[GK3]

It is very hard to figure out which news "fact" regarding Russian Petroleum problems is at least fairly accurate.  I believe Russia exports the largest amount of oil from facilities in the Black Sea which would put those facilities in range of Ukrainian drone attacks, but are also probably very well defended.

I agree that getting "facts" about what is exported and from where is difficult. I do think Russia exports as much as possible via pipeline. They do lack capacity to do this to China, but they are building it as fast as they can. Exporting raw crude does require loading facilities and tank storage. However, these facilities are nowhere near as complicated or fragile as a refinery. Russia must refine oil products for domestic use. I think there refineries are the main target of Ukraine. Having these assets out of use hurts the Russian people directly, and they will notice.

One report I saw claimed that when Russia started modernizing its oil business, they switched from home grown technology that that purchased from the West.  This now makes some fairly minor damage more significant due to difficulty in getting parts.  No idea if that theory has any basis in fact.

This is accurate, but most of that technology is distributed in oil fields which are by nature very unprofitable targets. Knocking out one oil well is a fly speck. Hitting pipelines (which also use imported parts) from the fields to the oil export terminals is more profitable, although still a pretty distributed target. IMO sabotage is a better way to go than drones on these targets. The pipelines great extent makes them vulnerable to sabotage and sabotage can have a much larger "bang" than a single drone can. The drone has to fly a long way and can only carry a relatively small warhead.

 Another report I saw contends that we are buying billions of dollars of refined products from India, made from Russian Oil.  Why would we provide support for their oil when we have all these sanctions in place?  Break enough small parts and you can probably cause much bigger problems.

US firms do it because it makes money. It is also a problematic issue because when the oil is refined it loses it's identity. It may be mixed with oil from all over the world. Attempting to stop this trade by sanctioning India is a non-starter, so US firms can't be prohibited from buying all refined products made in India. It is also probable that lots of plastic parts made in India and China contain molecules that originated in Russia. Nobody believes that trade can be controlled. The only hope is that India can be persuaded not to buy Russian oil, China being a "lost cause". Ukrainian AMCs sinking a few tankers in the IO might just make that happen :-).

Sweden does bring a fairly modern and capable Military Industrial Complex to NATO.  I would hope the NATO nations would be willing to adopt common weapons, calibers, aircraft and armored vehicles.  Seems sort of silly for each country to insist on their own types.  It would certainly complicate resupply if war actually comes to NATO.

It does make NATO logistics more complicated. However, the common weapons etc. is never, ever, under any circumstances going to happen. There are some very good reasons for this (along with some less good reasons for this). The first is that each countries forces are not solely (or even mainly) dedicated to NATO. They are dedicated to protecting each individual country, and that is never going to change. Each country may make different decisions about which weapons fit them "best".

Germany (for example) will not use US discarding sabot tank ammunition (even though we use basically a copy of their main gun) because they refuse to use depleted uranium. The US thinks (rightly IMO) that is just stupid and wants to use it. We also use it in lower caliber weapons, which the Europeans do not. The British OTOH insist on using rifled tank guns because they believe that tanks need to fire "conventional" HE pretty often and smooth-bores don't do that as well. Different opinions for different countries. Even "NATO standard" 155 mm artillery ammunition isn't. Each country makes different variants, some of which are certified for M777s and some of which are not. They make them because they want them, and after all, it is "their" army. 

Arguably, the eurofighter Typhoon needn't exist. Like most development programs, when it first came out, it wasn't a very good jet. It was designed by a committee that insisted in incorporating the biases of all the participants :-). Enough "upgrades" have been added that it now is at least competitive, but why do it at all? Because the countries involved wanted to preserve their military-industrial base. The market in single nations wasn't big enough to support the NRE necessary to build a "clean sheet" fighter, so a consortium was necessary. The French of course maintained their "side hustle" at Dassault. The Gryphon was built to meet Swedish needs, and as a "neutral" nation they couldn't rely on outside suppliers. Of course the Gryphon uses LOTS of imported parts, especially electronics, but politically it is "100% Swedish". It is a nice jet but commercially not viable. Big time subsides. The trajectory and travails of Kockums is a story in itself. I could go on, but you get the idea I am sure :-).

This isn't all bad. Having different approaches requires your opponent to be ready for all of them. Distributing production across a wide geographic area makes NATO more resilient. It also prevents everyone from adopting the same "bad" weapon choice  and increases the pressure to innovate. The trend toward large multi-national  corporations doing most of the defense work could eventually lead to less parochialism. After all, BAE isn't really "British" anymore. Fincanterri owns Marinette Marine and is building US Constellation class frigates in Wisconsin. This trend has it's own problems, but some of the effects may be good.

One big benefit that Ukraine accrues from its expanding drone operations is that they can generate significant attacks across a wide geographic area and targets without putting boots on the ground and incurring more manpower losses. If they can do enough damage to inhibit Russian offensive operations they benefit greatly. It should also start to spread out the Russian defenses possibly making it easier to penetrate.  Time will tell.

IMO you are correct. Technology, if it works, can save lots of lives. The US relies on that. Ukraine realizes that the Russians will always outnumber them. If they are going to win, they need force multipliers.

\
I get that each country is first and foremost defending itself first and NATO countries second.  It seems to me that the only enemy that any European country is preparing to defend itself against is Russia.  I think the probability of a Russian encroachment into a NATO country is far more likely a conflict that say France vs Germany. Considering these probabilities it would seem to make sense to have common NATO standards in terms of arms and munitions. I know they aren't agreeing with my logic, but it seems rather idiotic not to put yourself in the best position you can for any potential conflict with an enemy as strong as Russia. But how often does common sense the guiding light?

[GK3]

It is very hard to figure out which news "fact" regarding Russian Petroleum problems is at least fairly accurate.  I believe Russia exports the largest amount of oil from facilities in the Black Sea which would put those facilities in range of Ukrainian drone attacks, but are also probably very well defended.

I agree that getting "facts" about what is exported and from where is difficult. I do think Russia exports as much as possible via pipeline. They do lack capacity to do this to China, but they are building it as fast as they can. Exporting raw crude does require loading facilities and tank storage. However, these facilities are nowhere near as complicated or fragile as a refinery. Russia must refine oil products for domestic use. I think there refineries are the main target of Ukraine. Having these assets out of use hurts the Russian people directly, and they will notice.

One report I saw claimed that when Russia started modernizing its oil business, they switched from home grown technology that that purchased from the West.  This now makes some fairly minor damage more significant due to difficulty in getting parts.  No idea if that theory has any basis in fact.

This is accurate, but most of that technology is distributed in oil fields which are by nature very unprofitable targets. Knocking out one oil well is a fly speck. Hitting pipelines (which also use imported parts) from the fields to the oil export terminals is more profitable, although still a pretty distributed target. IMO sabotage is a better way to go than drones on these targets. The pipelines great extent makes them vulnerable to sabotage and sabotage can have a much larger "bang" than a single drone can. The drone has to fly a long way and can only carry a relatively small warhead.

