06-06-2024, 07:28 AM
Question: Was it wise to allow Ukraine to fire US made rockets into Russia?
Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine
06-06-2024, 08:06 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-despe...46362.html
It appears that the training of F-16 pilots for Ukraine is totally inadequate to the requirements. The problem with the US effort is that it is going through the "normal" USAF training program for foreign nationals. This program has limited capacity especially compared to the one for US nationals. The one for US nationals is downsizing as the F-35 becomes more prevalent. The decision to use the foreign national pipeline is in itself understandable. That program is set up to deal with the language issues much more effectively. However it doesn't meet the need and that fact was obvious from day 1. It lacks capacity. Ukraine has all along questioned why its pilots weren't just put in the "regular" flow of training. The first four were done as a (no pun intended) pilot program. The remainder were supposed to just go the regular route, but apparently did not. Training 4 squadrons of Ukrainian pilots will therefore take four to five years starting today. The 20 Ukraine is getting via the US pipeline would be enough for maybe 1 F-16 squadron of 16 aircraft. It would be marginally manned. Of course, the issue of ground support staff is not addressed in the article. It could be in worse shape than pilot training AFAIK.
The article points out the previously stated fact that the European training site in Denmark has a capacity of 8 pilots a year and is set to close. Denmark doesn't have the resources to keep it open even if they wanted to do so. To keep using it some other countries in the EU will have to come up with the money. The one in Romania isn't up and running yet and IMO has all the hallmarks of an expensive fiasco that never does anything. Generating such a facility from scratch was never going to be easy and contractors in general haven't been a good way to do so. There is also a LOT to be said for training all the F-16 pilots in the same manner. It produces pilots that do the same things the same way reliably. Multiple instruction paths create variances in procedure. It is not a matter of right vs wrong, it is a matter of uniformity.
All that said, I see another very real problem here. It has been pointed out before, but here is a quote from the article.
It appears that the training of F-16 pilots for Ukraine is totally inadequate to the requirements. The problem with the US effort is that it is going through the "normal" USAF training program for foreign nationals. This program has limited capacity especially compared to the one for US nationals. The one for US nationals is downsizing as the F-35 becomes more prevalent. The decision to use the foreign national pipeline is in itself understandable. That program is set up to deal with the language issues much more effectively. However it doesn't meet the need and that fact was obvious from day 1. It lacks capacity. Ukraine has all along questioned why its pilots weren't just put in the "regular" flow of training. The first four were done as a (no pun intended) pilot program. The remainder were supposed to just go the regular route, but apparently did not. Training 4 squadrons of Ukrainian pilots will therefore take four to five years starting today. The 20 Ukraine is getting via the US pipeline would be enough for maybe 1 F-16 squadron of 16 aircraft. It would be marginally manned. Of course, the issue of ground support staff is not addressed in the article. It could be in worse shape than pilot training AFAIK.
The article points out the previously stated fact that the European training site in Denmark has a capacity of 8 pilots a year and is set to close. Denmark doesn't have the resources to keep it open even if they wanted to do so. To keep using it some other countries in the EU will have to come up with the money. The one in Romania isn't up and running yet and IMO has all the hallmarks of an expensive fiasco that never does anything. Generating such a facility from scratch was never going to be easy and contractors in general haven't been a good way to do so. There is also a LOT to be said for training all the F-16 pilots in the same manner. It produces pilots that do the same things the same way reliably. Multiple instruction paths create variances in procedure. It is not a matter of right vs wrong, it is a matter of uniformity.
All that said, I see another very real problem here. It has been pointed out before, but here is a quote from the article.
Quote:The warplanes "will give the Ukrainians an increment of capability that they don't have right now," Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said in May 2023. "But it's not going to be a dramatic game changer, as far as I'm concerned, for their total military capabilities."This is and has been an issue all along. The USAF doesn't think Ukraine can operate F-16s and that even if they can the USAF doesn't believe it is worth the trouble. This isn't a case of managing expectations. The USAF didn't and doesn't want to do it. They are following orders but nothing beyond that. In fairness the USAF is very much a process driven organization. This was always true but has become much worse in the last 25-30 years. The point here is that nobody (that speaks in public anyway) is trying to figure out a way to overcome difficulties and make it happen. Business as usual is the order of the day. IMO if the US policy is to provide the capability to Ukraine come hell or high water, the SecDef needs to order the Air Staff to get with the program and make it happen, period. Make it clear that if they can't do it, they will be replaced and quickly. Good policy is useless if not executed, and from the beginning we have not executed. It may not be easy, but IMO this effort has been pro-forma at best.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-despe...46362.html
It appears that the training of F-16 pilots for Ukraine is totally inadequate to the requirements. The problem with the US effort is that it is going through the "normal" USAF training program for foreign nationals. This program has limited capacity especially compared to the one for US nationals. The one for US nationals is downsizing as the F-35 becomes more prevalent. The decision to use the foreign national pipeline is in itself understandable. That program is set up to deal with the language issues much more effectively. However it doesn't meet the need and that fact was obvious from day 1. It lacks capacity. Ukraine has all along questioned why its pilots weren't just put in the "regular" flow of training. The first four were done as a (no pun intended) pilot program. The remainder were supposed to just go the regular route, but apparently did not. Training 4 squadrons of Ukrainian pilots will therefore take four to five years starting today. The 20 Ukraine is getting via the US pipeline would be enough for maybe 1 F-16 squadron of 16 aircraft. It would be marginally manned. Of course, the issue of ground support staff is not addressed in the article. It could be in worse shape than pilot training AFAIK.
The article points out the previously stated fact that the European training site in Denmark has a capacity of 8 pilots a year and is set to close. Denmark doesn't have the resources to keep it open even if they wanted to do so. To keep using it some other countries in the EU will have to come up with the money. The one in Romania isn't up and running yet and IMO has all the hallmarks of an expensive fiasco that never does anything. Generating such a facility from scratch was never going to be easy and contractors in general haven't been a good way to do so. There is also a LOT to be said for training all the F-16 pilots in the same manner. It produces pilots that do the same things the same way reliably. Multiple instruction paths create variances in procedure. It is not a matter of right vs wrong, it is a matter of uniformity.
All that said, I see another very real problem here. It has been pointed out before, but here is a quote from the article.
It appears that the training of F-16 pilots for Ukraine is totally inadequate to the requirements. The problem with the US effort is that it is going through the "normal" USAF training program for foreign nationals. This program has limited capacity especially compared to the one for US nationals. The one for US nationals is downsizing as the F-35 becomes more prevalent. The decision to use the foreign national pipeline is in itself understandable. That program is set up to deal with the language issues much more effectively. However it doesn't meet the need and that fact was obvious from day 1. It lacks capacity. Ukraine has all along questioned why its pilots weren't just put in the "regular" flow of training. The first four were done as a (no pun intended) pilot program. The remainder were supposed to just go the regular route, but apparently did not. Training 4 squadrons of Ukrainian pilots will therefore take four to five years starting today. The 20 Ukraine is getting via the US pipeline would be enough for maybe 1 F-16 squadron of 16 aircraft. It would be marginally manned. Of course, the issue of ground support staff is not addressed in the article. It could be in worse shape than pilot training AFAIK.
The article points out the previously stated fact that the European training site in Denmark has a capacity of 8 pilots a year and is set to close. Denmark doesn't have the resources to keep it open even if they wanted to do so. To keep using it some other countries in the EU will have to come up with the money. The one in Romania isn't up and running yet and IMO has all the hallmarks of an expensive fiasco that never does anything. Generating such a facility from scratch was never going to be easy and contractors in general haven't been a good way to do so. There is also a LOT to be said for training all the F-16 pilots in the same manner. It produces pilots that do the same things the same way reliably. Multiple instruction paths create variances in procedure. It is not a matter of right vs wrong, it is a matter of uniformity.
All that said, I see another very real problem here. It has been pointed out before, but here is a quote from the article.
Quote:The warplanes "will give the Ukrainians an increment of capability that they don't have right now," Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said in May 2023. "But it's not going to be a dramatic game changer, as far as I'm concerned, for their total military capabilities."This is and has been an issue all along. The USAF doesn't think Ukraine can operate F-16s and that even if they can the USAF doesn't believe it is worth the trouble. This isn't a case of managing expectations. The USAF didn't and doesn't want to do it. They are following orders but nothing beyond that. In fairness the USAF is very much a process driven organization. This was always true but has become much worse in the last 25-30 years. The point here is that nobody (that speaks in public anyway) is trying to figure out a way to overcome difficulties and make it happen. Business as usual is the order of the day. IMO if the US policy is to provide the capability to Ukraine come hell or high water, the SecDef needs to order the Air Staff to get with the program and make it happen, period. Make it clear that if they can't do it, they will be replaced and quickly. Good policy is useless if not executed, and from the beginning we have not executed. It may not be easy, but IMO this effort has been pro-forma at best.
(06-06-2024, 07:28 AM)lex24 Wrote: Question: Was it wise to allow Ukraine to fire US made rockets into Russia?
IMO the problem is that Ukraine is at a very significant geographic disadvantage in the Kharkiv area. It is just too close to Russia. Ukraine has no strategic depth. They have to defend Kharkiv and its surrounding territory. They can't walk away from such a city. Allowing Russia unmolested GLOC would put Ukraine in an even more catastrophic tactical situation. FWIW Kyiv is in an even worse geographical situation. The saving grace there is that Belarus is the border, not Russia. Ukraine could have lost the war on the first night if Russia had been able to mass more troops in Belarus.
