[M T]

Conversely, an antenna on a plane at 40,000 feet could impact GPS (jam or spoof) surface (and air) regions up to 400km.
And, of course, we're talking about the public GPS.  
Against a device that can understand the military GPS (do we supply such devices to Ukraine?), the spoofing presumably won't work, but jamming still could.  With a directional antenna array, a device can do better against jamming.

[M T]

Conversely, an antenna on a plane at 40,000 feet could impact GPS (jam or spoof) surface (and air) regions up to 400km.
And, of course, we're talking about the public GPS.  
Against a device that can understand the military GPS (do we supply such devices to Ukraine?), the spoofing presumably won't work, but jamming still could.  With a directional antenna array, a device can do better against jamming.

[dabigv13]

Related to this topic, GLSDBs which for sometime have not been very effective due to Russian jamming efforts and were not being used, seem to be back now.

It's been reported that their guidance systems have been reworked.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1792238328214949895

[dabigv13]

Related to this topic, GLSDBs which for sometime have not been very effective due to Russian jamming efforts and were not being used, seem to be back now.

It's been reported that their guidance systems have been reworked.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1792238328214949895

[Goose]

Conversely, an antenna on a plane at 40,000 feet could impact GPS (jam or spoof) surface (and air) regions up to 400km.
And, of course, we're talking about the public GPS. 

This is indeed true. 

Against a device that can understand the military GPS (do we supply such devices to Ukraine?), the spoofing presumably won't work, but jamming still could.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selective_...ing_module
The "old" selective availability is no longer physically present in the GPS satellites. We agreed not to ever use it, so it was decided there was no reason to support it any more. I doubt that the GPS supplied with the JDAMs to Ukraine (or the ones we use) are "M code" equipped. I could be wrong. Jamming could still work, depending on the exact "type" of jamming and many other factors.

 With a directional antenna array, a device can do better against jamming.

Indeed. It can render jamming ineffective. However, it requires a multi-channel receiver and multiple physical antennas. That does cost money and occupies space. On things like a JDAM, space and antenna location is a big problem.

---

Related to this topic, GLSDBs which for sometime have not been very effective due to Russian jamming efforts and were not being used, seem to be back now.

It's been reported that their guidance systems have been reworked.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1792238328214949895

There were several problems. One was with the launcher. This problem was the one that literally forced Ukraine to quit using them. That hopefully has been fixed. Reworking the software in the guidance module to resist jamming more effectively seems feasible. If it works well, that will be a "way ahead". We shall see.

[Goose]

Conversely, an antenna on a plane at 40,000 feet could impact GPS (jam or spoof) surface (and air) regions up to 400km.
And, of course, we're talking about the public GPS. 

This is indeed true. 

Against a device that can understand the military GPS (do we supply such devices to Ukraine?), the spoofing presumably won't work, but jamming still could.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selective_...ing_module
The "old" selective availability is no longer physically present in the GPS satellites. We agreed not to ever use it, so it was decided there was no reason to support it any more. I doubt that the GPS supplied with the JDAMs to Ukraine (or the ones we use) are "M code" equipped. I could be wrong. Jamming could still work, depending on the exact "type" of jamming and many other factors.

 With a directional antenna array, a device can do better against jamming.

Indeed. It can render jamming ineffective. However, it requires a multi-channel receiver and multiple physical antennas. That does cost money and occupies space. On things like a JDAM, space and antenna location is a big problem.

---

Related to this topic, GLSDBs which for sometime have not been very effective due to Russian jamming efforts and were not being used, seem to be back now.

It's been reported that their guidance systems have been reworked.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1792238328214949895

There were several problems. One was with the launcher. This problem was the one that literally forced Ukraine to quit using them. That hopefully has been fixed. Reworking the software in the guidance module to resist jamming more effectively seems feasible. If it works well, that will be a "way ahead". We shall see.

[M T]

Related to this topic, GLSDBs which for sometime have not been very effective due to Russian jamming efforts and were not being used, seem to be back now.

It's been reported that their guidance systems have been reworked.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1792238328214949895

It appears that only the first of the 3 strikes (first 2 were on opposite corner of the building) had cluster bomblets.  But I don't see any personnel or vehicles outside the buildings.

That pair of buildings looks to have been a nice chateau on a little river or lake.  That is, until Russia decided to lay siege to the area.  Damn those Russians!

[M T]

Related to this topic, GLSDBs which for sometime have not been very effective due to Russian jamming efforts and were not being used, seem to be back now.

It's been reported that their guidance systems have been reworked.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1792238328214949895

It appears that only the first of the 3 strikes (first 2 were on opposite corner of the building) had cluster bomblets.  But I don't see any personnel or vehicles outside the buildings.