 Another report I saw contends that we are buying billions of dollars of refined products from India, made from Russian Oil.  Why would we provide support for their oil when we have all these sanctions in place?  Break enough small parts and you can probably cause much bigger problems.

US firms do it because it makes money. It is also a problematic issue because when the oil is refined it loses it's identity. It may be mixed with oil from all over the world. Attempting to stop this trade by sanctioning India is a non-starter, so US firms can't be prohibited from buying all refined products made in India. It is also probable that lots of plastic parts made in India and China contain molecules that originated in Russia. Nobody believes that trade can be controlled. The only hope is that India can be persuaded not to buy Russian oil, China being a "lost cause". Ukrainian AMCs sinking a few tankers in the IO might just make that happen :-).

Sweden does bring a fairly modern and capable Military Industrial Complex to NATO.  I would hope the NATO nations would be willing to adopt common weapons, calibers, aircraft and armored vehicles.  Seems sort of silly for each country to insist on their own types.  It would certainly complicate resupply if war actually comes to NATO.

It does make NATO logistics more complicated. However, the common weapons etc. is never, ever, under any circumstances going to happen. There are some very good reasons for this (along with some less good reasons for this). The first is that each countries forces are not solely (or even mainly) dedicated to NATO. They are dedicated to protecting each individual country, and that is never going to change. Each country may make different decisions about which weapons fit them "best".

Germany (for example) will not use US discarding sabot tank ammunition (even though we use basically a copy of their main gun) because they refuse to use depleted uranium. The US thinks (rightly IMO) that is just stupid and wants to use it. We also use it in lower caliber weapons, which the Europeans do not. The British OTOH insist on using rifled tank guns because they believe that tanks need to fire "conventional" HE pretty often and smooth-bores don't do that as well. Different opinions for different countries. Even "NATO standard" 155 mm artillery ammunition isn't. Each country makes different variants, some of which are certified for M777s and some of which are not. They make them because they want them, and after all, it is "their" army. 

Arguably, the eurofighter Typhoon needn't exist. Like most development programs, when it first came out, it wasn't a very good jet. It was designed by a committee that insisted in incorporating the biases of all the participants :-). Enough "upgrades" have been added that it now is at least competitive, but why do it at all? Because the countries involved wanted to preserve their military-industrial base. The market in single nations wasn't big enough to support the NRE necessary to build a "clean sheet" fighter, so a consortium was necessary. The French of course maintained their "side hustle" at Dassault. The Gryphon was built to meet Swedish needs, and as a "neutral" nation they couldn't rely on outside suppliers. Of course the Gryphon uses LOTS of imported parts, especially electronics, but politically it is "100% Swedish". It is a nice jet but commercially not viable. Big time subsides. The trajectory and travails of Kockums is a story in itself. I could go on, but you get the idea I am sure :-).

This isn't all bad. Having different approaches requires your opponent to be ready for all of them. Distributing production across a wide geographic area makes NATO more resilient. It also prevents everyone from adopting the same "bad" weapon choice  and increases the pressure to innovate. The trend toward large multi-national  corporations doing most of the defense work could eventually lead to less parochialism. After all, BAE isn't really "British" anymore. Fincanterri owns Marinette Marine and is building US Constellation class frigates in Wisconsin. This trend has it's own problems, but some of the effects may be good.

One big benefit that Ukraine accrues from its expanding drone operations is that they can generate significant attacks across a wide geographic area and targets without putting boots on the ground and incurring more manpower losses. If they can do enough damage to inhibit Russian offensive operations they benefit greatly. It should also start to spread out the Russian defenses possibly making it easier to penetrate.  Time will tell.

IMO you are correct. Technology, if it works, can save lots of lives. The US relies on that. Ukraine realizes that the Russians will always outnumber them. If they are going to win, they need force multipliers.

\
I get that each country is first and foremost defending itself first and NATO countries second.  It seems to me that the only enemy that any European country is preparing to defend itself against is Russia.  I think the probability of a Russian encroachment into a NATO country is far more likely a conflict that say France vs Germany. Considering these probabilities it would seem to make sense to have common NATO standards in terms of arms and munitions. I know they aren't agreeing with my logic, but it seems rather idiotic not to put yourself in the best position you can for any potential conflict with an enemy as strong as Russia. But how often does common sense the guiding light?

[Goose]

I get that each country is first and foremost defending itself first and NATO countries second.  It seems to me that the only enemy that any European country is preparing to defend itself against is Russia.  I think the probability of a Russian encroachment into a NATO country is far more likely a conflict that say France vs Germany. 

I think these countries agree the probability of a Russian encroachment into a NATO country is far more likely a conflict with any other European state. However, unlike your evaluation, many of these countries emphatically do NOT believe that the probability of conflict with other European states is essentially zero. Therefore, they have contingency plans to react accordingly. I can tell you from first-hand knowledge that was true in the 70s and 80s and I am virtually certain (although not first hand) they do so today. Have you noticed how closely French military personnel strength tracks the German strength? IMO that is not an accident. It is also true that European nations do not have a mostly "joint" defense and have separate intelligence organizations. For good reasons they do not fully trust each other.

Considering these probabilities it would seem to make sense to have common NATO standards in terms of arms and munitions.

I know they aren't agreeing with my logic, but it seems rather idiotic not to put yourself in the best position you can for any potential conflict with an enemy as strong as Russia. But how often does common sense the guiding light?

Their "common sense" != your "common sense". For one thing, each nation may disagree on what the "best" weapons for a particular task are. It can be a real, honest disagreement on military grounds. It can be a "political" one based on "other" considerations. It can be based on affordability. A given country may just be unable to afford "the best" and chooses to do something else (as opposed to doing nothing at all). It can (and most often is) a combination of these factors.

The arguably "common sense" thing to do would be to buy everything from the USA because we have a volume advantage the Europeans can never match :-). To some extent, they in fact do so, although "offsets" are often (almost always) required. Yet a consortium built the Typhoon. Is the Leopard better than the Abrams? Many allegedly unbiased people say so. It was lots cheaper. Was the US ever going to choose the Leopard over their own tank (even though we did very quietly choose their main gun) ? These consideration apply here in the USA too. This evaluation leaves out individual companies IP issues, which is also an elephant in the room.

Russia during the cold war had several different aircraft design bureaus that built competing "products". Some "common sense" would declare that wasteful, another version of "common sense" would declare it a necessary insurance against a single point of failure. I think NATO is in that same boat. Of course, political reasons within both the party and the military made choosing a "winner" problematic. This was true in an absolute dictatorship. What democracy can pull off what a command economy could not?

[Goose]

I get that each country is first and foremost defending itself first and NATO countries second.  It seems to me that the only enemy that any European country is preparing to defend itself against is Russia.  I think the probability of a Russian encroachment into a NATO country is far more likely a conflict that say France vs Germany. 