Ukraine can still easily lose the war in the north of the country. This is true even if they can fire US made rockets into Russia. I assume permission was given because Ukraine made a compelling case it was absolutely necessary to avoid imminent defeat. So, was it "wise"? That question needed answering two+ years ago. When the US made the decision to support Ukraine (which FWIW I agreed with) it was incumbent on us to answer the question "How does this end?". In the past we have answered that question by assuming the other side will eventually see sweet reason and quit. That is never a good idea. Wars are fought to compel the opponent to act as we wish. It can't rely on the opponent just quitting. You need a reasonable plan to make him quit.
Make no mistake, the US chose to involve itself in a war, even if only a proxy war. IMO we needed a plan for Ukraine to win basically no matter what Russia did. This included the possibility Russia may use tactical nuclear weapons, even though we may believe that is a low probability event. It was entirely likely Russia would utilize their geographic advantages. The fact they failed to do so effectively early on is a serendipity not a feature. This should have been war-gamed and if it was necessary to allow Ukraine to fire rockets into Russia to defend Kharkiv we should have know that going in and have granted that permission to Ukraine when we sent them the missiles. It could have been conditional on certain threats materializing, but the decision should have already been made long ago. It is unwise to increase the fog of war by not telling your ally what your intentions are. It may result in them making sub-optimal decisions.
In point of fact, it has become necessary. If this was a surprise to our NCA that indicates severe prior planning problems. Evolving escalation in proxy wars has a very poor track record. This creeping escalation denies the combined kinetic effect of our involvement by stretching it out on a case-by-case basis. It also often leaves us in a position we would never have accepted at the beginning of our involvement. I hope that isn't what we are doing, but I fear it is.
(06-06-2024, 07:28 AM)lex24 Wrote: Question: Was it wise to allow Ukraine to fire US made rockets into Russia?
IMO the problem is that Ukraine is at a very significant geographic disadvantage in the Kharkiv area. It is just too close to Russia. Ukraine has no strategic depth. They have to defend Kharkiv and its surrounding territory. They can't walk away from such a city. Allowing Russia unmolested GLOC would put Ukraine in an even more catastrophic tactical situation. FWIW Kyiv is in an even worse geographical situation. The saving grace there is that Belarus is the border, not Russia. Ukraine could have lost the war on the first night if Russia had been able to mass more troops in Belarus.
Ukraine can still easily lose the war in the north of the country. This is true even if they can fire US made rockets into Russia. I assume permission was given because Ukraine made a compelling case it was absolutely necessary to avoid imminent defeat. So, was it "wise"? That question needed answering two+ years ago. When the US made the decision to support Ukraine (which FWIW I agreed with) it was incumbent on us to answer the question "How does this end?". In the past we have answered that question by assuming the other side will eventually see sweet reason and quit. That is never a good idea. Wars are fought to compel the opponent to act as we wish. It can't rely on the opponent just quitting. You need a reasonable plan to make him quit.
Make no mistake, the US chose to involve itself in a war, even if only a proxy war. IMO we needed a plan for Ukraine to win basically no matter what Russia did. This included the possibility Russia may use tactical nuclear weapons, even though we may believe that is a low probability event. It was entirely likely Russia would utilize their geographic advantages. The fact they failed to do so effectively early on is a serendipity not a feature. This should have been war-gamed and if it was necessary to allow Ukraine to fire rockets into Russia to defend Kharkiv we should have know that going in and have granted that permission to Ukraine when we sent them the missiles. It could have been conditional on certain threats materializing, but the decision should have already been made long ago. It is unwise to increase the fog of war by not telling your ally what your intentions are. It may result in them making sub-optimal decisions.
In point of fact, it has become necessary. If this was a surprise to our NCA that indicates severe prior planning problems. Evolving escalation in proxy wars has a very poor track record. This creeping escalation denies the combined kinetic effect of our involvement by stretching it out on a case-by-case basis. It also often leaves us in a position we would never have accepted at the beginning of our involvement. I hope that isn't what we are doing, but I fear it is.
06-07-2024, 07:29 AM
(06-06-2024, 08:55 AM)Goose Wrote:(06-06-2024, 07:28 AM)lex24 Wrote: Question: Was it wise to allow Ukraine to fire US made rockets into Russia?
IMO the problem is that Ukraine is at a very significant geographic disadvantage in the Kharkiv area. It is just too close to Russia. Ukraine has no strategic depth. They have to defend Kharkiv and its surrounding territory. They can't walk away from such a city. Allowing Russia unmolested GLOC would put Ukraine in an even more catastrophic tactical situation. FWIW Kyiv is in an even worse geographical situation. The saving grace there is that Belarus is the border, not Russia. Ukraine could have lost the war on the first night if Russia had been able to mass more troops in Belarus.
Ukraine can still easily lose the war in the north of the country. This is true even if they can fire US made rockets into Russia. I assume permission was given because Ukraine made a compelling case it was absolutely necessary to avoid imminent defeat. So, was it "wise"? That question needed answering two+ years ago. When the US made the decision to support Ukraine (which FWIW I agreed with) it was incumbent on us to answer the question "How does this end?". In the past we have answered that question by assuming the other side will eventually see sweet reason and quit. That is never a good idea. Wars are fought to compel the opponent to act as we wish. It can't rely on the opponent just quitting. You need a reasonable plan to make him quit.
Make no mistake, the US chose to involve itself in a war, even if only a proxy war. IMO we needed a plan for Ukraine to win basically no matter what Russia did. This included the possibility Russia may use tactical nuclear weapons, even though we may believe that is a low probability event. It was entirely likely Russia would utilize their geographic advantages. The fact they failed to do so effectively early on is a serendipity not a feature. This should have been war-gamed and if it was necessary to allow Ukraine to fire rockets into Russia to defend Kharkiv we should have know that going in and have granted that permission to Ukraine when we sent them the missiles. It could have been conditional on certain threats materializing, but the decision should have already been made long ago. It is unwise to increase the fog of war by not telling your ally what your intentions are. It may result in them making sub-optimal decisions.
In point of fact, it has become necessary. If this was a surprise to our NCA that indicates severe prior planning problems. Evolving escalation in proxy wars has a very poor track record. This creeping escalation denies the combined kinetic effect of our involvement by stretching it out on a case-by-case basis. It also often leaves us in a position we would never have accepted at the beginning of our involvement. I hope that isn't what we are doing, but I fear it is.
Thanks. Not a hopeful response. But appreciated.
(06-06-2024, 08:55 AM)Goose Wrote:(06-06-2024, 07:28 AM)lex24 Wrote: Question: Was it wise to allow Ukraine to fire US made rockets into Russia?
IMO the problem is that Ukraine is at a very significant geographic disadvantage in the Kharkiv area. It is just too close to Russia. Ukraine has no strategic depth. They have to defend Kharkiv and its surrounding territory. They can't walk away from such a city. Allowing Russia unmolested GLOC would put Ukraine in an even more catastrophic tactical situation. FWIW Kyiv is in an even worse geographical situation. The saving grace there is that Belarus is the border, not Russia. Ukraine could have lost the war on the first night if Russia had been able to mass more troops in Belarus.
Ukraine can still easily lose the war in the north of the country. This is true even if they can fire US made rockets into Russia. I assume permission was given because Ukraine made a compelling case it was absolutely necessary to avoid imminent defeat. So, was it "wise"? That question needed answering two+ years ago. When the US made the decision to support Ukraine (which FWIW I agreed with) it was incumbent on us to answer the question "How does this end?". In the past we have answered that question by assuming the other side will eventually see sweet reason and quit. That is never a good idea. Wars are fought to compel the opponent to act as we wish. It can't rely on the opponent just quitting. You need a reasonable plan to make him quit.
Make no mistake, the US chose to involve itself in a war, even if only a proxy war. IMO we needed a plan for Ukraine to win basically no matter what Russia did. This included the possibility Russia may use tactical nuclear weapons, even though we may believe that is a low probability event. It was entirely likely Russia would utilize their geographic advantages. The fact they failed to do so effectively early on is a serendipity not a feature. This should have been war-gamed and if it was necessary to allow Ukraine to fire rockets into Russia to defend Kharkiv we should have know that going in and have granted that permission to Ukraine when we sent them the missiles. It could have been conditional on certain threats materializing, but the decision should have already been made long ago. It is unwise to increase the fog of war by not telling your ally what your intentions are. It may result in them making sub-optimal decisions.
In point of fact, it has become necessary. If this was a surprise to our NCA that indicates severe prior planning problems. Evolving escalation in proxy wars has a very poor track record. This creeping escalation denies the combined kinetic effect of our involvement by stretching it out on a case-by-case basis. It also often leaves us in a position we would never have accepted at the beginning of our involvement. I hope that isn't what we are doing, but I fear it is.
Thanks. Not a hopeful response. But appreciated.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/permission-wi...57176.html
Interesting timing on this article. As will become apparent when you read it I emphatically concur with some of its arguments, but certainly not all. I agree that US strategy must define the desired end state and have a feasible and credible plan to achieve this end state. This is critical to success and we apparently don't have such a plan. Obviously all plans must change as events unfold. Good plans drive events and have branches for various outcomes. If you find yourself constantly reacting to events and changing your plan frequently it is probably wise to step back and reconsider your basic assumptions.
