[GK3]

An interesting article on Ukraine's drone attacks against Russian oil and gas industry.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambli...74ee632355

Makes one think about how many drones you can build for the price of one F16. The F16's are clearly needed, but the explosive growth of the drone segment of the Ukrainian military is significant. I would assume our military and that of our allies our paying attention to what is going on and what works and what doesn't.

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?  

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

[GK3]

An interesting article on Ukraine's drone attacks against Russian oil and gas industry.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambli...74ee632355

Makes one think about how many drones you can build for the price of one F16. The F16's are clearly needed, but the explosive growth of the drone segment of the Ukrainian military is significant. I would assume our military and that of our allies our paying attention to what is going on and what works and what doesn't.

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?  

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

[Goose]

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?

Russia unfortunately already has LOTS of what is needed to defend against "medium sized" drones in the class of Shahed-xxx. Ukraine has been using old, obsolete Gepard AAA systems against drones of this class. Russia built 6,500 ZSU-23-4s (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka) which are similar in capability. They have plenty sitting around. Their radar ("Gun Dish" https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...88.en.html) is "good enough" for this task. Russia would need to get them out of long-term storage, fix them up well enough to work, and surround the critical infrastructure at the ports with them. Russia can do this. It is not a "high-tech, high cost" activity. It is mostly a manpower intensive job and I imagine lots of soldiers would volunteer for this duty. Beats the trenches in Ukraine. One does need lots of them because of their short effective range, but like the Gepard they work great against targets that have no SEAD capability. Zoo-23s were used by the North Vietnamese. They were a significant problem until the Shrike came along. After that, not so much. FWIW Ukraine uses ZSU-23-4Ms themselves.

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

I totally agree that the more Ukraine can demonstrate the capability to "hurt" Russia, even minimally, the more problems the regime must confront. It is also correct that some of this damage actually will require a response. It does raise questions of confidence to go along with any real damage it causes. However, I would caution that it also angers the public against the Ukrainians. While eventually the public may begin to question why Putin put them in such a difficult position, that only comes "later" and only if the problems are serious enough to "matter". The anger comes immediately and will be fanned by the Russian government for their own ends. It is a very non-linear process and it will significantly strengthen Putin in the near term. He may even be able to get away with a "mobilization" in response to the "threat". It is still important for Ukraine to do these things, but it is equally important to understand the probable results. I expect Ukraine does already know this.

As far as Putin leaving power, the tendency has been to assume that is a near-term probability. IMO that isn't a "good" assumption. While Putin is 71, Biden is 81. Trump is 77. Of course, any of us could die tomorrow, but I am pretty sure Putin fully expects to be around in 10 years. He will act accordingly. If it means a long war, so be it.

[Goose]

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?

Russia unfortunately already has LOTS of what is needed to defend against "medium sized" drones in the class of Shahed-xxx. Ukraine has been using old, obsolete Gepard AAA systems against drones of this class. Russia built 6,500 ZSU-23-4s (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka) which are similar in capability. They have plenty sitting around. Their radar ("Gun Dish" https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...88.en.html) is "good enough" for this task. Russia would need to get them out of long-term storage, fix them up well enough to work, and surround the critical infrastructure at the ports with them. Russia can do this. It is not a "high-tech, high cost" activity. It is mostly a manpower intensive job and I imagine lots of soldiers would volunteer for this duty. Beats the trenches in Ukraine. One does need lots of them because of their short effective range, but like the Gepard they work great against targets that have no SEAD capability. Zoo-23s were used by the North Vietnamese. They were a significant problem until the Shrike came along. After that, not so much. FWIW Ukraine uses ZSU-23-4Ms themselves.

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

I totally agree that the more Ukraine can demonstrate the capability to "hurt" Russia, even minimally, the more problems the regime must confront. It is also correct that some of this damage actually will require a response. It does raise questions of confidence to go along with any real damage it causes. However, I would caution that it also angers the public against the Ukrainians. While eventually the public may begin to question why Putin put them in such a difficult position, that only comes "later" and only if the problems are serious enough to "matter". The anger comes immediately and will be fanned by the Russian government for their own ends. It is a very non-linear process and it will significantly strengthen Putin in the near term. He may even be able to get away with a "mobilization" in response to the "threat". It is still important for Ukraine to do these things, but it is equally important to understand the probable results. I expect Ukraine does already know this.

As far as Putin leaving power, the tendency has been to assume that is a near-term probability. IMO that isn't a "good" assumption. While Putin is 71, Biden is 81. Trump is 77. Of course, any of us could die tomorrow, but I am pretty sure Putin fully expects to be around in 10 years. He will act accordingly. If it means a long war, so be it.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-approves-f...00191.html

It looks like the "exchange of hostages" is complete. This is great news. Even better news is that once Türkiye approved Sweden and delivered notice of approval, they can't take it back.

Now we will see if Hungary really has a quid pro quo or is just pandering to the base. Either way, it could take "a while". I hope it is the fighter lease that is the issue. That can be negotiated. Domestic politics often cannot.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-approves-f...00191.html

It looks like the "exchange of hostages" is complete. This is great news. Even better news is that once Türkiye approved Sweden and delivered notice of approval, they can't take it back.

Now we will see if Hungary really has a quid pro quo or is just pandering to the base. Either way, it could take "a while". I hope it is the fighter lease that is the issue. That can be negotiated. Domestic politics often cannot.

[GK3]

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?

Russia unfortunately already has LOTS of what is needed to defend against "medium sized" drones in the class of Shahed-xxx. Ukraine has been using old, obsolete Gepard AAA systems against drones of this class. Russia built 6,500 ZSU-23-4s (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka) which are similar in capability. They have plenty sitting around. Their radar ("Gun Dish" https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...88.en.html) is "good enough" for this task. Russia would need to get them out of long-term storage, fix them up well enough to work, and surround the critical infrastructure at the ports with them. Russia can do this. It is not a "high-tech, high cost" activity. It is mostly a manpower intensive job and I imagine lots of soldiers would volunteer for this duty. Beats the trenches in Ukraine. One does need lots of them because of their short effective range, but like the Gepard they work great against targets that have no SEAD capability. Zoo-23s were used by the North Vietnamese. They were a significant problem until the Shrike came along. After that, not so much. FWIW Ukraine uses ZSU-23-4Ms themselves.

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

I totally agree that the more Ukraine can demonstrate the capability to "hurt" Russia, even minimally, the more problems the regime must confront. It is also correct that some of this damage actually will require a response. It does raise questions of confidence to go along with any real damage it causes. However, I would caution that it also angers the public against the Ukrainians. While eventually the public may begin to question why Putin put them in such a difficult position, that only comes "later" and only if the problems are serious enough to "matter". The anger comes immediately and will be fanned by the Russian government for their own ends. It is a very non-linear process and it will significantly strengthen Putin in the near term. He may even be able to get away with a "mobilization" in response to the "threat". It is still important for Ukraine to do these things, but it is equally important to understand the probable results. I expect Ukraine does already know this.