I think these countries agree the probability of a Russian encroachment into a NATO country is far more likely a conflict with any other European state. However, unlike your evaluation, many of these countries emphatically do NOT believe that the probability of conflict with other European states is essentially zero. Therefore, they have contingency plans to react accordingly. I can tell you from first-hand knowledge that was true in the 70s and 80s and I am virtually certain (although not first hand) they do so today. Have you noticed how closely French military personnel strength tracks the German strength? IMO that is not an accident. It is also true that European nations do not have a mostly "joint" defense and have separate intelligence organizations. For good reasons they do not fully trust each other.

Considering these probabilities it would seem to make sense to have common NATO standards in terms of arms and munitions.

I know they aren't agreeing with my logic, but it seems rather idiotic not to put yourself in the best position you can for any potential conflict with an enemy as strong as Russia. But how often does common sense the guiding light?

Their "common sense" != your "common sense". For one thing, each nation may disagree on what the "best" weapons for a particular task are. It can be a real, honest disagreement on military grounds. It can be a "political" one based on "other" considerations. It can be based on affordability. A given country may just be unable to afford "the best" and chooses to do something else (as opposed to doing nothing at all). It can (and most often is) a combination of these factors.

The arguably "common sense" thing to do would be to buy everything from the USA because we have a volume advantage the Europeans can never match :-). To some extent, they in fact do so, although "offsets" are often (almost always) required. Yet a consortium built the Typhoon. Is the Leopard better than the Abrams? Many allegedly unbiased people say so. It was lots cheaper. Was the US ever going to choose the Leopard over their own tank (even though we did very quietly choose their main gun) ? These consideration apply here in the USA too. This evaluation leaves out individual companies IP issues, which is also an elephant in the room.

Russia during the cold war had several different aircraft design bureaus that built competing "products". Some "common sense" would declare that wasteful, another version of "common sense" would declare it a necessary insurance against a single point of failure. I think NATO is in that same boat. Of course, political reasons within both the party and the military made choosing a "winner" problematic. This was true in an absolute dictatorship. What democracy can pull off what a command economy could not?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/macro...00884.html

This article points out some of the "fault lines" that exist between Germany and France at the moment. There are good reasons that the interests of these two nations often clash. Unfortunately, there are also many petty personal ones. Both make it difficult to agree to a "way ahead" that is reliably adhered to by either party, let alone both.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/macro...00884.html

This article points out some of the "fault lines" that exist between Germany and France at the moment. There are good reasons that the interests of these two nations often clash. Unfortunately, there are also many petty personal ones. Both make it difficult to agree to a "way ahead" that is reliably adhered to by either party, let alone both.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russias-adapt...52996.html

Interesting article. While I fully share the frustration with the fact the F-16s were not available in 2023 to support the Ukrainian offensives in the south that doesn't mean F-16s will be "useless" in 2024. As the article correctly points out, the Russians have been gifted with at least a year of warning. As stated, the Russians learn. The slowness of US/NATO initiatives has indeed allowed Russia to correct/mitigate deficiencies in their forces before the "new" Ukrainian capabilities can be decisive. The west can't move at "the speed of war", and that is in the process of defeating Ukraine.

The idea the Russians are firing "ranging" shots is undoubtedly incorrect. Russia knows full well how far their missiles go, both with and without warheads. IMO what the probably are doing is characterizing the range of their control of the missiles. This is necessary because Russia must finally come to grips with the fact the very long range of their SAMs is useless if the tracking radar can't see the targets or the missile can't "hear" the command guidance. If you are shooting at targets that operate at high altitudes and on reasonably predictable courses that isn't a big problem because the radar horizon and path loss are well known. However if you want to target a low-flying maneuvering target you have to be able to control/guide the missile until it is close enough to the target to engage on it's own. If it is a SARH missile it will not be able to engage on its own and needs either an illuminator or a real good command guidance link. For Russia, this is not a great situation. This is not something the Russians really planned to do. That was going to be a PVO task. Well, the PVO (as such) is no longer available, so Russia is probably trying to figure out how to use SARH missiles (of which they have many) to do the job. It is probable they intended to use Mainstays in the control role, but now with the vulnerability of Mainstays and the lack of available platforms something else may be tried. The Russians are learning indeed. Ukraine and the west is not making them pay in blood for their newfound knowledge. That is how you lose winnable wars.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russias-adapt...52996.html

Interesting article. While I fully share the frustration with the fact the F-16s were not available in 2023 to support the Ukrainian offensives in the south that doesn't mean F-16s will be "useless" in 2024. As the article correctly points out, the Russians have been gifted with at least a year of warning. As stated, the Russians learn. The slowness of US/NATO initiatives has indeed allowed Russia to correct/mitigate deficiencies in their forces before the "new" Ukrainian capabilities can be decisive. The west can't move at "the speed of war", and that is in the process of defeating Ukraine.

The idea the Russians are firing "ranging" shots is undoubtedly incorrect. Russia knows full well how far their missiles go, both with and without warheads. IMO what the probably are doing is characterizing the range of their control of the missiles. This is necessary because Russia must finally come to grips with the fact the very long range of their SAMs is useless if the tracking radar can't see the targets or the missile can't "hear" the command guidance. If you are shooting at targets that operate at high altitudes and on reasonably predictable courses that isn't a big problem because the radar horizon and path loss are well known. However if you want to target a low-flying maneuvering target you have to be able to control/guide the missile until it is close enough to the target to engage on it's own. If it is a SARH missile it will not be able to engage on its own and needs either an illuminator or a real good command guidance link. For Russia, this is not a great situation. This is not something the Russians really planned to do. That was going to be a PVO task. Well, the PVO (as such) is no longer available, so Russia is probably trying to figure out how to use SARH missiles (of which they have many) to do the job. It is probable they intended to use Mainstays in the control role, but now with the vulnerability of Mainstays and the lack of available platforms something else may be tried. The Russians are learning indeed. Ukraine and the west is not making them pay in blood for their newfound knowledge. That is how you lose winnable wars.

[TrumpCard]

The level of advance planning you advocate might have been possible a year ago (though I doubt that). At this point, we aren’t remotely close to the type of planning for which you advocate. IMHO, no point in pining for something completely unattainable.

[TrumpCard]

The level of advance planning you advocate might have been possible a year ago (though I doubt that). At this point, we aren’t remotely close to the type of planning for which you advocate. IMHO, no point in pining for something completely unattainable.

[Goose]

The level of advance planning you advocate might have been possible a year ago (though I doubt that). At this point, we aren’t remotely close to the type of planning for which you advocate. IMHO, no point in pining for something completely unattainable.

Actually it was required two years ago. That would have made the F-16s available in time for the 2023 offensives. In terms of what was/is "possible", it was clearly foreseeable that we may need F-16 capability by spring/summer of 2023. You are correct that we were not thinking that way at a governmental level. I don't "pine" for that type of planning, but I do believe that ignoring our deficiencies ensures they will continue. They may anyway, unfortunately. IMO our military is capable of making such determinations and delivering appropriate advice. It is probable our politicians wouldn't follow it, but back in 2022 there was a very much better chance they would than there is today.

