[Goose]

Well, can you truly separate the military from politics? I don’t think we ever could.  But I think it’s worse now.

I agree that the military is unquestionably affected by politics. The objectives certainly are established by civilian politicians. That is how the system is designed. The members of the military are also citizens (for the great majority) who vote and who also have political opinions. The civilian politicians ideally would allow the military to use Auftragstaktik in accomplishing the commander's intent. As is normal with Auftragstaktik there will be constraints set forth specifying limitations the military must observe. Unfortunately, throughout history the civilian command authority (as well as other non-command politicians) have often "meddled" in this process. This has been true throughout our nation's history. Equally unfortunately the "objectives" set forth are often poorly thought out, ill-defined, and arguable not deliverable by military action. Without a doubt, these latter problems have become much worse since WW II.

IMO it is possible (and desirable) to separate the strategic and tactical execution of the (possibly bad, maybe even fatally compromised)  plan from the plan itself. We can't expect the military to remove legislative delays. That isn't their job. Their job is to execute the strategy and tactics necessary to fulfill the NCA's stated intent. The NCA clearly intends to supply weapons to Ukraine as expeditiously as possible. To whatever degree the military doesn't do that, we can criticize them without regard to whether we believe the NCA's intent is wise or prudent.  Stupid wars are bad. Stupid wars fought poorly are worse. The "fought poorly" part is IMO subject to criticism that is independent of politics. Deciding to do it is political. Actually doing it is not.

[Goose]

Well, can you truly separate the military from politics? I don’t think we ever could.  But I think it’s worse now.

I agree that the military is unquestionably affected by politics. The objectives certainly are established by civilian politicians. That is how the system is designed. The members of the military are also citizens (for the great majority) who vote and who also have political opinions. The civilian politicians ideally would allow the military to use Auftragstaktik in accomplishing the commander's intent. As is normal with Auftragstaktik there will be constraints set forth specifying limitations the military must observe. Unfortunately, throughout history the civilian command authority (as well as other non-command politicians) have often "meddled" in this process. This has been true throughout our nation's history. Equally unfortunately the "objectives" set forth are often poorly thought out, ill-defined, and arguable not deliverable by military action. Without a doubt, these latter problems have become much worse since WW II.

IMO it is possible (and desirable) to separate the strategic and tactical execution of the (possibly bad, maybe even fatally compromised)  plan from the plan itself. We can't expect the military to remove legislative delays. That isn't their job. Their job is to execute the strategy and tactics necessary to fulfill the NCA's stated intent. The NCA clearly intends to supply weapons to Ukraine as expeditiously as possible. To whatever degree the military doesn't do that, we can criticize them without regard to whether we believe the NCA's intent is wise or prudent.  Stupid wars are bad. Stupid wars fought poorly are worse. The "fought poorly" part is IMO subject to criticism that is independent of politics. Deciding to do it is political. Actually doing it is not.

[BostonCard]

It’s worth noting that the speaker appears to have had a legitimate change of heart after being briefed by the intelligence services, and he put his job on the line. More than half of Republicans voted against the bill. There’s a pending motion to discharge the speaker with enough cosponsors that unless he gets help from democrats, he will lose the speakership. Regardless of how one might feel about his politics, I give him credit for showing a spine.

https://x.com/russianpropx/status/178174...34441?s=46

All democrats present voted in favor; a narrow majority of Republicans voted against. 

BC

[BostonCard]

It’s worth noting that the speaker appears to have had a legitimate change of heart after being briefed by the intelligence services, and he put his job on the line. More than half of Republicans voted against the bill. There’s a pending motion to discharge the speaker with enough cosponsors that unless he gets help from democrats, he will lose the speakership. Regardless of how one might feel about his politics, I give him credit for showing a spine.

https://x.com/russianpropx/status/178174...34441?s=46

All democrats present voted in favor; a narrow majority of Republicans voted against. 

BC

[Goose]

It’s worth noting that the speaker appears to have had a legitimate change of heart after being briefed by the intelligence services, and he put his job on the line. More than half of Republicans voted against the bill. There’s a pending motion to discharge the speaker with enough cosponsors that unless he gets help from democrats, he will lose the speakership. Regardless of how one might feel about his politics, I give him credit for showing a spine.

Agree with you here. He did the "right thing". Not often found in today's politics.

https://x.com/russianpropx/status/178174...34441?s=46

All democrats present voted in favor; a narrow majority of Republicans voted against. 

BC

Sadly, IMO many of the Republican's voting against did so for political reasons, not out of their own conviction. Sadly, that too appears to be becoming more the norm.

[Goose]

It’s worth noting that the speaker appears to have had a legitimate change of heart after being briefed by the intelligence services, and he put his job on the line. More than half of Republicans voted against the bill. There’s a pending motion to discharge the speaker with enough cosponsors that unless he gets help from democrats, he will lose the speakership. Regardless of how one might feel about his politics, I give him credit for showing a spine.

Agree with you here. He did the "right thing". Not often found in today's politics.

https://x.com/russianpropx/status/178174...34441?s=46

All democrats present voted in favor; a narrow majority of Republicans voted against. 

BC

Sadly, IMO many of the Republican's voting against did so for political reasons, not out of their own conviction. Sadly, that too appears to be becoming more the norm.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/everything-kn...57601.html

It appears that the Ukraine did indeed shoot down the Backfire at a range of about 300 km to the border of Ukraine. Why the TU-22M was anywhere near that close to Ukraine is unknown. It seems a bit silly when presumably they were using KH-22 missiles, which have a range of over 600 km. The technical reasons I can think of are as follows. First, the KH-22 uses an INS, not GLONASS/GPS. The further it flies the less accurate it will be. The Kh-22 active seeker works against ships and (maybe) bridges, but not cities. Perhaps getting close was an attempt to actually hit a specific target. Second, shorter flight time makes it more difficult to shoot down this missile. There is less time to react and much less time for a second shot if you miss. The missile normally flies at relatively high speed, but not the 5600 m/sec that it reaches in its terminal dive. Neither of these reasons are particularly "good" ones. Much more probable that the Backfire just thought it was perfectly safe. Why it didn't detect the S-200 illuminator and act accordingly also remains a mystery.

Due to this missiles very high speed the only systems Ukraine has that have a good chance to hit the KH-22 are Patriot and (maybe) S-400. The AIM-7 and AMRAAM have such limited range and speed that unless the KH-22 is fired almost right at the missile launcher it has no chance. Even Patriot has some geographic limitations against such a high-speed missile. SAMs, even "good ones", are inherently point defense weapons against such high-speed targets.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/everything-kn...57601.html

It appears that the Ukraine did indeed shoot down the Backfire at a range of about 300 km to the border of Ukraine. Why the TU-22M was anywhere near that close to Ukraine is unknown. It seems a bit silly when presumably they were using KH-22 missiles, which have a range of over 600 km. The technical reasons I can think of are as follows. First, the KH-22 uses an INS, not GLONASS/GPS. The further it flies the less accurate it will be. The Kh-22 active seeker works against ships and (maybe) bridges, but not cities. Perhaps getting close was an attempt to actually hit a specific target. Second, shorter flight time makes it more difficult to shoot down this missile. There is less time to react and much less time for a second shot if you miss. The missile normally flies at relatively high speed, but not the 5600 m/sec that it reaches in its terminal dive. Neither of these reasons are particularly "good" ones. Much more probable that the Backfire just thought it was perfectly safe. Why it didn't detect the S-200 illuminator and act accordingly also remains a mystery.

