through a minefield — I have personally observed with nearly every brigade training at the 30 rotations I have participated in at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center. While the combat training centers provide these brigades with superb training, they are not replicating the problem set experienced by the Ukrainian army (nor should they; they should replicate the context in which the U.S. military expects to fight).

The last time the U.S. Army exercised a division with all its subordinate elements in a force-on-force exercise was during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. During the last few years, U.S. Army Forces Command’s training guidance has prioritized training at the company level and below. The rare time when U.S. Army brigades train as a whole unit is when they deploy to a combat training center, which occurs approximately once every 18 months. At these training events, brigades face a reinforced battalion of opposing forces that are only notionally a part of a larger scenario. During training, opposing forces are not tied into a continuous defense in depth. They are thinly spread and provide attacking forces opportunities for enveloping or bypassing them. Opposing forces do not employ mines anywhere near the density faced by the Ukrainian military, they do not mass artillery with decisive effects (it is unproductive to wipe out a battalion after a few minutes of training an attack when it spent millions to come to the training), and they do not employ operational-level reserves for counterattacks.

Meanwhile, when working with the Army, the U.S. Air Force focuses on the corps-level deep fight against high-payoff targets. Some commentators think that American airpower would clear enemies from their trenches, but the Air Force has moved away from close air support and is not employed for such tasks during the Army’s simulated warfighter exercises. Furthermore, the Army is centralizing artillery in divisions to concentrate on the deep fight, so it is unclear how the United States would provide massed, sustained, and responsive fires during an attack on a large-scale trench system to achieve a breakthrough.
...
A further critique has been that “Ukraine hasn’t been able to master combined arms warfare at scale.” Instead of attempting a single, massed breakthrough, they are attacking along three axes in dispersed attacks. Soviet interwar theorists, such as Aleksandr Svechin and Vladimir Triandafillov, examined the difficulty of overcoming a continuous defense in depth. They recognized the value of multiple axes of attack to prevent an enemy from massing their operational reserves on a single breakthrough. They highlighted the Brusilov offensive in 1916 as an example of a broad front offensive with multiple breakthroughs that overwhelmed the Austro-Hungarian reserves. Ukraine is attempting a similar approach, which is even more appropriate given the contemporary threat of Russian unmanned aerial systems providing observation for concentrated artillery fires on any massing of Ukrainian forces.

....
The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

[Goose]

Interesting and well argued article on attrition versus maneuver, with a nice peppering of historical analogues to consider.

The author-

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He previously served at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center

.

Sounds like he thinks the US has more to learn from Ukraine than vice versa.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting...l-context/

A further critique has been that “Ukraine hasn’t been able to master combined arms warfare at scale.” Instead of attempting a single, massed breakthrough, they are attacking along three axes in dispersed attacks. Soviet interwar theorists, such as Aleksandr Svechin and Vladimir Triandafillov, examined the difficulty of overcoming a continuous defense in depth. They recognized the value of multiple axes of attack to prevent an enemy from massing their operational reserves on a single breakthrough. They highlighted the Brusilov offensive in 1916 as an example of a broad front offensive with multiple breakthroughs that overwhelmed the Austro-Hungarian reserves. Ukraine is attempting a similar approach, which is even more appropriate given the contemporary threat of Russian unmanned aerial systems providing observation for concentrated artillery fires on any massing of Ukrainian forces.

There are indeed interesting parallels to the Brusilov offensive to the war in Ukraine. The Austro-Hungarian suffered from the inability to move quickly, ever. Their troops had poor morale, and their leadership was terrible. The majority of the Austrian troops were actually Slavs. These are all characteristics of the current Russian army as well. Many of their troops are not ethnic Russians. We have seen their leadership and maneuver failures.

However, IMO there are more differences than similarities. The Russians greatly benefited from the fact the Austrians did not believe there was any way the Russian army could generate enough combat power to attack. The Russians had just suffered a crushing defeat. The Austrians therefore did not construct massive field fortifications and sow mines densely in front of it. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. It also must be remembered that both sides suffered massive casualties, over a million men in both armies. Austria suffered more, but neither army could sustain those losses. On top of that, Romania declared war against the Central Powers near the end of the Russian offensive. However, in the end, the Russians could not get through the Carpathians. They ran into German troops (including one Oberleutnant Irwin Rommel) that that was the end of the advance.  In the end, Russia had to leave the war.

The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

I totally agree the US should not, in fact must not, tell the Ukrainians how they should fight. I do think a collegial consultation is appropriate, and indeed the US Army may learn more from that than the Ukraine does! The deficiencies of the US army and it's ability to fight a near-peer competitor who is fighting a defensive battle are unquestionable. The US Army has assumed it will be fighting an aggressor that is attacking, not an enemy that is dug in and intends to hold. In the latter case, the theory is to isolate the defenses from supply via "deep strike". Ukraine lacks sufficient "deep strike" capability to even imagine trying this approach.

I do not believe Ukraine is in any way adopting a strategy of exhaustion or attrition. The fact must be faced that there are more Russians than Ukrainians, and that the Russian economy, while damaged by sanctions, is in much, much better shape than the Ukrainian economy. Given that Russia is a dictatorship, even civil disaffection will not necessarily end the war. It is always a bad idea to target the enemy will as a strategy for victory. The exhaustion strategy involves making it impossible for the enemy to continue, not unwilling to continue. Ukraine knows all this.

Ukraine's strategy is clear. They intend to cut the land bridge, destroy the Kerch bridge, isolate and take back Crimea. In the meantime, they will continue to fight in the Donbas to force Russia to commit significant resources to that area. Ukraine believes, apparently, that if they accomplish these goals, Russia cannot continue to fight. The Sea of Azov will be closed to Russia, inflicting another serious economic blow. No shipping out of Rostov-on-Don. The entire Ukrainian coast will be free of Russian naval threats, allow expansion of the existing grain corridor. Ukraine can start making serious threats to the port Novorossiysk (mines, drones, etc). There are reasons to believe that Russia would have to give up at that point. For them, there would be no good way ahead. Taking all of Ukraine by attacking through the Donbas is a very, very heavy lift.

Ukraine isn't attempting to exhaust Russia, they are attempting to defeat Russia, and so far they have shown a dedication and skill that just might do that.

[Goose]

Interesting and well argued article on attrition versus maneuver, with a nice peppering of historical analogues to consider.

The author-

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He previously served at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center

.

Sounds like he thinks the US has more to learn from Ukraine than vice versa.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting...l-context/

A further critique has been that “Ukraine hasn’t been able to master combined arms warfare at scale.” Instead of attempting a single, massed breakthrough, they are attacking along three axes in dispersed attacks. Soviet interwar theorists, such as Aleksandr Svechin and Vladimir Triandafillov, examined the difficulty of overcoming a continuous defense in depth. They recognized the value of multiple axes of attack to prevent an enemy from massing their operational reserves on a single breakthrough. They highlighted the Brusilov offensive in 1916 as an example of a broad front offensive with multiple breakthroughs that overwhelmed the Austro-Hungarian reserves. Ukraine is attempting a similar approach, which is even more appropriate given the contemporary threat of Russian unmanned aerial systems providing observation for concentrated artillery fires on any massing of Ukrainian forces.

There are indeed interesting parallels to the Brusilov offensive to the war in Ukraine. The Austro-Hungarian suffered from the inability to move quickly, ever. Their troops had poor morale, and their leadership was terrible. The majority of the Austrian troops were actually Slavs. These are all characteristics of the current Russian army as well. Many of their troops are not ethnic Russians. We have seen their leadership and maneuver failures.

However, IMO there are more differences than similarities. The Russians greatly benefited from the fact the Austrians did not believe there was any way the Russian army could generate enough combat power to attack. The Russians had just suffered a crushing defeat. The Austrians therefore did not construct massive field fortifications and sow mines densely in front of it. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. It also must be remembered that both sides suffered massive casualties, over a million men in both armies. Austria suffered more, but neither army could sustain those losses. On top of that, Romania declared war against the Central Powers near the end of the Russian offensive. However, in the end, the Russians could not get through the Carpathians. They ran into German troops (including one Oberleutnant Irwin Rommel) that that was the end of the advance.  In the end, Russia had to leave the war.

The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

I totally agree the US should not, in fact must not, tell the Ukrainians how they should fight. I do think a collegial consultation is appropriate, and indeed the US Army may learn more from that than the Ukraine does! The deficiencies of the US army and it's ability to fight a near-peer competitor who is fighting a defensive battle are unquestionable. The US Army has assumed it will be fighting an aggressor that is attacking, not an enemy that is dug in and intends to hold. In the latter case, the theory is to isolate the defenses from supply via "deep strike". Ukraine lacks sufficient "deep strike" capability to even imagine trying this approach.

I do not believe Ukraine is in any way adopting a strategy of exhaustion or attrition. The fact must be faced that there are more Russians than Ukrainians, and that the Russian economy, while damaged by sanctions, is in much, much better shape than the Ukrainian economy. Given that Russia is a dictatorship, even civil disaffection will not necessarily end the war. It is always a bad idea to target the enemy will as a strategy for victory. The exhaustion strategy involves making it impossible for the enemy to continue, not unwilling to continue. Ukraine knows all this.

Ukraine's strategy is clear. They intend to cut the land bridge, destroy the Kerch bridge, isolate and take back Crimea. In the meantime, they will continue to fight in the Donbas to force Russia to commit significant resources to that area. Ukraine believes, apparently, that if they accomplish these goals, Russia cannot continue to fight. The Sea of Azov will be closed to Russia, inflicting another serious economic blow. No shipping out of Rostov-on-Don. The entire Ukrainian coast will be free of Russian naval threats, allow expansion of the existing grain corridor. Ukraine can start making serious threats to the port Novorossiysk (mines, drones, etc). There are reasons to believe that Russia would have to give up at that point. For them, there would be no good way ahead. Taking all of Ukraine by attacking through the Donbas is a very, very heavy lift.