[Goose]

The level of advance planning you advocate might have been possible a year ago (though I doubt that). At this point, we aren’t remotely close to the type of planning for which you advocate. IMHO, no point in pining for something completely unattainable.

Actually it was required two years ago. That would have made the F-16s available in time for the 2023 offensives. In terms of what was/is "possible", it was clearly foreseeable that we may need F-16 capability by spring/summer of 2023. You are correct that we were not thinking that way at a governmental level. I don't "pine" for that type of planning, but I do believe that ignoring our deficiencies ensures they will continue. They may anyway, unfortunately. IMO our military is capable of making such determinations and delivering appropriate advice. It is probable our politicians wouldn't follow it, but back in 2022 there was a very much better chance they would than there is today.

[GK3]

The level of advance planning you advocate might have been possible a year ago (though I doubt that). At this point, we aren’t remotely close to the type of planning for which you advocate. IMHO, no point in pining for something completely unattainable.

Actually it was required two years ago. That would have made the F-16s available in time for the 2023 offensives. In terms of what was/is "possible", it was clearly foreseeable that we may need F-16 capability by spring/summer of 2023. You are correct that we were not thinking that way at a governmental level. I don't "pine" for that type of planning, but I do believe that ignoring our deficiencies ensures they will continue. They may anyway, unfortunately. IMO our military is capable of making such determinations and delivering appropriate advice. It is probable our politicians wouldn't follow it, but back in 2022 there was a very much better chance they would than there is today.

It seems to me that too much of our decision making the last few years has been reactive, appearing as no real thought had been given into whatever now needs a response. This may be because our political system has been tied in knots for several years.
Ukraine on the other hand is showing an amazing ability to make do and adapt on the fly.  Particularly in the field of drone warfare It may well be what is keepiing them in the war in view of the F16 delays and lack of artillery shells.
This article seems to be a pretty comprehensive evaluation of the current state of drone warfare in the Ukraine, and its developing direction.  I have to assume we have a lot  of people paying attention to this.
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE...pkeyjwkpm/

[GK3]

The level of advance planning you advocate might have been possible a year ago (though I doubt that). At this point, we aren’t remotely close to the type of planning for which you advocate. IMHO, no point in pining for something completely unattainable.

Actually it was required two years ago. That would have made the F-16s available in time for the 2023 offensives. In terms of what was/is "possible", it was clearly foreseeable that we may need F-16 capability by spring/summer of 2023. You are correct that we were not thinking that way at a governmental level. I don't "pine" for that type of planning, but I do believe that ignoring our deficiencies ensures they will continue. They may anyway, unfortunately. IMO our military is capable of making such determinations and delivering appropriate advice. It is probable our politicians wouldn't follow it, but back in 2022 there was a very much better chance they would than there is today.

It seems to me that too much of our decision making the last few years has been reactive, appearing as no real thought had been given into whatever now needs a response. This may be because our political system has been tied in knots for several years.
Ukraine on the other hand is showing an amazing ability to make do and adapt on the fly.  Particularly in the field of drone warfare It may well be what is keepiing them in the war in view of the F16 delays and lack of artillery shells.
This article seems to be a pretty comprehensive evaluation of the current state of drone warfare in the Ukraine, and its developing direction.  I have to assume we have a lot  of people paying attention to this.
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE...pkeyjwkpm/

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-bureau...34864.html

Yet another analysis of problems NATO has in Europe. There is absolutely no reason to "regulate" the transport of military equipment in peacetime. It doesn't happen frequently and is easily coordinated. Requiring diplomatic approval is absurd. Does Germany really think France is going to start a war with Russia (or anybody else) by a surprise attack executed by troops moved by rail across Germany? If so, Germany has much worse problems. Just plain stupid. The assumption that all this goes away if a real war starts is a bold one. Bureaucracy should never be under-estimated.

One thing that does call into question the authority of this article is the statement that the Russian rail gauge is "narrower". The opposite is the case. The Russians (and the Finns) use a nominal rail gauge of 1524mm. The EU (and German) rail gauge is 1435 mm. Doesn't anybody proofread these articles?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-bureau...34864.html

Yet another analysis of problems NATO has in Europe. There is absolutely no reason to "regulate" the transport of military equipment in peacetime. It doesn't happen frequently and is easily coordinated. Requiring diplomatic approval is absurd. Does Germany really think France is going to start a war with Russia (or anybody else) by a surprise attack executed by troops moved by rail across Germany? If so, Germany has much worse problems. Just plain stupid. The assumption that all this goes away if a real war starts is a bold one. Bureaucracy should never be under-estimated.

One thing that does call into question the authority of this article is the statement that the Russian rail gauge is "narrower". The opposite is the case. The Russians (and the Finns) use a nominal rail gauge of 1524mm. The EU (and German) rail gauge is 1435 mm. Doesn't anybody proofread these articles?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/deadly-drones...57188.html

Zelenskyy is telling it like it is. Drones are an important class of weapons, but they aren't going to come anywhere close to ending the war. Artillery is still Queen of Battles in Ukraine and will be for the foreseeable future. Both the Ukrainian and Russian air forces have failed to perform well in this war. Both sides are handicapped by former Soviet doctrine. Ukraine has the additional handicaps of obsolete aircraft and way too few of them.  Ukraine was also the victim of an attack on their air bases that Russia was not, at least initially. Neither side has attempted a "serious" SEAD campaign.

Russia is starting to use their air force to effectively support ground offensives. They have developed their version of the JDAM and are using it. Ukraine has no answer in the air and has to rely on too few western supplied missile systems to deter the Russian air forces. If either side can get their act together, they can use air forces to augment artillery and reduce its importance. It is very unlikely either side can ever generate enough sorties to match the persistent presence of artillery. Ukraine certainly cannot do so with 60 F-16s and Russia seems unable/unwilling to do it with their much larger air force. Russia also has the artillery and required ammunition to make it unnecessary to use that much air power. Ukraine arguably has the tubes, but it does not have and cannot make enough ammunition. Without much more continuing support from the west in the form of artillery ammunition, Ukraine loses. That will be true even if Ukrainian morale holds up until "the end" when they are overrun.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/deadly-drones...57188.html

Zelenskyy is telling it like it is. Drones are an important class of weapons, but they aren't going to come anywhere close to ending the war. Artillery is still Queen of Battles in Ukraine and will be for the foreseeable future. Both the Ukrainian and Russian air forces have failed to perform well in this war. Both sides are handicapped by former Soviet doctrine. Ukraine has the additional handicaps of obsolete aircraft and way too few of them.  Ukraine was also the victim of an attack on their air bases that Russia was not, at least initially. Neither side has attempted a "serious" SEAD campaign.