That pair of buildings looks to have been a nice chateau on a little river or lake.  That is, until Russia decided to lay siege to the area.  Damn those Russians!

[dabigv13]

I believe what you are seeing are not cluster bomblets but rather tungsten fragments from the warhead casing, which are designed to fragment out for anti-personnel effect in addition to the blast effect from the warhead explosive. The second warhead hit a part of the building without windows unlike the other two, so I think that's why you don't see the same dispersed effects, as those fragments were probably "caught" by the internal structure of the building.

The GMLRS missiles fired by HIMARS look similar but with even more of those dispersed dust particles because it also has 180,000 tungsten balls in the warhead.

[dabigv13]

I believe what you are seeing are not cluster bomblets but rather tungsten fragments from the warhead casing, which are designed to fragment out for anti-personnel effect in addition to the blast effect from the warhead explosive. The second warhead hit a part of the building without windows unlike the other two, so I think that's why you don't see the same dispersed effects, as those fragments were probably "caught" by the internal structure of the building.

The GMLRS missiles fired by HIMARS look similar but with even more of those dispersed dust particles because it also has 180,000 tungsten balls in the warhead.

[Goose]

I believe what you are seeing are not cluster bomblets but rather tungsten fragments from the warhead casing, which are designed to fragment out for anti-personnel effect in addition to the blast effect from the warhead explosive. The second warhead hit a part of the building without windows unlike the other two, so I think that's why you don't see the same dispersed effects, as those fragments were probably "caught" by the internal structure of the building.
The GMLRS missiles fired by HIMARS look similar but with even more of those dispersed dust particles because it also has 180,000 tungsten balls in the warhead.

Certainly a reasonable explanation. However at their request Ukraine has received some M30 GMLRS missiles that contain DPICM, i.e. "cluster munitions". It is also possible the missile was an M30A1 which has the 180,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments. Hard to know from the video. If the target is a building I would expect that at least some unitary HE would be used to collapse the structure. If you don't have any HE, you of course use what you have.

[Goose]

I believe what you are seeing are not cluster bomblets but rather tungsten fragments from the warhead casing, which are designed to fragment out for anti-personnel effect in addition to the blast effect from the warhead explosive. The second warhead hit a part of the building without windows unlike the other two, so I think that's why you don't see the same dispersed effects, as those fragments were probably "caught" by the internal structure of the building.
The GMLRS missiles fired by HIMARS look similar but with even more of those dispersed dust particles because it also has 180,000 tungsten balls in the warhead.

Certainly a reasonable explanation. However at their request Ukraine has received some M30 GMLRS missiles that contain DPICM, i.e. "cluster munitions". It is also possible the missile was an M30A1 which has the 180,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments. Hard to know from the video. If the target is a building I would expect that at least some unitary HE would be used to collapse the structure. If you don't have any HE, you of course use what you have.

[dabigv13]

These were definitely not DPICM or cluster type munitions- those would disperse above the target and then explode near-simultaneously (not exactly simultaneously as from a blast fragmentation) in a circular pattern. Here are some videos showing what that would look like-

https://x.com/bigSAC10/status/1728032570351243433

https://x.com/qHZ4aaZxWd32422/status/178...0326891940


And here is what a GMLRS impact with its 180,000 tungsten balls looks like-

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1786406430607565081

I believe the original post attributing this to GLSDB was based on what the projectiles looked like, but sometimes you might not get a good freeze frame and the impact effect can give a clue to the munition type.

[dabigv13]

These were definitely not DPICM or cluster type munitions- those would disperse above the target and then explode near-simultaneously (not exactly simultaneously as from a blast fragmentation) in a circular pattern. Here are some videos showing what that would look like-

https://x.com/bigSAC10/status/1728032570351243433

https://x.com/qHZ4aaZxWd32422/status/178...0326891940


And here is what a GMLRS impact with its 180,000 tungsten balls looks like-

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1786406430607565081

I believe the original post attributing this to GLSDB was based on what the projectiles looked like, but sometimes you might not get a good freeze frame and the impact effect can give a clue to the munition type.

[Goose]

These were definitely not DPICM or cluster type munitions- those would disperse above the target and then explode near-simultaneously (not exactly simultaneously as from a blast fragmentation) in a circular pattern. Here are some videos showing what that would look like-

https://x.com/bigSAC10/status/1728032570351243433

https://x.com/qHZ4aaZxWd32422/status/178...0326891940


And here is what a GMLRS impact with its 180,000 tungsten balls looks like-

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1786406430607565081

I believe the original post attributing this to GLSDB was based on what the projectiles looked like, but sometimes you might not get a good freeze frame and the impact effect can give a clue to the munition type.