Due to this missiles very high speed the only systems Ukraine has that have a good chance to hit the KH-22 are Patriot and (maybe) S-400. The AIM-7 and AMRAAM have such limited range and speed that unless the KH-22 is fired almost right at the missile launcher it has no chance. Even Patriot has some geographic limitations against such a high-speed missile. SAMs, even "good ones", are inherently point defense weapons against such high-speed targets.

[dabigv13]

Good article with very nice satellite images from the recent Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Russian Dzhankoi airbase in Crimea. The Russian S-400 system apparently unable to defend itself. 

https://www.twz.com/news-features/major-...ian-attack

Hopefully Ukraine gets many more soon with this new aid package, and hopefully at very depreciated prices, like zero for the "obsolete" ATACMS used here to great effect. And hopefully longer range variants and many of those as well, though I'm sure Ukraine will want the bulk of the aid in air defense missiles and 155mm shells.

[dabigv13]

Good article with very nice satellite images from the recent Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Russian Dzhankoi airbase in Crimea. The Russian S-400 system apparently unable to defend itself. 

https://www.twz.com/news-features/major-...ian-attack

Hopefully Ukraine gets many more soon with this new aid package, and hopefully at very depreciated prices, like zero for the "obsolete" ATACMS used here to great effect. And hopefully longer range variants and many of those as well, though I'm sure Ukraine will want the bulk of the aid in air defense missiles and 155mm shells.

[Goose]

Good article with very nice satellite images from the recent Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Russian Dzhankoi airbase in Crimea. The Russian S-400 system apparently unable to defend itself. 

https://www.twz.com/news-features/major-...ian-attack

Hopefully Ukraine gets many more soon with this new aid package, and hopefully at very depreciated prices, like zero for the "obsolete" ATACMS used here to great effect. And hopefully longer range variants and many of those as well, though I'm sure Ukraine will want the bulk of the aid in air defense missiles and 155mm shells.

I like the images a lot! Thanks for finding them. One very important thing it shows us that indeed the S-400 system was at least configured as an operational unit and was not there for repair. This base contains a depot maintenance facility for these systems and some of the systems destroyed/damaged were probably undergoing repair/maintenance. The apparently operational S-400 was indeed unable to defend itself. Not really surprising. Russia advertises lots of capabilities for their systems that cause us in the west to ask "How do they do that with this hardware?". Sometimes Russia surprises us and has some really clever solution to a problem that is superior to anything we have imagined. Fortunately, this doesn't happen often. It does require us to "research" the situation, that's for sure.

Also totally agree with your belief that the Patriot missiles and the 155 mm munitions are the most important part of the current aid package. The Patriots do have a definite tactical purpose and will cut down on the Russian ability to pummel Ukraine. It won't eliminate it however, and IMO the greatest impact of the Patriots will be political, not tactical. Ukraine needs to know that we are now and will in the future stand behind them. The Patriots are a message that we will. The population of Ukraine also needs to believe they are not absolutely helpless against Russia, and the Patriots demonstrate they aren't with every successful intercept.

The 155 mm munitions are IMO the most important part of the package, by far. The Ukrainians can't withstand endless uncontested shelling by Russian artillery. It is the ultimate form of attrition. You have to man the defenses to prevent Russian infantry attacks from succeeding, but if you do man them some percentage of your troops die every day. The Russian infantry doesn't need to attack. They simply need to pose the threat of an attack. If Ukraine has the 155 mm munitions it can destroy the Russian artillery, or at a minimum make it move around a lot. It creates a symmetrical situation where neither Russia nor Ukraine can just sit there and absorb the losses. They both must develop a strategy that allows them to control their losses. We hope Ukraine can do that better than Russia does. There is lots of reason, based on past history, to believe that is the case.

Then, we can talk about ATACMS :-).

[Goose]

Good article with very nice satellite images from the recent Ukrainian ATACMS strike on the Russian Dzhankoi airbase in Crimea. The Russian S-400 system apparently unable to defend itself. 

https://www.twz.com/news-features/major-...ian-attack

Hopefully Ukraine gets many more soon with this new aid package, and hopefully at very depreciated prices, like zero for the "obsolete" ATACMS used here to great effect. And hopefully longer range variants and many of those as well, though I'm sure Ukraine will want the bulk of the aid in air defense missiles and 155mm shells.

I like the images a lot! Thanks for finding them. One very important thing it shows us that indeed the S-400 system was at least configured as an operational unit and was not there for repair. This base contains a depot maintenance facility for these systems and some of the systems destroyed/damaged were probably undergoing repair/maintenance. The apparently operational S-400 was indeed unable to defend itself. Not really surprising. Russia advertises lots of capabilities for their systems that cause us in the west to ask "How do they do that with this hardware?". Sometimes Russia surprises us and has some really clever solution to a problem that is superior to anything we have imagined. Fortunately, this doesn't happen often. It does require us to "research" the situation, that's for sure.

Also totally agree with your belief that the Patriot missiles and the 155 mm munitions are the most important part of the current aid package. The Patriots do have a definite tactical purpose and will cut down on the Russian ability to pummel Ukraine. It won't eliminate it however, and IMO the greatest impact of the Patriots will be political, not tactical. Ukraine needs to know that we are now and will in the future stand behind them. The Patriots are a message that we will. The population of Ukraine also needs to believe they are not absolutely helpless against Russia, and the Patriots demonstrate they aren't with every successful intercept.

The 155 mm munitions are IMO the most important part of the package, by far. The Ukrainians can't withstand endless uncontested shelling by Russian artillery. It is the ultimate form of attrition. You have to man the defenses to prevent Russian infantry attacks from succeeding, but if you do man them some percentage of your troops die every day. The Russian infantry doesn't need to attack. They simply need to pose the threat of an attack. If Ukraine has the 155 mm munitions it can destroy the Russian artillery, or at a minimum make it move around a lot. It creates a symmetrical situation where neither Russia nor Ukraine can just sit there and absorb the losses. They both must develop a strategy that allows them to control their losses. We hope Ukraine can do that better than Russia does. There is lots of reason, based on past history, to believe that is the case.

Then, we can talk about ATACMS :-).

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1781923869529633115?s=46[/tweet]

The tweet is in Ukrainian, but google translate does a good job. No insight there that Goose can’t provide, but I think it is correct. This will likely be the last “big” US aid package, barring something surprising in November, so all it does is buy time for the EU to get its act together and Ukraine to develop a military industrial complex. Just out of curiosity, how hard would it be for Ukraine to set up a shell factory (my guess is not easy or it would have been done already), because the Ukrainians would be nothing if not motivated if we can provide the expertise to help them get it up and running, and I would think two years would be adequate time to do so. Teach a man to fish and all that.

BC

---

A quick add:

https://x.com/markhertling/status/178206...54143?s=46

Mark is no longer active duty, but he likely knows.

BC

[BostonCard]

[tweet]https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1781923869529633115?s=46[/tweet]

The tweet is in Ukrainian, but google translate does a good job. No insight there that Goose can’t provide, but I think it is correct. This will likely be the last “big” US aid package, barring something surprising in November, so all it does is buy time for the EU to get its act together and Ukraine to develop a military industrial complex. Just out of curiosity, how hard would it be for Ukraine to set up a shell factory (my guess is not easy or it would have been done already), because the Ukrainians would be nothing if not motivated if we can provide the expertise to help them get it up and running, and I would think two years would be adequate time to do so. Teach a man to fish and all that.