Russia is starting to use their air force to effectively support ground offensives. They have developed their version of the JDAM and are using it. Ukraine has no answer in the air and has to rely on too few western supplied missile systems to deter the Russian air forces. If either side can get their act together, they can use air forces to augment artillery and reduce its importance. It is very unlikely either side can ever generate enough sorties to match the persistent presence of artillery. Ukraine certainly cannot do so with 60 F-16s and Russia seems unable/unwilling to do it with their much larger air force. Russia also has the artillery and required ammunition to make it unnecessary to use that much air power. Ukraine arguably has the tubes, but it does not have and cannot make enough ammunition. Without much more continuing support from the west in the form of artillery ammunition, Ukraine loses. That will be true even if Ukrainian morale holds up until "the end" when they are overrun.

[martyup]

[martyup]

[TrumpCard]

Has that ever happened at any time in history?  I have no desire for the U.S. to just get along with Putin.  I'd rather see the U.S. send $60 billion in military equipment to help Ukraine destroy Russia's army and liberate Ukrainian territory.

[TrumpCard]

Has that ever happened at any time in history?  I have no desire for the U.S. to just get along with Putin.  I'd rather see the U.S. send $60 billion in military equipment to help Ukraine destroy Russia's army and liberate Ukrainian territory.

[TrumpCard]

This battlefield update is infuriating to read: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...hasiv-yar/

[TrumpCard]

This battlefield update is infuriating to read: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/202...hasiv-yar/

[dabigv13]

Lots of videos of Russian airstrikes on front line Ukrainian cities, with continuous Russian drone overhead footage. Air defenses are clearly diminished and no longer providing the same coverage they did even a month ago.

[dabigv13]

Lots of videos of Russian airstrikes on front line Ukrainian cities, with continuous Russian drone overhead footage. Air defenses are clearly diminished and no longer providing the same coverage they did even a month ago.

[Goose]

Lots of videos of Russian airstrikes on front line Ukrainian cities, with continuous Russian drone overhead footage. Air defenses are clearly diminished and no longer providing the same coverage they did even a month ago.

I am not so sure it is mostly air defenses being diminished. Ukraine never had a very robust air defense. They are probably running very low on Patriot missiles, but IMO the main difference is that the Russian air force is finally getting off their dead ass. Having JDAM style weapons really helps, and you don't need great accuracy when your target is a city. Ukraine has way too few SAMs and virtually no remaining air force, having started with a small and old one two years ago.

This may be a reason for the Biden administration releasing "emergency" funds to rehab some of the HAWK batteries given to Ukraine. This HAWK thing has been going on for literally a year, at least. Once again, much too little and certainly very, very late. The US is getting eaten alive because we don't move "at the speed of war". Neither does Russia, but they are faster than we are in adapting to the situations they face. God help us if we have to fight a "real" war with a near-peer competitor. We are real good at "playing down to our competition", but it seems we are today playing well below it. Sickening.

[Goose]

Lots of videos of Russian airstrikes on front line Ukrainian cities, with continuous Russian drone overhead footage. Air defenses are clearly diminished and no longer providing the same coverage they did even a month ago.

I am not so sure it is mostly air defenses being diminished. Ukraine never had a very robust air defense. They are probably running very low on Patriot missiles, but IMO the main difference is that the Russian air force is finally getting off their dead ass. Having JDAM style weapons really helps, and you don't need great accuracy when your target is a city. Ukraine has way too few SAMs and virtually no remaining air force, having started with a small and old one two years ago.

This may be a reason for the Biden administration releasing "emergency" funds to rehab some of the HAWK batteries given to Ukraine. This HAWK thing has been going on for literally a year, at least. Once again, much too little and certainly very, very late. The US is getting eaten alive because we don't move "at the speed of war". Neither does Russia, but they are faster than we are in adapting to the situations they face. God help us if we have to fight a "real" war with a near-peer competitor. We are real good at "playing down to our competition", but it seems we are today playing well below it. Sickening.

[dabigv13]

It may be that Russia is improving in their ability to deploy their glide bombs, but I don't think it's disputable that the Ukrainian air defense system is much more leaky. Their percentage of interception is lessened for cruise missiles and ballistic missiles and drones, and Russia is having more success hitting high value targets even in the most heavily defended rear cities like Odessa and Kyiv.

And like I mentioned Russia seems to be able to fly their Orlan type surveillance drones over cities closer to the front, like Sumy and Zaporhizia, where previously these would be shot down by lower end, IE not Patriot, Ukrainian missile systems. This certainly increases the effect of Russian glide bombs.

[dabigv13]

It may be that Russia is improving in their ability to deploy their glide bombs, but I don't think it's disputable that the Ukrainian air defense system is much more leaky. Their percentage of interception is lessened for cruise missiles and ballistic missiles and drones, and Russia is having more success hitting high value targets even in the most heavily defended rear cities like Odessa and Kyiv.

And like I mentioned Russia seems to be able to fly their Orlan type surveillance drones over cities closer to the front, like Sumy and Zaporhizia, where previously these would be shot down by lower end, IE not Patriot, Ukrainian missile systems. This certainly increases the effect of Russian glide bombs.

[Goose]

It may be that Russia is improving in their ability to deploy their glide bombs, but I don't think it's disputable that the Ukrainian air defense system is much more leaky. Their percentage of interception is lessened for cruise missiles and ballistic missiles and drones, and Russia is having more success hitting high value targets even in the most heavily defended rear cities like Odessa and Kyiv.

And like I mentioned Russia seems to be able to fly their Orlan type surveillance drones over cities closer to the front, like Sumy and Zaporhizia, where previously these would be shot down by lower end, IE not Patriot, Ukrainian missile systems. This certainly increases the effect of Russian glide bombs.

I don't at all disagree with what you say about Ukrainian capabilities being reduced. However there is another overriding factor IMO. The Russian air force is now operating on a much larger scale which stretches Ukrainian capabilities beyond what they could do even at their previous strength. They only have so many SAM launchers to position. After that, they have none. Russia is flying MORE Orlans more aggressively and are coordinating their recon with their strike force. They didn't do that before. Russia loses a few drones, maybe quite a few, in quick succession. Eventually Ukraine is locally out of missiles but Russia is not out of drones. Then their strike (which has been drilling holes in the sky over occupied/Russian territory) goes in. In some cities, they may fail. In others, they won't. They will also be back the next day. They have learned. They always had the assets to do this, from day one. They didn't have the skill and/or the will. Now they do.

[Goose]

It may be that Russia is improving in their ability to deploy their glide bombs, but I don't think it's disputable that the Ukrainian air defense system is much more leaky. Their percentage of interception is lessened for cruise missiles and ballistic missiles and drones, and Russia is having more success hitting high value targets even in the most heavily defended rear cities like Odessa and Kyiv.

And like I mentioned Russia seems to be able to fly their Orlan type surveillance drones over cities closer to the front, like Sumy and Zaporhizia, where previously these would be shot down by lower end, IE not Patriot, Ukrainian missile systems. This certainly increases the effect of Russian glide bombs.