As far as Putin leaving power, the tendency has been to assume that is a near-term probability. IMO that isn't a "good" assumption. While Putin is 71, Biden is 81. Trump is 77. Of course, any of us could die tomorrow, but I am pretty sure Putin fully expects to be around in 10 years. He will act accordingly. If it means a long war, so be it.

The Putin question remains in the hands of someone who isn't talking.  I am still walking around and I was in high school when Putin was born.  I understand that the drone attacks could help Putin drum up an out pouring of nationalism in favor of the war, but the same event could hit his Siloviki where it really hurts, their pocket book.
I also understand Russia never throws anything away and they have lots of old equipment that can be put to work, but do they have enough trained personnel to do that with any kind of speed? Has the so-called "brain drain" really hurt Russia's ability to rapidly rehab older equipment?  It is one thing to have all that stuff, but if the best you can is two or three hundred a year, it may not be enough.;

[GK3]

Almost all militaries are paying attention. The problem is what conclusions should be drawn from what they see. The war in Ukraine has many very unique characteristics that may or may not be applicable to wars "in general". The world's militaries have a long history of preparing to re-fight the last war. When the next war comes, it is then substantially different from the war they prepared to fight. There is also a very long history of journalists writing articles about the impact of "new weapons" or "new tactics" that turn out to be totally misguided a month or so later.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using drones in many cases because they have no alternative weapons system they can deploy. In very few cases is the drone the "best" choice, but is the one they can build in quantity. Ukraine can certainly impose a "cost" on Russia to defend itself against these drone attacks. The idea that such defense is "impossible" is refuted by Ukraine's own efforts against the Shaheds. Russia can pretty easily defend the 5 "critical" ports, but they have to actually do it. That imposes a cost, and such defense is never perfect. That said, Ukraine hasn't built a "war winner".

True enough, the drones are not war winners but Russia has I think limited resources and it can order up all kinds of stuff, but how much of what they want can they buy or build?

Russia unfortunately already has LOTS of what is needed to defend against "medium sized" drones in the class of Shahed-xxx. Ukraine has been using old, obsolete Gepard AAA systems against drones of this class. Russia built 6,500 ZSU-23-4s (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZSU-23-4_Shilka) which are similar in capability. They have plenty sitting around. Their radar ("Gun Dish" https://www.radartutorial.eu/19.kartei/1...88.en.html) is "good enough" for this task. Russia would need to get them out of long-term storage, fix them up well enough to work, and surround the critical infrastructure at the ports with them. Russia can do this. It is not a "high-tech, high cost" activity. It is mostly a manpower intensive job and I imagine lots of soldiers would volunteer for this duty. Beats the trenches in Ukraine. One does need lots of them because of their short effective range, but like the Gepard they work great against targets that have no SEAD capability. Zoo-23s were used by the North Vietnamese. They were a significant problem until the Shrike came along. After that, not so much. FWIW Ukraine uses ZSU-23-4Ms themselves.

The more holes Ukraine punches in Putin's balloon will only make life harder for him. He might find himself too close to an upper story  window. The more hits on Mother Russia will on one hand gain him some support, but on the other hand he will lose some.  At what, 71? his remaining time in the saddle is limited.

I totally agree that the more Ukraine can demonstrate the capability to "hurt" Russia, even minimally, the more problems the regime must confront. It is also correct that some of this damage actually will require a response. It does raise questions of confidence to go along with any real damage it causes. However, I would caution that it also angers the public against the Ukrainians. While eventually the public may begin to question why Putin put them in such a difficult position, that only comes "later" and only if the problems are serious enough to "matter". The anger comes immediately and will be fanned by the Russian government for their own ends. It is a very non-linear process and it will significantly strengthen Putin in the near term. He may even be able to get away with a "mobilization" in response to the "threat". It is still important for Ukraine to do these things, but it is equally important to understand the probable results. I expect Ukraine does already know this.

As far as Putin leaving power, the tendency has been to assume that is a near-term probability. IMO that isn't a "good" assumption. While Putin is 71, Biden is 81. Trump is 77. Of course, any of us could die tomorrow, but I am pretty sure Putin fully expects to be around in 10 years. He will act accordingly. If it means a long war, so be it.

The Putin question remains in the hands of someone who isn't talking.  I am still walking around and I was in high school when Putin was born.  I understand that the drone attacks could help Putin drum up an out pouring of nationalism in favor of the war, but the same event could hit his Siloviki where it really hurts, their pocket book.
I also understand Russia never throws anything away and they have lots of old equipment that can be put to work, but do they have enough trained personnel to do that with any kind of speed? Has the so-called "brain drain" really hurt Russia's ability to rapidly rehab older equipment?  It is one thing to have all that stuff, but if the best you can is two or three hundred a year, it may not be enough.;

[Goose]

The Putin question remains in the hands of someone who isn't talking.  I am still walking around and I was in high school when Putin was born.  I understand that the drone attacks could help Putin drum up an out pouring of nationalism in favor of the war, but the same event could hit his Siloviki where it really hurts, their pocket book.

It is true that Ukraine taking the war into Russia proper could cost the Siloviki money. The war itself, Ukrainian drone offensives aside, has already cost many of them lots of money. However, the Siloviki are all Putin's creatures. They exist and prosper because of him. They don't trust each other (with good reason) and jockey for position (and profit) among themselves. They have virtually no political power.  If one of them gets out of his lane (or "somebody" says he might), he falls out of a window. These people are similar to the Russian nobility under the Tsars. The rest of the world was always expecting the nobility to "do something" about "bad" Tsars. It never happened. They knew, as the Siloviki know, if the Tsar goes, they go too, and probably faster. They aren't going to do anything to weaken Putin, let alone replace him, no matter what he does.

I also understand Russia never throws anything away and they have lots of old equipment that can be put to work, but do they have enough trained personnel to do that with any kind of speed? Has the so-called "brain drain" really hurt Russia's ability to rapidly rehab older equipment?  It is one thing to have all that stuff, but if the best you can is two or three hundred a year, it may not be enough.;

There are many things in Russia that are affected by emigration/lack of trained personnel. In general, rehabbing old equipment isn't one of them. There are lots of ex-servicemen that worked on ZSU-23-4s for years. Literally tens of thousands. Many of them have died, but there are many still extant. Some are actually young, as the ZSU-23-4 is still used actively by the Russian military.  Getting the people isn't the problem. Russian also has lots of experience with organizing masses of people to do things. It isn't efficient, but if it can be done by "brute force", Russia can do it. If you are talking about upgrades to older equipment, that is a different story.

We in the west are always surprised how Russia keeps doing things we thought they couldn't. If they did it the way we would attack the same task, they probably couldn't do it. However, their approach is different and "works" for them. For example, Russia has greatly expanded (at least doubled) it's production of artillery shells by creating factories in old shopping malls (among other similar expedients). Of course, that is unsafe for the surrounding populace, but they don't care. They are now producing twice as many shells, today, as NATO estimated they could. We of course have contracts in place that will double our production in 2025 :-(. Russia is just "different".