BC

---

A quick add:

https://x.com/markhertling/status/178206...54143?s=46

Mark is no longer active duty, but he likely knows.

BC

[TrumpCard]

The Tartigami post is sober in the way the US and Ukraine planning should have been last spring/summer. Instead of planning an offensive that churned precious Ukrainian lives, we should have been focused on establishing a sustainable defense to last as many years as needed before Russia ended its efforts to take more territory.

[TrumpCard]

The Tartigami post is sober in the way the US and Ukraine planning should have been last spring/summer. Instead of planning an offensive that churned precious Ukrainian lives, we should have been focused on establishing a sustainable defense to last as many years as needed before Russia ended its efforts to take more territory.

[Goose]

[tweet]https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1781923869529633115?s=46[/tweet]

The tweet is in Ukrainian, but google translate does a good job. No insight there that Goose can’t provide, but I think it is correct. This will likely be the last “big” US aid package, barring something surprising in November, so all it does is buy time for the EU to get its act together and Ukraine to develop a military industrial complex. Just out of curiosity, how hard would it be for Ukraine to set up a shell factory (my guess is not easy or it would have been done already), because the Ukrainians would be nothing if not motivated if we can provide the expertise to help them get it up and running, and I would think two years would be adequate time to do so. Teach a man to fish and all that.

BC

BC, do you mean the last big aid package until after the elections or the last aid package ever, even in 2025. If the latter, Ukraine should basically give up now. Either that or figure out a way to win this summer.

Ukraine is and has been trying to re-establish the ability to supply itself with ordinance. There are "joint ventures" all over Eastern Europe. This approach is being used because Russia can't attack ammunition factories in say Bulgaria because they are in NATO. If they were built in Ukraine, they wouldn't last long unless they came equipped with a couple of Patriot batteries. Building up the Ukrainian arms industry would be a daunting task even in peacetime where all the money and skilled labor was not in demand by other critical functions. It is improbable these joint ventures will deliver significant ordinance in the near term, if ever. Maybe in a few years. These eastern European countries aren't exactly manufacturing titans in the first place. Teaching a man to fish while he is drowning is real hard, even if that man has good intentions :-).

Europe in it's wildest dreams doesn't have the ability to supply adequate ordinance to Ukraine. Look at the trajectory of their famous "1 million shells" program. The EU simply doesn't have the manufacturing available to do it, even if fully committed. The US is better off in this regard. Not great, but better off. We also have immense stockpiles compared to Europe. We can take lots of 155 mm out of stock for Ukraine and still have plenty left. Europe cannot. Like it or not, the US is still very much "the arsenal of democracy". If we don't play, it will be a very short game. Given unanimity of purpose, Europe could in two or three years set up ordinance manufacturing to a very high level. Consider the new Rheinmetall plant being built in the Netherlands. It was started last year with the expectation of producing product in 2025.

The US has been slow to react and evaluate what needs to be be done to prepare us for the possible scenarios in 2025 and later. There are all kinds of reasons for this. We have done a very poor job of getting ready for even the relatively foreseeable "next". Europe has arguably done worse. They had further to go, so the knock-on effects are multiplied. Bad as we are, we remain the only viable vendor.

[Goose]

[tweet]https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1781923869529633115?s=46[/tweet]

The tweet is in Ukrainian, but google translate does a good job. No insight there that Goose can’t provide, but I think it is correct. This will likely be the last “big” US aid package, barring something surprising in November, so all it does is buy time for the EU to get its act together and Ukraine to develop a military industrial complex. Just out of curiosity, how hard would it be for Ukraine to set up a shell factory (my guess is not easy or it would have been done already), because the Ukrainians would be nothing if not motivated if we can provide the expertise to help them get it up and running, and I would think two years would be adequate time to do so. Teach a man to fish and all that.

BC

BC, do you mean the last big aid package until after the elections or the last aid package ever, even in 2025. If the latter, Ukraine should basically give up now. Either that or figure out a way to win this summer.

Ukraine is and has been trying to re-establish the ability to supply itself with ordinance. There are "joint ventures" all over Eastern Europe. This approach is being used because Russia can't attack ammunition factories in say Bulgaria because they are in NATO. If they were built in Ukraine, they wouldn't last long unless they came equipped with a couple of Patriot batteries. Building up the Ukrainian arms industry would be a daunting task even in peacetime where all the money and skilled labor was not in demand by other critical functions. It is improbable these joint ventures will deliver significant ordinance in the near term, if ever. Maybe in a few years. These eastern European countries aren't exactly manufacturing titans in the first place. Teaching a man to fish while he is drowning is real hard, even if that man has good intentions :-).

Europe in it's wildest dreams doesn't have the ability to supply adequate ordinance to Ukraine. Look at the trajectory of their famous "1 million shells" program. The EU simply doesn't have the manufacturing available to do it, even if fully committed. The US is better off in this regard. Not great, but better off. We also have immense stockpiles compared to Europe. We can take lots of 155 mm out of stock for Ukraine and still have plenty left. Europe cannot. Like it or not, the US is still very much "the arsenal of democracy". If we don't play, it will be a very short game. Given unanimity of purpose, Europe could in two or three years set up ordinance manufacturing to a very high level. Consider the new Rheinmetall plant being built in the Netherlands. It was started last year with the expectation of producing product in 2025.

The US has been slow to react and evaluate what needs to be be done to prepare us for the possible scenarios in 2025 and later. There are all kinds of reasons for this. We have done a very poor job of getting ready for even the relatively foreseeable "next". Europe has arguably done worse. They had further to go, so the knock-on effects are multiplied. Bad as we are, we remain the only viable vendor.

[lex24]

[tweet]https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1781923869529633115?s=46[/tweet]

The tweet is in Ukrainian, but google translate does a good job. No insight there that Goose can’t provide, but I think it is correct. This will likely be the last “big” US aid package, barring something surprising in November, so all it does is buy time for the EU to get its act together and Ukraine to develop a military industrial complex. Just out of curiosity, how hard would it be for Ukraine to set up a shell factory (my guess is not easy or it would have been done already), because the Ukrainians would be nothing if not motivated if we can provide the expertise to help them get it up and running, and I would think two years would be adequate time to do so. Teach a man to fish and all that.

BC

BC, do you mean the last big aid package until after the elections or the last aid package ever, even in 2025. If the latter, Ukraine should basically give up now. Either that or figure out a way to win this summer.

Ukraine is and has been trying to re-establish the ability to supply itself with ordinance. There are "joint ventures" all over Eastern Europe. This approach is being used because Russia can't attack ammunition factories in say Bulgaria because they are in NATO. If they were built in Ukraine, they wouldn't last long unless they came equipped with a couple of Patriot batteries. Building up the Ukrainian arms industry would be a daunting task even in peacetime where all the money and skilled labor was not in demand by other critical functions. It is improbable these joint ventures will deliver significant ordinance in the near term, if ever. Maybe in a few years. These eastern European countries aren't exactly manufacturing titans in the first place. Teaching a man to fish while he is drowning is real hard, even if that man has good intentions :-).