I do not agree with the "rosy" picture painted in the article regarding the results of making Russia part of a "free fire" zone for ATACMS. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATACMS at their disposal to prevent Russian military operations. Neither does (or did) the US. It is a tool Ukraine should be able to employ "appropriately" considering the limited stocks. A "free fire" zone is useful in that it imposes significant "costs" on Russia, even if the ATACMS is only used when Russia screws up and exposes a high value target. The situation in northern Ukraine is "different". Regular M30-M31 rockets can be used to good effect inside Russia. Ukraine has lots of those, and IMO there should never have been a restriction on using them.
I am also troubled about the apparently cavalier attitude the quoted sources have towards what Putin will or will not do. Once again, it is a capability vs intention situation. Many battles have been lost and many wars have been started based on a misunderstanding of your opponents intentions. Intentions are very difficult to ascertain because they involve what people think. Capabilities can, at least in theory, be objectively measured. In this case, we know Russia has a large stock of tactical nuclear weapons. They have the capability. While I agree that Putin almost certainly will not use them just because the US declares Russia a free fire zone for US weapons operated by Ukrainians, that isn't cast in stone. The US needs a contingency plan of what we will do if Putin uses one. Do we have that in place? I doubt it. The real danger of incrementally testing Russia resolve in Ukraine is that Russia's repeated forbearance will convince us that it will continue. A similar situation existed in 1939. The German NCA was convinced that since the Allies had accepted the Anschluss and caved in on Czechoslovakia they would do the same in Poland. The reaction in the German High Command was shock when Britain actually declared war. They literally said "Well, what do we do now?" knowing there really was no plan in existence. We don't want to be there.
Interesting timing on this article. As will become apparent when you read it I emphatically concur with some of its arguments, but certainly not all. I agree that US strategy must define the desired end state and have a feasible and credible plan to achieve this end state. This is critical to success and we apparently don't have such a plan. Obviously all plans must change as events unfold. Good plans drive events and have branches for various outcomes. If you find yourself constantly reacting to events and changing your plan frequently it is probably wise to step back and reconsider your basic assumptions.
I do not agree with the "rosy" picture painted in the article regarding the results of making Russia part of a "free fire" zone for ATACMS. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATACMS at their disposal to prevent Russian military operations. Neither does (or did) the US. It is a tool Ukraine should be able to employ "appropriately" considering the limited stocks. A "free fire" zone is useful in that it imposes significant "costs" on Russia, even if the ATACMS is only used when Russia screws up and exposes a high value target. The situation in northern Ukraine is "different". Regular M30-M31 rockets can be used to good effect inside Russia. Ukraine has lots of those, and IMO there should never have been a restriction on using them.
I am also troubled about the apparently cavalier attitude the quoted sources have towards what Putin will or will not do. Once again, it is a capability vs intention situation. Many battles have been lost and many wars have been started based on a misunderstanding of your opponents intentions. Intentions are very difficult to ascertain because they involve what people think. Capabilities can, at least in theory, be objectively measured. In this case, we know Russia has a large stock of tactical nuclear weapons. They have the capability. While I agree that Putin almost certainly will not use them just because the US declares Russia a free fire zone for US weapons operated by Ukrainians, that isn't cast in stone. The US needs a contingency plan of what we will do if Putin uses one. Do we have that in place? I doubt it. The real danger of incrementally testing Russia resolve in Ukraine is that Russia's repeated forbearance will convince us that it will continue. A similar situation existed in 1939. The German NCA was convinced that since the Allies had accepted the Anschluss and caved in on Czechoslovakia they would do the same in Poland. The reaction in the German High Command was shock when Britain actually declared war. They literally said "Well, what do we do now?" knowing there really was no plan in existence. We don't want to be there.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/permission-wi...57176.html
Interesting timing on this article. As will become apparent when you read it I emphatically concur with some of its arguments, but certainly not all. I agree that US strategy must define the desired end state and have a feasible and credible plan to achieve this end state. This is critical to success and we apparently don't have such a plan. Obviously all plans must change as events unfold. Good plans drive events and have branches for various outcomes. If you find yourself constantly reacting to events and changing your plan frequently it is probably wise to step back and reconsider your basic assumptions.
I do not agree with the "rosy" picture painted in the article regarding the results of making Russia part of a "free fire" zone for ATACMS. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATACMS at their disposal to prevent Russian military operations. Neither does (or did) the US. It is a tool Ukraine should be able to employ "appropriately" considering the limited stocks. A "free fire" zone is useful in that it imposes significant "costs" on Russia, even if the ATACMS is only used when Russia screws up and exposes a high value target. The situation in northern Ukraine is "different". Regular M30-M31 rockets can be used to good effect inside Russia. Ukraine has lots of those, and IMO there should never have been a restriction on using them.
I am also troubled about the apparently cavalier attitude the quoted sources have towards what Putin will or will not do. Once again, it is a capability vs intention situation. Many battles have been lost and many wars have been started based on a misunderstanding of your opponents intentions. Intentions are very difficult to ascertain because they involve what people think. Capabilities can, at least in theory, be objectively measured. In this case, we know Russia has a large stock of tactical nuclear weapons. They have the capability. While I agree that Putin almost certainly will not use them just because the US declares Russia a free fire zone for US weapons operated by Ukrainians, that isn't cast in stone. The US needs a contingency plan of what we will do if Putin uses one. Do we have that in place? I doubt it. The real danger of incrementally testing Russia resolve in Ukraine is that Russia's repeated forbearance will convince us that it will continue. A similar situation existed in 1939. The German NCA was convinced that since the Allies had accepted the Anschluss and caved in on Czechoslovakia they would do the same in Poland. The reaction in the German High Command was shock when Britain actually declared war. They literally said "Well, what do we do now?" knowing there really was no plan in existence. We don't want to be there.
Interesting timing on this article. As will become apparent when you read it I emphatically concur with some of its arguments, but certainly not all. I agree that US strategy must define the desired end state and have a feasible and credible plan to achieve this end state. This is critical to success and we apparently don't have such a plan. Obviously all plans must change as events unfold. Good plans drive events and have branches for various outcomes. If you find yourself constantly reacting to events and changing your plan frequently it is probably wise to step back and reconsider your basic assumptions.
I do not agree with the "rosy" picture painted in the article regarding the results of making Russia part of a "free fire" zone for ATACMS. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATACMS at their disposal to prevent Russian military operations. Neither does (or did) the US. It is a tool Ukraine should be able to employ "appropriately" considering the limited stocks. A "free fire" zone is useful in that it imposes significant "costs" on Russia, even if the ATACMS is only used when Russia screws up and exposes a high value target. The situation in northern Ukraine is "different". Regular M30-M31 rockets can be used to good effect inside Russia. Ukraine has lots of those, and IMO there should never have been a restriction on using them.
I am also troubled about the apparently cavalier attitude the quoted sources have towards what Putin will or will not do. Once again, it is a capability vs intention situation. Many battles have been lost and many wars have been started based on a misunderstanding of your opponents intentions. Intentions are very difficult to ascertain because they involve what people think. Capabilities can, at least in theory, be objectively measured. In this case, we know Russia has a large stock of tactical nuclear weapons. They have the capability. While I agree that Putin almost certainly will not use them just because the US declares Russia a free fire zone for US weapons operated by Ukrainians, that isn't cast in stone. The US needs a contingency plan of what we will do if Putin uses one. Do we have that in place? I doubt it. The real danger of incrementally testing Russia resolve in Ukraine is that Russia's repeated forbearance will convince us that it will continue. A similar situation existed in 1939. The German NCA was convinced that since the Allies had accepted the Anschluss and caved in on Czechoslovakia they would do the same in Poland. The reaction in the German High Command was shock when Britain actually declared war. They literally said "Well, what do we do now?" knowing there really was no plan in existence. We don't want to be there.
06-08-2024, 09:39 AM
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn00e422yr2o
I take from this that he acknowledges it would take a change in the doctrine, not just that he wakes up grumpy one day. I suspect he indicates that he will do some testing before long as part of his persona as a bully.
What is characterized by the reporter as a warning to Europe seems a little strange to me. His saying this should help support those who want more defense in Europe and to reduce any Russian support in Europe.
Quote:The Kremlin leader said he did not rule out changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine: the document which sets out the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons.
“This doctrine is a living tool and we are carefully watching what is happening in the world around us and do not exclude making changes to this doctrine. This is also related to the testing of nuclear weapons.”
And he delivered a warning to those European countries who’ve been supporting Ukraine: Russia’s has “many more [tactical nuclear weapons] than there are on the European continent, even if the United States brings theirs over.”
“Europe does not have a developed [early warning system],” he added. “In this sense they are more or less defenceless.”
I take from this that he acknowledges it would take a change in the doctrine, not just that he wakes up grumpy one day. I suspect he indicates that he will do some testing before long as part of his persona as a bully.
What is characterized by the reporter as a warning to Europe seems a little strange to me. His saying this should help support those who want more defense in Europe and to reduce any Russian support in Europe.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn00e422yr2o
I take from this that he acknowledges it would take a change in the doctrine, not just that he wakes up grumpy one day. I suspect he indicates that he will do some testing before long as part of his persona as a bully.
What is characterized by the reporter as a warning to Europe seems a little strange to me. His saying this should help support those who want more defense in Europe and to reduce any Russian support in Europe.
Quote:The Kremlin leader said he did not rule out changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine: the document which sets out the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons.
“This doctrine is a living tool and we are carefully watching what is happening in the world around us and do not exclude making changes to this doctrine. This is also related to the testing of nuclear weapons.”
And he delivered a warning to those European countries who’ve been supporting Ukraine: Russia’s has “many more [tactical nuclear weapons] than there are on the European continent, even if the United States brings theirs over.”