Agree. Your analysis is IMO correct. I take it that you also believe it was not the result of a GLSDB strike but rather some kind of GMLRS. That seems likely to me as well. However the SDB with the Alternative Warhead has the same  180,000 tungsten balls. Really no way to tell them apart except by seeing the delivery vehicle in the air. If it has wings, it is a SDB (ground launch or otherwise). If not, it is GMLRS.

[Goose]

These were definitely not DPICM or cluster type munitions- those would disperse above the target and then explode near-simultaneously (not exactly simultaneously as from a blast fragmentation) in a circular pattern. Here are some videos showing what that would look like-

https://x.com/bigSAC10/status/1728032570351243433

https://x.com/qHZ4aaZxWd32422/status/178...0326891940


And here is what a GMLRS impact with its 180,000 tungsten balls looks like-

https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1786406430607565081

I believe the original post attributing this to GLSDB was based on what the projectiles looked like, but sometimes you might not get a good freeze frame and the impact effect can give a clue to the munition type.

Agree. Your analysis is IMO correct. I take it that you also believe it was not the result of a GLSDB strike but rather some kind of GMLRS. That seems likely to me as well. However the SDB with the Alternative Warhead has the same  180,000 tungsten balls. Really no way to tell them apart except by seeing the delivery vehicle in the air. If it has wings, it is a SDB (ground launch or otherwise). If not, it is GMLRS.

[dabigv13]

The source that identified them as GLSDB is a good one so I trust that's true.

I tried to find information on whether the SDB has the additional tungsten balls in the warhead but I couldn't find any source indicating it did, as compared to the M30A1 GMLRS Alternative Warhead where this information is easily found. The only things I found describe it as having a tungsten casing as the source of the fragments. There is an SDB variant with a carbon fiber casing that does not have the fragmentation effect and is meant to have a smaller radius of damage for more localized effect (the FLM variant).

The SDBs do have less explosive than the GMLRS warhead. 16kg versus 24.5kg.

[dabigv13]

The source that identified them as GLSDB is a good one so I trust that's true.

I tried to find information on whether the SDB has the additional tungsten balls in the warhead but I couldn't find any source indicating it did, as compared to the M30A1 GMLRS Alternative Warhead where this information is easily found. The only things I found describe it as having a tungsten casing as the source of the fragments. There is an SDB variant with a carbon fiber casing that does not have the fragmentation effect and is meant to have a smaller radius of damage for more localized effect (the FLM variant).

The SDBs do have less explosive than the GMLRS warhead. 16kg versus 24.5kg.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-wes...40486.html

I agree that the West is usually about a year late in deciding to provide new weapons systems. We don't at all understand the "speed of war". FWIW, Ukraine is still complaining about the slow delivery of promised aid, particularly Patriot missiles. To be fair, Ukraine hasn't always got out in front of the issues either, but they are better at it than we are. It is "interesting" that Ukraine now is openly saying they need 100-150 F-16s to actually do what is needed. Yes, they need an air force. They don't really have one now, and that is a very big problem. The 50 or so "slightly used" F-16s they may get (not in one "bunch") are going to be inadequate to meet the expanding threat. A year ago, it would arguably been "enough". Russia is finally actually using their air force, and despite Ukraine's successes against the Mainstays, things will just get worse until Ukraine can make it too expensive for the VKS to operate. Patriot missiles aren't going to do that. There are too few missiles and way too few launchers.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-wes...40486.html

I agree that the West is usually about a year late in deciding to provide new weapons systems. We don't at all understand the "speed of war". FWIW, Ukraine is still complaining about the slow delivery of promised aid, particularly Patriot missiles. To be fair, Ukraine hasn't always got out in front of the issues either, but they are better at it than we are. It is "interesting" that Ukraine now is openly saying they need 100-150 F-16s to actually do what is needed. Yes, they need an air force. They don't really have one now, and that is a very big problem. The 50 or so "slightly used" F-16s they may get (not in one "bunch") are going to be inadequate to meet the expanding threat. A year ago, it would arguably been "enough". Russia is finally actually using their air force, and despite Ukraine's successes against the Mainstays, things will just get worse until Ukraine can make it too expensive for the VKS to operate. Patriot missiles aren't going to do that. There are too few missiles and way too few launchers.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-wes...40486.html

I agree that the West is usually about a year late in deciding to provide new weapons systems. We don't at all understand the "speed of war". FWIW, Ukraine is still complaining about the slow delivery of promised aid, particularly Patriot missiles. To be fair, Ukraine hasn't always got out in front of the issues either, but they are better at it than we are. It is "interesting" that Ukraine now is openly saying they need 100-150 F-16s to actually do what is needed. Yes, they need an air force. They don't really have one now, and that is a very big problem. The 50 or so "slightly used" F-16s they may get (not in one "bunch") are going to be inadequate to meet the expanding threat. A year ago, it would arguably been "enough". Russia is finally actually using their air force, and despite Ukraine's successes against the Mainstays, things will just get worse until Ukraine can make it too expensive for the VKS to operate. Patriot missiles aren't going to do that. There are too few missiles and way too few launchers.