Europe in it's wildest dreams doesn't have the ability to supply adequate ordinance to Ukraine. Look at the trajectory of their famous "1 million shells" program. The EU simply doesn't have the manufacturing available to do it, even if fully committed. The US is better off in this regard. Not great, but better off. We also have immense stockpiles compared to Europe. We can take lots of 155 mm out of stock for Ukraine and still have plenty left. Europe cannot. Like it or not, the US is still very much "the arsenal of democracy". If we don't play, it will be a very short game. Given unanimity of purpose, Europe could in two or three years set up ordinance manufacturing to a very high level. Consider the new Rheinmetall plant being built in the Netherlands. It was started last year with the expectation of producing product in 2025.

The US has been slow to react and evaluate what needs to be be done to prepare us for the possible scenarios in 2025 and later. There are all kinds of reasons for this. We have done a very poor job of getting ready for even the relatively foreseeable "next". Europe has arguably done worse. They had further to go, so the knock-on effects are multiplied. Bad as we are, we remain the only viable vendor.

Goose,

I appreciate your analysis.  But is there anyway Ukraine wins?  And if so, what does that look like.  Personally, I fear if Putin smells defeat he will go to “tactical” nukes.

[lex24]

[tweet]https://x.com/tatarigami_ua/status/1781923869529633115?s=46[/tweet]

The tweet is in Ukrainian, but google translate does a good job. No insight there that Goose can’t provide, but I think it is correct. This will likely be the last “big” US aid package, barring something surprising in November, so all it does is buy time for the EU to get its act together and Ukraine to develop a military industrial complex. Just out of curiosity, how hard would it be for Ukraine to set up a shell factory (my guess is not easy or it would have been done already), because the Ukrainians would be nothing if not motivated if we can provide the expertise to help them get it up and running, and I would think two years would be adequate time to do so. Teach a man to fish and all that.

BC

BC, do you mean the last big aid package until after the elections or the last aid package ever, even in 2025. If the latter, Ukraine should basically give up now. Either that or figure out a way to win this summer.

Ukraine is and has been trying to re-establish the ability to supply itself with ordinance. There are "joint ventures" all over Eastern Europe. This approach is being used because Russia can't attack ammunition factories in say Bulgaria because they are in NATO. If they were built in Ukraine, they wouldn't last long unless they came equipped with a couple of Patriot batteries. Building up the Ukrainian arms industry would be a daunting task even in peacetime where all the money and skilled labor was not in demand by other critical functions. It is improbable these joint ventures will deliver significant ordinance in the near term, if ever. Maybe in a few years. These eastern European countries aren't exactly manufacturing titans in the first place. Teaching a man to fish while he is drowning is real hard, even if that man has good intentions :-).

Europe in it's wildest dreams doesn't have the ability to supply adequate ordinance to Ukraine. Look at the trajectory of their famous "1 million shells" program. The EU simply doesn't have the manufacturing available to do it, even if fully committed. The US is better off in this regard. Not great, but better off. We also have immense stockpiles compared to Europe. We can take lots of 155 mm out of stock for Ukraine and still have plenty left. Europe cannot. Like it or not, the US is still very much "the arsenal of democracy". If we don't play, it will be a very short game. Given unanimity of purpose, Europe could in two or three years set up ordinance manufacturing to a very high level. Consider the new Rheinmetall plant being built in the Netherlands. It was started last year with the expectation of producing product in 2025.

The US has been slow to react and evaluate what needs to be be done to prepare us for the possible scenarios in 2025 and later. There are all kinds of reasons for this. We have done a very poor job of getting ready for even the relatively foreseeable "next". Europe has arguably done worse. They had further to go, so the knock-on effects are multiplied. Bad as we are, we remain the only viable vendor.

Goose,

I appreciate your analysis.  But is there anyway Ukraine wins?  And if so, what does that look like.  Personally, I fear if Putin smells defeat he will go to “tactical” nukes.

[TrumpCard]

Putin is not close to smelling defeat nor is he close to using nuclear weapons.  Ukraine admits it was on the verge of losing before the US came up with 10s of billions in aid.  If I were in charge, I would be using most available resources to build robust defenses on the current de facto border and to protect Ukrainian cities and troop positions from missile strikes.  As the saying goes, the best defense is a good offense, so I would invest in some attacks behind enemy lines too  But I don't think Ukraine has much shot at taking significant amounts of territory in the short term.  If retaking the territory that Russia seized is a prerequisite to Ukraine's survival, then Ukraine would need a lot of events to line up in its favor to survive.  I have no expertise in the matter, but I've remained hopeful that Ukraine can reach a stalemate and that a stalemate is good enough for Ukraine to survive as a nation.  Maybe Ukraine would need ongoing aid from Europe to remain a viable nation.  If so, I think Europe might see the value in that investment and pitch in to keep Ukraine afloat.  To me, that seems much more likely than Ukraine retaking vast swaths of territory.

[TrumpCard]

Putin is not close to smelling defeat nor is he close to using nuclear weapons.  Ukraine admits it was on the verge of losing before the US came up with 10s of billions in aid.  If I were in charge, I would be using most available resources to build robust defenses on the current de facto border and to protect Ukrainian cities and troop positions from missile strikes.  As the saying goes, the best defense is a good offense, so I would invest in some attacks behind enemy lines too  But I don't think Ukraine has much shot at taking significant amounts of territory in the short term.  If retaking the territory that Russia seized is a prerequisite to Ukraine's survival, then Ukraine would need a lot of events to line up in its favor to survive.  I have no expertise in the matter, but I've remained hopeful that Ukraine can reach a stalemate and that a stalemate is good enough for Ukraine to survive as a nation.  Maybe Ukraine would need ongoing aid from Europe to remain a viable nation.  If so, I think Europe might see the value in that investment and pitch in to keep Ukraine afloat.  To me, that seems much more likely than Ukraine retaking vast swaths of territory.

[Goose]

Putin is not close to smelling defeat nor is he close to using nuclear weapons.  Ukraine admits it was on the verge of losing before the US came up with 10s of billions in aid.

And it is still on the verge of losing. That may change in the next few weeks, but as of now, things are not good.

If I were in charge, I would be using most available resources to build robust defenses on the current de facto border

In so far as Ukraine can do so, this is necessary.

and to protect Ukrainian cities and troop positions from missile strikes.

Unfortunately this is just plain not possible. Ukraine can, with significant help, build an anti-missile defense that is fairly effective, say even 90%. That might be "good enough" to keep the population in the war for a while. However, if your city is being slowly destroyed and there is no end in sight, the population will eventually say "enough" and collapse will ensue. A truly "stable" endless war in Ukraine is impossible for that reason.

As the saying goes, the best defense is a good offense, so I would invest in some attacks behind enemy lines too  But I don't think Ukraine has much shot at taking significant amounts of territory in the short term.  If retaking the territory that Russia seized is a prerequisite to Ukraine's survival, then Ukraine would need a lot of events to line up in its favor to survive.  I have no expertise in the matter, but I've remained hopeful that Ukraine can reach a stalemate and that a stalemate is good enough for Ukraine to survive as a nation.

Ukraine was only barely a viable nation when it had the coast of the Sea of Azov under its control. As things stand now, they have only one port, Odessa, that is "any good". The rail and road system isn't properly oriented to move all exports that way, even if Odessa was a "good" port, which it is not. The Germans quickly discovered that they couldn't supply their troops through it. You are correct that retaking territory from Russia isn't going to be easy. The overriding problem is that if Russia achieves a stalemate, unless lots of things line up in Ukraine's favor, why should Russia quit fighting?  If Ukraine can't significantly injure Russia, but Russia can significantly injure Ukraine with missile strikes, why stop? Ukraine will fold first, or so the Russians see it. They are very probably correct. How does Zelenskyy sell his people on enduring continual missile strikes, some of which get through, on sending their citizens to the front to fight and die for a stalemate where nothing changes and there is no hope of victory?  No way he can do that.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelensky-says...13126.html
Note he didn't say it will give Ukraine a chance for stalemate :-).