Ukraine isn't attempting to exhaust Russia, they are attempting to defeat Russia, and so far they have shown a dedication and skill that just might do that.

[dabigv13]

I've said similar before, but the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and the US pulled out of Vietnam, even though they were much larger countries with much bigger economies. This was the result of exhaustion.

Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Crimea, what is to stop Putin from continuing to prosecute the war? He would still have the same advantages as a much larger country that you pointed out. If Ukraine retakes Crimea but Russia is unable to counter, or obtain or manufacture enough weaponry or draft enough soldiers to change the situation on the battlefield, I think this would be considered by the author to be a victory by exhaustion for Ukraine, not a victory through tactical or strategic acumen in the deployment of combined arms maneuver, so I'm not sure there is much tension in what the author is proposing and the hopeful end state in your post.

Ultimately the West must be prepared for this to be a long war and that it will end when one side is exhausted, not when Ukraine achieves some combination of the right advanced weapons systems and the right tactics to use them in some sort of rapid breakthrough or encirclement. This was the takeaway for me from the article and I think it's correct.

[dabigv13]

I've said similar before, but the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and the US pulled out of Vietnam, even though they were much larger countries with much bigger economies. This was the result of exhaustion.

Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Crimea, what is to stop Putin from continuing to prosecute the war? He would still have the same advantages as a much larger country that you pointed out. If Ukraine retakes Crimea but Russia is unable to counter, or obtain or manufacture enough weaponry or draft enough soldiers to change the situation on the battlefield, I think this would be considered by the author to be a victory by exhaustion for Ukraine, not a victory through tactical or strategic acumen in the deployment of combined arms maneuver, so I'm not sure there is much tension in what the author is proposing and the hopeful end state in your post.

Ultimately the West must be prepared for this to be a long war and that it will end when one side is exhausted, not when Ukraine achieves some combination of the right advanced weapons systems and the right tactics to use them in some sort of rapid breakthrough or encirclement. This was the takeaway for me from the article and I think it's correct.

[Goose]

I've said similar before, but the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and the US pulled out of Vietnam, even though they were much larger countries with much bigger economies. This was the result of exhaustion.

IMO it was by no means exhaustion. Russia could have, for certain, continued to fight in Afghanistan. They left because they realized that to "win" would require occupying the country with an iron fist indefinitely. It wasn't worth it.

The US left Vietnam not because we could no longer fight there but because it was politically untenable to do so. To "win" was just too heavy a lift at that point.

Exhaustion is when you simply can't fight any more, even if you want to. That was Germany's state at the end of WW I. In the past, many European wars ended not because one side couldn't continue but rather because they decided it wasn't worth it. The risk/reward ratio wasn't favorable. This state is obviously easier to achieve, because you don't have to totally destroy your opponent's ability to make war. The problem is that the other side may be real slow to recognize it isn't worth it. Switzerland for hundreds of years, and even today relies on the fact they can make it so expensive to defeat it just isn't worth it. Unfortunately for them, Napoleon didn't get the memo.

Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Crimea, what is to stop Putin from continuing to prosecute the war? He would still have the same advantages as a much larger country that you pointed out. If Ukraine retakes Crimea but Russia is unable to counter, or obtain or manufacture enough weaponry or draft enough soldiers to change the situation on the battlefield, I think this would be considered by the author to be a victory by exhaustion for Ukraine, not a victory through tactical or strategic acumen in the deployment of combined arms maneuver, so I'm not sure there is much tension in what the author is proposing and the hopeful end state in your post.

I guess the place I differ with this conclusion is that it really makes little difference whether Ukraine accomplishes the strategic objectives of breaking the land bridge and taking back Crimea via a coup de main through tactical acumen or a methodical, set piece battle. Obviously, Ukraine prefers the latter, and for good reason given their ORBAT.  As you correctly point out, even if Ukraine accomplishes these goals, Russia is not "exhausted". 

They can keep fighting, just as they could have in Afghanistan. However, they will have suffered several serious losses and will have to fight at a tactical disadvantage. Ukraine won't have to defend their entire land mass because Russia does not have and cannot create an amphibious landing threat. Ukraine can concentrate their forces in the north east, the Donbas. This much smaller line of contact equalizes the numbers game. Russia may have more troops but the front is only so wide. I think it is pretty clear that Ukraine can never force Russia to stop fighting. Russia can be driven totally out of Ukraine and keep lobbing Iranian drones into Ukraine essentially forever. They can't win that way, but they can still be a serious "problem".  Ukraine can't exhaust Russia, but hopefully they can create a Swiss situation where continuing the fight is recognized in Russia as counter-productive. You do hit upon the real crux of the issue. What happens if Russia continues to behave irrationally even in the face of these significant reverses?

Why this isn't "exhaustion" is that it requires the Russians to act rationally and quit an unwinnable war. At the end of WW I Germany had every intention of fighting on, even though they obviously couldn't win. What ended the war is that they simply couldn't continue. The population was starving, they were out of nitrates for explosives and their industry couldn't function because they had no workers. It wasn't a matter of them being "rational".

Ultimately the West must be prepared for this to be a long war and that it will end when one side is exhausted, not when Ukraine achieves some combination of the right advanced weapons systems and the right tactics to use them in some sort of rapid breakthrough or encirclement. This was the takeaway for me from the article and I think it's correct.

I do agree that the West must be prepared for this to be a long war. However, I think we have a difference in definition of "exhausted". One side or the other can cease hostilities not because they are incapable of continuing but rather because it becomes clear it isn't worth it. Exhaustion is when one side simply can no longer fight because they lack the resources to do so. IMO if one side can become "exhausted" in this war, it is Ukraine, not Russia. They may not lose the will to fight but their economic and infrastructure situation can become so degraded they simply can't continue. That isn't going to happen to Russia. We have to hope for Russia to make a rational decision that this war just isn't worth it, and anything Ukraine does to make it harder for Russia increases the probability of that. If Ukraine doesn't expect to dictate terms  in Red Square (and they don't), that is how this will end.

[Goose]

I've said similar before, but the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and the US pulled out of Vietnam, even though they were much larger countries with much bigger economies. This was the result of exhaustion.

IMO it was by no means exhaustion. Russia could have, for certain, continued to fight in Afghanistan. They left because they realized that to "win" would require occupying the country with an iron fist indefinitely. It wasn't worth it.

The US left Vietnam not because we could no longer fight there but because it was politically untenable to do so. To "win" was just too heavy a lift at that point.

Exhaustion is when you simply can't fight any more, even if you want to. That was Germany's state at the end of WW I. In the past, many European wars ended not because one side couldn't continue but rather because they decided it wasn't worth it. The risk/reward ratio wasn't favorable. This state is obviously easier to achieve, because you don't have to totally destroy your opponent's ability to make war. The problem is that the other side may be real slow to recognize it isn't worth it. Switzerland for hundreds of years, and even today relies on the fact they can make it so expensive to defeat it just isn't worth it. Unfortunately for them, Napoleon didn't get the memo.

Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Crimea, what is to stop Putin from continuing to prosecute the war? He would still have the same advantages as a much larger country that you pointed out. If Ukraine retakes Crimea but Russia is unable to counter, or obtain or manufacture enough weaponry or draft enough soldiers to change the situation on the battlefield, I think this would be considered by the author to be a victory by exhaustion for Ukraine, not a victory through tactical or strategic acumen in the deployment of combined arms maneuver, so I'm not sure there is much tension in what the author is proposing and the hopeful end state in your post.

I guess the place I differ with this conclusion is that it really makes little difference whether Ukraine accomplishes the strategic objectives of breaking the land bridge and taking back Crimea via a coup de main through tactical acumen or a methodical, set piece battle. Obviously, Ukraine prefers the latter, and for good reason given their ORBAT.  As you correctly point out, even if Ukraine accomplishes these goals, Russia is not "exhausted". 

They can keep fighting, just as they could have in Afghanistan. However, they will have suffered several serious losses and will have to fight at a tactical disadvantage. Ukraine won't have to defend their entire land mass because Russia does not have and cannot create an amphibious landing threat. Ukraine can concentrate their forces in the north east, the Donbas. This much smaller line of contact equalizes the numbers game. Russia may have more troops but the front is only so wide. I think it is pretty clear that Ukraine can never force Russia to stop fighting. Russia can be driven totally out of Ukraine and keep lobbing Iranian drones into Ukraine essentially forever. They can't win that way, but they can still be a serious "problem".  Ukraine can't exhaust Russia, but hopefully they can create a Swiss situation where continuing the fight is recognized in Russia as counter-productive. You do hit upon the real crux of the issue. What happens if Russia continues to behave irrationally even in the face of these significant reverses?

Why this isn't "exhaustion" is that it requires the Russians to act rationally and quit an unwinnable war. At the end of WW I Germany had every intention of fighting on, even though they obviously couldn't win. What ended the war is that they simply couldn't continue. The population was starving, they were out of nitrates for explosives and their industry couldn't function because they had no workers. It wasn't a matter of them being "rational".

Ultimately the West must be prepared for this to be a long war and that it will end when one side is exhausted, not when Ukraine achieves some combination of the right advanced weapons systems and the right tactics to use them in some sort of rapid breakthrough or encirclement. This was the takeaway for me from the article and I think it's correct.

I do agree that the West must be prepared for this to be a long war. However, I think we have a difference in definition of "exhausted". One side or the other can cease hostilities not because they are incapable of continuing but rather because it becomes clear it isn't worth it. Exhaustion is when one side simply can no longer fight because they lack the resources to do so. IMO if one side can become "exhausted" in this war, it is Ukraine, not Russia. They may not lose the will to fight but their economic and infrastructure situation can become so degraded they simply can't continue. That isn't going to happen to Russia. We have to hope for Russia to make a rational decision that this war just isn't worth it, and anything Ukraine does to make it harder for Russia increases the probability of that. If Ukraine doesn't expect to dictate terms  in Red Square (and they don't), that is how this will end.