I don't at all disagree with what you say about Ukrainian capabilities being reduced. However there is another overriding factor IMO. The Russian air force is now operating on a much larger scale which stretches Ukrainian capabilities beyond what they could do even at their previous strength. They only have so many SAM launchers to position. After that, they have none. Russia is flying MORE Orlans more aggressively and are coordinating their recon with their strike force. They didn't do that before. Russia loses a few drones, maybe quite a few, in quick succession. Eventually Ukraine is locally out of missiles but Russia is not out of drones. Then their strike (which has been drilling holes in the sky over occupied/Russian territory) goes in. In some cities, they may fail. In others, they won't. They will also be back the next day. They have learned. They always had the assets to do this, from day one. They didn't have the skill and/or the will. Now they do.

[dabigv13]

Maybe in the last couple months, over two years into the war, Russia finally figured out how to use their air force, but I think the more parsimonious explanation, the one that fits the known facts, is that Ukraine is running out of air defense missiles.

Fortunately there is a solution for that if the House can ever vote on it.

Should be said that Russia is running out of things too. They're now sending in troops for assaults over exposed territory using ATVs and vans. Here's a Russian golf cart attack bring disrupted with an FPV drone.

https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1779017304224731629

[dabigv13]

Maybe in the last couple months, over two years into the war, Russia finally figured out how to use their air force, but I think the more parsimonious explanation, the one that fits the known facts, is that Ukraine is running out of air defense missiles.

Fortunately there is a solution for that if the House can ever vote on it.

Should be said that Russia is running out of things too. They're now sending in troops for assaults over exposed territory using ATVs and vans. Here's a Russian golf cart attack bring disrupted with an FPV drone.

https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1779017304224731629

[Goose]

Maybe in the last couple months, over two years into the war, Russia finally figured out how to use their air force, but I think the more parsimonious explanation, the one that fits the known facts, is that Ukraine is running out of air defense missiles.

Fortunately there is a solution for that if the House can ever vote on it.

There is another set of "known facts" you seem to ignore. The first article, clearly written from a Ukrainian point of view, describes the situation precisely.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/03...ombs-tech/

The Russians are currently flying over a hundred TAC air sorties a day, compared to basically zero a year ago. This is placing a massive load on the Ukrainian air defense systems that previously didn't exist at all. As the article points out, the front is 960 km long. Ukraine has nowhere near enough missile launchers to cover that entire front, even if/when they have missiles to supply them. This illustrates with clarity the inherent limitation of a SAM-based defense. Each missile site is a point defense system that defends a circle around it's location. To defend a long front, you need LOTS of such point defense systems. That is why the USSR built a vast number of them. Ukraine doesn't have and since 2014 has not had anywhere near enough missile launchers to meet Soviet standards.

Equally importantly the glide bombs provide a "stand off" distance of 40 km. A Patriot can reach that far easily and can be located far enough behind the "front" to be relatively "safe". An NASAMS has a maximum range of 30 km with "standard" AMRAAMs and 50 km with AMRAAM-ERs. That puts the NASAMs at most 10 km behind the  front. Possible but risky. This analysis for NASAMS relies on the attack being directly towards the missile launcher. Being "off axis" increases the range beyond what an NASAMS can hit. HAWK missiles have ranges similar to NASAMS-ER. IRIS-T doesn't have near the range. The S300/400 does have the range but it is unclear how many of these systems Ukraine has remaining and how many missiles are available. Getting more missiles will obviously rely on purchasing them from current users. AFAIK, those are the choices.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/05/world...lanes.html

This article makes many of the same points, while debunking the Ukrainian claims that they destroyed 14 Russian aircraft. 2 or possibly 3 are "confirmed" kills. Both articles point out that the VKS is suffering attrition due to Ukrainian missiles. The VKS has responded to its losses by using extensive drone reconnaissance to both locate the targets and (more importantly) verify (as best they can) there are no long-range SAMs in the immediate vicinity. Orlan drones can carry an ELINT package that will detect the radars of most NATO and essentially all USSR designed SAMs, so they can usually find any SAM sites.

Like all things in war, especially for Russians, these capabilities often aren't used very well, but the VKS is getting better. All they need to do is look at the USAF "playbook" and copy it. Easier said than done, but given time they have got a lot of it right. The important maneuver we have yet to see from the VKS is "toss" glide bomb launches. The VKS flies high to maximize the range of their glide bombs.The VKS is right now behaving as if it is impervious while over occupied/Russian territory. They aren't quite, but pretty close, especially if their "snoopers" say there are no active SAMs in the area. If/when the F-16s "arrive" and/or Ukraine gets a larger supply of missiles the Russians may have to learn how to do that. The SU-34 is a fast aircraft, so the VKS can in theory do the job even better than the USAF. It can get up to speed below the radar horizon, "pop up" and "toss" its glide bombs, then dive for the deck. SARH missiles can't cope with this maneuver and ARH often fails because the initial steer doesn't bring them close enough to "see" the target.  It takes better airmanship than the typical VKS pilot normally possess, but as Russia has shown, they learn.

I agree that Ukraine running out of SAMs is an immense problem, but even if they had all they needed, they have a new and very deadly enemy to face. Of that there is no doubt. The first article makes the case that Ukraine can, with the F-16s and an adequate SAM supply, inflict unsustainable losses on the VKS. This analysis must be relying heavily on the F-16s, because Ukraine doesn't have anywhere near enough SAM launchers to do that, assuming the VKS fights "smart" and avoids them. The USAF knows how to do that pretty well. The VKS may not be able to do it, but I suspect they can learn, given time. Ukraine's best hope is to not give them time.

Should be said that Russia is running out of things too. They're now sending in troops for assaults over exposed territory using ATVs and vans. Here's a Russian golf cart attack bring disrupted with an FPV drone.

https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1779017304224731629

While I don't doubt Russia is running out of things, I don't think this video supports that contention in any way. What is different between the vehicle used by the Russians and the RWMIK Land Rover used by the UK? https://www.eliteukforces.info/uksf-gear/wmik/ Does the fact the UK uses these vehicles mean they are running out of things? https://www.americanspecialops.com/vehicles/atv/ Ditto. https://military.polaris.com/en-us/appli.../military/ In fact, the US uses all kinds of ATVs for military purposes.

The vehicle in the photo carried a crew of two (it appears) and had what looked like an antenna radome mounted on it. Hardly looks like a vehicle making an assault, but more like a communications/EW vehicle. It may have actually been a GPS jammer for all we know. Glad Ukraine hit it because if it was a jammer it can cause problems for precision weapons and drones. Maybe it can only transmit when parked because it uses a dismounted generator.

[Goose]

Maybe in the last couple months, over two years into the war, Russia finally figured out how to use their air force, but I think the more parsimonious explanation, the one that fits the known facts, is that Ukraine is running out of air defense missiles.

Fortunately there is a solution for that if the House can ever vote on it.