I understand the reality that politics makes actually making a decision and getting through Congress is a project that could try the souls of many men. What makes no sense is why one of the pols hasn't told the Sec Def that if the bill gets signed we want you ready to go, so go make that happen. To borrow the title of a book that touches on this kind of issue, what happened is a "Dereliction of Duty".
How many Ukrainian pilots are currently being trained, somewhere, anywhere?  Not a good situation.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-wes...40486.html

I agree that the West is usually about a year late in deciding to provide new weapons systems. We don't at all understand the "speed of war". FWIW, Ukraine is still complaining about the slow delivery of promised aid, particularly Patriot missiles. To be fair, Ukraine hasn't always got out in front of the issues either, but they are better at it than we are. It is "interesting" that Ukraine now is openly saying they need 100-150 F-16s to actually do what is needed. Yes, they need an air force. They don't really have one now, and that is a very big problem. The 50 or so "slightly used" F-16s they may get (not in one "bunch") are going to be inadequate to meet the expanding threat. A year ago, it would arguably been "enough". Russia is finally actually using their air force, and despite Ukraine's successes against the Mainstays, things will just get worse until Ukraine can make it too expensive for the VKS to operate. Patriot missiles aren't going to do that. There are too few missiles and way too few launchers.

I understand the reality that politics makes actually making a decision and getting through Congress is a project that could try the souls of many men. What makes no sense is why one of the pols hasn't told the Sec Def that if the bill gets signed we want you ready to go, so go make that happen. To borrow the title of a book that touches on this kind of issue, what happened is a "Dereliction of Duty".
How many Ukrainian pilots are currently being trained, somewhere, anywhere?  Not a good situation.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-com...48451.html

IMO this article is somewhat poorly written, perhaps even "bogus". However, it still has a point to make. If Ukrainian infantry has a Russian formation massing to attack in visual range, an ATACMS almost certainly is NOT the weapon of choice. Artillery is much better for dispersed targets, like troop concentrations. Failing that, "regular" HIMARS M26xM30x/M31x missiles work well too. In all cases DPICM is what one wants, not unitary explosive warheads. ATACMS is a good weapon against fixed high-value targets, like buildings, radar installations, ordinance storage points. It is not an area weapon. Its unitary warhead is ill-suited to such targets. Yes, it will kill a few Russians, but then it is "over". No "finger of God" effect.

That aside, the US ROEs forbid Ukraine from employing any of these weapons inside Russian territory. While I fully understand that the US doesn't want to "provoke" Russia, it is simply illogical to say Ukraine should defend itself but only on its own soil. If the US had some great can't miss plan that would lead to a Ukrainian victory without Ukraine using US supplied weapons against Russians in Russia, such ROEs might make sense. Since we don't have such a plan, if we are going to help Ukraine at all we need to allow them to act rationally without any additional constraints. Ukraine has the great misfortune of having large population centers very close to the Russian border. This is a tactical nightmare. Ukraine politically simply can't retreat. They have no tactical depth available to them. Ukraine can lose the war due to defeats in this area much faster than anywhere else in the country. The US ignores that fact at our peril. These ROEs must be modified to allow Ukraine the possibility of creating some tactical depth.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-com...48451.html

IMO this article is somewhat poorly written, perhaps even "bogus". However, it still has a point to make. If Ukrainian infantry has a Russian formation massing to attack in visual range, an ATACMS almost certainly is NOT the weapon of choice. Artillery is much better for dispersed targets, like troop concentrations. Failing that, "regular" HIMARS M26xM30x/M31x missiles work well too. In all cases DPICM is what one wants, not unitary explosive warheads. ATACMS is a good weapon against fixed high-value targets, like buildings, radar installations, ordinance storage points. It is not an area weapon. Its unitary warhead is ill-suited to such targets. Yes, it will kill a few Russians, but then it is "over". No "finger of God" effect.

That aside, the US ROEs forbid Ukraine from employing any of these weapons inside Russian territory. While I fully understand that the US doesn't want to "provoke" Russia, it is simply illogical to say Ukraine should defend itself but only on its own soil. If the US had some great can't miss plan that would lead to a Ukrainian victory without Ukraine using US supplied weapons against Russians in Russia, such ROEs might make sense. Since we don't have such a plan, if we are going to help Ukraine at all we need to allow them to act rationally without any additional constraints. Ukraine has the great misfortune of having large population centers very close to the Russian border. This is a tactical nightmare. Ukraine politically simply can't retreat. They have no tactical depth available to them. Ukraine can lose the war due to defeats in this area much faster than anywhere else in the country. The US ignores that fact at our peril. These ROEs must be modified to allow Ukraine the possibility of creating some tactical depth.