Maybe Ukraine would need ongoing aid from Europe to remain a viable nation.  If so, I think Europe might see the value in that investment and pitch in to keep Ukraine afloat.  To me, that seems much more likely than Ukraine retaking vast swaths of territory.

IMO the idea that Europe would aid Ukraine long-term is a zero probability event. It might sound good, but when the bills come due Ukraine will be the first thing cut. Besides that, everybody in Ukraine who possibly can will leave. Who wants to live in the poorest country in Europe depending on others charity, especially when that charity can go away at any time. Leave and get a job.

IMO the Ukrainian summer offensive wasn't a disaster. It didn't gain its objectives, but it did make progress and did highlight the problems that need to be overcome. First, the aid promised by the US and the EU was not delivered on schedule. That delayed the start of the offensive and gave Russia even more time to prepare. Worse still, the expected quantity of minefield clearing systems never were supplied. This was largely because we didn't have them. This is an elementary planning error that really can't be excused. Everybody knew the Russians had laid extensive minefields. Getting hung up in a minefield is obviously fatal to meeting any timelines. This kind of problem is probably inevitable when the people doing the planning are not the same people (or even country) providing the logistics. Ukraine went ahead anyway, although belatedly. It was probably politically impossible to call off the effort.
Second, the Russian Air Force started to come out of its slumber. Ukraine did make some significant progress, although usually at great cost. However, whenever they did that Russian helicopters would show up and plug the breech until the Russian defense could reorganize. Ukraine wanted to create the mobile battle that NATO wanted them to fight. They couldn't because they had no answer for Russian air. Later on, things got worse as the VKS started using glide bombs on Ukrainian formations. Again, Ukraine has no answer. It was probably stupid to assume the VKS would forever be so timid it would do nothing. We and the Ukrainians did. We were wrong.

IMO it is still true that Ukraine's only way to survival is to find a way to inflict pain on Russia in at least equal measure to what Russia can inflict on them. The only way to do that is to take back Crimea, or at least credibly threaten to do so. Taking back a lot of land in the Donbas doesn't matter. Russia can absorb that loss without flinching, and it will be hard for Ukraine to do so anyway. Crimea won't be easy either, but that is the only place Ukraine has a chance to win. Lots of things do have to line up the right way, but both Ukraine and "the west" can do things to make that happen. Last year, we didn't succeed. This year, we need to. That is why I get so upset at avoidable delays and the lack of planning for reasonably foreseeable events. The lack of a viable mine clearance plan was a very big mistake. The lack of a contingency plan for Russia using air power was equally a mistake. If we can do better this next time, success is possible. Russia knows this as well as Ukraine does. Russia has some advantages. That doesn't mean Ukraine can't beat them.

[Goose]

Putin is not close to smelling defeat nor is he close to using nuclear weapons.  Ukraine admits it was on the verge of losing before the US came up with 10s of billions in aid.

And it is still on the verge of losing. That may change in the next few weeks, but as of now, things are not good.

If I were in charge, I would be using most available resources to build robust defenses on the current de facto border

In so far as Ukraine can do so, this is necessary.

and to protect Ukrainian cities and troop positions from missile strikes.

Unfortunately this is just plain not possible. Ukraine can, with significant help, build an anti-missile defense that is fairly effective, say even 90%. That might be "good enough" to keep the population in the war for a while. However, if your city is being slowly destroyed and there is no end in sight, the population will eventually say "enough" and collapse will ensue. A truly "stable" endless war in Ukraine is impossible for that reason.

As the saying goes, the best defense is a good offense, so I would invest in some attacks behind enemy lines too  But I don't think Ukraine has much shot at taking significant amounts of territory in the short term.  If retaking the territory that Russia seized is a prerequisite to Ukraine's survival, then Ukraine would need a lot of events to line up in its favor to survive.  I have no expertise in the matter, but I've remained hopeful that Ukraine can reach a stalemate and that a stalemate is good enough for Ukraine to survive as a nation.

Ukraine was only barely a viable nation when it had the coast of the Sea of Azov under its control. As things stand now, they have only one port, Odessa, that is "any good". The rail and road system isn't properly oriented to move all exports that way, even if Odessa was a "good" port, which it is not. The Germans quickly discovered that they couldn't supply their troops through it. You are correct that retaking territory from Russia isn't going to be easy. The overriding problem is that if Russia achieves a stalemate, unless lots of things line up in Ukraine's favor, why should Russia quit fighting?  If Ukraine can't significantly injure Russia, but Russia can significantly injure Ukraine with missile strikes, why stop? Ukraine will fold first, or so the Russians see it. They are very probably correct. How does Zelenskyy sell his people on enduring continual missile strikes, some of which get through, on sending their citizens to the front to fight and die for a stalemate where nothing changes and there is no hope of victory?  No way he can do that.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/zelensky-says...13126.html
Note he didn't say it will give Ukraine a chance for stalemate :-).

Maybe Ukraine would need ongoing aid from Europe to remain a viable nation.  If so, I think Europe might see the value in that investment and pitch in to keep Ukraine afloat.  To me, that seems much more likely than Ukraine retaking vast swaths of territory.

IMO the idea that Europe would aid Ukraine long-term is a zero probability event. It might sound good, but when the bills come due Ukraine will be the first thing cut. Besides that, everybody in Ukraine who possibly can will leave. Who wants to live in the poorest country in Europe depending on others charity, especially when that charity can go away at any time. Leave and get a job.

IMO the Ukrainian summer offensive wasn't a disaster. It didn't gain its objectives, but it did make progress and did highlight the problems that need to be overcome. First, the aid promised by the US and the EU was not delivered on schedule. That delayed the start of the offensive and gave Russia even more time to prepare. Worse still, the expected quantity of minefield clearing systems never were supplied. This was largely because we didn't have them. This is an elementary planning error that really can't be excused. Everybody knew the Russians had laid extensive minefields. Getting hung up in a minefield is obviously fatal to meeting any timelines. This kind of problem is probably inevitable when the people doing the planning are not the same people (or even country) providing the logistics. Ukraine went ahead anyway, although belatedly. It was probably politically impossible to call off the effort.
Second, the Russian Air Force started to come out of its slumber. Ukraine did make some significant progress, although usually at great cost. However, whenever they did that Russian helicopters would show up and plug the breech until the Russian defense could reorganize. Ukraine wanted to create the mobile battle that NATO wanted them to fight. They couldn't because they had no answer for Russian air. Later on, things got worse as the VKS started using glide bombs on Ukrainian formations. Again, Ukraine has no answer. It was probably stupid to assume the VKS would forever be so timid it would do nothing. We and the Ukrainians did. We were wrong.

IMO it is still true that Ukraine's only way to survival is to find a way to inflict pain on Russia in at least equal measure to what Russia can inflict on them. The only way to do that is to take back Crimea, or at least credibly threaten to do so. Taking back a lot of land in the Donbas doesn't matter. Russia can absorb that loss without flinching, and it will be hard for Ukraine to do so anyway. Crimea won't be easy either, but that is the only place Ukraine has a chance to win. Lots of things do have to line up the right way, but both Ukraine and "the west" can do things to make that happen. Last year, we didn't succeed. This year, we need to. That is why I get so upset at avoidable delays and the lack of planning for reasonably foreseeable events. The lack of a viable mine clearance plan was a very big mistake. The lack of a contingency plan for Russia using air power was equally a mistake. If we can do better this next time, success is possible. Russia knows this as well as Ukraine does. Russia has some advantages. That doesn't mean Ukraine can't beat them.