There is another set of "known facts" you seem to ignore. The first article, clearly written from a Ukrainian point of view, describes the situation precisely.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/03...ombs-tech/

The Russians are currently flying over a hundred TAC air sorties a day, compared to basically zero a year ago. This is placing a massive load on the Ukrainian air defense systems that previously didn't exist at all. As the article points out, the front is 960 km long. Ukraine has nowhere near enough missile launchers to cover that entire front, even if/when they have missiles to supply them. This illustrates with clarity the inherent limitation of a SAM-based defense. Each missile site is a point defense system that defends a circle around it's location. To defend a long front, you need LOTS of such point defense systems. That is why the USSR built a vast number of them. Ukraine doesn't have and since 2014 has not had anywhere near enough missile launchers to meet Soviet standards.

Equally importantly the glide bombs provide a "stand off" distance of 40 km. A Patriot can reach that far easily and can be located far enough behind the "front" to be relatively "safe". An NASAMS has a maximum range of 30 km with "standard" AMRAAMs and 50 km with AMRAAM-ERs. That puts the NASAMs at most 10 km behind the  front. Possible but risky. This analysis for NASAMS relies on the attack being directly towards the missile launcher. Being "off axis" increases the range beyond what an NASAMS can hit. HAWK missiles have ranges similar to NASAMS-ER. IRIS-T doesn't have near the range. The S300/400 does have the range but it is unclear how many of these systems Ukraine has remaining and how many missiles are available. Getting more missiles will obviously rely on purchasing them from current users. AFAIK, those are the choices.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/05/world...lanes.html

This article makes many of the same points, while debunking the Ukrainian claims that they destroyed 14 Russian aircraft. 2 or possibly 3 are "confirmed" kills. Both articles point out that the VKS is suffering attrition due to Ukrainian missiles. The VKS has responded to its losses by using extensive drone reconnaissance to both locate the targets and (more importantly) verify (as best they can) there are no long-range SAMs in the immediate vicinity. Orlan drones can carry an ELINT package that will detect the radars of most NATO and essentially all USSR designed SAMs, so they can usually find any SAM sites.

Like all things in war, especially for Russians, these capabilities often aren't used very well, but the VKS is getting better. All they need to do is look at the USAF "playbook" and copy it. Easier said than done, but given time they have got a lot of it right. The important maneuver we have yet to see from the VKS is "toss" glide bomb launches. The VKS flies high to maximize the range of their glide bombs.The VKS is right now behaving as if it is impervious while over occupied/Russian territory. They aren't quite, but pretty close, especially if their "snoopers" say there are no active SAMs in the area. If/when the F-16s "arrive" and/or Ukraine gets a larger supply of missiles the Russians may have to learn how to do that. The SU-34 is a fast aircraft, so the VKS can in theory do the job even better than the USAF. It can get up to speed below the radar horizon, "pop up" and "toss" its glide bombs, then dive for the deck. SARH missiles can't cope with this maneuver and ARH often fails because the initial steer doesn't bring them close enough to "see" the target.  It takes better airmanship than the typical VKS pilot normally possess, but as Russia has shown, they learn.

I agree that Ukraine running out of SAMs is an immense problem, but even if they had all they needed, they have a new and very deadly enemy to face. Of that there is no doubt. The first article makes the case that Ukraine can, with the F-16s and an adequate SAM supply, inflict unsustainable losses on the VKS. This analysis must be relying heavily on the F-16s, because Ukraine doesn't have anywhere near enough SAM launchers to do that, assuming the VKS fights "smart" and avoids them. The USAF knows how to do that pretty well. The VKS may not be able to do it, but I suspect they can learn, given time. Ukraine's best hope is to not give them time.

Should be said that Russia is running out of things too. They're now sending in troops for assaults over exposed territory using ATVs and vans. Here's a Russian golf cart attack bring disrupted with an FPV drone.

https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1779017304224731629

While I don't doubt Russia is running out of things, I don't think this video supports that contention in any way. What is different between the vehicle used by the Russians and the RWMIK Land Rover used by the UK? https://www.eliteukforces.info/uksf-gear/wmik/ Does the fact the UK uses these vehicles mean they are running out of things? https://www.americanspecialops.com/vehicles/atv/ Ditto. https://military.polaris.com/en-us/appli.../military/ In fact, the US uses all kinds of ATVs for military purposes.

The vehicle in the photo carried a crew of two (it appears) and had what looked like an antenna radome mounted on it. Hardly looks like a vehicle making an assault, but more like a communications/EW vehicle. It may have actually been a GPS jammer for all we know. Glad Ukraine hit it because if it was a jammer it can cause problems for precision weapons and drones. Maybe it can only transmit when parked because it uses a dismounted generator.

[dabigv13]

My theory is that maybe VKS is much more active the past two months because Ukraine is almost out of AD missiles. Your hypothesis is after two years Russia, for some unknown reason yet to be elucidated, is suddenly much more active and successful.

And because you just couldn't be happy watching a Russian assault golf cart get blown up by a short range FPV, here are some Russian assault vans getting blown up near Robotyne.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1778449016071622958

Fortunately Germany is partially stepping in where the US is failing. They are going to provide another Patriot battery.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1779141789678440782

[dabigv13]

My theory is that maybe VKS is much more active the past two months because Ukraine is almost out of AD missiles. Your hypothesis is after two years Russia, for some unknown reason yet to be elucidated, is suddenly much more active and successful.

And because you just couldn't be happy watching a Russian assault golf cart get blown up by a short range FPV, here are some Russian assault vans getting blown up near Robotyne.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1778449016071622958

Fortunately Germany is partially stepping in where the US is failing. They are going to provide another Patriot battery.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1779141789678440782

[Goose]

My theory is that maybe VKS is much more active the past two months because Ukraine is almost out of AD missiles. Your hypothesis is after two years Russia, for some unknown reason yet to be elucidated, is suddenly much more active and successful.

I totally agree the fact Ukraine is almost out of AD missiles is a major factor in the success the VKS is having. However, I certainly don't understand your statement about "reasons yet to be elucidated". The included links elucidated the reasons quite well IMO. The two big game changers are that Russia has (finally) developed an equivalent of the US JDAM. They didn't have them previously because their belief was that the US and NATO would make their use impossible. The Russians developed that capability at scale. The second big changer is that the VKS recognized their pilots were inadequately trained. They didn't fly enough and didn't have the training (because they had no reason) to deliver precision guided weapons. Now the VKS does have the training and is "delivering the goods".  One hundred sorties a day is nothing to sneeze at even if Ukraine has adequate missile stocks for all its Patriot batteries.