“Europe does not have a developed [early warning system],” he added. “In this sense they are more or less defenceless.”
I take from this that he acknowledges it would take a change in the doctrine, not just that he wakes up grumpy one day. I suspect he indicates that he will do some testing before long as part of his persona as a bully.
What is characterized by the reporter as a warning to Europe seems a little strange to me. His saying this should help support those who want more defense in Europe and to reduce any Russian support in Europe.
06-08-2024, 11:29 AM
(06-08-2024, 09:39 AM)M T Wrote: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn00e422yr2oMy interpretation is that he is reminding the world that he can change that doctrine if he wakes up grumpy in the morning :-). More explicitly, based on the statement by Mr. Solovyov the "red lines" exists and just because Russia didn't do anything about X or Y, do not assume Russia will not react if you do Z. If one wants to ascribe sanity to the Russian position, it could be described as "strategic ambiguity". Europe and the US may be deterred from doing all kinds of things because they are unsure of the Russian response. It works, at least to some extent. There is no question about that. The danger is that the ambiguity may result in a nuclear war by accident.
Quote:The Kremlin leader said he did not rule out changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine: the document which sets out the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons.
“This doctrine is a living tool and we are carefully watching what is happening in the world around us and do not exclude making changes to this doctrine. This is also related to the testing of nuclear weapons.”
And he delivered a warning to those European countries who’ve been supporting Ukraine: Russia’s has “many more [tactical nuclear weapons] than there are on the European continent, even if the United States brings theirs over.”
“Europe does not have a developed [early warning system],” he added. “In this sense they are more or less defenceless.”
I take from this that he acknowledges it would take a change in the doctrine, not just that he wakes up grumpy one day. I suspect he indicates that he will do some testing before long as part of his persona as a bully.
As Dr. Strangeglove pointed out, a doomsday machine is a deterrent only if the other side knows it exists. If the west is misled into doubting the Russian will, bad things can happen. OTOH the west can't be intimidated into giving all nations who have nuclear weapons a free pass to do whatever they want. Of course there is nothing new about that. It has been true since 1949.
To set Mr. Putin straight, while Europe doesn't have an "early warning system" of their own, the US certainly does and it is interfaced directly to both NATO and Europe. The problems with tactical nuclear weapon defense are 1) the "warning" period for tactical nuclear weapons is very short and 2) distinguishing tactical nuclear weapons from non-nuclear weapons is often impossible. The time of flight for a ground launched guided missile from Russia to places in in Europe can be very short. From Kaliningrad to Berlin or Warsaw is single digit minutes. However, anything launched from Kaliningrad is going to be considered a nuclear threat just on general principles. The moment it exits Russian airspace a Patriot will smack it (if everything works as it should). NATO also intercepts and escorts all Russian aircraft that enter the ADIZ (usually long before they do). Obviously this is a big task and things may "leak". This is one big reason that the elimination of short-range tactical nuclear systems was the very first order of business in the US-USSR arms limitation activities. They are inherently destabilizing weapons.
IMO it would be very wise for NATO to say something to the effect that "In light of Russian saber rattling and irresponsible threats to employ tactical nuclear weapons in Europe we must remind Russia that NATO's defensive posture requires us to respond promptly to any incursion by Russian forces into European airspace". It isn't a threat to nuke them, but it does point out their attempt may not succeed. That would be very bad for them and may function as a deterrent.
(06-08-2024, 09:39 AM)M T Wrote: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn00e422yr2oMy interpretation is that he is reminding the world that he can change that doctrine if he wakes up grumpy in the morning :-). More explicitly, based on the statement by Mr. Solovyov the "red lines" exists and just because Russia didn't do anything about X or Y, do not assume Russia will not react if you do Z. If one wants to ascribe sanity to the Russian position, it could be described as "strategic ambiguity". Europe and the US may be deterred from doing all kinds of things because they are unsure of the Russian response. It works, at least to some extent. There is no question about that. The danger is that the ambiguity may result in a nuclear war by accident.
Quote:The Kremlin leader said he did not rule out changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine: the document which sets out the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons.
“This doctrine is a living tool and we are carefully watching what is happening in the world around us and do not exclude making changes to this doctrine. This is also related to the testing of nuclear weapons.”
And he delivered a warning to those European countries who’ve been supporting Ukraine: Russia’s has “many more [tactical nuclear weapons] than there are on the European continent, even if the United States brings theirs over.”
“Europe does not have a developed [early warning system],” he added. “In this sense they are more or less defenceless.”
I take from this that he acknowledges it would take a change in the doctrine, not just that he wakes up grumpy one day. I suspect he indicates that he will do some testing before long as part of his persona as a bully.
As Dr. Strangeglove pointed out, a doomsday machine is a deterrent only if the other side knows it exists. If the west is misled into doubting the Russian will, bad things can happen. OTOH the west can't be intimidated into giving all nations who have nuclear weapons a free pass to do whatever they want. Of course there is nothing new about that. It has been true since 1949.
To set Mr. Putin straight, while Europe doesn't have an "early warning system" of their own, the US certainly does and it is interfaced directly to both NATO and Europe. The problems with tactical nuclear weapon defense are 1) the "warning" period for tactical nuclear weapons is very short and 2) distinguishing tactical nuclear weapons from non-nuclear weapons is often impossible. The time of flight for a ground launched guided missile from Russia to places in in Europe can be very short. From Kaliningrad to Berlin or Warsaw is single digit minutes. However, anything launched from Kaliningrad is going to be considered a nuclear threat just on general principles. The moment it exits Russian airspace a Patriot will smack it (if everything works as it should). NATO also intercepts and escorts all Russian aircraft that enter the ADIZ (usually long before they do). Obviously this is a big task and things may "leak". This is one big reason that the elimination of short-range tactical nuclear systems was the very first order of business in the US-USSR arms limitation activities. They are inherently destabilizing weapons.
IMO it would be very wise for NATO to say something to the effect that "In light of Russian saber rattling and irresponsible threats to employ tactical nuclear weapons in Europe we must remind Russia that NATO's defensive posture requires us to respond promptly to any incursion by Russian forces into European airspace". It isn't a threat to nuke them, but it does point out their attempt may not succeed. That would be very bad for them and may function as a deterrent.
06-08-2024, 03:08 PM
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWc2CTs8A8k
Interesting video. Of course, to me the most interesting fact is that the BTR had troops riding on the outside even though they were in what is at least nominally Ukrainian controlled territory. Bad habits die hard, as well as some of those that practice them it appears. Granted, they may not have fared very well if they were inside either, but at least they would have been shielded from small arms.
Here is another article on what appears to be the same incident. More detailed explanation.
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-m2-b...-skirmish/
Interesting video. Of course, to me the most interesting fact is that the BTR had troops riding on the outside even though they were in what is at least nominally Ukrainian controlled territory. Bad habits die hard, as well as some of those that practice them it appears. Granted, they may not have fared very well if they were inside either, but at least they would have been shielded from small arms.
Here is another article on what appears to be the same incident. More detailed explanation.
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-m2-b...-skirmish/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWc2CTs8A8k
Interesting video. Of course, to me the most interesting fact is that the BTR had troops riding on the outside even though they were in what is at least nominally Ukrainian controlled territory. Bad habits die hard, as well as some of those that practice them it appears. Granted, they may not have fared very well if they were inside either, but at least they would have been shielded from small arms.
Here is another article on what appears to be the same incident. More detailed explanation.
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-m2-b...-skirmish/
Interesting video. Of course, to me the most interesting fact is that the BTR had troops riding on the outside even though they were in what is at least nominally Ukrainian controlled territory. Bad habits die hard, as well as some of those that practice them it appears. Granted, they may not have fared very well if they were inside either, but at least they would have been shielded from small arms.
Here is another article on what appears to be the same incident. More detailed explanation.
https://mil.in.ua/en/news/ukrainian-m2-b...-skirmish/
06-09-2024, 10:07 AM
https://x.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1799813374676783118
Interviews with US Army folks involved in the training and deployment of Patriot for Ukraine. Lots of interesting details. Notably the A50 shootdown confirmed here as being from a Patriot "SAMbush".
Interviews with US Army folks involved in the training and deployment of Patriot for Ukraine. Lots of interesting details. Notably the A50 shootdown confirmed here as being from a Patriot "SAMbush".
https://x.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1799813374676783118
Interviews with US Army folks involved in the training and deployment of Patriot for Ukraine. Lots of interesting details. Notably the A50 shootdown confirmed here as being from a Patriot "SAMbush".
Interviews with US Army folks involved in the training and deployment of Patriot for Ukraine. Lots of interesting details. Notably the A50 shootdown confirmed here as being from a Patriot "SAMbush".
06-09-2024, 11:48 AM
(06-09-2024, 10:07 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: https://x.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1799813374676783118
Interviews with US Army folks involved in the training and deployment of Patriot for Ukraine. Lots of interesting details. Notably the A50 shootdown confirmed here as being from a Patriot "SAMbush".
Great post! This is one of the most informative posts ever on this thread coming from people who were involved. It is interesting in many ways. One of the most informative was the steps that were and are being taken to turn what is now an iADS into an IADS. The "layering" aspect is also interesting. The discussion does show that to build a comprehensive IADS takes lots of people and lots of equipment. You do need NASAMS or similar to relieve the Patriot of the necessity of defending itself against lower altitude air threats.