[GK3]

I've said similar before, but the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and the US pulled out of Vietnam, even though they were much larger countries with much bigger economies. This was the result of exhaustion.

IMO it was by no means exhaustion. Russia could have, for certain, continued to fight in Afghanistan. They left because they realized that to "win" would require occupying the country with an iron fist indefinitely. It wasn't worth it.

The US left Vietnam not because we could no longer fight there but because it was politically untenable to do so. To "win" was just too heavy a lift at that point.

Exhaustion is when you simply can't fight any more, even if you want to. That was Germany's state at the end of WW I. In the past, many European wars ended not because one side couldn't continue but rather because they decided it wasn't worth it. The risk/reward ratio wasn't favorable. This state is obviously easier to achieve, because you don't have to totally destroy your opponent's ability to make war. The problem is that the other side may be real slow to recognize it isn't worth it. Switzerland for hundreds of years, and even today relies on the fact they can make it so expensive to defeat it just isn't worth it. Unfortunately for them, Napoleon didn't get the memo.

Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Crimea, what is to stop Putin from continuing to prosecute the war? He would still have the same advantages as a much larger country that you pointed out. If Ukraine retakes Crimea but Russia is unable to counter, or obtain or manufacture enough weaponry or draft enough soldiers to change the situation on the battlefield, I think this would be considered by the author to be a victory by exhaustion for Ukraine, not a victory through tactical or strategic acumen in the deployment of combined arms maneuver, so I'm not sure there is much tension in what the author is proposing and the hopeful end state in your post.

I guess the place I differ with this conclusion is that it really makes little difference whether Ukraine accomplishes the strategic objectives of breaking the land bridge and taking back Crimea via a coup de main through tactical acumen or a methodical, set piece battle. Obviously, Ukraine prefers the latter, and for good reason given their ORBAT.  As you correctly point out, even if Ukraine accomplishes these goals, Russia is not "exhausted". 

They can keep fighting, just as they could have in Afghanistan. However, they will have suffered several serious losses and will have to fight at a tactical disadvantage. Ukraine won't have to defend their entire land mass because Russia does not have and cannot create an amphibious landing threat. Ukraine can concentrate their forces in the north east, the Donbas. This much smaller line of contact equalizes the numbers game. Russia may have more troops but the front is only so wide. I think it is pretty clear that Ukraine can never force Russia to stop fighting. Russia can be driven totally out of Ukraine and keep lobbing Iranian drones into Ukraine essentially forever. They can't win that way, but they can still be a serious "problem".  Ukraine can't exhaust Russia, but hopefully they can create a Swiss situation where continuing the fight is recognized in Russia as counter-productive. You do hit upon the real crux of the issue. What happens if Russia continues to behave irrationally even in the face of these significant reverses?

Why this isn't "exhaustion" is that it requires the Russians to act rationally and quit an unwinnable war. At the end of WW I Germany had every intention of fighting on, even though they obviously couldn't win. What ended the war is that they simply couldn't continue. The population was starving, they were out of nitrates for explosives and their industry couldn't function because they had no workers. It wasn't a matter of them being "rational".

Ultimately the West must be prepared for this to be a long war and that it will end when one side is exhausted, not when Ukraine achieves some combination of the right advanced weapons systems and the right tactics to use them in some sort of rapid breakthrough or encirclement. This was the takeaway for me from the article and I think it's correct.

I do agree that the West must be prepared for this to be a long war. However, I think we have a difference in definition of "exhausted". One side or the other can cease hostilities not because they are incapable of continuing but rather because it becomes clear it isn't worth it. Exhaustion is when one side simply can no longer fight because they lack the resources to do so. IMO if one side can become "exhausted" in this war, it is Ukraine, not Russia. They may not lose the will to fight but their economic and infrastructure situation can become so degraded they simply can't continue. That isn't going to happen to Russia. We have to hope for Russia to make a rational decision that this war just isn't worth it, and anything Ukraine does to make it harder for Russia increases the probability of that. If Ukraine doesn't expect to dictate terms  in Red Square (and they don't), that is how this will end.

Question, Putin is not a young man.  The big question remains what happens if Putin dies or is kicked out. Is the Ukraine so important that Russia continues the war continues?  Do the other power brokers in the Kremlin think that continuing the war make sense?

[GK3]

I've said similar before, but the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan and the US pulled out of Vietnam, even though they were much larger countries with much bigger economies. This was the result of exhaustion.

IMO it was by no means exhaustion. Russia could have, for certain, continued to fight in Afghanistan. They left because they realized that to "win" would require occupying the country with an iron fist indefinitely. It wasn't worth it.

The US left Vietnam not because we could no longer fight there but because it was politically untenable to do so. To "win" was just too heavy a lift at that point.

Exhaustion is when you simply can't fight any more, even if you want to. That was Germany's state at the end of WW I. In the past, many European wars ended not because one side couldn't continue but rather because they decided it wasn't worth it. The risk/reward ratio wasn't favorable. This state is obviously easier to achieve, because you don't have to totally destroy your opponent's ability to make war. The problem is that the other side may be real slow to recognize it isn't worth it. Switzerland for hundreds of years, and even today relies on the fact they can make it so expensive to defeat it just isn't worth it. Unfortunately for them, Napoleon didn't get the memo.

Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking Crimea, what is to stop Putin from continuing to prosecute the war? He would still have the same advantages as a much larger country that you pointed out. If Ukraine retakes Crimea but Russia is unable to counter, or obtain or manufacture enough weaponry or draft enough soldiers to change the situation on the battlefield, I think this would be considered by the author to be a victory by exhaustion for Ukraine, not a victory through tactical or strategic acumen in the deployment of combined arms maneuver, so I'm not sure there is much tension in what the author is proposing and the hopeful end state in your post.

I guess the place I differ with this conclusion is that it really makes little difference whether Ukraine accomplishes the strategic objectives of breaking the land bridge and taking back Crimea via a coup de main through tactical acumen or a methodical, set piece battle. Obviously, Ukraine prefers the latter, and for good reason given their ORBAT.  As you correctly point out, even if Ukraine accomplishes these goals, Russia is not "exhausted". 

They can keep fighting, just as they could have in Afghanistan. However, they will have suffered several serious losses and will have to fight at a tactical disadvantage. Ukraine won't have to defend their entire land mass because Russia does not have and cannot create an amphibious landing threat. Ukraine can concentrate their forces in the north east, the Donbas. This much smaller line of contact equalizes the numbers game. Russia may have more troops but the front is only so wide. I think it is pretty clear that Ukraine can never force Russia to stop fighting. Russia can be driven totally out of Ukraine and keep lobbing Iranian drones into Ukraine essentially forever. They can't win that way, but they can still be a serious "problem".  Ukraine can't exhaust Russia, but hopefully they can create a Swiss situation where continuing the fight is recognized in Russia as counter-productive. You do hit upon the real crux of the issue. What happens if Russia continues to behave irrationally even in the face of these significant reverses?

Why this isn't "exhaustion" is that it requires the Russians to act rationally and quit an unwinnable war. At the end of WW I Germany had every intention of fighting on, even though they obviously couldn't win. What ended the war is that they simply couldn't continue. The population was starving, they were out of nitrates for explosives and their industry couldn't function because they had no workers. It wasn't a matter of them being "rational".

Ultimately the West must be prepared for this to be a long war and that it will end when one side is exhausted, not when Ukraine achieves some combination of the right advanced weapons systems and the right tactics to use them in some sort of rapid breakthrough or encirclement. This was the takeaway for me from the article and I think it's correct.

I do agree that the West must be prepared for this to be a long war. However, I think we have a difference in definition of "exhausted". One side or the other can cease hostilities not because they are incapable of continuing but rather because it becomes clear it isn't worth it. Exhaustion is when one side simply can no longer fight because they lack the resources to do so. IMO if one side can become "exhausted" in this war, it is Ukraine, not Russia. They may not lose the will to fight but their economic and infrastructure situation can become so degraded they simply can't continue. That isn't going to happen to Russia. We have to hope for Russia to make a rational decision that this war just isn't worth it, and anything Ukraine does to make it harder for Russia increases the probability of that. If Ukraine doesn't expect to dictate terms  in Red Square (and they don't), that is how this will end.

Question, Putin is not a young man.  The big question remains what happens if Putin dies or is kicked out. Is the Ukraine so important that Russia continues the war continues?  Do the other power brokers in the Kremlin think that continuing the war make sense?

[OutsiderFan]

The only way Ukraine can protect itself is by attacking inside Russia. The question is if this will be the case only until Ukraine recaptures its territory, or if it will continue after because Russia keeps on attacking Ukraine after it does. 

This is why the best long-term option to stop them from fighting each other is to get Ukraine in NATO.  This way, an armistice can be signed between the two countries, Ukraine can be made a member, and if Russia pulls any more shit on Ukraine, NATO will respond.

It is preposterous for the U.S. to be against making Ukraine a NATO member after the war is over, so the current stance against it might be to leave a path open to a negotiated settlement with Russia, which would require Ukraine to not join NATO. But, Jens Stoltenberg says every country should have a right to determine its own allies, and he clearly wants Ukraine in NATO or he would have put the kibosh on such talk and he hasn't.

Maybe there is some idea in U.S. foreign policy circles that Ukraine shouldn't join NATO to keep a buffer zone between Poland and Russia, and let Russia know that NATO members will arm Ukraine to the teeth so it can protect itself, as a deterrent. Perhaps there is a reason to believe the only reason Russia invaded Ukraine was because Putin didn't think Ukraine would get the military aid it has received after the fact, and now that Russia knows better, deterrence with just western military aid to Ukraine is enough to protect Ukraine.

But it seems penny wise and pound foolish to take this approach. It will be far more economical to have NATO countries ready to fight for Ukraine than to give weapons to Ukraine to fight for itself. And as has been accurately stated many times, the only thing Russia respects is power and force. Ukraine in NATO will be much more likely to end hostilities than any other alternative, especially since Russia can't be trusted to honor any agreements.