The VKS undoubtedly still has training issues, but they are much better than they were. Russia has "learned". Even (or perhaps especially) the Ukrainians are saying it. FWIW, Russia's activity increase was incremental. Ukraine saw some of it when they attempted the summer/fall offensive in the south. You may remember that that was the point (August 2023) when Ukraine's request for F-16 hit a maximum and finally succeeded. Ukraine knows it is a different battle. They need an air force to win it. They said so, repeatedly and loudly. They experienced what the nascent VKS was doing and realized what it meant. What Ukraine (or some of their commanders anyway) have stated is that it is "too late" for the F-16s. This may be intentional disinformation. The idea presented was that the VKS had already prepared to deal with the F-16s. Certainly they were trying. The increased Mainstay activity had the hallmarks of learning to target low-flying aircraft with SAMs that can't actually "see" them. The Ukrainian destruction of the A-50s has, at least for now, stopped that. The Ukrainian success against an SU-34 strike, shooting down two, led the VKS to stand down for a week or so while they figured out what happened. They have responded by increasing drone activity to develop corridors where there are no SAMs. This also helps cruise missile targeting. Right now, we don't really know how well this is working, because Ukraine doesn't have the SAMs available to contest the airspace anyway. Hopefully that will soon change and the VKS will get to find out how good they are (or are not) at mission planning.

 AFAIK, the VKS has not yet demonstrated that it can deliver glide bomb attacks in the presence of active aerial opposition. It is wise to remember that since the start of the war neither Ukraine nor Russia could/did use their IFF. That has lead to considerable "red on red" by Russia. Now imagine mixing in a bunch of "yellow" bandits. If it reaches that point, it will be very "interesting". I think Russia could get a very bloody nose there. Their doctrine has always been to defend "bombers" with dedicated fighters. However, they really haven't had to do so and given their previous performances it is entirely possible the VKS can't deliver. However, the longer it takes the better the VKS "bomber" pilots will be. 

And because you just couldn't be happy watching a Russian assault golf cart get blown up by a short range FPV, here are some Russian assault vans getting blown up near Robotyne.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1778449016071622958

I am always happy to see orcs destroyed. I am not happy when totally unsupported conclusions are drawn from it happening. It makes us believe that Russia is "bleeding out" when that is not actually indicated by what we see. I don't see an "assault" being conducted in either of these movies. I see isolated vehicles moving across open ground where they probably thought the were relatively safe. All armies have such vehicles that get used every day. What IS different in this war is that Ukraine has drones that range far and wide, even in what would be called "rear" areas. They take out targets of opportunity. Thin skinned ones are "prime meat" because any hit probably kills the vehicle. Does that mean Russia is running out of armored vehicles? Not at all. It means Russia (just like all other armies) has  lots of thin-skinned vehicles that it regularly uses for supply and various "special" missions where armored vehicles are not appropriate.

Fortunately Germany is partially stepping in where the US is failing. They are going to provide another Patriot battery.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1779141789678440782

Good. Delivery will be "initiated immediately". When will an operational Patriot arrive in Ukraine along with at least 5 full ammunition loads? Germany's record on promising vs. delivery isn't very good. Right now, the US unfortunately is promising and delivering nothing, so we don't have anything to crow about. Lets hope the Germans actually move rapidly.

[Goose]

My theory is that maybe VKS is much more active the past two months because Ukraine is almost out of AD missiles. Your hypothesis is after two years Russia, for some unknown reason yet to be elucidated, is suddenly much more active and successful.

I totally agree the fact Ukraine is almost out of AD missiles is a major factor in the success the VKS is having. However, I certainly don't understand your statement about "reasons yet to be elucidated". The included links elucidated the reasons quite well IMO. The two big game changers are that Russia has (finally) developed an equivalent of the US JDAM. They didn't have them previously because their belief was that the US and NATO would make their use impossible. The Russians developed that capability at scale. The second big changer is that the VKS recognized their pilots were inadequately trained. They didn't fly enough and didn't have the training (because they had no reason) to deliver precision guided weapons. Now the VKS does have the training and is "delivering the goods".  One hundred sorties a day is nothing to sneeze at even if Ukraine has adequate missile stocks for all its Patriot batteries.

The VKS undoubtedly still has training issues, but they are much better than they were. Russia has "learned". Even (or perhaps especially) the Ukrainians are saying it. FWIW, Russia's activity increase was incremental. Ukraine saw some of it when they attempted the summer/fall offensive in the south. You may remember that that was the point (August 2023) when Ukraine's request for F-16 hit a maximum and finally succeeded. Ukraine knows it is a different battle. They need an air force to win it. They said so, repeatedly and loudly. They experienced what the nascent VKS was doing and realized what it meant. What Ukraine (or some of their commanders anyway) have stated is that it is "too late" for the F-16s. This may be intentional disinformation. The idea presented was that the VKS had already prepared to deal with the F-16s. Certainly they were trying. The increased Mainstay activity had the hallmarks of learning to target low-flying aircraft with SAMs that can't actually "see" them. The Ukrainian destruction of the A-50s has, at least for now, stopped that. The Ukrainian success against an SU-34 strike, shooting down two, led the VKS to stand down for a week or so while they figured out what happened. They have responded by increasing drone activity to develop corridors where there are no SAMs. This also helps cruise missile targeting. Right now, we don't really know how well this is working, because Ukraine doesn't have the SAMs available to contest the airspace anyway. Hopefully that will soon change and the VKS will get to find out how good they are (or are not) at mission planning.

 AFAIK, the VKS has not yet demonstrated that it can deliver glide bomb attacks in the presence of active aerial opposition. It is wise to remember that since the start of the war neither Ukraine nor Russia could/did use their IFF. That has lead to considerable "red on red" by Russia. Now imagine mixing in a bunch of "yellow" bandits. If it reaches that point, it will be very "interesting". I think Russia could get a very bloody nose there. Their doctrine has always been to defend "bombers" with dedicated fighters. However, they really haven't had to do so and given their previous performances it is entirely possible the VKS can't deliver. However, the longer it takes the better the VKS "bomber" pilots will be. 

And because you just couldn't be happy watching a Russian assault golf cart get blown up by a short range FPV, here are some Russian assault vans getting blown up near Robotyne.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1778449016071622958

I am always happy to see orcs destroyed. I am not happy when totally unsupported conclusions are drawn from it happening. It makes us believe that Russia is "bleeding out" when that is not actually indicated by what we see. I don't see an "assault" being conducted in either of these movies. I see isolated vehicles moving across open ground where they probably thought the were relatively safe. All armies have such vehicles that get used every day. What IS different in this war is that Ukraine has drones that range far and wide, even in what would be called "rear" areas. They take out targets of opportunity. Thin skinned ones are "prime meat" because any hit probably kills the vehicle. Does that mean Russia is running out of armored vehicles? Not at all. It means Russia (just like all other armies) has  lots of thin-skinned vehicles that it regularly uses for supply and various "special" missions where armored vehicles are not appropriate.

Fortunately Germany is partially stepping in where the US is failing. They are going to provide another Patriot battery.

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1779141789678440782

Good. Delivery will be "initiated immediately". When will an operational Patriot arrive in Ukraine along with at least 5 full ammunition loads? Germany's record on promising vs. delivery isn't very good. Right now, the US unfortunately is promising and delivering nothing, so we don't have anything to crow about. Lets hope the Germans actually move rapidly.