(06-09-2024, 10:07 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: https://x.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1799813374676783118
Interviews with US Army folks involved in the training and deployment of Patriot for Ukraine. Lots of interesting details. Notably the A50 shootdown confirmed here as being from a Patriot "SAMbush".
Great post! This is one of the most informative posts ever on this thread coming from people who were involved. It is interesting in many ways. One of the most informative was the steps that were and are being taken to turn what is now an iADS into an IADS. The "layering" aspect is also interesting. The discussion does show that to build a comprehensive IADS takes lots of people and lots of equipment. You do need NASAMS or similar to relieve the Patriot of the necessity of defending itself against lower altitude air threats.
06-10-2024, 04:40 PM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-su-...58629.html
Some new (to me at least) data on how some of the weapons are being utilized by Ukraine. Unfortunately some of the information does not directly address performance. “nearly 90 percent of dropped [Small Diameter Bombs] struck their target.” indicates the weapon is performing well overall. It unfortunately does not directly state that it is resisting the Russian GPS jamming. Of course, they may not actually know. The INS may have just worked well :-).
The statement regarding JDAMs is less powerful and less reassuring. "On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Joint Direct Attack Munition is restricted by the limited quantities of these weapons that are available to Ukraine". Does this mean it is working well now in the presence of jamming or not? Unknown. Ukraine is actively working on their own version. That may be because ours still doesn't work. Hopefully they have enough "dumb" bombs to make the effort worthwhile.
As far as HARMs go: "Golubtsov says that the AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile, or HARM, is still used “daily” but that Russian forces have adapted to its presence by turning off their air defense radars and/or changing their operating frequencies." This statement pretty much confirms the missiles are operating in pre-planned mode. Of course, if the radar shuts down it can't shoot you and is out of the fight. The "changing frequency" part is harder to interpret. Depends on exactly what he means. Also depends on which HARMs they have. Radars can change frequencies but only over a limited bandwidth. Lots of radars are pulse-to-pulse agile so they don't have a "frequency" a such. Every pulse is on a different frequency. Many radars also have significant "chirp" inside each pulse. HARMs can deal with all that, especially the newer ones.
It is also clear that Ukraine believes their F-16 force is going to be able to hold Russian air at risk. There are good reasons to believe he is correct. The "crawl, walk, run" discussion is also a bit reassuring. There appears to be a plan of how to exploit their F-16s when they get them. Of course, there is still the question of mass. The recent ALCM missile strikes into Russia says the Ukrainians aren't unreasonably risk averse :-).
Looking at the "kills" painted on the Patriot the number of low-performance drones and cruise missiles is disturbing. Good they were destroyed, bad it required a Patriot to do it. Hopefully the F-16s can clean up those "low slow" targets and leave the Patriots for "fast" targets. There were plenty of those painted on too.
One think the US could (and IMO should) do is make the Link-16 feed from any AWACS in the area available to Ukraine in real time. This will assist the Ukrainian ADS right now and will also assist the F-16s when they arrive. The Ukrainian Saab won't be there for a while, so starting with the crawl phase on Link-16 now would be a good idea. We may have already done this and not told anyone, but I doubt such a thing would remain secret very long. Obviously AWACS flying in NATO airspace can't see everything in Ukraine, but it can see a lot.
Some new (to me at least) data on how some of the weapons are being utilized by Ukraine. Unfortunately some of the information does not directly address performance. “nearly 90 percent of dropped [Small Diameter Bombs] struck their target.” indicates the weapon is performing well overall. It unfortunately does not directly state that it is resisting the Russian GPS jamming. Of course, they may not actually know. The INS may have just worked well :-).
The statement regarding JDAMs is less powerful and less reassuring. "On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Joint Direct Attack Munition is restricted by the limited quantities of these weapons that are available to Ukraine". Does this mean it is working well now in the presence of jamming or not? Unknown. Ukraine is actively working on their own version. That may be because ours still doesn't work. Hopefully they have enough "dumb" bombs to make the effort worthwhile.
As far as HARMs go: "Golubtsov says that the AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile, or HARM, is still used “daily” but that Russian forces have adapted to its presence by turning off their air defense radars and/or changing their operating frequencies." This statement pretty much confirms the missiles are operating in pre-planned mode. Of course, if the radar shuts down it can't shoot you and is out of the fight. The "changing frequency" part is harder to interpret. Depends on exactly what he means. Also depends on which HARMs they have. Radars can change frequencies but only over a limited bandwidth. Lots of radars are pulse-to-pulse agile so they don't have a "frequency" a such. Every pulse is on a different frequency. Many radars also have significant "chirp" inside each pulse. HARMs can deal with all that, especially the newer ones.
It is also clear that Ukraine believes their F-16 force is going to be able to hold Russian air at risk. There are good reasons to believe he is correct. The "crawl, walk, run" discussion is also a bit reassuring. There appears to be a plan of how to exploit their F-16s when they get them. Of course, there is still the question of mass. The recent ALCM missile strikes into Russia says the Ukrainians aren't unreasonably risk averse :-).
Looking at the "kills" painted on the Patriot the number of low-performance drones and cruise missiles is disturbing. Good they were destroyed, bad it required a Patriot to do it. Hopefully the F-16s can clean up those "low slow" targets and leave the Patriots for "fast" targets. There were plenty of those painted on too.
One think the US could (and IMO should) do is make the Link-16 feed from any AWACS in the area available to Ukraine in real time. This will assist the Ukrainian ADS right now and will also assist the F-16s when they arrive. The Ukrainian Saab won't be there for a while, so starting with the crawl phase on Link-16 now would be a good idea. We may have already done this and not told anyone, but I doubt such a thing would remain secret very long. Obviously AWACS flying in NATO airspace can't see everything in Ukraine, but it can see a lot.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-su-...58629.html
Some new (to me at least) data on how some of the weapons are being utilized by Ukraine. Unfortunately some of the information does not directly address performance. “nearly 90 percent of dropped [Small Diameter Bombs] struck their target.” indicates the weapon is performing well overall. It unfortunately does not directly state that it is resisting the Russian GPS jamming. Of course, they may not actually know. The INS may have just worked well :-).
The statement regarding JDAMs is less powerful and less reassuring. "On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Joint Direct Attack Munition is restricted by the limited quantities of these weapons that are available to Ukraine". Does this mean it is working well now in the presence of jamming or not? Unknown. Ukraine is actively working on their own version. That may be because ours still doesn't work. Hopefully they have enough "dumb" bombs to make the effort worthwhile.
As far as HARMs go: "Golubtsov says that the AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile, or HARM, is still used “daily” but that Russian forces have adapted to its presence by turning off their air defense radars and/or changing their operating frequencies." This statement pretty much confirms the missiles are operating in pre-planned mode. Of course, if the radar shuts down it can't shoot you and is out of the fight. The "changing frequency" part is harder to interpret. Depends on exactly what he means. Also depends on which HARMs they have. Radars can change frequencies but only over a limited bandwidth. Lots of radars are pulse-to-pulse agile so they don't have a "frequency" a such. Every pulse is on a different frequency. Many radars also have significant "chirp" inside each pulse. HARMs can deal with all that, especially the newer ones.
It is also clear that Ukraine believes their F-16 force is going to be able to hold Russian air at risk. There are good reasons to believe he is correct. The "crawl, walk, run" discussion is also a bit reassuring. There appears to be a plan of how to exploit their F-16s when they get them. Of course, there is still the question of mass. The recent ALCM missile strikes into Russia says the Ukrainians aren't unreasonably risk averse :-).
Looking at the "kills" painted on the Patriot the number of low-performance drones and cruise missiles is disturbing. Good they were destroyed, bad it required a Patriot to do it. Hopefully the F-16s can clean up those "low slow" targets and leave the Patriots for "fast" targets. There were plenty of those painted on too.
One think the US could (and IMO should) do is make the Link-16 feed from any AWACS in the area available to Ukraine in real time. This will assist the Ukrainian ADS right now and will also assist the F-16s when they arrive. The Ukrainian Saab won't be there for a while, so starting with the crawl phase on Link-16 now would be a good idea. We may have already done this and not told anyone, but I doubt such a thing would remain secret very long. Obviously AWACS flying in NATO airspace can't see everything in Ukraine, but it can see a lot.
Some new (to me at least) data on how some of the weapons are being utilized by Ukraine. Unfortunately some of the information does not directly address performance. “nearly 90 percent of dropped [Small Diameter Bombs] struck their target.” indicates the weapon is performing well overall. It unfortunately does not directly state that it is resisting the Russian GPS jamming. Of course, they may not actually know. The INS may have just worked well :-).
The statement regarding JDAMs is less powerful and less reassuring. "On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Joint Direct Attack Munition is restricted by the limited quantities of these weapons that are available to Ukraine". Does this mean it is working well now in the presence of jamming or not? Unknown. Ukraine is actively working on their own version. That may be because ours still doesn't work. Hopefully they have enough "dumb" bombs to make the effort worthwhile.
As far as HARMs go: "Golubtsov says that the AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile, or HARM, is still used “daily” but that Russian forces have adapted to its presence by turning off their air defense radars and/or changing their operating frequencies." This statement pretty much confirms the missiles are operating in pre-planned mode. Of course, if the radar shuts down it can't shoot you and is out of the fight. The "changing frequency" part is harder to interpret. Depends on exactly what he means. Also depends on which HARMs they have. Radars can change frequencies but only over a limited bandwidth. Lots of radars are pulse-to-pulse agile so they don't have a "frequency" a such. Every pulse is on a different frequency. Many radars also have significant "chirp" inside each pulse. HARMs can deal with all that, especially the newer ones.