[Goose]

The Putin question remains in the hands of someone who isn't talking.  I am still walking around and I was in high school when Putin was born.  I understand that the drone attacks could help Putin drum up an out pouring of nationalism in favor of the war, but the same event could hit his Siloviki where it really hurts, their pocket book.

It is true that Ukraine taking the war into Russia proper could cost the Siloviki money. The war itself, Ukrainian drone offensives aside, has already cost many of them lots of money. However, the Siloviki are all Putin's creatures. They exist and prosper because of him. They don't trust each other (with good reason) and jockey for position (and profit) among themselves. They have virtually no political power.  If one of them gets out of his lane (or "somebody" says he might), he falls out of a window. These people are similar to the Russian nobility under the Tsars. The rest of the world was always expecting the nobility to "do something" about "bad" Tsars. It never happened. They knew, as the Siloviki know, if the Tsar goes, they go too, and probably faster. They aren't going to do anything to weaken Putin, let alone replace him, no matter what he does.

I also understand Russia never throws anything away and they have lots of old equipment that can be put to work, but do they have enough trained personnel to do that with any kind of speed? Has the so-called "brain drain" really hurt Russia's ability to rapidly rehab older equipment?  It is one thing to have all that stuff, but if the best you can is two or three hundred a year, it may not be enough.;

There are many things in Russia that are affected by emigration/lack of trained personnel. In general, rehabbing old equipment isn't one of them. There are lots of ex-servicemen that worked on ZSU-23-4s for years. Literally tens of thousands. Many of them have died, but there are many still extant. Some are actually young, as the ZSU-23-4 is still used actively by the Russian military.  Getting the people isn't the problem. Russian also has lots of experience with organizing masses of people to do things. It isn't efficient, but if it can be done by "brute force", Russia can do it. If you are talking about upgrades to older equipment, that is a different story.

We in the west are always surprised how Russia keeps doing things we thought they couldn't. If they did it the way we would attack the same task, they probably couldn't do it. However, their approach is different and "works" for them. For example, Russia has greatly expanded (at least doubled) it's production of artillery shells by creating factories in old shopping malls (among other similar expedients). Of course, that is unsafe for the surrounding populace, but they don't care. They are now producing twice as many shells, today, as NATO estimated they could. We of course have contracts in place that will double our production in 2025 :-(. Russia is just "different".

[GK3]

The Putin question remains in the hands of someone who isn't talking.  I am still walking around and I was in high school when Putin was born.  I understand that the drone attacks could help Putin drum up an out pouring of nationalism in favor of the war, but the same event could hit his Siloviki where it really hurts, their pocket book.

It is true that Ukraine taking the war into Russia proper could cost the Siloviki money. The war itself, Ukrainian drone offensives aside, has already cost many of them lots of money. However, the Siloviki are all Putin's creatures. They exist and prosper because of him. They don't trust each other (with good reason) and jockey for position (and profit) among themselves. They have virtually no political power.  If one of them gets out of his lane (or "somebody" says he might), he falls out of a window. These people are similar to the Russian nobility under the Tsars. The rest of the world was always expecting the nobility to "do something" about "bad" Tsars. It never happened. They knew, as the Siloviki know, if the Tsar goes, they go too, and probably faster. They aren't going to do anything to weaken Putin, let alone replace him, no matter what he does.

I also understand Russia never throws anything away and they have lots of old equipment that can be put to work, but do they have enough trained personnel to do that with any kind of speed? Has the so-called "brain drain" really hurt Russia's ability to rapidly rehab older equipment?  It is one thing to have all that stuff, but if the best you can is two or three hundred a year, it may not be enough.;

There are many things in Russia that are affected by emigration/lack of trained personnel. In general, rehabbing old equipment isn't one of them. There are lots of ex-servicemen that worked on ZSU-23-4s for years. Literally tens of thousands. Many of them have died, but there are many still extant. Some are actually young, as the ZSU-23-4 is still used actively by the Russian military.  Getting the people isn't the problem. Russian also has lots of experience with organizing masses of people to do things. It isn't efficient, but if it can be done by "brute force", Russia can do it. If you are talking about upgrades to older equipment, that is a different story.

We in the west are always surprised how Russia keeps doing things we thought they couldn't. If they did it the way we would attack the same task, they probably couldn't do it. However, their approach is different and "works" for them. For example, Russia has greatly expanded (at least doubled) it's production of artillery shells by creating factories in old shopping malls (among other similar expedients). Of course, that is unsafe for the surrounding populace, but they don't care. They are now producing twice as many shells, today, as NATO estimated they could. We of course have contracts in place that will double our production in 2025 :-(. Russia is just "different".

Good point that Putin et al are just the Tsar in different clothing.
I guess going from the Czar, to Stalin and his subsequent successors now gives us Putin pretending he is leading a free society.  The people simply having known much else.

[GK3]

The Putin question remains in the hands of someone who isn't talking.  I am still walking around and I was in high school when Putin was born.  I understand that the drone attacks could help Putin drum up an out pouring of nationalism in favor of the war, but the same event could hit his Siloviki where it really hurts, their pocket book.

It is true that Ukraine taking the war into Russia proper could cost the Siloviki money. The war itself, Ukrainian drone offensives aside, has already cost many of them lots of money. However, the Siloviki are all Putin's creatures. They exist and prosper because of him. They don't trust each other (with good reason) and jockey for position (and profit) among themselves. They have virtually no political power.  If one of them gets out of his lane (or "somebody" says he might), he falls out of a window. These people are similar to the Russian nobility under the Tsars. The rest of the world was always expecting the nobility to "do something" about "bad" Tsars. It never happened. They knew, as the Siloviki know, if the Tsar goes, they go too, and probably faster. They aren't going to do anything to weaken Putin, let alone replace him, no matter what he does.

I also understand Russia never throws anything away and they have lots of old equipment that can be put to work, but do they have enough trained personnel to do that with any kind of speed? Has the so-called "brain drain" really hurt Russia's ability to rapidly rehab older equipment?  It is one thing to have all that stuff, but if the best you can is two or three hundred a year, it may not be enough.;

There are many things in Russia that are affected by emigration/lack of trained personnel. In general, rehabbing old equipment isn't one of them. There are lots of ex-servicemen that worked on ZSU-23-4s for years. Literally tens of thousands. Many of them have died, but there are many still extant. Some are actually young, as the ZSU-23-4 is still used actively by the Russian military.  Getting the people isn't the problem. Russian also has lots of experience with organizing masses of people to do things. It isn't efficient, but if it can be done by "brute force", Russia can do it. If you are talking about upgrades to older equipment, that is a different story.

We in the west are always surprised how Russia keeps doing things we thought they couldn't. If they did it the way we would attack the same task, they probably couldn't do it. However, their approach is different and "works" for them. For example, Russia has greatly expanded (at least doubled) it's production of artillery shells by creating factories in old shopping malls (among other similar expedients). Of course, that is unsafe for the surrounding populace, but they don't care. They are now producing twice as many shells, today, as NATO estimated they could. We of course have contracts in place that will double our production in 2025 :-(. Russia is just "different".