[OutsiderFan]

The only way Ukraine can protect itself is by attacking inside Russia. The question is if this will be the case only until Ukraine recaptures its territory, or if it will continue after because Russia keeps on attacking Ukraine after it does. 

This is why the best long-term option to stop them from fighting each other is to get Ukraine in NATO.  This way, an armistice can be signed between the two countries, Ukraine can be made a member, and if Russia pulls any more shit on Ukraine, NATO will respond.

It is preposterous for the U.S. to be against making Ukraine a NATO member after the war is over, so the current stance against it might be to leave a path open to a negotiated settlement with Russia, which would require Ukraine to not join NATO. But, Jens Stoltenberg says every country should have a right to determine its own allies, and he clearly wants Ukraine in NATO or he would have put the kibosh on such talk and he hasn't.

Maybe there is some idea in U.S. foreign policy circles that Ukraine shouldn't join NATO to keep a buffer zone between Poland and Russia, and let Russia know that NATO members will arm Ukraine to the teeth so it can protect itself, as a deterrent. Perhaps there is a reason to believe the only reason Russia invaded Ukraine was because Putin didn't think Ukraine would get the military aid it has received after the fact, and now that Russia knows better, deterrence with just western military aid to Ukraine is enough to protect Ukraine.

But it seems penny wise and pound foolish to take this approach. It will be far more economical to have NATO countries ready to fight for Ukraine than to give weapons to Ukraine to fight for itself. And as has been accurately stated many times, the only thing Russia respects is power and force. Ukraine in NATO will be much more likely to end hostilities than any other alternative, especially since Russia can't be trusted to honor any agreements.

[81alum]

Today's NYT front page story on the nearly complete stagnation of the front lines is disheartening.  The maps that visually show the lack of progress puts things in perspective. 

Since January 1, Russia has actually gained twice as much ground as Ukraine has.  But the amount of ground that either side has gained is less than the city limits of Kiev--a tiny amount.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023...-line.html

I guess I thought that the Ukrainian offensive had made some difficult progress, but it is barely a blip on the map and balanced by similar gains by Russia on other parts of the line.

Several of you with military backgrounds will no doubt have much keener insights than I have.  But my instincts to view this war as WWI-like just seem to be strengthened by stories like this.  Will this war continue, with minimal shifts in the lines, until attrition gets so bad that someone has to give up?  That the end will come not because one side seizes key territory or "breaks through" but instead will come when one side concludes that the casualties are just not worth continuing?

Count me as a skeptic that new weapons systems (air power, atacms, etc.) or better training will arrive in time to fundamentally change this highly static situation.  Hopefully one of you can dispel my pessimism and give me some reason to be hopeful.

[81alum]

Today's NYT front page story on the nearly complete stagnation of the front lines is disheartening.  The maps that visually show the lack of progress puts things in perspective. 

Since January 1, Russia has actually gained twice as much ground as Ukraine has.  But the amount of ground that either side has gained is less than the city limits of Kiev--a tiny amount.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023...-line.html

I guess I thought that the Ukrainian offensive had made some difficult progress, but it is barely a blip on the map and balanced by similar gains by Russia on other parts of the line.

Several of you with military backgrounds will no doubt have much keener insights than I have.  But my instincts to view this war as WWI-like just seem to be strengthened by stories like this.  Will this war continue, with minimal shifts in the lines, until attrition gets so bad that someone has to give up?  That the end will come not because one side seizes key territory or "breaks through" but instead will come when one side concludes that the casualties are just not worth continuing?

Count me as a skeptic that new weapons systems (air power, atacms, etc.) or better training will arrive in time to fundamentally change this highly static situation.  Hopefully one of you can dispel my pessimism and give me some reason to be hopeful.

[OutsiderFan]

Today's NYT front page story on the nearly complete stagnation of the front lines is disheartening.  The maps that visually show the lack of progress puts things in perspective. 

Since January 1, Russia has actually gained twice as much ground as Ukraine has.  But the amount of ground that either side has gained is less than the city limits of Kiev--a tiny amount.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023...-line.html

I guess I thought that the Ukrainian offensive had made some difficult progress, but it is barely a blip on the map and balanced by similar gains by Russia on other parts of the line.

Several of you with military backgrounds will no doubt have much keener insights than I have.  But my instincts to view this war as WWI-like just seem to be strengthened by stories like this.  Will this war continue, with minimal shifts in the lines, until attrition gets so bad that someone has to give up?  That the end will come not because one side seizes key territory or "breaks through" but instead will come when one side concludes that the casualties are just not worth continuing?

Count me as a skeptic that new weapons systems (air power, atacms, etc.) or better training will arrive in time to fundamentally change this highly static situation.  Hopefully one of you can dispel my pessimism and give me some reason to be hopeful.

A balloon stays intact until it bursts.  And when it bursts, it's not a slow leak, everything is let out at once. You can watch that balloon slowly take in air and think isn't ever gonna burst, just like you can see what looks like a stalemate in a war. A better analogy might be RISK. You can have your armies concentrated where you expect to be attacked and hold ground, but if there is a breakthrough, you lose it really fast because the territory is lightly defended.

It looks to me like there is about to be a real Ukrainian breakthrough in the Tokmak direction based on the information I've seen. Who cares what territory has or hasn't been re-taken by today, if there is a big breakthrough tomorrow?

It seems like Ukraine has finally bought into U.S. military suggestions which is to concentrate forces in one place, and the road to Tokmak appears to be where that is. Russia seems to know this too, but Ukraine is doing a good job of disrupting Russian supplies and logistics that I don't see Russia doing on Ukraine. Maybe they are, I'm just not seeing it.

The point is, using territorial gains as a measure to assess who is better positioned to prevail, is only sometimes the best measure to use. There are many other contexts to consider.

[OutsiderFan]

Today's NYT front page story on the nearly complete stagnation of the front lines is disheartening.  The maps that visually show the lack of progress puts things in perspective. 

Since January 1, Russia has actually gained twice as much ground as Ukraine has.  But the amount of ground that either side has gained is less than the city limits of Kiev--a tiny amount.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023...-line.html

I guess I thought that the Ukrainian offensive had made some difficult progress, but it is barely a blip on the map and balanced by similar gains by Russia on other parts of the line.

Several of you with military backgrounds will no doubt have much keener insights than I have.  But my instincts to view this war as WWI-like just seem to be strengthened by stories like this.  Will this war continue, with minimal shifts in the lines, until attrition gets so bad that someone has to give up?  That the end will come not because one side seizes key territory or "breaks through" but instead will come when one side concludes that the casualties are just not worth continuing?

Count me as a skeptic that new weapons systems (air power, atacms, etc.) or better training will arrive in time to fundamentally change this highly static situation.  Hopefully one of you can dispel my pessimism and give me some reason to be hopeful.

A balloon stays intact until it bursts.  And when it bursts, it's not a slow leak, everything is let out at once. You can watch that balloon slowly take in air and think isn't ever gonna burst, just like you can see what looks like a stalemate in a war. A better analogy might be RISK. You can have your armies concentrated where you expect to be attacked and hold ground, but if there is a breakthrough, you lose it really fast because the territory is lightly defended.

It looks to me like there is about to be a real Ukrainian breakthrough in the Tokmak direction based on the information I've seen. Who cares what territory has or hasn't been re-taken by today, if there is a big breakthrough tomorrow?

It seems like Ukraine has finally bought into U.S. military suggestions which is to concentrate forces in one place, and the road to Tokmak appears to be where that is. Russia seems to know this too, but Ukraine is doing a good job of disrupting Russian supplies and logistics that I don't see Russia doing on Ukraine. Maybe they are, I'm just not seeing it.

The point is, using territorial gains as a measure to assess who is better positioned to prevail, is only sometimes the best measure to use. There are many other contexts to consider.

[Goose]

The only way Ukraine can protect itself is by attacking inside Russia. The question is if this will be the case only until Ukraine recaptures its territory, or if it will continue after because Russia keeps on attacking Ukraine after it does. 

This is why the best long-term option to stop them from fighting each other is to get Ukraine in NATO.  This way, an armistice can be signed between the two countries, Ukraine can be made a member, and if Russia pulls any more shit on Ukraine, NATO will respond.

It is preposterous for the U.S. to be against making Ukraine a NATO member after the war is over, so the current stance against it might be to leave a path open to a negotiated settlement with Russia, which would require Ukraine to not join NATO. But, Jens Stoltenberg says every country should have a right to determine its own allies, and he clearly wants Ukraine in NATO or he would have put the kibosh on such talk and he hasn't.

Maybe there is some idea in U.S. foreign policy circles that Ukraine shouldn't join NATO to keep a buffer zone between Poland and Russia, and let Russia know that NATO members will arm Ukraine to the teeth so it can protect itself, as a deterrent. Perhaps there is a reason to believe the only reason Russia invaded Ukraine was because Putin didn't think Ukraine would get the military aid it has received after the fact, and now that Russia knows better, deterrence with just western military aid to Ukraine is enough to protect Ukraine.

But it seems penny wise and pound foolish to take this approach. It will be far more economical to have NATO countries ready to fight for Ukraine than to give weapons to Ukraine to fight for itself. And as has been accurately stated many times, the only thing Russia respects is power and force. Ukraine in NATO will be much more likely to end hostilities than any other alternative, especially since Russia can't be trusted to honor any agreements.

Well OF, I have to disagree with every one of your paragraphs :). First of all, Ukraine cannot "protect" itself by attacking inside Russia because never in their wildest dreams does Ukraine (or anybody else) believe they can inflict enough damage to make a strategic difference. They aren't, and cannot be capable of invading Russia, and everybody knows it. Their attacks in Russia to date consist of important high value targets and politically significant targets. These attacks are carefully considered by Ukraine because they are fully aware that Putin et al can use the argument of an "existential threat" to mobilize the entire country, and that such a threat, real or not, may "fix" a lot of the Russian morale problems. Attacking Russia at scale is exactly what Ukraine will not do and doing so would be pointless.