It is also clear that Ukraine believes their F-16 force is going to be able to hold Russian air at risk. There are good reasons to believe he is correct. The "crawl, walk, run" discussion is also a bit reassuring. There appears to be a plan of how to exploit their F-16s when they get them. Of course, there is still the question of mass. The recent ALCM missile strikes into Russia says the Ukrainians aren't unreasonably risk averse :-).
Looking at the "kills" painted on the Patriot the number of low-performance drones and cruise missiles is disturbing. Good they were destroyed, bad it required a Patriot to do it. Hopefully the F-16s can clean up those "low slow" targets and leave the Patriots for "fast" targets. There were plenty of those painted on too.
One think the US could (and IMO should) do is make the Link-16 feed from any AWACS in the area available to Ukraine in real time. This will assist the Ukrainian ADS right now and will also assist the F-16s when they arrive. The Ukrainian Saab won't be there for a while, so starting with the crawl phase on Link-16 now would be a good idea. We may have already done this and not told anyone, but I doubt such a thing would remain secret very long. Obviously AWACS flying in NATO airspace can't see everything in Ukraine, but it can see a lot.
06-11-2024, 08:21 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-patrol...59186.html
Russia has finally come down to their last line of offense. A little over two years ago I posted the following:
https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid352444
Ukraine has broken the blockade by establishing a route that passes entirely through NATO nations territorial waters. This took some doing. The route didn't exist before the war and lots of cleanup was required to create it. This route isn't ideal but it is much better than nothing. It isn't a "fast" route and never will be. Commercially these are problems. All this has kind of dropped off the news cycle but it matters a lot to Ukraine. A reference to the current state of Ukrainian agriculture can be found here:
https://www.csis.org/analysis/setting-re...in-exports
Bottom line here is that Ukraine hasn't ever reached pre-war export levels. These export numbers in the last two years are additionally artificially inflated by grain that was stored previously because it couldn't be exported. Almost all of that backlog is now gone and Ukrainian exports are expected to drop to the currently sustainable levels, which for many reasons will be substantially even further below pre-war levels.
Russia can't attack ships in NATO waters for "political" reasons. They still can and do attack ships in Ukrainian ports. These attacks are more harassment than they are serious attempts to shut down the grain corridor. Even if the Russian Black Sea fleet was restored to its pre-war state that wouldn't change. Invisible lines in the water protect Ukrainian commerce in this area :-).
The Kalibr capable submarines still pose a threat to Ukraine because they can launch missiles from unexpected bearings and these missiles can have a short time of flight relative to those launched from Russia proper, especially against targets in south Ukraine. The short flight time makes these missiles difficult to destroy. As it turned out Ukraine didn't need NATO's help to attack Novorossiysk. They can do it themselves, if only occasionally. So far these attacks can also be classed as harassment. The six Kilo class submarines are down to four. Ukraine effectively destroyed one while it was in dry dock, but that was in Sevastopol. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...evastopol/ I think one other one is in a major refit and is also not operational. Of the four remaining, only three are upgraded to fire Kalibr.
The submarines still patrol the Black Sea. Ukraine can undoubtedly take them out by attacking them when they are leaving or re-entering port. Ukraine has suicide sea drones that can do it. However, IMO a better way would be to outfit a sea drone with a lightweight ASW torpedo like the MU-90 (a European model so the US won't be involved). The torpedo is much more likely to sink the submarine outright. It can also home on the submarine via active sonar so it is much more likely to hit it somewhere vital. It can also be fired from a significant distance away. This latter property is important because the drone may not detect the submarine visually. It can hear it (when it is on the surface) well before it can see it, particularly at night.
Russia has finally come down to their last line of offense. A little over two years ago I posted the following:
https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid352444
Ukraine has broken the blockade by establishing a route that passes entirely through NATO nations territorial waters. This took some doing. The route didn't exist before the war and lots of cleanup was required to create it. This route isn't ideal but it is much better than nothing. It isn't a "fast" route and never will be. Commercially these are problems. All this has kind of dropped off the news cycle but it matters a lot to Ukraine. A reference to the current state of Ukrainian agriculture can be found here:
https://www.csis.org/analysis/setting-re...in-exports
Bottom line here is that Ukraine hasn't ever reached pre-war export levels. These export numbers in the last two years are additionally artificially inflated by grain that was stored previously because it couldn't be exported. Almost all of that backlog is now gone and Ukrainian exports are expected to drop to the currently sustainable levels, which for many reasons will be substantially even further below pre-war levels.
Russia can't attack ships in NATO waters for "political" reasons. They still can and do attack ships in Ukrainian ports. These attacks are more harassment than they are serious attempts to shut down the grain corridor. Even if the Russian Black Sea fleet was restored to its pre-war state that wouldn't change. Invisible lines in the water protect Ukrainian commerce in this area :-).
The Kalibr capable submarines still pose a threat to Ukraine because they can launch missiles from unexpected bearings and these missiles can have a short time of flight relative to those launched from Russia proper, especially against targets in south Ukraine. The short flight time makes these missiles difficult to destroy. As it turned out Ukraine didn't need NATO's help to attack Novorossiysk. They can do it themselves, if only occasionally. So far these attacks can also be classed as harassment. The six Kilo class submarines are down to four. Ukraine effectively destroyed one while it was in dry dock, but that was in Sevastopol. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...evastopol/ I think one other one is in a major refit and is also not operational. Of the four remaining, only three are upgraded to fire Kalibr.
The submarines still patrol the Black Sea. Ukraine can undoubtedly take them out by attacking them when they are leaving or re-entering port. Ukraine has suicide sea drones that can do it. However, IMO a better way would be to outfit a sea drone with a lightweight ASW torpedo like the MU-90 (a European model so the US won't be involved). The torpedo is much more likely to sink the submarine outright. It can also home on the submarine via active sonar so it is much more likely to hit it somewhere vital. It can also be fired from a significant distance away. This latter property is important because the drone may not detect the submarine visually. It can hear it (when it is on the surface) well before it can see it, particularly at night.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-patrol...59186.html
Russia has finally come down to their last line of offense. A little over two years ago I posted the following:
https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid352444
Ukraine has broken the blockade by establishing a route that passes entirely through NATO nations territorial waters. This took some doing. The route didn't exist before the war and lots of cleanup was required to create it. This route isn't ideal but it is much better than nothing. It isn't a "fast" route and never will be. Commercially these are problems. All this has kind of dropped off the news cycle but it matters a lot to Ukraine. A reference to the current state of Ukrainian agriculture can be found here:
https://www.csis.org/analysis/setting-re...in-exports
Bottom line here is that Ukraine hasn't ever reached pre-war export levels. These export numbers in the last two years are additionally artificially inflated by grain that was stored previously because it couldn't be exported. Almost all of that backlog is now gone and Ukrainian exports are expected to drop to the currently sustainable levels, which for many reasons will be substantially even further below pre-war levels.
Russia can't attack ships in NATO waters for "political" reasons. They still can and do attack ships in Ukrainian ports. These attacks are more harassment than they are serious attempts to shut down the grain corridor. Even if the Russian Black Sea fleet was restored to its pre-war state that wouldn't change. Invisible lines in the water protect Ukrainian commerce in this area :-).
The Kalibr capable submarines still pose a threat to Ukraine because they can launch missiles from unexpected bearings and these missiles can have a short time of flight relative to those launched from Russia proper, especially against targets in south Ukraine. The short flight time makes these missiles difficult to destroy. As it turned out Ukraine didn't need NATO's help to attack Novorossiysk. They can do it themselves, if only occasionally. So far these attacks can also be classed as harassment. The six Kilo class submarines are down to four. Ukraine effectively destroyed one while it was in dry dock, but that was in Sevastopol. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...evastopol/ I think one other one is in a major refit and is also not operational. Of the four remaining, only three are upgraded to fire Kalibr.
The submarines still patrol the Black Sea. Ukraine can undoubtedly take them out by attacking them when they are leaving or re-entering port. Ukraine has suicide sea drones that can do it. However, IMO a better way would be to outfit a sea drone with a lightweight ASW torpedo like the MU-90 (a European model so the US won't be involved). The torpedo is much more likely to sink the submarine outright. It can also home on the submarine via active sonar so it is much more likely to hit it somewhere vital. It can also be fired from a significant distance away. This latter property is important because the drone may not detect the submarine visually. It can hear it (when it is on the surface) well before it can see it, particularly at night.
Russia has finally come down to their last line of offense. A little over two years ago I posted the following:
https://thecardboard.org/board/showthrea...#pid352444
Ukraine has broken the blockade by establishing a route that passes entirely through NATO nations territorial waters. This took some doing. The route didn't exist before the war and lots of cleanup was required to create it. This route isn't ideal but it is much better than nothing. It isn't a "fast" route and never will be. Commercially these are problems. All this has kind of dropped off the news cycle but it matters a lot to Ukraine. A reference to the current state of Ukrainian agriculture can be found here:
https://www.csis.org/analysis/setting-re...in-exports
Bottom line here is that Ukraine hasn't ever reached pre-war export levels. These export numbers in the last two years are additionally artificially inflated by grain that was stored previously because it couldn't be exported. Almost all of that backlog is now gone and Ukrainian exports are expected to drop to the currently sustainable levels, which for many reasons will be substantially even further below pre-war levels.
Russia can't attack ships in NATO waters for "political" reasons. They still can and do attack ships in Ukrainian ports. These attacks are more harassment than they are serious attempts to shut down the grain corridor. Even if the Russian Black Sea fleet was restored to its pre-war state that wouldn't change. Invisible lines in the water protect Ukrainian commerce in this area :-).