[TrumpCard]

Moldova and North Macedonia are poor countries with limited or no access to a port, but they are still kicking.  
If you think it's so improbable that Ukraine will survive, then why are you so gung ho about providing $65 billion in aid to Ukraine?
I tend to think that many outcomes are possible, and I would not bet against the will of a people with their collective back to a wall.

[TrumpCard]

Moldova and North Macedonia are poor countries with limited or no access to a port, but they are still kicking.  
If you think it's so improbable that Ukraine will survive, then why are you so gung ho about providing $65 billion in aid to Ukraine?
I tend to think that many outcomes are possible, and I would not bet against the will of a people with their collective back to a wall.

[M T]

Perhaps a more appropriate question is why Russia/Putin is willing to spend so many dead and so much of the oligarchs’ frozen assets?  Also, it has seemingly exposed some softer than generally known aspects of its military. 

This prixy war for the west helps clarify what is working and what isn’t. 

I don’t think Putin views Ukraine as a vacation spot where he wants a summer home.

Whatever advantages (political, location
, natural resources) that Russia gains from bulldozing Ukraine, the West has every reason to deny them from a country where outright war is their means of expansion. (Shades of Hitler overrunning countries)
To me, providing financial and military weapons seems cheap)

[M T]

Perhaps a more appropriate question is why Russia/Putin is willing to spend so many dead and so much of the oligarchs’ frozen assets?  Also, it has seemingly exposed some softer than generally known aspects of its military. 

This prixy war for the west helps clarify what is working and what isn’t. 

I don’t think Putin views Ukraine as a vacation spot where he wants a summer home.

Whatever advantages (political, location
, natural resources) that Russia gains from bulldozing Ukraine, the West has every reason to deny them from a country where outright war is their means of expansion. (Shades of Hitler overrunning countries)
To me, providing financial and military weapons seems cheap)

[Goose]

Moldova and North Macedonia are poor countries with limited or no access to a port, but they are still kicking. 

Indeed they are. The GDP per capita of Moldova in 2019 was $4,404.95, and in 2022 was $5,741.43. The corresponding numbers for North Macedonia are $6,070.49 and $6,591.47. Both sets of numbers reflect their lack of economic strength. The numbers for Ukraine are $3,661.46 and $4,533.98. If the first two are "poor", what does that make Ukraine? For reference these numbers are from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/) I included 2019 to remove any effects of the current war. I believe all these numbers include any "foreign aid", but I don't know that.

Just to be absolutely precise, Moldova is not land locked. It has a small strip of land at Palanca that supports a very small port. Palanca is a village and the port is good for fishing and not much else. However, since Moldova used to be part of Romania and the transportation system runs in that direction, it isn't a problem. There are very good rail links and canal links to Romania which easily accommodate Moldova's exports. During the current war Ukraine used these facilities for some exports of grain. 

For reference, the corresponding numbers for Russia are $11,536.26 and $15,270.71. Obviously inflation is real, but the difference between Russia and Ukraine is stark. One might ask why any sane Russian would want to dilute their GDP per capita by that much.

If you think it's so improbable that Ukraine will survive, then why are you so gung ho about providing $65 billion in aid to Ukraine?

To be clear, I don't think Ukraine will "survive" if it does not "win". The main reason for this is that I don't believe Russia will stop fighting until they occupy all of Ukraine or until the tide of battle turns and some vital interest of Russia is threatened. The related reason is that I don't think Ukraine will be able to continue fighting very long if the goal is a stalemate. Enough of the military capable population will decide a stalemate isn't worth their life, especially when/if even that stalemate isn't a sure thing.

When the US decided to aid Ukraine in resisting the Russians, it was undoubtedly over the strong objections of the US military. As the very first post in this thread says, Russia and give the points was the best bet. It was decided (and IMO correctly) that despite the degree of difficulty, we couldn't stand by and let Russia get away with invading Ukraine. Ukraine has accomplished more than we had any reason to expect. However, the US and NATO has not done the necessary extremely good job of strategic planning and execution of logistic support necessary to win. Despite Ukraine doing well and despite Russia having their own set of problems, the correlation of forces is what it is. We have to be better or Ukraine will be defeated.

IMO the US has not behaved as if Ukraine winning was a long shot. We have not been "all in" short of sending troops to fight. We have dithered over decisions and been slow to execute. It appears we do not have a plan that leads to a Ukrainian victory. It seems we have no plan at all. We react to events rather than shaping events. As the underdog, we can't do that. It appears that the "plan", in so far as there is one, is to support Ukraine enough they can hang on until Russia realizes this war isn't worth it. Sounds a lot like the "messaging" strategy we used in Vietnam. Russia has had ample time to realize this war wasn't worth it. They don't agree and they believe the west will lose interest and/or Ukraine will be defeated.  It is probable that once again nobody in Washington addressed the "How does this end?" question with anything other than the belief our opponents will just give up. Might happen, but not a good bet. As I have said before, the only thing worse for the US and NATO than passively letting Russia have Ukraine would be to oppose that outcome and fail. We don't seem to realize that.

 
I tend to think that many outcomes are possible, and I would not bet against the will of a people with their collective back to a wall.

I agree emphatically with your second point. I am the one saying they can "win". That victory can take many forms, but all of them involve Russia leaving/being driven out of Crimea. Otherwise, Russia stays and fights. There are other possible outcomes. One of those, which at this moment is unfortunately the most probable one, is that Russia occupies all of Ukraine. If Russia hasn't accomplished this before Putin leaves power, other outcomes MAY become more probable, depending on who replaces Putin. Betting on this scenario is IMO not wise.

[Goose]

Moldova and North Macedonia are poor countries with limited or no access to a port, but they are still kicking. 

Indeed they are. The GDP per capita of Moldova in 2019 was $4,404.95, and in 2022 was $5,741.43. The corresponding numbers for North Macedonia are $6,070.49 and $6,591.47. Both sets of numbers reflect their lack of economic strength. The numbers for Ukraine are $3,661.46 and $4,533.98. If the first two are "poor", what does that make Ukraine? For reference these numbers are from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/) I included 2019 to remove any effects of the current war. I believe all these numbers include any "foreign aid", but I don't know that.

Just to be absolutely precise, Moldova is not land locked. It has a small strip of land at Palanca that supports a very small port. Palanca is a village and the port is good for fishing and not much else. However, since Moldova used to be part of Romania and the transportation system runs in that direction, it isn't a problem. There are very good rail links and canal links to Romania which easily accommodate Moldova's exports. During the current war Ukraine used these facilities for some exports of grain. 

For reference, the corresponding numbers for Russia are $11,536.26 and $15,270.71. Obviously inflation is real, but the difference between Russia and Ukraine is stark. One might ask why any sane Russian would want to dilute their GDP per capita by that much.

If you think it's so improbable that Ukraine will survive, then why are you so gung ho about providing $65 billion in aid to Ukraine?