[TrumpCard]

Change the ROE in secret and announce it after Ukraine takes full advantage of the element of surprise.

[TrumpCard]

Change the ROE in secret and announce it after Ukraine takes full advantage of the element of surprise.

[Goose]

I understand the reality that politics makes actually making a decision and getting through Congress is a project that could try the souls of many men. What makes no sense is why one of the pols hasn't told the Sec Def that if the bill gets signed we want you ready to go, so go make that happen. To borrow the title of a book that touches on this kind of issue, what happened is a "Dereliction of Duty".
How many Ukrainian pilots are currently being trained, somewhere, anywhere?  Not a good situation.

https://theaviationist.com/2024/05/21/uk...ng-france/

This article discusses some Ukrainian pilots who are training in France. These pilots are totally inexperienced. They went through "basic" in the UK, as well as English language instruction. They are transitioning to an "intermediate" combat trainer (similar to the USN T-45). Later they will require F-16 instruction. These guys are probably at least 9-10 months (probably more) away from being "ready". They get 6 months of Alpha jet and then the F-16 transition class. As the article points out, training total novices is probably necessary, given that Ukraine needs their experienced aviators and (perhaps equally importantly) re-training pilots that are ex Warsaw pact pilots is often very difficult. All that said, what is happening now should have happened two years ago as a "just in case". It didn't, and that is IMO indeed a "dereliction of duty" by the US air staff. 

The article appears to say there are 3 groups of 12 pilots being trained in the US, UK, and Denmark. These pilots are expected to be ready "this summer". It is unclear whether this includes the "original" class being trained in the US, but I expect it does. The following article is a bit old but consistent with that timeline. https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/0...ay/394264/

So, that is 36 pilots, assuming nobody "washes out". Everybody making it would be a bit of a surprise, but who knows what the standards actually are. Obviously not really enough, almost a joke, except this is literally "deadly" serious. The guys in France right now will be a nice add, but one wonders what the state of the force will be in early 2025 when they graduate.

[Goose]

I understand the reality that politics makes actually making a decision and getting through Congress is a project that could try the souls of many men. What makes no sense is why one of the pols hasn't told the Sec Def that if the bill gets signed we want you ready to go, so go make that happen. To borrow the title of a book that touches on this kind of issue, what happened is a "Dereliction of Duty".
How many Ukrainian pilots are currently being trained, somewhere, anywhere?  Not a good situation.

https://theaviationist.com/2024/05/21/uk...ng-france/

This article discusses some Ukrainian pilots who are training in France. These pilots are totally inexperienced. They went through "basic" in the UK, as well as English language instruction. They are transitioning to an "intermediate" combat trainer (similar to the USN T-45). Later they will require F-16 instruction. These guys are probably at least 9-10 months (probably more) away from being "ready". They get 6 months of Alpha jet and then the F-16 transition class. As the article points out, training total novices is probably necessary, given that Ukraine needs their experienced aviators and (perhaps equally importantly) re-training pilots that are ex Warsaw pact pilots is often very difficult. All that said, what is happening now should have happened two years ago as a "just in case". It didn't, and that is IMO indeed a "dereliction of duty" by the US air staff. 

The article appears to say there are 3 groups of 12 pilots being trained in the US, UK, and Denmark. These pilots are expected to be ready "this summer". It is unclear whether this includes the "original" class being trained in the US, but I expect it does. The following article is a bit old but consistent with that timeline. https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2024/0...ay/394264/

So, that is 36 pilots, assuming nobody "washes out". Everybody making it would be a bit of a surprise, but who knows what the standards actually are. Obviously not really enough, almost a joke, except this is literally "deadly" serious. The guys in France right now will be a nice add, but one wonders what the state of the force will be in early 2025 when they graduate.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/wild-kremlin-...43167.html

The press is treating these actions as a belated realization that there were immense problems in the Defense Ministry. Optically, this is what Putin wants to convey. Obviously, Putin was well aware there were problems in the Defense Ministry. Even if he two years ago didn't realize that, after the first 6 months of war, he certainly did. For him, it is necessary that the military remain "quiescent" and that nobody in the Defense organization be competent enough to attempt Putin's removal. Putting non-military individuals in that position is potentially a good way to do that. The military will not easily accept being "led" at the highest levels by civilians. Obviously Putin hasn't been relying on the people he has just dismissed. He has another "work around" to directly control the actual strategic (and probably tactical) war-fighting. Putin himself probably has made many strategic and even tactical decisions, as did Hitler and Stalin. In general, the record of such direct control from the top is not good.