Good point that Putin et al are just the Tsar in different clothing.
I guess going from the Czar, to Stalin and his subsequent successors now gives us Putin pretending he is leading a free society.  The people simply having known much else.

[82lsju]

not sure if this is new news or been discussed here previously as the intention to supply this device was apparently announced about a year ago

The Pentagon has successfully tested a new long-range precision bomb for Ukraine that is expected to arrive on the battlefield as soon as Wednesday, according to a U.S. official and three other people with knowledge of the talks.

Ukraine will receive its first batch of Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, a brand new long-range weapon made by Boeing that even the U.S. doesn’t have in its inventory, according to the four people, all of whom were granted anonymity to discuss matters ahead of an announcement.

The new bomb, which can travel about 90 miles, is expected to be “a significant capability for Ukraine,” said the U.S. official.

“It gives them a deeper strike capability they haven’t had, it complements their long-range fire arsenal,” the U.S. official said. “It’s just an extra arrow in the quiver that’s gonna allow them to do more.”

An Army spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The weapon, co-developed by Boeing and Saab, is made up of a precision-guided 250-pound bomb strapped to a rocket motor and fired from various ground launchers. The U.S. military has a similar version of the bomb that is air-launched, but a ground-launched version does not yet exist in U.S. inventory.

The Pentagon announced last February that the Biden administration was providing the new bomb to Ukraine. But before sending the new version, the U.S. military needed to test the weapon — and that took many months.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/30...lid=964328

[82lsju]

not sure if this is new news or been discussed here previously as the intention to supply this device was apparently announced about a year ago

The Pentagon has successfully tested a new long-range precision bomb for Ukraine that is expected to arrive on the battlefield as soon as Wednesday, according to a U.S. official and three other people with knowledge of the talks.

Ukraine will receive its first batch of Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, a brand new long-range weapon made by Boeing that even the U.S. doesn’t have in its inventory, according to the four people, all of whom were granted anonymity to discuss matters ahead of an announcement.

The new bomb, which can travel about 90 miles, is expected to be “a significant capability for Ukraine,” said the U.S. official.

“It gives them a deeper strike capability they haven’t had, it complements their long-range fire arsenal,” the U.S. official said. “It’s just an extra arrow in the quiver that’s gonna allow them to do more.”

An Army spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The weapon, co-developed by Boeing and Saab, is made up of a precision-guided 250-pound bomb strapped to a rocket motor and fired from various ground launchers. The U.S. military has a similar version of the bomb that is air-launched, but a ground-launched version does not yet exist in U.S. inventory.

The Pentagon announced last February that the Biden administration was providing the new bomb to Ukraine. But before sending the new version, the U.S. military needed to test the weapon — and that took many months.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/30...lid=964328

[Goose]

not sure if this is new news or been discussed here previously as the intention to supply this device was apparently announced about a year ago

The Pentagon has successfully tested a new long-range precision bomb for Ukraine that is expected to arrive on the battlefield as soon as Wednesday, according to a U.S. official and three other people with knowledge of the talks.

Ukraine will receive its first batch of Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, a brand new long-range weapon made by Boeing that even the U.S. doesn’t have in its inventory, according to the four people, all of whom were granted anonymity to discuss matters ahead of an announcement.

The new bomb, which can travel about 90 miles, is expected to be “a significant capability for Ukraine,” said the U.S. official.

“It gives them a deeper strike capability they haven’t had, it complements their long-range fire arsenal,” the U.S. official said. “It’s just an extra arrow in the quiver that’s gonna allow them to do more.”

An Army spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The weapon, co-developed by Boeing and Saab, is made up of a precision-guided 250-pound bomb strapped to a rocket motor and fired from various ground launchers. The U.S. military has a similar version of the bomb that is air-launched, but a ground-launched version does not yet exist in U.S. inventory.

The Pentagon announced last February that the Biden administration was providing the new bomb to Ukraine. But before sending the new version, the U.S. military needed to test the weapon — and that took many months.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/30...lid=964328

This is actually a bit of corporate welfare, but it is good for Ukraine to have a weapon of this class. Since they are the first users of this weapon, they will endure whatever teething problems it may have. It would be interesting to know if this weapon has a "jam resistant" GPS that is near the US state of the art. Since it is a "new" weapon, it very well may. If it does, that could become a very big deal for Ukraine. They can use this weapon to knock out the GPS jammers in a given area and then immediately hit the intended targets with other GPS guided weapons that are not jam resistant (like JDAMs). Definition of a force multiplier.

https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid381001
As I said back then, the US isn't going to deliver a system that has not been tested by the US military. Indeed they didn't do so. The GLSDB went through an operational test. It still is not projected as a weapon the US will buy for it's own troops. After all, we do have an air force :-). My question still is how many are actually ready to ship. They have has almost a year to build them, but that isn't a lot of time these days. Inventory is probably still "small".

[Goose]

not sure if this is new news or been discussed here previously as the intention to supply this device was apparently announced about a year ago

The Pentagon has successfully tested a new long-range precision bomb for Ukraine that is expected to arrive on the battlefield as soon as Wednesday, according to a U.S. official and three other people with knowledge of the talks.

Ukraine will receive its first batch of Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs, a brand new long-range weapon made by Boeing that even the U.S. doesn’t have in its inventory, according to the four people, all of whom were granted anonymity to discuss matters ahead of an announcement.

The new bomb, which can travel about 90 miles, is expected to be “a significant capability for Ukraine,” said the U.S. official.

“It gives them a deeper strike capability they haven’t had, it complements their long-range fire arsenal,” the U.S. official said. “It’s just an extra arrow in the quiver that’s gonna allow them to do more.”

An Army spokesperson did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The weapon, co-developed by Boeing and Saab, is made up of a precision-guided 250-pound bomb strapped to a rocket motor and fired from various ground launchers. The U.S. military has a similar version of the bomb that is air-launched, but a ground-launched version does not yet exist in U.S. inventory.

The Pentagon announced last February that the Biden administration was providing the new bomb to Ukraine. But before sending the new version, the U.S. military needed to test the weapon — and that took many months.

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/01/30...lid=964328

This is actually a bit of corporate welfare, but it is good for Ukraine to have a weapon of this class. Since they are the first users of this weapon, they will endure whatever teething problems it may have. It would be interesting to know if this weapon has a "jam resistant" GPS that is near the US state of the art. Since it is a "new" weapon, it very well may. If it does, that could become a very big deal for Ukraine. They can use this weapon to knock out the GPS jammers in a given area and then immediately hit the intended targets with other GPS guided weapons that are not jam resistant (like JDAMs). Definition of a force multiplier.

https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid381001
As I said back then, the US isn't going to deliver a system that has not been tested by the US military. Indeed they didn't do so. The GLSDB went through an operational test. It still is not projected as a weapon the US will buy for it's own troops. After all, we do have an air force :-). My question still is how many are actually ready to ship. They have has almost a year to build them, but that isn't a lot of time these days. Inventory is probably still "small".