To be clear, I don't think Ukraine will "survive" if it does not "win". The main reason for this is that I don't believe Russia will stop fighting until they occupy all of Ukraine or until the tide of battle turns and some vital interest of Russia is threatened. The related reason is that I don't think Ukraine will be able to continue fighting very long if the goal is a stalemate. Enough of the military capable population will decide a stalemate isn't worth their life, especially when/if even that stalemate isn't a sure thing.

When the US decided to aid Ukraine in resisting the Russians, it was undoubtedly over the strong objections of the US military. As the very first post in this thread says, Russia and give the points was the best bet. It was decided (and IMO correctly) that despite the degree of difficulty, we couldn't stand by and let Russia get away with invading Ukraine. Ukraine has accomplished more than we had any reason to expect. However, the US and NATO has not done the necessary extremely good job of strategic planning and execution of logistic support necessary to win. Despite Ukraine doing well and despite Russia having their own set of problems, the correlation of forces is what it is. We have to be better or Ukraine will be defeated.

IMO the US has not behaved as if Ukraine winning was a long shot. We have not been "all in" short of sending troops to fight. We have dithered over decisions and been slow to execute. It appears we do not have a plan that leads to a Ukrainian victory. It seems we have no plan at all. We react to events rather than shaping events. As the underdog, we can't do that. It appears that the "plan", in so far as there is one, is to support Ukraine enough they can hang on until Russia realizes this war isn't worth it. Sounds a lot like the "messaging" strategy we used in Vietnam. Russia has had ample time to realize this war wasn't worth it. They don't agree and they believe the west will lose interest and/or Ukraine will be defeated.  It is probable that once again nobody in Washington addressed the "How does this end?" question with anything other than the belief our opponents will just give up. Might happen, but not a good bet. As I have said before, the only thing worse for the US and NATO than passively letting Russia have Ukraine would be to oppose that outcome and fail. We don't seem to realize that.

 
I tend to think that many outcomes are possible, and I would not bet against the will of a people with their collective back to a wall.

I agree emphatically with your second point. I am the one saying they can "win". That victory can take many forms, but all of them involve Russia leaving/being driven out of Crimea. Otherwise, Russia stays and fights. There are other possible outcomes. One of those, which at this moment is unfortunately the most probable one, is that Russia occupies all of Ukraine. If Russia hasn't accomplished this before Putin leaves power, other outcomes MAY become more probable, depending on who replaces Putin. Betting on this scenario is IMO not wise.

[Goose]

Perhaps a more appropriate question is why Russia/Putin is willing to spend so many dead and so much of the oligarchs’ frozen assets?

Who knows? It doesn't make sense to us, but it does to them. That is why relying on them to behave "rationally" isn't a good strategy. They already aren't.

Also, it has seemingly exposed some softer than generally known aspects of its military.

Indeed it has.  Unfortunately we/Ukraine have been unable to rapidly take advantage of these weaknesses and have given Russia time to correct them. We have "immunized" them by applying a non-lethal dose of the "disease". It is actually quite interesting (in a macabre sort of way) to follow the evolution of the air war. Russia is getting better by the day. Not good for NATO. 

This proxy war for the west helps clarify what is working and what isn’t.

Mostly helps Russia. Ukraine isn't fighting as we would. Lots of what happens in Ukraine wouldn't happen in a NATO vs Russia conflict, so those lessons learned will not apply. Russia OTOH is finding out all the "mechanical" problems they have to fix, because they ARE fighting as the would against NATO. For better of worse, our Army and Air Force have lots of recent practice. We are mechanically very good. Russia is now getting the "practice" they need to fix their mechanics. They are doing it.

I don’t think Putin views Ukraine as a vacation spot where he wants a summer home.

Whatever advantages (political, location, natural resources) that Russia gains from bulldozing Ukraine, the West has every reason to deny them from a country where outright war is their means of expansion. (Shades of Hitler overrunning countries) To me, providing financial and military weapons seems cheap)

Totally agree, but ONLY if Ukraine is "successful" in some sense. If Ukraine falls despite our aid, it sends the message to Russia that we are not able to effectively oppose their aggression. It also sends the same message to all of Russia's neighbors. These nations will realize that we can't save them. It will be even worse if Ukraine falls after we stop providing military aid. It will send the further message that you can't trust the US to help you even when they said they would. You fight a long costly war and then they drop you on a whim. Either will be a big problem going forward. These nations will be forced to look for an accommodation with Russia given no viable alternative. The Stans certainly will conclude that. Belarus OTOH is already pretty much toast, so it won't matter to them :-).

[Goose]

Perhaps a more appropriate question is why Russia/Putin is willing to spend so many dead and so much of the oligarchs’ frozen assets?

Who knows? It doesn't make sense to us, but it does to them. That is why relying on them to behave "rationally" isn't a good strategy. They already aren't.

Also, it has seemingly exposed some softer than generally known aspects of its military.

Indeed it has.  Unfortunately we/Ukraine have been unable to rapidly take advantage of these weaknesses and have given Russia time to correct them. We have "immunized" them by applying a non-lethal dose of the "disease". It is actually quite interesting (in a macabre sort of way) to follow the evolution of the air war. Russia is getting better by the day. Not good for NATO. 

This proxy war for the west helps clarify what is working and what isn’t.

Mostly helps Russia. Ukraine isn't fighting as we would. Lots of what happens in Ukraine wouldn't happen in a NATO vs Russia conflict, so those lessons learned will not apply. Russia OTOH is finding out all the "mechanical" problems they have to fix, because they ARE fighting as the would against NATO. For better of worse, our Army and Air Force have lots of recent practice. We are mechanically very good. Russia is now getting the "practice" they need to fix their mechanics. They are doing it.

I don’t think Putin views Ukraine as a vacation spot where he wants a summer home.

Whatever advantages (political, location, natural resources) that Russia gains from bulldozing Ukraine, the West has every reason to deny them from a country where outright war is their means of expansion. (Shades of Hitler overrunning countries) To me, providing financial and military weapons seems cheap)

Totally agree, but ONLY if Ukraine is "successful" in some sense. If Ukraine falls despite our aid, it sends the message to Russia that we are not able to effectively oppose their aggression. It also sends the same message to all of Russia's neighbors. These nations will realize that we can't save them. It will be even worse if Ukraine falls after we stop providing military aid. It will send the further message that you can't trust the US to help you even when they said they would. You fight a long costly war and then they drop you on a whim. Either will be a big problem going forward. These nations will be forced to look for an accommodation with Russia given no viable alternative. The Stans certainly will conclude that. Belarus OTOH is already pretty much toast, so it won't matter to them :-).

[dabigv13]

The Ukrainian state will certainly last longer than Putin, and it's likely that any Putin successor will realize the blood and treasure spent in a war for Ukraine is not worth continuing to try and conquer it.

[dabigv13]

The Ukrainian state will certainly last longer than Putin, and it's likely that any Putin successor will realize the blood and treasure spent in a war for Ukraine is not worth continuing to try and conquer it.

[GK3]

Perhaps a more appropriate question is why Russia/Putin is willing to spend so many dead and so much of the oligarchs’ frozen assets?

Who knows? It doesn't make sense to us, but it does to them. That is why relying on them to behave "rationally" isn't a good strategy. They already aren't.

Also, it has seemingly exposed some softer than generally known aspects of its military.

Indeed it has.  Unfortunately we/Ukraine have been unable to rapidly take advantage of these weaknesses and have given Russia time to correct them. We have "immunized" them by applying a non-lethal dose of the "disease". It is actually quite interesting (in a macabre sort of way) to follow the evolution of the air war. Russia is getting better by the day. Not good for NATO. 