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/wild-kremlin-...43167.html

The press is treating these actions as a belated realization that there were immense problems in the Defense Ministry. Optically, this is what Putin wants to convey. Obviously, Putin was well aware there were problems in the Defense Ministry. Even if he two years ago didn't realize that, after the first 6 months of war, he certainly did. For him, it is necessary that the military remain "quiescent" and that nobody in the Defense organization be competent enough to attempt Putin's removal. Putting non-military individuals in that position is potentially a good way to do that. The military will not easily accept being "led" at the highest levels by civilians. Obviously Putin hasn't been relying on the people he has just dismissed. He has another "work around" to directly control the actual strategic (and probably tactical) war-fighting. Putin himself probably has made many strategic and even tactical decisions, as did Hitler and Stalin. In general, the record of such direct control from the top is not good.

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

[Mick]

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

That's the old Stalin model. Works, so long as you don't run out of troops -- and NATO doesn't supply troops to Ukraine.

[Mick]

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

That's the old Stalin model. Works, so long as you don't run out of troops -- and NATO doesn't supply troops to Ukraine.

[Goose]

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

That's the old Stalin model. Works, so long as you don't run out of troops -- and NATO doesn't supply troops to Ukraine.

IMO similar, but not quite the same. Stalin had already proved he was certifiably nuts. He had purged the military of officers to prevent it from becoming a threat. At the beginning of the war that created a disaster. Stalin had Beria and the NKVD. The NKVD makes the current FSB look like choir boys. Beria was absolutely ruthless and absolutely loyal to Stalin. He was also very good at what he did. The public was terrified of the NKVD (for good reason). Putin has no Beria, and that is a big problem for him. He can't terrorize the public to nearly the same extent Stalin could. Stalin also had a public communist ideology to fall back on, cynical as it may have been. Stalin also had a legitimate existential threat to Russia about which there could be no doubt. The "Great Patriotic War" actually was that. Putin has neither.

Most importantly, Stalin was fortunate enough to eventually locate two very competent military leaders that he could play off against each other, Zukhov and Konev. Neither party could move against Stalin (even if they wished to) because the other would oppose them militarily. Stalin also kept around at least three other generals that commanded "Fronts", any one of which was strong enough to fatally damage a coup while not strong enough to stage their own. This resulted in the Red Army not being as efficient as it would have been by following the "Unity of Command" principle, but it did help Stalin sleep at night. Right after the war ended, Zhukov was stripped of his power. Stalin didn't trust him and expected a coup.

Putin therefore has a greater challenge balancing the forces that may array against him. The main positive thing he has going for him (compared to Stalin) is that Russia itself isn't suffering nearly as it did in WWII. Putin is however a "one man band" without any strong allies. He also doesn't instill the deep fear in the general public that Stalin did.

[Goose]

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

That's the old Stalin model. Works, so long as you don't run out of troops -- and NATO doesn't supply troops to Ukraine.

IMO similar, but not quite the same. Stalin had already proved he was certifiably nuts. He had purged the military of officers to prevent it from becoming a threat. At the beginning of the war that created a disaster. Stalin had Beria and the NKVD. The NKVD makes the current FSB look like choir boys. Beria was absolutely ruthless and absolutely loyal to Stalin. He was also very good at what he did. The public was terrified of the NKVD (for good reason). Putin has no Beria, and that is a big problem for him. He can't terrorize the public to nearly the same extent Stalin could. Stalin also had a public communist ideology to fall back on, cynical as it may have been. Stalin also had a legitimate existential threat to Russia about which there could be no doubt. The "Great Patriotic War" actually was that. Putin has neither.

Most importantly, Stalin was fortunate enough to eventually locate two very competent military leaders that he could play off against each other, Zukhov and Konev. Neither party could move against Stalin (even if they wished to) because the other would oppose them militarily. Stalin also kept around at least three other generals that commanded "Fronts", any one of which was strong enough to fatally damage a coup while not strong enough to stage their own. This resulted in the Red Army not being as efficient as it would have been by following the "Unity of Command" principle, but it did help Stalin sleep at night. Right after the war ended, Zhukov was stripped of his power. Stalin didn't trust him and expected a coup.

Putin therefore has a greater challenge balancing the forces that may array against him. The main positive thing he has going for him (compared to Stalin) is that Russia itself isn't suffering nearly as it did in WWII. Putin is however a "one man band" without any strong allies. He also doesn't instill the deep fear in the general public that Stalin did.