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-getti...11944.html

In a press release from September 2022, Saab said it featured a Laser SDB variant, supported by a "highly" jamming-resistant GPS.

So it appears they are indeed getting the "high-price spread" GPS :-). This can be a real "enabler" to the other less "jamming-resistant" PGMs Ukraine has.  The question is how many missiles are they getting. It would be very unfortunate if the production capacity is single digits a month or anything like it. Ukraine needs "lots" of these weapons.

Along those lines, it would be very nice if the US would provide some JASSM/LRASM missiles to go along with the F-16 Ukraine will get from EU countries. These missiles are "stealthy" and are equipped with jam-resistant GPS. The LRASM also can carry a jammer and can operate in anti-radiation mode. That capability can definitely put paid to any Russian air search radars anywhere in Ukraine (including Crimea).  These missiles can also reach the Kerch bridge. Ukraine would have to penetrate into South Kherson airspace (or the Sea of Azov) to do the launch, but that is doable and very much worth the effort if it destroys the bridge.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM
Note that the JASSM shares the production line with LRASM. They are the same missile with different guidance packages.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-getti...11944.html

In a press release from September 2022, Saab said it featured a Laser SDB variant, supported by a "highly" jamming-resistant GPS.

So it appears they are indeed getting the "high-price spread" GPS :-). This can be a real "enabler" to the other less "jamming-resistant" PGMs Ukraine has.  The question is how many missiles are they getting. It would be very unfortunate if the production capacity is single digits a month or anything like it. Ukraine needs "lots" of these weapons.

Along those lines, it would be very nice if the US would provide some JASSM/LRASM missiles to go along with the F-16 Ukraine will get from EU countries. These missiles are "stealthy" and are equipped with jam-resistant GPS. The LRASM also can carry a jammer and can operate in anti-radiation mode. That capability can definitely put paid to any Russian air search radars anywhere in Ukraine (including Crimea).  These missiles can also reach the Kerch bridge. Ukraine would have to penetrate into South Kherson airspace (or the Sea of Azov) to do the launch, but that is doable and very much worth the effort if it destroys the bridge.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM
Note that the JASSM shares the production line with LRASM. They are the same missile with different guidance packages.

[dabigv13]

Impressive video of Russia's black sea fleet shrinking once more.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1753011...40859?s=20

[dabigv13]

Impressive video of Russia's black sea fleet shrinking once more.

https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1753011...40859?s=20

[Goose]

IMO the following article is nonsense and a prime example of drawing the wrong conclusions going forward from the Ukraine war.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-expe...06094.html

First of all, the US has really never had a SAM system as anything but a secondary focus. The primary form of air defense is and always has been our air force. The Nike, Hawk, and Patriot were/are very good systems, but they were never available in large enough numbers to provide anything but a basic point defense against "leakers".  The main difference today is that point defense against tactical ballistic missiles (all Russian FROG missiles, such as SCD, TOR, Iskander-M) must be provided by high capability missiles. Drones and cruise missiles are an air force problem. For that reason, the basic premise of the article is wrong regarding the US military. The US also performs SEAD/DEAD plans that has (and hopefully will in the future) eliminated the enemy ground based defenses against air attack. We have an effective anti-radiation missile program that at the very least makes them keep their heads down.

Ukraine has none of the above. They rely on their SAM systems because they effectively have no fixed wing air defense. Yes, the US doesn't have a lot to give them because we don't intend to fight that way. Given an unlimited budget, one could have both. The Soviet Union at least tried to do that (arguably with little success). They discovered they didn't have an unlimited budget :-). The US does not either and has chosen a different path than Ukraine was forced to follow. That doesn't mean our path is "wrong", it just means we aren't in an ideal place to help Ukraine on theirs.

[Goose]

IMO the following article is nonsense and a prime example of drawing the wrong conclusions going forward from the Ukraine war.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraines-expe...06094.html

First of all, the US has really never had a SAM system as anything but a secondary focus. The primary form of air defense is and always has been our air force. The Nike, Hawk, and Patriot were/are very good systems, but they were never available in large enough numbers to provide anything but a basic point defense against "leakers".  The main difference today is that point defense against tactical ballistic missiles (all Russian FROG missiles, such as SCD, TOR, Iskander-M) must be provided by high capability missiles. Drones and cruise missiles are an air force problem. For that reason, the basic premise of the article is wrong regarding the US military. The US also performs SEAD/DEAD plans that has (and hopefully will in the future) eliminated the enemy ground based defenses against air attack. We have an effective anti-radiation missile program that at the very least makes them keep their heads down.

Ukraine has none of the above. They rely on their SAM systems because they effectively have no fixed wing air defense. Yes, the US doesn't have a lot to give them because we don't intend to fight that way. Given an unlimited budget, one could have both. The Soviet Union at least tried to do that (arguably with little success). They discovered they didn't have an unlimited budget :-). The US does not either and has chosen a different path than Ukraine was forced to follow. That doesn't mean our path is "wrong", it just means we aren't in an ideal place to help Ukraine on theirs.

[TrumpCard]

The EU got Hungary to agree to the 50 billion Euro aid package with no clear veto right during the next 4 years:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-...024-02-01/

Next up, U.S. funding for Ukraine, which may take some time.

Also possibly coming soon, Swedish accession to NATO, which may not provide a material boost to Ukraine right away, but which still seems important as part of a longer term strategy to mitigate the Russian threat.

[TrumpCard]

The EU got Hungary to agree to the 50 billion Euro aid package with no clear veto right during the next 4 years:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-...024-02-01/

Next up, U.S. funding for Ukraine, which may take some time.

Also possibly coming soon, Swedish accession to NATO, which may not provide a material boost to Ukraine right away, but which still seems important as part of a longer term strategy to mitigate the Russian threat.

[Goose]

The EU got Hungary to agree to the 50 billion Euro aid package with no clear veto right during the next 4 years:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-...024-02-01/

Indeed good news. I am almost certain Hungary (Orbán) was promised something for getting out of the way. However, it probably wasn't much. The EU getting fed up with Hungary's obstructionism may have scared Orbán more than any negative domestic political fallout did.

Next up, U.S. funding for Ukraine, which may take some time.

Unfortunately, you may be correct. It may be "a while" before the House finally passes something. Right now, the US is sending weapons to other friendly nations (Greece) with the understanding they will immediately be donated to Ukraine. This helps a bit, but is not a fully powered "work-around". Hopefully things will get sorted "soon".

Also possibly coming soon, Swedish accession to NATO, which may not provide a material boost to Ukraine right away, but which still seems important as part of a longer term strategy to mitigate the Russian threat.

Swedish accession to NATO is important in practice because only then can they get access to NATO communications codes and intelligence data. In particular, fully "NATO Standard" IFF will need to be provided for their aircraft. It is probable the hardware is capable already, but they need the codes and protocols. Sweden undoubtedly has some significant info that they are holding back until they are fully "inside the tent". The full integration of Swedish assets into NATO will not happen instantaneously. The sooner it starts the more effective it will be.