The object of NATO's existence is not to fight wars, but rather to deter anybody (including NATO members) from starting them. In order to do that, NATO has to be able to fight wars, at least on some level. Unlike say the Triple Alliance, NATO preserves significant freedom of action to the members. This was necessary for reasons (among others) of preserving national sovereignty over the respective militarizes.  When a NATO nation invokes Article 5, all NATO members respond "as they see fit". They may chose to do nothing. When NATO existed primarily to deter the Soviet Union, there was a definite common interest in protecting Europe and it was assured everybody would be "all in" in the face of a Soviet attack. It is important to realize however that every war game NATO seriously examined required, in the end, the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It was also believed (rightly as it turned out) that the Soviet Union planned to use such weapons. The concern was that this would eventually escalate to full scale nuclear war. The question was then posed as "would the US risk New York for Bonn?" or similar. Fortunately, the Soviet Union always thought that answer was unclear enough there was no land war in Europe.

The problems inside NATO became relatively acute with the fall of the Soviet Union (which removed the imminent threat that provided a unity of purpose) and the subsequent admission of ex-Warsaw Pact nations that provided little military strength and many tactical challenges. The US, UK, and German military were were uniformly against these admission as the risk to worth ratio is horrible. Deterrence works only if it is credible. The strategic situation in places like Romania majorly sucks. Further, Russia may well believe that the US will not risk New York for Bucharest. The NATO expansion took place anyway for political reasons. However, with the continued downsizing of the US and European military it is even less probable that an Article 5 invocation in that part of the world is going to get a significant response from NATO members.

When Ukraine previously requested NATO membership, the NATO military response was not merely no, but hell no. The current NATO force structure simply isn't designed to defend Ukraine and probably could not do so if called upon. It is a logistics nightmare and a "bridge too far". On top of that, one needs to ask about the political willingness of the major NATO nations to defend Ukraine. As pointed out, NATO isn't a "guaranteed insurance". Nations respond as the see fit. Back in 2014, it would have been disingenuous to give Ukraine the illusion that in NATO they would be "safe". The will simply wasn't there. It is unclear the situation has actually changed much. Nothing stops e.g. Poland or Germany from committing troops to Ukraine today. They aren't doing it.

Would Ukraine being in NATO change this? Maybe, but perceived national interests aren't that easily altered. Lots of things are going to need changing to make a NATO member Ukraine a functional reality, and possibly some of those things can't be altered. Germany has simply collapsed militarily. Germany doesn't want to fight anybody, and as their military chiefs have pointed out, right now, they really can't. The UK army is essentially non-existent. What remains of it is good, but minuscule. So, who rushes to Ukraine to defend it with tons of troops. The US is the only candidate, but we are also a shadow of what we were in 1990. We also have significant commitments throughout the world. Does anybody see any willingness to send US troops into Ukraine in congress? I don't. The military will do as ordered, but they have made it clear there are no assurances we can be effective.

That brings us to the last paragraph. It suggests it would be more "efficient" for NATO countries to fight for Ukraine than for Ukraine to fight for themselves with NATO supplied weapons. I can absolutely assure you that every NATO nation does not consider it "efficient" for their citizens to die instead of Ukrainian citizens and in fact are uniformly unwilling to do that. Some NATO nations (but not all) are willing to help Ukraine with material aid. Nobody is so far willing to risk their own citizens, and I see no way that will happen.

[Goose]

The only way Ukraine can protect itself is by attacking inside Russia. The question is if this will be the case only until Ukraine recaptures its territory, or if it will continue after because Russia keeps on attacking Ukraine after it does. 

This is why the best long-term option to stop them from fighting each other is to get Ukraine in NATO.  This way, an armistice can be signed between the two countries, Ukraine can be made a member, and if Russia pulls any more shit on Ukraine, NATO will respond.

It is preposterous for the U.S. to be against making Ukraine a NATO member after the war is over, so the current stance against it might be to leave a path open to a negotiated settlement with Russia, which would require Ukraine to not join NATO. But, Jens Stoltenberg says every country should have a right to determine its own allies, and he clearly wants Ukraine in NATO or he would have put the kibosh on such talk and he hasn't.

Maybe there is some idea in U.S. foreign policy circles that Ukraine shouldn't join NATO to keep a buffer zone between Poland and Russia, and let Russia know that NATO members will arm Ukraine to the teeth so it can protect itself, as a deterrent. Perhaps there is a reason to believe the only reason Russia invaded Ukraine was because Putin didn't think Ukraine would get the military aid it has received after the fact, and now that Russia knows better, deterrence with just western military aid to Ukraine is enough to protect Ukraine.

But it seems penny wise and pound foolish to take this approach. It will be far more economical to have NATO countries ready to fight for Ukraine than to give weapons to Ukraine to fight for itself. And as has been accurately stated many times, the only thing Russia respects is power and force. Ukraine in NATO will be much more likely to end hostilities than any other alternative, especially since Russia can't be trusted to honor any agreements.

Well OF, I have to disagree with every one of your paragraphs :). First of all, Ukraine cannot "protect" itself by attacking inside Russia because never in their wildest dreams does Ukraine (or anybody else) believe they can inflict enough damage to make a strategic difference. They aren't, and cannot be capable of invading Russia, and everybody knows it. Their attacks in Russia to date consist of important high value targets and politically significant targets. These attacks are carefully considered by Ukraine because they are fully aware that Putin et al can use the argument of an "existential threat" to mobilize the entire country, and that such a threat, real or not, may "fix" a lot of the Russian morale problems. Attacking Russia at scale is exactly what Ukraine will not do and doing so would be pointless.

The object of NATO's existence is not to fight wars, but rather to deter anybody (including NATO members) from starting them. In order to do that, NATO has to be able to fight wars, at least on some level. Unlike say the Triple Alliance, NATO preserves significant freedom of action to the members. This was necessary for reasons (among others) of preserving national sovereignty over the respective militarizes.  When a NATO nation invokes Article 5, all NATO members respond "as they see fit". They may chose to do nothing. When NATO existed primarily to deter the Soviet Union, there was a definite common interest in protecting Europe and it was assured everybody would be "all in" in the face of a Soviet attack. It is important to realize however that every war game NATO seriously examined required, in the end, the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It was also believed (rightly as it turned out) that the Soviet Union planned to use such weapons. The concern was that this would eventually escalate to full scale nuclear war. The question was then posed as "would the US risk New York for Bonn?" or similar. Fortunately, the Soviet Union always thought that answer was unclear enough there was no land war in Europe.

The problems inside NATO became relatively acute with the fall of the Soviet Union (which removed the imminent threat that provided a unity of purpose) and the subsequent admission of ex-Warsaw Pact nations that provided little military strength and many tactical challenges. The US, UK, and German military were were uniformly against these admission as the risk to worth ratio is horrible. Deterrence works only if it is credible. The strategic situation in places like Romania majorly sucks. Further, Russia may well believe that the US will not risk New York for Bucharest. The NATO expansion took place anyway for political reasons. However, with the continued downsizing of the US and European military it is even less probable that an Article 5 invocation in that part of the world is going to get a significant response from NATO members.

When Ukraine previously requested NATO membership, the NATO military response was not merely no, but hell no. The current NATO force structure simply isn't designed to defend Ukraine and probably could not do so if called upon. It is a logistics nightmare and a "bridge too far". On top of that, one needs to ask about the political willingness of the major NATO nations to defend Ukraine. As pointed out, NATO isn't a "guaranteed insurance". Nations respond as the see fit. Back in 2014, it would have been disingenuous to give Ukraine the illusion that in NATO they would be "safe". The will simply wasn't there. It is unclear the situation has actually changed much. Nothing stops e.g. Poland or Germany from committing troops to Ukraine today. They aren't doing it.

Would Ukraine being in NATO change this? Maybe, but perceived national interests aren't that easily altered. Lots of things are going to need changing to make a NATO member Ukraine a functional reality, and possibly some of those things can't be altered. Germany has simply collapsed militarily. Germany doesn't want to fight anybody, and as their military chiefs have pointed out, right now, they really can't. The UK army is essentially non-existent. What remains of it is good, but minuscule. So, who rushes to Ukraine to defend it with tons of troops. The US is the only candidate, but we are also a shadow of what we were in 1990. We also have significant commitments throughout the world. Does anybody see any willingness to send US troops into Ukraine in congress? I don't. The military will do as ordered, but they have made it clear there are no assurances we can be effective.

That brings us to the last paragraph. It suggests it would be more "efficient" for NATO countries to fight for Ukraine than for Ukraine to fight for themselves with NATO supplied weapons. I can absolutely assure you that every NATO nation does not consider it "efficient" for their citizens to die instead of Ukrainian citizens and in fact are uniformly unwilling to do that. Some NATO nations (but not all) are willing to help Ukraine with material aid. Nobody is so far willing to risk their own citizens, and I see no way that will happen.

[Goose]

https://www.marinevesseltraffic.com/BLAC...ic-tracker

For those of you who are interested in what closing the Sea of Azov to Russian shipping would accomplish, take a look at this vessel tracking site. There is a continuous stream of traffic to Rostov-on-Don and points north. Cutting this link would be a brobdingnagian(yes, I used the abbreviation :-) economic blow to Russia in that area. Lots of stuff enters and leaves Russia this way. Moving it all to Novorossiysk isn't practical because 1) the port is too small. Loading and unloading delays would be massive, and 2) transportation out of that part of Russia to the rest of the country is limited. It is great for grain shipping, but only recently has become a significant container port. The port can't handle the additional volume, period. Not to mention the delays in time and increase in cost of what does come that way. 

In addition, there is already lots of  traffic into and out of that area that needs to continue. To be clear, it is a bigger volume port than Rostov-on-Don, but it can't handle the traffic for both. In addition, lots of the support infrastructure for the offshore oil industry is located in Rostov-on-Don. There are lots of manufacturers there. They build oil rigs and such that are then towed to where they are needed. That traffic can't be moved.