[GK3]

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

That's the old Stalin model. Works, so long as you don't run out of troops -- and NATO doesn't supply troops to Ukraine.

IMO similar, but not quite the same. Stalin had already proved he was certifiably nuts. He had purged the military of officers to prevent it from becoming a threat. At the beginning of the war that created a disaster. Stalin had Beria and the NKVD. The NKVD makes the current FSB look like choir boys. Beria was absolutely ruthless and absolutely loyal to Stalin. He was also very good at what he did. The public was terrified of the NKVD (for good reason). Putin has no Beria, and that is a big problem for him. He can't terrorize the public to nearly the same extent Stalin could. Stalin also had a public communist ideology to fall back on, cynical as it may have been. Stalin also had a legitimate existential threat to Russia about which there could be no doubt. The "Great Patriotic War" actually was that. Putin has neither.

Most importantly, Stalin was fortunate enough to eventually locate two very competent military leaders that he could play off against each other, Zukhov and Konev. Neither party could move against Stalin (even if they wished to) because the other would oppose them militarily. Stalin also kept around at least three other generals that commanded "Fronts", any one of which was strong enough to fatally damage a coup while not strong enough to stage their own. This resulted in the Red Army not being as efficient as it would have been by following the "Unity of Command" principle, but it did help Stalin sleep at night. Right after the war ended, Zhukov was stripped of his power. Stalin didn't trust him and expected a coup.

Putin therefore has a greater challenge balancing the forces that may array against him. The main positive thing he has going for him (compared to Stalin) is that Russia itself isn't suffering nearly as it did in WWII. Putin is however a "one man band" without any strong allies. He also doesn't instill the deep fear in the general public that Stalin did.

Putin must be at least a little worried since he is replacing multiple senior officers.  My question is how long can he make this system of staying in power work?  He is definitely not Stalin and has to deal with a society that has had some exposure to "Western Capitalism", and others who have basically stolen billions from the Russian Federation. So how does he keep the quagmire underlying his regeime in place and himself in power?
If the "West" starts using frozen Russian Assets to provide support to Ukraine, what impact will that have on his power base?  
Although Putin may currently be "winning", can he maintain enough support to continue to "win".  His recent actions seem to indicate he is not confident he can continue to win with those who got him this far.  I take the justifications for the replacement of a number of senior military officers to clear evidence that he feels he power base slipping away.  Again, he is NOT Stalin.

[GK3]

The problem with all this is that Putin still can't allow the concentration of too much power in the hands of a competent organization. If he does, that organization is by its very existence a threat to him. This ensures that Russia will always have an arguably corrupt and inefficient military. Putin has to execute a balancing act where it is inefficient enough and corrupt enough it won't create a threat to Putin but is at the same time competent enough to execute his will. This is a difficult task to pull off.

That's the old Stalin model. Works, so long as you don't run out of troops -- and NATO doesn't supply troops to Ukraine.

IMO similar, but not quite the same. Stalin had already proved he was certifiably nuts. He had purged the military of officers to prevent it from becoming a threat. At the beginning of the war that created a disaster. Stalin had Beria and the NKVD. The NKVD makes the current FSB look like choir boys. Beria was absolutely ruthless and absolutely loyal to Stalin. He was also very good at what he did. The public was terrified of the NKVD (for good reason). Putin has no Beria, and that is a big problem for him. He can't terrorize the public to nearly the same extent Stalin could. Stalin also had a public communist ideology to fall back on, cynical as it may have been. Stalin also had a legitimate existential threat to Russia about which there could be no doubt. The "Great Patriotic War" actually was that. Putin has neither.

Most importantly, Stalin was fortunate enough to eventually locate two very competent military leaders that he could play off against each other, Zukhov and Konev. Neither party could move against Stalin (even if they wished to) because the other would oppose them militarily. Stalin also kept around at least three other generals that commanded "Fronts", any one of which was strong enough to fatally damage a coup while not strong enough to stage their own. This resulted in the Red Army not being as efficient as it would have been by following the "Unity of Command" principle, but it did help Stalin sleep at night. Right after the war ended, Zhukov was stripped of his power. Stalin didn't trust him and expected a coup.

Putin therefore has a greater challenge balancing the forces that may array against him. The main positive thing he has going for him (compared to Stalin) is that Russia itself isn't suffering nearly as it did in WWII. Putin is however a "one man band" without any strong allies. He also doesn't instill the deep fear in the general public that Stalin did.