IMO Orbán is going to hold out for a "good deal" on the renewal and expansion of the Gripen lease. I think he will get it pretty fast, as it doesn't really cost Sweden much "real" money. Sweden can view it as "foreign aid" to a fellow NATO nation and claim it enhances Swedish security. Orbán can claim victory for domestic consumption. Sweden will get into NATO at a minimal cost. All will then be well (until Orbán makes a nuisance of himself about something else).

[Goose]

The EU got Hungary to agree to the 50 billion Euro aid package with no clear veto right during the next 4 years:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-...024-02-01/

Indeed good news. I am almost certain Hungary (Orbán) was promised something for getting out of the way. However, it probably wasn't much. The EU getting fed up with Hungary's obstructionism may have scared Orbán more than any negative domestic political fallout did.

Next up, U.S. funding for Ukraine, which may take some time.

Unfortunately, you may be correct. It may be "a while" before the House finally passes something. Right now, the US is sending weapons to other friendly nations (Greece) with the understanding they will immediately be donated to Ukraine. This helps a bit, but is not a fully powered "work-around". Hopefully things will get sorted "soon".

Also possibly coming soon, Swedish accession to NATO, which may not provide a material boost to Ukraine right away, but which still seems important as part of a longer term strategy to mitigate the Russian threat.

Swedish accession to NATO is important in practice because only then can they get access to NATO communications codes and intelligence data. In particular, fully "NATO Standard" IFF will need to be provided for their aircraft. It is probable the hardware is capable already, but they need the codes and protocols. Sweden undoubtedly has some significant info that they are holding back until they are fully "inside the tent". The full integration of Swedish assets into NATO will not happen instantaneously. The sooner it starts the more effective it will be.

IMO Orbán is going to hold out for a "good deal" on the renewal and expansion of the Gripen lease. I think he will get it pretty fast, as it doesn't really cost Sweden much "real" money. Sweden can view it as "foreign aid" to a fellow NATO nation and claim it enhances Swedish security. Orbán can claim victory for domestic consumption. Sweden will get into NATO at a minimal cost. All will then be well (until Orbán makes a nuisance of himself about something else).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/viktor-orb-ns...36758.html

In my previous post I may have been a bit too optimistic. Quoted from above article:

But Hungary's governing party, led by nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has signaled that it will boycott the session, blocking the chance for a vote and further delaying a decision on Stockholm's bid.

It may still be "transactional" and the lease deal may be the object of the boycott. However,  as the article points out the idea that "Orbán's intransigence is purely transactional" is false. There is a definite domestic political content as well, and what is governing may change at any time  for reasons nobody but Orbán really understands. Sweden is still "on hold".

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/viktor-orb-ns...36758.html

In my previous post I may have been a bit too optimistic. Quoted from above article:

But Hungary's governing party, led by nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has signaled that it will boycott the session, blocking the chance for a vote and further delaying a decision on Stockholm's bid.

It may still be "transactional" and the lease deal may be the object of the boycott. However,  as the article points out the idea that "Orbán's intransigence is purely transactional" is false. There is a definite domestic political content as well, and what is governing may change at any time  for reasons nobody but Orbán really understands. Sweden is still "on hold".

[TrumpCard]

Fwiw, it sounded to me like this was just a debate over when the debate would take place and Orban’s party boycotted the accelerated timeline the opposition wanted. I agree that’s playing politics, but I am not sure I interpret it as a sign that accession won’t pass.

[TrumpCard]

Fwiw, it sounded to me like this was just a debate over when the debate would take place and Orban’s party boycotted the accelerated timeline the opposition wanted. I agree that’s playing politics, but I am not sure I interpret it as a sign that accession won’t pass.

[Goose]

Fwiw, it sounded to me like this was just a debate over when the debate would take place and Orban’s party boycotted the accelerated timeline the opposition wanted. I agree that’s playing politics, but I am not sure I interpret it as a sign that accession won’t pass.

I agree it will eventually pass. The question is when. FWIW the Fidesz leader in the legislature is on record opposing Sweden's membership. The opposition parties are, for better or worse, making this a declared political issue. That is pushing Fidesz into a reflexive opposition that may not have been part of Orban’s original agenda. It could be "a while" before this all settles out. It could also be settled quickly if Orban can spin it as a "win" for his party. IMO it won't be quick, because all the Hungarian parties are playing politics.

[Goose]

Fwiw, it sounded to me like this was just a debate over when the debate would take place and Orban’s party boycotted the accelerated timeline the opposition wanted. I agree that’s playing politics, but I am not sure I interpret it as a sign that accession won’t pass.

I agree it will eventually pass. The question is when. FWIW the Fidesz leader in the legislature is on record opposing Sweden's membership. The opposition parties are, for better or worse, making this a declared political issue. That is pushing Fidesz into a reflexive opposition that may not have been part of Orban’s original agenda. It could be "a while" before this all settles out. It could also be settled quickly if Orban can spin it as a "win" for his party. IMO it won't be quick, because all the Hungarian parties are playing politics.

[lex24]

The EU got Hungary to agree to the 50 billion Euro aid package with no clear veto right during the next 4 years:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-...024-02-01/

Indeed good news. I am almost certain Hungary (Orbán) was promised something for getting out of the way. However, it probably wasn't much. The EU getting fed up with Hungary's obstructionism may have scared Orbán more than any negative domestic political fallout did.

Next up, U.S. funding for Ukraine, which may take some time.

Unfortunately, you may be correct. It may be "a while" before the House finally passes something. Right now, the US is sending weapons to other friendly nations (Greece) with the understanding they will immediately be donated to Ukraine. This helps a bit, but is not a fully powered "work-around". Hopefully things will get sorted "soon".

Also possibly coming soon, Swedish accession to NATO, which may not provide a material boost to Ukraine right away, but which still seems important as part of a longer term strategy to mitigate the Russian threat.

Swedish accession to NATO is important in practice because only then can they get access to NATO communications codes and intelligence data. In particular, fully "NATO Standard" IFF will need to be provided for their aircraft. It is probable the hardware is capable already, but they need the codes and protocols. Sweden undoubtedly has some significant info that they are holding back until they are fully "inside the tent". The full integration of Swedish assets into NATO will not happen instantaneously. The sooner it starts the more effective it will be.

IMO Orbán is going to hold out for a "good deal" on the renewal and expansion of the Gripen lease. I think he will get it pretty fast, as it doesn't really cost Sweden much "real" money. Sweden can view it as "foreign aid" to a fellow NATO nation and claim it enhances Swedish security. Orbán can claim victory for domestic consumption. Sweden will get into NATO at a minimal cost. All will then be well (until Orbán makes a nuisance of himself about something else).

I stay off this for the most part.  But I ask you these questions Goose  because you seem to be quite knowledgeable.  How does this end? And is there any legitimacy to arguments that are being made that all that NATO and the  US are doing is prolonging the inevitable.