[Goose]

https://www.marinevesseltraffic.com/BLAC...ic-tracker

For those of you who are interested in what closing the Sea of Azov to Russian shipping would accomplish, take a look at this vessel tracking site. There is a continuous stream of traffic to Rostov-on-Don and points north. Cutting this link would be a brobdingnagian(yes, I used the abbreviation :-) economic blow to Russia in that area. Lots of stuff enters and leaves Russia this way. Moving it all to Novorossiysk isn't practical because 1) the port is too small. Loading and unloading delays would be massive, and 2) transportation out of that part of Russia to the rest of the country is limited. It is great for grain shipping, but only recently has become a significant container port. The port can't handle the additional volume, period. Not to mention the delays in time and increase in cost of what does come that way. 

In addition, there is already lots of  traffic into and out of that area that needs to continue. To be clear, it is a bigger volume port than Rostov-on-Don, but it can't handle the traffic for both. In addition, lots of the support infrastructure for the offshore oil industry is located in Rostov-on-Don. There are lots of manufacturers there. They build oil rigs and such that are then towed to where they are needed. That traffic can't be moved.

[BigJohn043]

The only way Ukraine can protect itself is by attacking inside Russia. The question is if this will be the case only until Ukraine recaptures its territory, or if it will continue after because Russia keeps on attacking Ukraine after it does. 

This is why the best long-term option to stop them from fighting each other is to get Ukraine in NATO.  This way, an armistice can be signed between the two countries, Ukraine can be made a member, and if Russia pulls any more shit on Ukraine, NATO will respond.

It is preposterous for the U.S. to be against making Ukraine a NATO member after the war is over, so the current stance against it might be to leave a path open to a negotiated settlement with Russia, which would require Ukraine to not join NATO. But, Jens Stoltenberg says every country should have a right to determine its own allies, and he clearly wants Ukraine in NATO or he would have put the kibosh on such talk and he hasn't.

Maybe there is some idea in U.S. foreign policy circles that Ukraine shouldn't join NATO to keep a buffer zone between Poland and Russia, and let Russia know that NATO members will arm Ukraine to the teeth so it can protect itself, as a deterrent. Perhaps there is a reason to believe the only reason Russia invaded Ukraine was because Putin didn't think Ukraine would get the military aid it has received after the fact, and now that Russia knows better, deterrence with just western military aid to Ukraine is enough to protect Ukraine.

But it seems penny wise and pound foolish to take this approach. It will be far more economical to have NATO countries ready to fight for Ukraine than to give weapons to Ukraine to fight for itself. And as has been accurately stated many times, the only thing Russia respects is power and force. Ukraine in NATO will be much more likely to end hostilities than any other alternative, especially since Russia can't be trusted to honor any agreements.

Well OF, I have to disagree with every one of your paragraphs :). First of all, Ukraine cannot "protect" itself by attacking inside Russia because never in their wildest dreams does Ukraine (or anybody else) believe they can inflict enough damage to make a strategic difference. They aren't, and cannot be capable of invading Russia, and everybody knows it. Their attacks in Russia to date consist of important high value targets and politically significant targets. These attacks are carefully considered by Ukraine because they are fully aware that Putin et al can use the argument of an "existential threat" to mobilize the entire country, and that such a threat, real or not, may "fix" a lot of the Russian morale problems. Attacking Russia at scale is exactly what Ukraine will not do and doing so would be pointless.

The object of NATO's existence is not to fight wars, but rather to deter anybody (including NATO members) from starting them. In order to do that, NATO has to be able to fight wars, at least on some level. Unlike say the Triple Alliance, NATO preserves significant freedom of action to the members. This was necessary for reasons (among others) of preserving national sovereignty over the respective militarizes.  When a NATO nation invokes Article 5, all NATO members respond "as they see fit". They may chose to do nothing. When NATO existed primarily to deter the Soviet Union, there was a definite common interest in protecting Europe and it was assured everybody would be "all in" in the face of a Soviet attack. It is important to realize however that every war game NATO seriously examined required, in the end, the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It was also believed (rightly as it turned out) that the Soviet Union planned to use such weapons. The concern was that this would eventually escalate to full scale nuclear war. The question was then posed as "would the US risk New York for Bonn?" or similar. Fortunately, the Soviet Union always thought that answer was unclear enough there was no land war in Europe.

The problems inside NATO became relatively acute with the fall of the Soviet Union (which removed the imminent threat that provided a unity of purpose) and the subsequent admission of ex-Warsaw Pact nations that provided little military strength and many tactical challenges. The US, UK, and German military were were uniformly against these admission as the risk to worth ratio is horrible. Deterrence works only if it is credible. The strategic situation in places like Romania majorly sucks. Further, Russia may well believe that the US will not risk New York for Bucharest. The NATO expansion took place anyway for political reasons. However, with the continued downsizing of the US and European military it is even less probable that an Article 5 invocation in that part of the world is going to get a significant response from NATO members.

When Ukraine previously requested NATO membership, the NATO military response was not merely no, but hell no. The current NATO force structure simply isn't designed to defend Ukraine and probably could not do so if called upon. It is a logistics nightmare and a "bridge too far". On top of that, one needs to ask about the political willingness of the major NATO nations to defend Ukraine. As pointed out, NATO isn't a "guaranteed insurance". Nations respond as the see fit. Back in 2014, it would have been disingenuous to give Ukraine the illusion that in NATO they would be "safe". The will simply wasn't there. It is unclear the situation has actually changed much. Nothing stops e.g. Poland or Germany from committing troops to Ukraine today. They aren't doing it.

Would Ukraine being in NATO change this? Maybe, but perceived national interests aren't that easily altered. Lots of things are going to need changing to make a NATO member Ukraine a functional reality, and possibly some of those things can't be altered. Germany has simply collapsed militarily. Germany doesn't want to fight anybody, and as their military chiefs have pointed out, right now, they really can't. The UK army is essentially non-existent. What remains of it is good, but minuscule. So, who rushes to Ukraine to defend it with tons of troops. The US is the only candidate, but we are also a shadow of what we were in 1990. We also have significant commitments throughout the world. Does anybody see any willingness to send US troops into Ukraine in congress? I don't. The military will do as ordered, but they have made it clear there are no assurances we can be effective.

That brings us to the last paragraph. It suggests it would be more "efficient" for NATO countries to fight for Ukraine than for Ukraine to fight for themselves with NATO supplied weapons. I can absolutely assure you that every NATO nation does not consider it "efficient" for their citizens to die instead of Ukrainian citizens and in fact are uniformly unwilling to do that. Some NATO nations (but not all) are willing to help Ukraine with material aid. Nobody is so far willing to risk their own citizens, and I see no way that will happen.

Ukraine is doing a reasonable job of defending itself on its own.  Wouldn't NATA air forces gaining control of the air plus the existing ground forces of Ukraine be easily enough to defeat Russia?

I am not making a point but asking a real question.

[BigJohn043]

The only way Ukraine can protect itself is by attacking inside Russia. The question is if this will be the case only until Ukraine recaptures its territory, or if it will continue after because Russia keeps on attacking Ukraine after it does. 

This is why the best long-term option to stop them from fighting each other is to get Ukraine in NATO.  This way, an armistice can be signed between the two countries, Ukraine can be made a member, and if Russia pulls any more shit on Ukraine, NATO will respond.

It is preposterous for the U.S. to be against making Ukraine a NATO member after the war is over, so the current stance against it might be to leave a path open to a negotiated settlement with Russia, which would require Ukraine to not join NATO. But, Jens Stoltenberg says every country should have a right to determine its own allies, and he clearly wants Ukraine in NATO or he would have put the kibosh on such talk and he hasn't.

Maybe there is some idea in U.S. foreign policy circles that Ukraine shouldn't join NATO to keep a buffer zone between Poland and Russia, and let Russia know that NATO members will arm Ukraine to the teeth so it can protect itself, as a deterrent. Perhaps there is a reason to believe the only reason Russia invaded Ukraine was because Putin didn't think Ukraine would get the military aid it has received after the fact, and now that Russia knows better, deterrence with just western military aid to Ukraine is enough to protect Ukraine.

But it seems penny wise and pound foolish to take this approach. It will be far more economical to have NATO countries ready to fight for Ukraine than to give weapons to Ukraine to fight for itself. And as has been accurately stated many times, the only thing Russia respects is power and force. Ukraine in NATO will be much more likely to end hostilities than any other alternative, especially since Russia can't be trusted to honor any agreements.

Well OF, I have to disagree with every one of your paragraphs :). First of all, Ukraine cannot "protect" itself by attacking inside Russia because never in their wildest dreams does Ukraine (or anybody else) believe they can inflict enough damage to make a strategic difference. They aren't, and cannot be capable of invading Russia, and everybody knows it. Their attacks in Russia to date consist of important high value targets and politically significant targets. These attacks are carefully considered by Ukraine because they are fully aware that Putin et al can use the argument of an "existential threat" to mobilize the entire country, and that such a threat, real or not, may "fix" a lot of the Russian morale problems. Attacking Russia at scale is exactly what Ukraine will not do and doing so would be pointless.

The object of NATO's existence is not to fight wars, but rather to deter anybody (including NATO members) from starting them. In order to do that, NATO has to be able to fight wars, at least on some level. Unlike say the Triple Alliance, NATO preserves significant freedom of action to the members. This was necessary for reasons (among others) of preserving national sovereignty over the respective militarizes.  When a NATO nation invokes Article 5, all NATO members respond "as they see fit". They may chose to do nothing. When NATO existed primarily to deter the Soviet Union, there was a definite common interest in protecting Europe and it was assured everybody would be "all in" in the face of a Soviet attack. It is important to realize however that every war game NATO seriously examined required, in the end, the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It was also believed (rightly as it turned out) that the Soviet Union planned to use such weapons. The concern was that this would eventually escalate to full scale nuclear war. The question was then posed as "would the US risk New York for Bonn?" or similar. Fortunately, the Soviet Union always thought that answer was unclear enough there was no land war in Europe.