This proxy war for the west helps clarify what is working and what isn’t.

Mostly helps Russia. Ukraine isn't fighting as we would. Lots of what happens in Ukraine wouldn't happen in a NATO vs Russia conflict, so those lessons learned will not apply. Russia OTOH is finding out all the "mechanical" problems they have to fix, because they ARE fighting as the would against NATO. For better of worse, our Army and Air Force have lots of recent practice. We are mechanically very good. Russia is now getting the "practice" they need to fix their mechanics. They are doing it.

I don’t think Putin views Ukraine as a vacation spot where he wants a summer home.

Whatever advantages (political, location, natural resources) that Russia gains from bulldozing Ukraine, the West has every reason to deny them from a country where outright war is their means of expansion. (Shades of Hitler overrunning countries) To me, providing financial and military weapons seems cheap)

Totally agree, but ONLY if Ukraine is "successful" in some sense. If Ukraine falls despite our aid, it sends the message to Russia that we are not able to effectively oppose their aggression. It also sends the same message to all of Russia's neighbors. These nations will realize that we can't save them. It will be even worse if Ukraine falls after we stop providing military aid. It will send the further message that you can't trust the US to help you even when they said they would. You fight a long costly war and then they drop you on a whim. Either will be a big problem going forward. These nations will be forced to look for an accommodation with Russia given no viable alternative. The Stans certainly will conclude that. Belarus OTOH is already pretty much toast, so it won't matter to them :-).

This last paragraph is probably the most important out of all the stuff that has been posted.  Sometimes you have to play a bad hand, and then if you play the bad hand badly it gets worse,.  I don't think you can see\\ay we have done things anywhere near the way we should have done them. It is what it is and the impact of all of this is most likely to be felt by more than the current generation.

[GK3]

Perhaps a more appropriate question is why Russia/Putin is willing to spend so many dead and so much of the oligarchs’ frozen assets?

Who knows? It doesn't make sense to us, but it does to them. That is why relying on them to behave "rationally" isn't a good strategy. They already aren't.

Also, it has seemingly exposed some softer than generally known aspects of its military.

Indeed it has.  Unfortunately we/Ukraine have been unable to rapidly take advantage of these weaknesses and have given Russia time to correct them. We have "immunized" them by applying a non-lethal dose of the "disease". It is actually quite interesting (in a macabre sort of way) to follow the evolution of the air war. Russia is getting better by the day. Not good for NATO. 

This proxy war for the west helps clarify what is working and what isn’t.

Mostly helps Russia. Ukraine isn't fighting as we would. Lots of what happens in Ukraine wouldn't happen in a NATO vs Russia conflict, so those lessons learned will not apply. Russia OTOH is finding out all the "mechanical" problems they have to fix, because they ARE fighting as the would against NATO. For better of worse, our Army and Air Force have lots of recent practice. We are mechanically very good. Russia is now getting the "practice" they need to fix their mechanics. They are doing it.

I don’t think Putin views Ukraine as a vacation spot where he wants a summer home.

Whatever advantages (political, location, natural resources) that Russia gains from bulldozing Ukraine, the West has every reason to deny them from a country where outright war is their means of expansion. (Shades of Hitler overrunning countries) To me, providing financial and military weapons seems cheap)

Totally agree, but ONLY if Ukraine is "successful" in some sense. If Ukraine falls despite our aid, it sends the message to Russia that we are not able to effectively oppose their aggression. It also sends the same message to all of Russia's neighbors. These nations will realize that we can't save them. It will be even worse if Ukraine falls after we stop providing military aid. It will send the further message that you can't trust the US to help you even when they said they would. You fight a long costly war and then they drop you on a whim. Either will be a big problem going forward. These nations will be forced to look for an accommodation with Russia given no viable alternative. The Stans certainly will conclude that. Belarus OTOH is already pretty much toast, so it won't matter to them :-).

This last paragraph is probably the most important out of all the stuff that has been posted.  Sometimes you have to play a bad hand, and then if you play the bad hand badly it gets worse,.  I don't think you can see\\ay we have done things anywhere near the way we should have done them. It is what it is and the impact of all of this is most likely to be felt by more than the current generation.

[Goose]

The Ukrainian state will certainly last longer than Putin, and it's likely that any Putin successor will realize the blood and treasure spent in a war for Ukraine is not worth continuing to try and conquer it.

Hope you are correct on both counts, but hope is not a strategy. Ukraine and the west needs a strategy. Ukraine is stating the objective is to "win". I think that is the only possible objective that will keep Ukraine going. I am unsure of the strategy, if it exists. It is fine that the public doesn't know the strategy, but there needs to be one.

On the second point, since I have no idea who will follow Putin, or when, I can't have a claim to even guess at what that person will think. There are good reasons to believe they might attempt to blame all the problems on their predecessor. OTOH they may be a "continuity" candidate. In any case, IMO it is unwise to rely on that person quitting the war.

[Goose]

The Ukrainian state will certainly last longer than Putin, and it's likely that any Putin successor will realize the blood and treasure spent in a war for Ukraine is not worth continuing to try and conquer it.

Hope you are correct on both counts, but hope is not a strategy. Ukraine and the west needs a strategy. Ukraine is stating the objective is to "win". I think that is the only possible objective that will keep Ukraine going. I am unsure of the strategy, if it exists. It is fine that the public doesn't know the strategy, but there needs to be one.

On the second point, since I have no idea who will follow Putin, or when, I can't have a claim to even guess at what that person will think. There are good reasons to believe they might attempt to blame all the problems on their predecessor. OTOH they may be a "continuity" candidate. In any case, IMO it is unwise to rely on that person quitting the war.

[GK3]

The Ukrainian state will certainly last longer than Putin, and it's likely that any Putin successor will realize the blood and treasure spent in a war for Ukraine is not worth continuing to try and conquer it.

Hope you are correct on both counts, but hope is not a strategy. Ukraine and the west needs a strategy. Ukraine is stating the objective is to "win". I think that is the only possible objective that will keep Ukraine going. I am unsure of the strategy, if it exists. It is fine that the public doesn't know the strategy, but there needs to be one.

On the second point, since I have no idea who will follow Putin, or when, I can't have a claim to even guess at what that person will think. There are good reasons to believe they might attempt to blame all the problems on their predecessor. OTOH they may be a "continuity" candidate. In any case, IMO it is unwise to rely on that person quitting the war.

Any thoughts regarding whether any of the discussed systems make it Ukraine with the F16's?

https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/weapons-fo...y%20radars.

[GK3]

The Ukrainian state will certainly last longer than Putin, and it's likely that any Putin successor will realize the blood and treasure spent in a war for Ukraine is not worth continuing to try and conquer it.

Hope you are correct on both counts, but hope is not a strategy. Ukraine and the west needs a strategy. Ukraine is stating the objective is to "win". I think that is the only possible objective that will keep Ukraine going. I am unsure of the strategy, if it exists. It is fine that the public doesn't know the strategy, but there needs to be one.

On the second point, since I have no idea who will follow Putin, or when, I can't have a claim to even guess at what that person will think. There are good reasons to believe they might attempt to blame all the problems on their predecessor. OTOH they may be a "continuity" candidate. In any case, IMO it is unwise to rely on that person quitting the war.

Any thoughts regarding whether any of the discussed systems make it Ukraine with the F16's?

https://mil.in.ua/en/articles/weapons-fo...y%20radars.