The Kalibr capable submarines still pose a threat to Ukraine because they can launch missiles from unexpected bearings and these missiles can have a short time of flight relative to those launched from Russia proper, especially against targets in south Ukraine. The short flight time makes these missiles difficult to destroy. As it turned out Ukraine didn't need NATO's help to attack Novorossiysk. They can do it themselves, if only occasionally. So far these attacks can also be classed as harassment. The six Kilo class submarines are down to four. Ukraine effectively destroyed one while it was in dry dock, but that was in Sevastopol. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...evastopol/ I think one other one is in a major refit and is also not operational. Of the four remaining, only three are upgraded to fire Kalibr.
The submarines still patrol the Black Sea. Ukraine can undoubtedly take them out by attacking them when they are leaving or re-entering port. Ukraine has suicide sea drones that can do it. However, IMO a better way would be to outfit a sea drone with a lightweight ASW torpedo like the MU-90 (a European model so the US won't be involved). The torpedo is much more likely to sink the submarine outright. It can also home on the submarine via active sonar so it is much more likely to hit it somewhere vital. It can also be fired from a significant distance away. This latter property is important because the drone may not detect the submarine visually. It can hear it (when it is on the surface) well before it can see it, particularly at night.
06-11-2024, 11:27 AM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-had-go...50011.html
Interesting article. IMO the number one goal of the Kharkiv offensive was to force Ukraine to move significant assets to meet the new attack. It has in large measure accomplished that, as the article states. In addition, Russia has traditionally used an "attack everywhere and reinforce success" approach to war. This was one such attempt. The fact Russia is now opening a new line of advance by attacking at a point 100 miles away is indicative of this still being the case. This approach stretches Ukraine which is an area where Ukraine is vulnerable.
The article also indicates that the situation in Ukraine caused a change in US policy. In so far as this is the case it is IMO unsettling. Russia was inevitably going to eventually attempt to take advantage of the areas where Ukraine had no strategic depth due to the proximity of the Russian border. We should have long ago established contingency plans regarding what would be our response. The enemy can surprise you and do something you couldn't reasonably anticipate. This was not one of those times.
Interesting article. IMO the number one goal of the Kharkiv offensive was to force Ukraine to move significant assets to meet the new attack. It has in large measure accomplished that, as the article states. In addition, Russia has traditionally used an "attack everywhere and reinforce success" approach to war. This was one such attempt. The fact Russia is now opening a new line of advance by attacking at a point 100 miles away is indicative of this still being the case. This approach stretches Ukraine which is an area where Ukraine is vulnerable.
The article also indicates that the situation in Ukraine caused a change in US policy. In so far as this is the case it is IMO unsettling. Russia was inevitably going to eventually attempt to take advantage of the areas where Ukraine had no strategic depth due to the proximity of the Russian border. We should have long ago established contingency plans regarding what would be our response. The enemy can surprise you and do something you couldn't reasonably anticipate. This was not one of those times.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-had-go...50011.html
Interesting article. IMO the number one goal of the Kharkiv offensive was to force Ukraine to move significant assets to meet the new attack. It has in large measure accomplished that, as the article states. In addition, Russia has traditionally used an "attack everywhere and reinforce success" approach to war. This was one such attempt. The fact Russia is now opening a new line of advance by attacking at a point 100 miles away is indicative of this still being the case. This approach stretches Ukraine which is an area where Ukraine is vulnerable.
The article also indicates that the situation in Ukraine caused a change in US policy. In so far as this is the case it is IMO unsettling. Russia was inevitably going to eventually attempt to take advantage of the areas where Ukraine had no strategic depth due to the proximity of the Russian border. We should have long ago established contingency plans regarding what would be our response. The enemy can surprise you and do something you couldn't reasonably anticipate. This was not one of those times.
Interesting article. IMO the number one goal of the Kharkiv offensive was to force Ukraine to move significant assets to meet the new attack. It has in large measure accomplished that, as the article states. In addition, Russia has traditionally used an "attack everywhere and reinforce success" approach to war. This was one such attempt. The fact Russia is now opening a new line of advance by attacking at a point 100 miles away is indicative of this still being the case. This approach stretches Ukraine which is an area where Ukraine is vulnerable.
The article also indicates that the situation in Ukraine caused a change in US policy. In so far as this is the case it is IMO unsettling. Russia was inevitably going to eventually attempt to take advantage of the areas where Ukraine had no strategic depth due to the proximity of the Russian border. We should have long ago established contingency plans regarding what would be our response. The enemy can surprise you and do something you couldn't reasonably anticipate. This was not one of those times.
06-11-2024, 03:52 PM
The Biden Administration long ago made clear that its goal is to help Ukraine "avoid defeat," while minimizing the risk of head-to-head confrontation with Russia or other unacceptable types of escalation. This strategy constantly manifests itself in the day-to-day developments. Examples of this include the timing of providing packages of lethal military aid, the timing of expanding the scope of donated weapons systems, the timing of altering the artificial rules of engagement that the West imposes, etc. That strategy has some obvious downsides. Since this is a sports board first, I'll refer to the maxim that no one should ever play "not to lose" because that's a way to ensure defeat. Nevertheless, whether or not we like the Administration's strategy, we should not be surprised by it anymore. I remain hopeful that the strategy, though imperfect, will precipitate some sort of negotiated resolution that will allow Ukraine to continue to exist as an independent nation in the long term. I understand that others here disagree with my premise that such a resolution is possible.
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
The Biden Administration long ago made clear that its goal is to help Ukraine "avoid defeat," while minimizing the risk of head-to-head confrontation with Russia or other unacceptable types of escalation. This strategy constantly manifests itself in the day-to-day developments. Examples of this include the timing of providing packages of lethal military aid, the timing of expanding the scope of donated weapons systems, the timing of altering the artificial rules of engagement that the West imposes, etc. That strategy has some obvious downsides. Since this is a sports board first, I'll refer to the maxim that no one should ever play "not to lose" because that's a way to ensure defeat. Nevertheless, whether or not we like the Administration's strategy, we should not be surprised by it anymore. I remain hopeful that the strategy, though imperfect, will precipitate some sort of negotiated resolution that will allow Ukraine to continue to exist as an independent nation in the long term. I understand that others here disagree with my premise that such a resolution is possible.
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
06-12-2024, 03:36 PM
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...bat-video/
Don't always get the story on some of the interesting videos from the war.
This article interviews the Bradley driver from the 1v1 Bradley versus BTR encounter from a few days ago.
He states the Bradley was hit in its "targeting system", which explains why the Bradley stopped firing.
Don't always get the story on some of the interesting videos from the war.
This article interviews the Bradley driver from the 1v1 Bradley versus BTR encounter from a few days ago.
He states the Bradley was hit in its "targeting system", which explains why the Bradley stopped firing.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...bat-video/
Don't always get the story on some of the interesting videos from the war.
This article interviews the Bradley driver from the 1v1 Bradley versus BTR encounter from a few days ago.
He states the Bradley was hit in its "targeting system", which explains why the Bradley stopped firing.
Don't always get the story on some of the interesting videos from the war.
This article interviews the Bradley driver from the 1v1 Bradley versus BTR encounter from a few days ago.
He states the Bradley was hit in its "targeting system", which explains why the Bradley stopped firing.
(06-12-2024, 03:36 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...bat-video/Pretty sure you meant "why the BTR stopped firing". Good article, and I think the video is "better". It does stop a bit sooner than the one on X did and we don't see the BTR go into the weeds. It is unfortunate that Ukraine has to use the Bradley for so many roles that it was not designed for. The fact Ukraine has done so well is a tribute to their ingenuity, competence, and courage. It also says something about their opponents.
Don't always get the story on some of the interesting videos from the war.
This article interviews the Bradley driver from the 1v1 Bradley versus BTR encounter from a few days ago.
He states the Bradley was hit in its "targeting system", which explains why the Bradley stopped firing.
(06-12-2024, 03:36 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-...bat-video/Pretty sure you meant "why the BTR stopped firing". Good article, and I think the video is "better". It does stop a bit sooner than the one on X did and we don't see the BTR go into the weeds. It is unfortunate that Ukraine has to use the Bradley for so many roles that it was not designed for. The fact Ukraine has done so well is a tribute to their ingenuity, competence, and courage. It also says something about their opponents.
Don't always get the story on some of the interesting videos from the war.
This article interviews the Bradley driver from the 1v1 Bradley versus BTR encounter from a few days ago.
He states the Bradley was hit in its "targeting system", which explains why the Bradley stopped firing.
06-12-2024, 06:09 PM
No, I meant Bradley. There was lots of talk on twitter about the strangeness of the engagement when it first came out, like why the Bradley charged right at him rather than continuing to hit him from a distance, and why the Bradley's turret didn't turn to continue to engage as it drove past. People theorized that perhaps that the BTR scored a hit on the optics or some other system. This account from the driver explains it.
The BTR was quite fortunate to come off as well as it did, as it's much more lightly armored than the Bradley, though similarly armed. Their gunner must have been pretty lucky or good to get such a disabling shot. Saved at least few lives of his dismounts by preventing the Bradley from continuing to hammer it.
The BTR was quite fortunate to come off as well as it did, as it's much more lightly armored than the Bradley, though similarly armed. Their gunner must have been pretty lucky or good to get such a disabling shot. Saved at least few lives of his dismounts by preventing the Bradley from continuing to hammer it.