The problems inside NATO became relatively acute with the fall of the Soviet Union (which removed the imminent threat that provided a unity of purpose) and the subsequent admission of ex-Warsaw Pact nations that provided little military strength and many tactical challenges. The US, UK, and German military were were uniformly against these admission as the risk to worth ratio is horrible. Deterrence works only if it is credible. The strategic situation in places like Romania majorly sucks. Further, Russia may well believe that the US will not risk New York for Bucharest. The NATO expansion took place anyway for political reasons. However, with the continued downsizing of the US and European military it is even less probable that an Article 5 invocation in that part of the world is going to get a significant response from NATO members.

When Ukraine previously requested NATO membership, the NATO military response was not merely no, but hell no. The current NATO force structure simply isn't designed to defend Ukraine and probably could not do so if called upon. It is a logistics nightmare and a "bridge too far". On top of that, one needs to ask about the political willingness of the major NATO nations to defend Ukraine. As pointed out, NATO isn't a "guaranteed insurance". Nations respond as the see fit. Back in 2014, it would have been disingenuous to give Ukraine the illusion that in NATO they would be "safe". The will simply wasn't there. It is unclear the situation has actually changed much. Nothing stops e.g. Poland or Germany from committing troops to Ukraine today. They aren't doing it.

Would Ukraine being in NATO change this? Maybe, but perceived national interests aren't that easily altered. Lots of things are going to need changing to make a NATO member Ukraine a functional reality, and possibly some of those things can't be altered. Germany has simply collapsed militarily. Germany doesn't want to fight anybody, and as their military chiefs have pointed out, right now, they really can't. The UK army is essentially non-existent. What remains of it is good, but minuscule. So, who rushes to Ukraine to defend it with tons of troops. The US is the only candidate, but we are also a shadow of what we were in 1990. We also have significant commitments throughout the world. Does anybody see any willingness to send US troops into Ukraine in congress? I don't. The military will do as ordered, but they have made it clear there are no assurances we can be effective.

That brings us to the last paragraph. It suggests it would be more "efficient" for NATO countries to fight for Ukraine than for Ukraine to fight for themselves with NATO supplied weapons. I can absolutely assure you that every NATO nation does not consider it "efficient" for their citizens to die instead of Ukrainian citizens and in fact are uniformly unwilling to do that. Some NATO nations (but not all) are willing to help Ukraine with material aid. Nobody is so far willing to risk their own citizens, and I see no way that will happen.

Ukraine is doing a reasonable job of defending itself on its own.  Wouldn't NATA air forces gaining control of the air plus the existing ground forces of Ukraine be easily enough to defeat Russia?

I am not making a point but asking a real question.

[Goose]

Ukraine is doing a reasonable job of defending itself on its own.  Wouldn't NATA air forces gaining control of the air plus the existing ground forces of Ukraine be easily enough to defeat Russia?

I am not making a point but asking a real question.

IMO NATO air forces (read USAF and a bit of Poland and Norway) operating in conjunction with the current Ukrainian military could do the job. BUT, to do that, the US will execute a DEAD plan. We aren't going to send our aircraft into the teeth of the Russian IADS. That means attacking inside Russia, and that could be a complete game changer in a bad way. Russia may just start a general war if the USAF destroys radar and anti-aircraft missile sites inside Russia. We would also attack Russian airfields. Big escalation that will have consequences.

FWIW, the Ukraine is willing to fight Russia with F-16s and not require air superiority/supremacy. They know that without 5 gen assets they can't get that anyway, and will just have to accept the losses. At the end of the day, it wouldn't surprise me to see some "hot pursuit" into Russian airspace :-). The US simply won't accept the limitations Ukraine must.

Working out a coordinated plan with Ukraine will take some doing too.

[Goose]

Ukraine is doing a reasonable job of defending itself on its own.  Wouldn't NATA air forces gaining control of the air plus the existing ground forces of Ukraine be easily enough to defeat Russia?

I am not making a point but asking a real question.

IMO NATO air forces (read USAF and a bit of Poland and Norway) operating in conjunction with the current Ukrainian military could do the job. BUT, to do that, the US will execute a DEAD plan. We aren't going to send our aircraft into the teeth of the Russian IADS. That means attacking inside Russia, and that could be a complete game changer in a bad way. Russia may just start a general war if the USAF destroys radar and anti-aircraft missile sites inside Russia. We would also attack Russian airfields. Big escalation that will have consequences.

FWIW, the Ukraine is willing to fight Russia with F-16s and not require air superiority/supremacy. They know that without 5 gen assets they can't get that anyway, and will just have to accept the losses. At the end of the day, it wouldn't surprise me to see some "hot pursuit" into Russian airspace :-). The US simply won't accept the limitations Ukraine must.

Working out a coordinated plan with Ukraine will take some doing too.

[OutsiderFan]

Everyone knows NATO is a deterrent force. But deterrence only works if when called upon to act, you well, act. And alliances are only as strong as their weakest link. The best way to defeat Russia is to put Russia in a position where if it takes liberties with Ukraine, it gets hit harder than it is willing to be hit, or if it does, it is left bleeding and broken.

This isn’t some conclusion based on anything other than the laws of nature. There is a reason the Lion is known as “the king of the jungle” Every animal knows if you invade its territory you get yer ass kicked by the whole pride.

Moreover, all we ever hear about is the cost of fighting wars. Spreading the cost around - of lives and equipment - not only is the most economical, it’s also the surest way to be a deterrent not just for Russia for NATO itself to make sure wars aren’t fought. I guarantee you that if Ukraine was a NATO member before Russia invaded it, and Russia knew it would be fighting NATO if it did, the war never would have happened. Moreover, had NATO countries acting independent of NATO hit back harder at the beginning, the war could be over now. There was nothing stopping individual countries from putting boots on the ground like in all other wars.

And when I say Ukraine must attack Russia, that doesn’t mean invading it. That means doing what it is doing. I’m not a big fan of tit for tat, but you can’t sit there and do nothing when being attacked on your territory by someone attacking you.

I guess the bottom line is I want more NATO countries and citizens of them to pay the price for war so there is much more priority put on preventing it from ever happening. We need to be more like Lions to secure our peace and be ready to fight for democratic sovereignty when it is threatened even a little bit. Lions don’t sit there and watch their territory be invaded because they don’t want to get roughed up. Neither should cowardly NATO members.

[OutsiderFan]

Everyone knows NATO is a deterrent force. But deterrence only works if when called upon to act, you well, act. And alliances are only as strong as their weakest link. The best way to defeat Russia is to put Russia in a position where if it takes liberties with Ukraine, it gets hit harder than it is willing to be hit, or if it does, it is left bleeding and broken.

This isn’t some conclusion based on anything other than the laws of nature. There is a reason the Lion is known as “the king of the jungle” Every animal knows if you invade its territory you get yer ass kicked by the whole pride.

Moreover, all we ever hear about is the cost of fighting wars. Spreading the cost around - of lives and equipment - not only is the most economical, it’s also the surest way to be a deterrent not just for Russia for NATO itself to make sure wars aren’t fought. I guarantee you that if Ukraine was a NATO member before Russia invaded it, and Russia knew it would be fighting NATO if it did, the war never would have happened. Moreover, had NATO countries acting independent of NATO hit back harder at the beginning, the war could be over now. There was nothing stopping individual countries from putting boots on the ground like in all other wars.

And when I say Ukraine must attack Russia, that doesn’t mean invading it. That means doing what it is doing. I’m not a big fan of tit for tat, but you can’t sit there and do nothing when being attacked on your territory by someone attacking you.

I guess the bottom line is I want more NATO countries and citizens of them to pay the price for war so there is much more priority put on preventing it from ever happening. We need to be more like Lions to secure our peace and be ready to fight for democratic sovereignty when it is threatened even a little bit. Lions don’t sit there and watch their territory be invaded because they don’t want to get roughed up. Neither should cowardly NATO members.

[fullmetal]

At its core, NATO is a defensive alliance against a capricious, nuclear-armed entity.  No NATO country has actually been invaded at this point, and Ukraine is not a NATO member.  Let's not get too crazy about what individual nations should or shouldn't have done earlier, as satisfying it would have been to see a concerted response that didn't go nuclear.

Re: stagnation, is it the minefields?  Russian defensive artillery?  I don't think it's rainy/roadlessness season yet, is it?

MAJ Rose is correct in that the US has a lot to learn from the Armed Forces of Ukraine.  They are fighting an increasingly 21st century war, now with asymmetric aerial assets (drones) and electronic jamming against an opponent adapting to the same.  The numerous early retirements of upper echelon Russian officers has made way for younger, more effective leaders imo (rather than the older, politically-inclined cadre).  Without control of the air, this is going to be a long but winnable road for Ukraine.

If Putin retires earlier than expected, I would like to see hostilities cease, which means blame gets shifted onto Putin loyalists (who are offered up to the Hague as war criminals).  However, there's a real possibility that the war continues as internal politics could result in no one wanting to answer for all the evil done in Ukraine.  I guess it depends on who the FSB decides to obey in a post-Putin world.

[fullmetal]

At its core, NATO is a defensive alliance against a capricious, nuclear-armed entity.  No NATO country has actually been invaded at this point, and Ukraine is not a NATO member.  Let's not get too crazy about what individual nations should or shouldn't have done earlier, as satisfying it would have been to see a concerted response that didn't go nuclear.

Re: stagnation, is it the minefields?  Russian defensive artillery?  I don't think it's rainy/roadlessness season yet, is it?