Putin must be at least a little worried since he is replacing multiple senior officers.  My question is how long can he make this system of staying in power work?  He is definitely not Stalin and has to deal with a society that has had some exposure to "Western Capitalism", and others who have basically stolen billions from the Russian Federation. So how does he keep the quagmire underlying his regeime in place and himself in power?
If the "West" starts using frozen Russian Assets to provide support to Ukraine, what impact will that have on his power base?  
Although Putin may currently be "winning", can he maintain enough support to continue to "win".  His recent actions seem to indicate he is not confident he can continue to win with those who got him this far.  I take the justifications for the replacement of a number of senior military officers to clear evidence that he feels he power base slipping away.  Again, he is NOT Stalin.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-figure...24398.html

More bad news for Ukraine on the EW front. The above article has some rather curious statements in it. Some are literally true but irrelevant. It is true that satellites in geosynchronous orbit at 22,236 miles above the earth's surface, while Starlink satellites orbit at 342 miles. That indeed means the path loss from geosynchronous satellites is 36 dB more than from the LEO Starlink satellites, but so what? The GPS system, which is the other system Russia is jamming isn't geosynchronous anyway. It is MEO at 12,550 miles. The path loss is therefore 31 dB, or about the 6 dB one would expect for a factor of 2 difference. Of course, this path loss difference could be completely canceled out if the GPS satellite transmitted 1259 times the power of a Starlink or by some combination of transmitter power, antenna gain and "processing gain" of the modulation system. Since none of these factors were considered, the conjectures about the path loss are pretty meaningless.

In point of fact the GPS system has very high processing gain due to a very well designed modulation scheme and a 50 bits (!) per second very low data rate. OTOH the Starlink system has a much higher data rate (think streaming video) and a wider bandwidth (which MAY be harder to jam). If one wishes to geek out on the modulation scheme https://radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/wp-con...ucture.pdf. This article is oriented towards using Starlink in place of GPS satellites. The point is that range is far from the only consideration in jamming resistance.

One fact that is overlooked in the EW battle being fought in Ukraine is that both Russia and the US (as well as China and maybe others) can destroy the entire GPS constellation basically anytime they want to do so. All these wonderful weapons that rely on GPS now don't "work" and won't work for a very long time, as there aren't replacements ready to launch. Even if there were, the replacements could then be destroyed.  In the "proxy" wars between Russia and the US, that has never been done. In a "more serious" confrontation, it certainly could be. Other means of precision targeting that don't rely on satellite based signals must become the norm. Satellites can be destroyed and/or their signals jammed. The system is obviously too fragile to rely on in the future. If one never has to fight a "near-peer" competitor, one may get away with GPS based weapons. Otherwise, there are obviously serious problems.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-figure...24398.html

More bad news for Ukraine on the EW front. The above article has some rather curious statements in it. Some are literally true but irrelevant. It is true that satellites in geosynchronous orbit at 22,236 miles above the earth's surface, while Starlink satellites orbit at 342 miles. That indeed means the path loss from geosynchronous satellites is 36 dB more than from the LEO Starlink satellites, but so what? The GPS system, which is the other system Russia is jamming isn't geosynchronous anyway. It is MEO at 12,550 miles. The path loss is therefore 31 dB, or about the 6 dB one would expect for a factor of 2 difference. Of course, this path loss difference could be completely canceled out if the GPS satellite transmitted 1259 times the power of a Starlink or by some combination of transmitter power, antenna gain and "processing gain" of the modulation system. Since none of these factors were considered, the conjectures about the path loss are pretty meaningless.

In point of fact the GPS system has very high processing gain due to a very well designed modulation scheme and a 50 bits (!) per second very low data rate. OTOH the Starlink system has a much higher data rate (think streaming video) and a wider bandwidth (which MAY be harder to jam). If one wishes to geek out on the modulation scheme https://radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/wp-con...ucture.pdf. This article is oriented towards using Starlink in place of GPS satellites. The point is that range is far from the only consideration in jamming resistance.

One fact that is overlooked in the EW battle being fought in Ukraine is that both Russia and the US (as well as China and maybe others) can destroy the entire GPS constellation basically anytime they want to do so. All these wonderful weapons that rely on GPS now don't "work" and won't work for a very long time, as there aren't replacements ready to launch. Even if there were, the replacements could then be destroyed.  In the "proxy" wars between Russia and the US, that has never been done. In a "more serious" confrontation, it certainly could be. Other means of precision targeting that don't rely on satellite based signals must become the norm. Satellites can be destroyed and/or their signals jammed. The system is obviously too fragile to rely on in the future. If one never has to fight a "near-peer" competitor, one may get away with GPS based weapons. Otherwise, there are obviously serious problems.

[dabigv13]

Russian S-400 battery turned into pricey fireworks by ATACMS with cluster munitions.

https://x.com/yarotrof/status/1793942422138806460

[dabigv13]

Russian S-400 battery turned into pricey fireworks by ATACMS with cluster munitions.

https://x.com/yarotrof/status/1793942422138806460