Niall Ferguson wrote that the “fear of Putin“ coupled with the “appeasement of Iran“ is bringing us closer to World War III. I’m not trying to step into the political sphere here. (Although I do feel the need to make it clear I do not like Trump.). I know Ferguson is a conservative historian. But I don’t think he’s a nut.

I guess I’d like to see some reasoned analysis to confirm my fervent hope and prayer that Ferguson is wrong.

To the moderators – if this is overstepping and reaching into the political just say so. I’ll delete my post. I do not want to do anything that would take away from a discussion that many people are interested in. Thanks.

[lex24]

The EU got Hungary to agree to the 50 billion Euro aid package with no clear veto right during the next 4 years:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-...024-02-01/

Indeed good news. I am almost certain Hungary (Orbán) was promised something for getting out of the way. However, it probably wasn't much. The EU getting fed up with Hungary's obstructionism may have scared Orbán more than any negative domestic political fallout did.

Next up, U.S. funding for Ukraine, which may take some time.

Unfortunately, you may be correct. It may be "a while" before the House finally passes something. Right now, the US is sending weapons to other friendly nations (Greece) with the understanding they will immediately be donated to Ukraine. This helps a bit, but is not a fully powered "work-around". Hopefully things will get sorted "soon".

Also possibly coming soon, Swedish accession to NATO, which may not provide a material boost to Ukraine right away, but which still seems important as part of a longer term strategy to mitigate the Russian threat.

Swedish accession to NATO is important in practice because only then can they get access to NATO communications codes and intelligence data. In particular, fully "NATO Standard" IFF will need to be provided for their aircraft. It is probable the hardware is capable already, but they need the codes and protocols. Sweden undoubtedly has some significant info that they are holding back until they are fully "inside the tent". The full integration of Swedish assets into NATO will not happen instantaneously. The sooner it starts the more effective it will be.

IMO Orbán is going to hold out for a "good deal" on the renewal and expansion of the Gripen lease. I think he will get it pretty fast, as it doesn't really cost Sweden much "real" money. Sweden can view it as "foreign aid" to a fellow NATO nation and claim it enhances Swedish security. Orbán can claim victory for domestic consumption. Sweden will get into NATO at a minimal cost. All will then be well (until Orbán makes a nuisance of himself about something else).

I stay off this for the most part.  But I ask you these questions Goose  because you seem to be quite knowledgeable.  How does this end? And is there any legitimacy to arguments that are being made that all that NATO and the  US are doing is prolonging the inevitable.

Niall Ferguson wrote that the “fear of Putin“ coupled with the “appeasement of Iran“ is bringing us closer to World War III. I’m not trying to step into the political sphere here. (Although I do feel the need to make it clear I do not like Trump.). I know Ferguson is a conservative historian. But I don’t think he’s a nut.

I guess I’d like to see some reasoned analysis to confirm my fervent hope and prayer that Ferguson is wrong.

To the moderators – if this is overstepping and reaching into the political just say so. I’ll delete my post. I do not want to do anything that would take away from a discussion that many people are interested in. Thanks.

[Goose]

I stay off this for the most part.  But I ask you these questions Goose  because you seem to be quite knowledgeable.  How does this end? And is there any legitimacy to arguments that are being made that all that NATO and the  US are doing is prolonging the inevitable.

First, as has been stated and seconded by many that are wiser than I am, "In war, nothing is inevitable". IMO there is no question that Ukraine can lose this war, and with it it's national existence. Putin's Russia will keep fighting as long as they can. It is only very vaguely possible Putin will call a halt to his aggression unless and until Ukraine is at least threatening to take back Crimea. It is more probable that Russia attempts some kind of negotiated settlement when Putin is "gone" by means fair or foul.

There is also no question that Ukraine losing this war would be a disaster for the US, the EU, and NATO. That would have been true even if these three had refrained from helping Ukraine and let Russia overrun them. However, that is not what was done. These three supported the Ukrainian effort but stopped far short of direct participation in the conflict. Will the support given so far and into the future be "adequate" for Ukraine to win? I don't know. It could be "enough", but Ukraine is showing some internal cracks right now. This is absolutely understandable for a country going through what they are. Is this internal dissension (particularly about conscription)  going to be "fatal"? Maybe, maybe not.

IMO the US (and subsequently the EU and NATO) made the decision to "participate" because 1) the optics of letting Russia have their way would undoubtedly embolden both Russia and other nations to assume they could get away with aggression without much risk, and 2) the domestic political fallout of doing nothing would be "significant". It is IMO probable that offering Zelenskyy a ride was at least partially in hopes of ending the whole thing fairly quickly. Nobody was sanguine about Ukraine's chances. When Zelenskyy wanted ammunition, that forced the US to decide, and we did (sort of).

IMO the PR of the Ukraine war has been SERIOUSLY mismanaged in the US and the EU. Once we decided to help Ukraine, we took on lots of additional downside. The administration apparently didn't realize this was the case, and did not continually involve the American people in the effort. It is "our war" because we made it our war. Granted, we didn't and don't intend to put boots on the ground, but if Ukraine loses, we lose too, big time. Our credibility will be less than 0. We can attempt to say "Well, we didn't really mean it." but nobody will buy that. The ability of the US to influence events will drop like a stone. Nobody will trust our word for anything. Eastern Europe will view this as a replay and "Slavic solidarity" will once again be a thing.

Can Ukraine still win? Yes, by threatening/taking Crimea. We need to give them the weapons to do it. This will include ATACMS and JASSMs, plus (equally importantly) ESM to locate and allow the destruction of the Russian GPS jammers. With the F-16s Ukraine can put enough pressure on Russia that serious reversals for Russia can occur in very short order. IMO that is the only way Ukraine wins. They can't fight a very prolonged war. They don't have the manpower or the ability to defend adequately against missile attacks. If the US isn't willing to face the fact we are a party to this conflict and act accordingly, the consequences will IMO be dire.

So, IMO Ukraine can win. Russia can win too. They will if we don't follow through with our involvement and provide Ukraine the means to win. If we can't take a joke we shouldn't have joined.

Niall Ferguson wrote that the “fear of Putin“ coupled with the “appeasement of Iran“ is bringing us  closer to World War III.  I’m not trying to step into the political sphere here. (Although I do feel the need to make it clear I do not like Trump.). I know Ferguson is a conservative historian. But I don’t think he’s  a nut.

I guess I’d like to see some reasoned analysis to confirm my fervent hope and prayer that Ferguson is  wrong.

IMO, he isn't "wrong". The question is, compared to what? Removing Putin and the Iranian Theocracy from the face of the earth by magic would be nice, but so far we don't have a way to do it. A war in Iran has the very real danger of ending like the war in Iraq, where we accomplished our military goal but then had no way forward to install an effective popular government. Unlike Iraq,  Iran MAY actually have a credible opposition, but if they are brought to power by American arms, they cease to be credible. We can threaten Iran all we want, but the fact is they know we aren't going to attack them (until they cross some line that even we don't have a way to define). If we were, we would have already done so.