MAJ Rose is correct in that the US has a lot to learn from the Armed Forces of Ukraine.  They are fighting an increasingly 21st century war, now with asymmetric aerial assets (drones) and electronic jamming against an opponent adapting to the same.  The numerous early retirements of upper echelon Russian officers has made way for younger, more effective leaders imo (rather than the older, politically-inclined cadre).  Without control of the air, this is going to be a long but winnable road for Ukraine.

If Putin retires earlier than expected, I would like to see hostilities cease, which means blame gets shifted onto Putin loyalists (who are offered up to the Hague as war criminals).  However, there's a real possibility that the war continues as internal politics could result in no one wanting to answer for all the evil done in Ukraine.  I guess it depends on who the FSB decides to obey in a post-Putin world.

[Goose]

At its core, NATO is a defensive alliance against a capricious, nuclear-armed entity.  No NATO country has actually been invaded at this point, and Ukraine is not a NATO member.  Let's not get too crazy about what individual nations should or shouldn't have done earlier, as satisfying it would have been to see a concerted response that didn't go nuclear.

Agree. NATO nations are only going to do what they believe is in their own best interests at the time. This does include keeping NATO as at least a credible deterrent to the capricious nuclear power next door. NATO members have to at least keep up appearances. So far, the only Article 5 invocation was by the US in Afghanistan. The responses were, to say the least, a bit underwhelming, partly because of lack of capability and partly because nobody really believed the US needed any help.

The old "base" NATO members didn't really think through the admission of all the ex-Warsaw Pact members. Countries like e.g. France realize their safety in Europe is tied to the freedom of Germany, but are much more ambivalent about e.g. Bulgaria. That is just a fact and it is a problem for NATO. NATO has on paper committed to "defend" lots of countries that many of the more "significant" NATO nations really don't care about and even more importantly do not have domestic political support to defend. They will "die for Berlin" and probably will "die for Warsaw".  Budapest, not so much. The Baltics insist on hosting NATO ground forces as "hostage" units to ensure that if they are attacked NATO will already have "skin in the game". They are fully aware that a "so sorry, too hard to do" response to an Article 5 invocation is definitely a real possibility from at least some of their NATO partners. Historically, they have been promised help that in the event never arrived.

Ukraine was regarded by essentially everyone as the Baltics on steroids. The degree of difficulty is large and the probability of having to respond to an Article 5 was considered too high. The political will in the "key" NATO nations was just not there. On this board it is often treated as a given that Ukraine will end up in NATO. It isn't. Consider the resistance even in the US to spending more money on Ukraine. Imagine the resistance to going to war in Ukraine. That would be a non-starter IMO. NATO has already expanded into areas that its actual ability and will to defend is legitimately questioned. Ukraine membership will stretch this credibility even further. Is it "good" for them and is it "good" for NATO? IMO, it is not unless the NATO nations "mean it" and their commitment is credible. As of now, those conditions do not exist.

[Goose]

At its core, NATO is a defensive alliance against a capricious, nuclear-armed entity.  No NATO country has actually been invaded at this point, and Ukraine is not a NATO member.  Let's not get too crazy about what individual nations should or shouldn't have done earlier, as satisfying it would have been to see a concerted response that didn't go nuclear.

Agree. NATO nations are only going to do what they believe is in their own best interests at the time. This does include keeping NATO as at least a credible deterrent to the capricious nuclear power next door. NATO members have to at least keep up appearances. So far, the only Article 5 invocation was by the US in Afghanistan. The responses were, to say the least, a bit underwhelming, partly because of lack of capability and partly because nobody really believed the US needed any help.

The old "base" NATO members didn't really think through the admission of all the ex-Warsaw Pact members. Countries like e.g. France realize their safety in Europe is tied to the freedom of Germany, but are much more ambivalent about e.g. Bulgaria. That is just a fact and it is a problem for NATO. NATO has on paper committed to "defend" lots of countries that many of the more "significant" NATO nations really don't care about and even more importantly do not have domestic political support to defend. They will "die for Berlin" and probably will "die for Warsaw".  Budapest, not so much. The Baltics insist on hosting NATO ground forces as "hostage" units to ensure that if they are attacked NATO will already have "skin in the game". They are fully aware that a "so sorry, too hard to do" response to an Article 5 invocation is definitely a real possibility from at least some of their NATO partners. Historically, they have been promised help that in the event never arrived.

Ukraine was regarded by essentially everyone as the Baltics on steroids. The degree of difficulty is large and the probability of having to respond to an Article 5 was considered too high. The political will in the "key" NATO nations was just not there. On this board it is often treated as a given that Ukraine will end up in NATO. It isn't. Consider the resistance even in the US to spending more money on Ukraine. Imagine the resistance to going to war in Ukraine. That would be a non-starter IMO. NATO has already expanded into areas that its actual ability and will to defend is legitimately questioned. Ukraine membership will stretch this credibility even further. Is it "good" for them and is it "good" for NATO? IMO, it is not unless the NATO nations "mean it" and their commitment is credible. As of now, those conditions do not exist.

[Leftcoast]

Agreed, Goose. 

I am NOT a fan of making the list of countries I-will-send-our-sons-to-die-for overly large.  Western Europe yes.  Baltics and a bunch of ex-Soviet satellite states?  Not so much.

On the other hand, providing Ukraine the materiel to stave off Russia is very much in our interest and at this point the Russian Bear has been exposed as more growl than claw and I'm very pleased with that. 

So let's support Ukraine, let's reduce Russian land forces, and make them less hungry for a land war on their Western front.  Let's not create alliances we don't whole heartedly support or make promises we do not plan to back.

/Leftcoast

[Leftcoast]

Agreed, Goose. 

I am NOT a fan of making the list of countries I-will-send-our-sons-to-die-for overly large.  Western Europe yes.  Baltics and a bunch of ex-Soviet satellite states?  Not so much.

On the other hand, providing Ukraine the materiel to stave off Russia is very much in our interest and at this point the Russian Bear has been exposed as more growl than claw and I'm very pleased with that. 

So let's support Ukraine, let's reduce Russian land forces, and make them less hungry for a land war on their Western front.  Let's not create alliances we don't whole heartedly support or make promises we do not plan to back.

/Leftcoast

[Goose]

Agreed, Goose. 

I am NOT a fan of making the list of countries I-will-send-our-sons-to-die-for overly large.  Western Europe yes.  Baltics and a bunch of ex-Soviet satellite states?  Not so much.

Agree, but it's too late. These countries are already in NATO and the idea of having "second class" NATO members just isn't viable. We and the other NATO members are "on the hook" and for NATO to continue its role in the world the US is going to have to lobby like mad, beg, plead, threaten, whatever to convince everybody (including doubters in the US) that we must uphold our obligations. No way to walk it back now.

There were arguably compelling political justifications for admitting the ex-Soviet satellite states. It would have been better for all concerned if the politicians making those decisions took seriously the increased risk and obligation their nations were assuming and maintained a military posture sufficient to preclude anybody being willing to test the system. Unfortunately, they did the opposite, including in the USA.

On the other hand, providing Ukraine the materiel to stave off Russia is very much in our interest and at this point the Russian Bear has been exposed as more growl than claw and I'm very pleased with that.

Me too! It amazes me that anybody could believe otherwise. Another important point is that lots of the supposed "expense" of this effort is an accounting quirk, not reality. Much of the material is surplus to requirements and/or obsolete. It cost us a lot when we bought it, but it's actual value is much less because we don't intend to use it and will eventually scrap it. What we hear about is the "cost", not the "present value". No actual cash is being spent that we will have to borrow money to pay (other than transportation costs).

So let's support Ukraine, let's reduce Russian land forces, and make them less hungry for a land war on their Western front.  Let's not create alliances we don't whole heartedly support or make promises we do not plan to back.

/Leftcoast

Agree. It is important for everybody to be realistic about what the various NATO nations are actually willing and able to do. IMO Ukraine would actually be better off with bilateral treaties with countries that can actually help them and that will probably actually do so. For them, an Israel-like relationship to the US would be superior to being a NATO member IMO. Pretty sure their public wouldn't agree though, because they don't realize at the end of the day NATO members don't really have an obligation to act.

[Goose]

Agreed, Goose. 

I am NOT a fan of making the list of countries I-will-send-our-sons-to-die-for overly large.  Western Europe yes.  Baltics and a bunch of ex-Soviet satellite states?  Not so much.

Agree, but it's too late. These countries are already in NATO and the idea of having "second class" NATO members just isn't viable. We and the other NATO members are "on the hook" and for NATO to continue its role in the world the US is going to have to lobby like mad, beg, plead, threaten, whatever to convince everybody (including doubters in the US) that we must uphold our obligations. No way to walk it back now.

There were arguably compelling political justifications for admitting the ex-Soviet satellite states. It would have been better for all concerned if the politicians making those decisions took seriously the increased risk and obligation their nations were assuming and maintained a military posture sufficient to preclude anybody being willing to test the system. Unfortunately, they did the opposite, including in the USA.

On the other hand, providing Ukraine the materiel to stave off Russia is very much in our interest and at this point the Russian Bear has been exposed as more growl than claw and I'm very pleased with that.

Me too! It amazes me that anybody could believe otherwise. Another important point is that lots of the supposed "expense" of this effort is an accounting quirk, not reality. Much of the material is surplus to requirements and/or obsolete. It cost us a lot when we bought it, but it's actual value is much less because we don't intend to use it and will eventually scrap it. What we hear about is the "cost", not the "present value". No actual cash is being spent that we will have to borrow money to pay (other than transportation costs).

So let's support Ukraine, let's reduce Russian land forces, and make them less hungry for a land war on their Western front.  Let's not create alliances we don't whole heartedly support or make promises we do not plan to back.

/Leftcoast

Agree. It is important for everybody to be realistic about what the various NATO nations are actually willing and able to do. IMO Ukraine would actually be better off with bilateral treaties with countries that can actually help them and that will probably actually do so. For them, an Israel-like relationship to the US would be superior to being a NATO member IMO. Pretty sure their public wouldn't agree though, because they don't realize at the end of the day NATO members don't really have an obligation to act.