There is lots of frustration in the fact we can't "fix the problem" with Iran or Russia by direct military intervention. WW III is becoming more possible because both Iran and Putin for some reason believe they can achieve their foreign policy goals by military action at manageable cost to themselves. The US needs to make it painfully clear to both nations that isn't the case. We hope to do this without going to war.

In Ukraine, we have enmeshed ourselves in a conflict with Russia. If we fail to stop Putin there, WW III will indeed become more probable because Putin will believe NATO won't fight. That miscalculation will lead to "world wide war" eventually IMO.

Similarly, Iran so far has been able to do whatever it wants through it's proxy forces in much of the middle east. Eventually, they will go "too far" and either Israel or the US will take military action. We need a way to let Iran know this can't go on. We don't have that AFAIK. That is the danger. Starting a war and occupying Iran is possible. Then what?

[Goose]

I stay off this for the most part.  But I ask you these questions Goose  because you seem to be quite knowledgeable.  How does this end? And is there any legitimacy to arguments that are being made that all that NATO and the  US are doing is prolonging the inevitable.

First, as has been stated and seconded by many that are wiser than I am, "In war, nothing is inevitable". IMO there is no question that Ukraine can lose this war, and with it it's national existence. Putin's Russia will keep fighting as long as they can. It is only very vaguely possible Putin will call a halt to his aggression unless and until Ukraine is at least threatening to take back Crimea. It is more probable that Russia attempts some kind of negotiated settlement when Putin is "gone" by means fair or foul.

There is also no question that Ukraine losing this war would be a disaster for the US, the EU, and NATO. That would have been true even if these three had refrained from helping Ukraine and let Russia overrun them. However, that is not what was done. These three supported the Ukrainian effort but stopped far short of direct participation in the conflict. Will the support given so far and into the future be "adequate" for Ukraine to win? I don't know. It could be "enough", but Ukraine is showing some internal cracks right now. This is absolutely understandable for a country going through what they are. Is this internal dissension (particularly about conscription)  going to be "fatal"? Maybe, maybe not.

IMO the US (and subsequently the EU and NATO) made the decision to "participate" because 1) the optics of letting Russia have their way would undoubtedly embolden both Russia and other nations to assume they could get away with aggression without much risk, and 2) the domestic political fallout of doing nothing would be "significant". It is IMO probable that offering Zelenskyy a ride was at least partially in hopes of ending the whole thing fairly quickly. Nobody was sanguine about Ukraine's chances. When Zelenskyy wanted ammunition, that forced the US to decide, and we did (sort of).

IMO the PR of the Ukraine war has been SERIOUSLY mismanaged in the US and the EU. Once we decided to help Ukraine, we took on lots of additional downside. The administration apparently didn't realize this was the case, and did not continually involve the American people in the effort. It is "our war" because we made it our war. Granted, we didn't and don't intend to put boots on the ground, but if Ukraine loses, we lose too, big time. Our credibility will be less than 0. We can attempt to say "Well, we didn't really mean it." but nobody will buy that. The ability of the US to influence events will drop like a stone. Nobody will trust our word for anything. Eastern Europe will view this as a replay and "Slavic solidarity" will once again be a thing.

Can Ukraine still win? Yes, by threatening/taking Crimea. We need to give them the weapons to do it. This will include ATACMS and JASSMs, plus (equally importantly) ESM to locate and allow the destruction of the Russian GPS jammers. With the F-16s Ukraine can put enough pressure on Russia that serious reversals for Russia can occur in very short order. IMO that is the only way Ukraine wins. They can't fight a very prolonged war. They don't have the manpower or the ability to defend adequately against missile attacks. If the US isn't willing to face the fact we are a party to this conflict and act accordingly, the consequences will IMO be dire.

So, IMO Ukraine can win. Russia can win too. They will if we don't follow through with our involvement and provide Ukraine the means to win. If we can't take a joke we shouldn't have joined.

Niall Ferguson wrote that the “fear of Putin“ coupled with the “appeasement of Iran“ is bringing us  closer to World War III.  I’m not trying to step into the political sphere here. (Although I do feel the need to make it clear I do not like Trump.). I know Ferguson is a conservative historian. But I don’t think he’s  a nut.

I guess I’d like to see some reasoned analysis to confirm my fervent hope and prayer that Ferguson is  wrong.

IMO, he isn't "wrong". The question is, compared to what? Removing Putin and the Iranian Theocracy from the face of the earth by magic would be nice, but so far we don't have a way to do it. A war in Iran has the very real danger of ending like the war in Iraq, where we accomplished our military goal but then had no way forward to install an effective popular government. Unlike Iraq,  Iran MAY actually have a credible opposition, but if they are brought to power by American arms, they cease to be credible. We can threaten Iran all we want, but the fact is they know we aren't going to attack them (until they cross some line that even we don't have a way to define). If we were, we would have already done so.

There is lots of frustration in the fact we can't "fix the problem" with Iran or Russia by direct military intervention. WW III is becoming more possible because both Iran and Putin for some reason believe they can achieve their foreign policy goals by military action at manageable cost to themselves. The US needs to make it painfully clear to both nations that isn't the case. We hope to do this without going to war.

In Ukraine, we have enmeshed ourselves in a conflict with Russia. If we fail to stop Putin there, WW III will indeed become more probable because Putin will believe NATO won't fight. That miscalculation will lead to "world wide war" eventually IMO.

Similarly, Iran so far has been able to do whatever it wants through it's proxy forces in much of the middle east. Eventually, they will go "too far" and either Israel or the US will take military action. We need a way to let Iran know this can't go on. We don't have that AFAIK. That is the danger. Starting a war and occupying Iran is possible. Then what?

[Mick]

Similarly, Iran so far has been able to do whatever it wants through it's proxy forces in much of the middle east. Eventually, they will go "too far" and either Israel or the US will take military action. We need a way to let Iran know this can't go on. We don't have that AFAIK. That is the danger. Starting a war and occupying Iran is possible. Then what?

If the deaths of American military personnel isn't "too far", and the ongoing attacks by Houthis and others isn't "too far", then...what would constitute "too far"?

[Mick]

Similarly, Iran so far has been able to do whatever it wants through it's proxy forces in much of the middle east. Eventually, they will go "too far" and either Israel or the US will take military action. We need a way to let Iran know this can't go on. We don't have that AFAIK. That is the danger. Starting a war and occupying Iran is possible. Then what?

If the deaths of American military personnel isn't "too far", and the ongoing attacks by Houthis and others isn't "too far", then...what would constitute "too far"?

[TrumpCard]

Goose has pretty well summed up this multi-thousand word article about Swedish accession to NATO, but if you’re interested in the subject, there’s additional detail here. 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/04/swe...y-hungary/

[TrumpCard]

Goose has pretty well summed up this multi-thousand word article about Swedish accession to NATO, but if you’re interested in the subject, there’s additional detail here. 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/04/swe...y-hungary/