Quote:The Russians emerged from the trees, and for a few chaotic seconds, the two vehicles barreled toward each other while firing their heavy guns — as if they were jousting. A soldier fell from the speeding Russian vehicle. Viktor’s took a catastrophic hit to its targeting system, disabling the main weapon.
“Ram him,” Viktor recalled instructing his driver.
No, I meant Bradley. There was lots of talk on twitter about the strangeness of the engagement when it first came out, like why the Bradley charged right at him rather than continuing to hit him from a distance, and why the Bradley's turret didn't turn to continue to engage as it drove past. People theorized that perhaps that the BTR scored a hit on the optics or some other system. This account from the driver explains it.
The BTR was quite fortunate to come off as well as it did, as it's much more lightly armored than the Bradley, though similarly armed. Their gunner must have been pretty lucky or good to get such a disabling shot. Saved at least few lives of his dismounts by preventing the Bradley from continuing to hammer it.
The BTR was quite fortunate to come off as well as it did, as it's much more lightly armored than the Bradley, though similarly armed. Their gunner must have been pretty lucky or good to get such a disabling shot. Saved at least few lives of his dismounts by preventing the Bradley from continuing to hammer it.
Quote:The Russians emerged from the trees, and for a few chaotic seconds, the two vehicles barreled toward each other while firing their heavy guns — as if they were jousting. A soldier fell from the speeding Russian vehicle. Viktor’s took a catastrophic hit to its targeting system, disabling the main weapon.
“Ram him,” Viktor recalled instructing his driver.
(06-12-2024, 06:09 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: No, I meant Bradley. There was lots of talk on twitter about the strangeness of the engagement when it first came out, like why the Bradley charged right at him rather than continuing to hit him from a distance, and why the Bradley's turret didn't turn to continue to engage as it drove past. People theorized that perhaps that the BTR scored a hit on the optics or some other system. This account from the driver explains it.Thanks for pointing that out. I had that backwards for some reason. Indeed makes much more sense now. I am voting for lucky, although as we saw in the "Bradley vs. Tank" videos a large quantity of fire can cure a multitude of ills :-). You will eventually hit something "important".
The BTR was quite fortunate to come off as well as it did, as it's much more lightly armored than the Bradley, though similarly armed. Their gunner must have been pretty lucky or good to get such a disabling shot. Saved at least few lives of his dismounts by preventing the Bradley from continuing to hammer it.
Quote:The Russians emerged from the trees, and for a few chaotic seconds, the two vehicles barreled toward each other while firing their heavy guns — as if they were jousting. A soldier fell from the speeding Russian vehicle. Viktor’s took a catastrophic hit to its targeting system, disabling the main weapon.
“Ram him,” Viktor recalled instructing his driver.
(06-12-2024, 06:09 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: No, I meant Bradley. There was lots of talk on twitter about the strangeness of the engagement when it first came out, like why the Bradley charged right at him rather than continuing to hit him from a distance, and why the Bradley's turret didn't turn to continue to engage as it drove past. People theorized that perhaps that the BTR scored a hit on the optics or some other system. This account from the driver explains it.Thanks for pointing that out. I had that backwards for some reason. Indeed makes much more sense now. I am voting for lucky, although as we saw in the "Bradley vs. Tank" videos a large quantity of fire can cure a multitude of ills :-). You will eventually hit something "important".
The BTR was quite fortunate to come off as well as it did, as it's much more lightly armored than the Bradley, though similarly armed. Their gunner must have been pretty lucky or good to get such a disabling shot. Saved at least few lives of his dismounts by preventing the Bradley from continuing to hammer it.
Quote:The Russians emerged from the trees, and for a few chaotic seconds, the two vehicles barreled toward each other while firing their heavy guns — as if they were jousting. A soldier fell from the speeding Russian vehicle. Viktor’s took a catastrophic hit to its targeting system, disabling the main weapon.
“Ram him,” Viktor recalled instructing his driver.
06-13-2024, 01:09 AM
Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.
Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.
(06-13-2024, 01:09 AM)GK3 Wrote: Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?The fact that Ukraine has used ATACMS to destroy "several" S-400 and S-300 batteries is well enough documented that IMO it can be taken as a fact. The quantity and location is also very probably accurate. From there, things go downhill pretty fast. The Ukrainians claim the S-400s (and whatever may have been supposed to protect them) did not destroy a single ATACMS. If this is true, it could be immensely significant. We have no independent confirmation of this.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.
There are multiple possible causes of the failure. IF the S-400 was operating "normally" and IF the crew was of "typical" skill and were unable to destroy any of the inbound missiles it points to design deficiencies in the S-400. Russia may or may not be able to correct these deficiencies quickly. If they can't, the implications are obvious and the ability of F-16s to operate inside Crimea (or inside Russia for that matter) is greatly enhanced. The S-400s can be destroyed by ATACMS and the F-16s can utilize that gap to get inside the defended area without loss. A "big deal" if true.
It is also possible these batteries were not yet operational. Why Russia would deploy and thereby expose a battery that wasn't operational yet is anybodies guess. Maybe the date on the orders was wrong.
It also may be that the battery was operational but concentrating against low angle cruise missile targets/drones and wanted high duty cycle on these low altitude targets. The S-400 was therefore not maintaining surveillance at all altitudes. It is possible it literally didn't "see" the incoming. It is important to remember that the S-400 is designed to be used as part of an IADS where long-range acquisition radars detect the targets and designate them for individual batteries. It isn't being used that way in Ukraine. Each battery is acquiring its own targets. That undoubtedly degrades the effectiveness of the S-400 considerably. The SOPs may need to change.
It is also possible the crews were just not well trained. It may be they were sent to a "quiet" sector to work up and get ready for a move to the "real war" in a couple of months. If so, it didn't work out so well.
According to Newsweek on Sept 21, 2023 Russia had (on paper at least) 96 S-400 systems. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-s400-air...ne-1828058. The article said "Russia's S-400 Air Defense Systems Are Being Cut to Shreds". Those "shreds" still loom pretty large 9 months later. https://www.newsweek.com/how-many-s-400-...ia-1904353. Russia is supposedly down to 56 systems. Nobody (that is talking) really knows.
In reality neither Russia nor Ukraine has ever had an "impenetrable" air defense system precluding the operation of fixed wing aircraft in each other's airspace, particularly at low altitudes. Even if all 56 remaining Russian S-400s were committed to the fight that would be the case. What has been true is that the probability of running into an unexpectedly located SAM is high enough that neither side was willing to chance it. Attrition would be way too high. Once your pilots are dead you have no air force. Neither side has or has ever had a doctrine that their air force kills SAMs. ATACMS helps a lot (the USAF HATES it :-), but the reality is that to survive in a contested environment an air force needs a DEAD plan. SAM systems are vulnerable to attrition too and they don't move nearly as fast or as often as aircraft. They also don't work without radars that are just screaming "hit me". Hopefully the training the F-16 pilots are receiving includes that part of the syllabus.
Russia was fully aware that an IADS that depended entirely on SAM missiles wouldn't work. Geography and the radar horizon dictates this. They poured massive resources and skilled people into making the PVO an effective (arguably in the 1970s the most effective) part of their IADS. Russia developed the GCI to an art form. They can't afford to do that anymore and folded the PVO into the regular air force. What remains is vulnerable, but you have to make a plan to attack it.
The USAF uses stealth to perform the initial attack and it is, dare I say it, a "no brainer" on how we do it. It works. The subsequent air strikes use HARMs to clean up anything that survived somehow. It isn't efficient, but there are so many HARMs flying around nobody is turning on their radars. Ukraine isn't getting any F-35s (or even F-117s). Ukraine is going to have to do it the "old fashioned way". The good news is that there is no PVO to get in the way. The bad news is that the S-400 is a "challenge". Ukraine has ATACMS. That can help a lot, especially if the S-400 can't defend itself against them at all.
(06-13-2024, 01:09 AM)GK3 Wrote: Does anyone know if this article is at least reasonabley factual?The fact that Ukraine has used ATACMS to destroy "several" S-400 and S-300 batteries is well enough documented that IMO it can be taken as a fact. The quantity and location is also very probably accurate. From there, things go downhill pretty fast. The Ukrainians claim the S-400s (and whatever may have been supposed to protect them) did not destroy a single ATACMS. If this is true, it could be immensely significant. We have no independent confirmation of this.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...to-crimea/
If true, Russia's ability to defend Crimea from air attacks maybe become limited. The Ukrainians are seemingly becoming very good at taking out the S400. If Russia can't keep their S400 batteries up and functiioning, the F16s may have increased lattitude in terms of what they can do.
There are multiple possible causes of the failure. IF the S-400 was operating "normally" and IF the crew was of "typical" skill and were unable to destroy any of the inbound missiles it points to design deficiencies in the S-400. Russia may or may not be able to correct these deficiencies quickly. If they can't, the implications are obvious and the ability of F-16s to operate inside Crimea (or inside Russia for that matter) is greatly enhanced. The S-400s can be destroyed by ATACMS and the F-16s can utilize that gap to get inside the defended area without loss. A "big deal" if true.
It is also possible these batteries were not yet operational. Why Russia would deploy and thereby expose a battery that wasn't operational yet is anybodies guess. Maybe the date on the orders was wrong.
It also may be that the battery was operational but concentrating against low angle cruise missile targets/drones and wanted high duty cycle on these low altitude targets. The S-400 was therefore not maintaining surveillance at all altitudes. It is possible it literally didn't "see" the incoming. It is important to remember that the S-400 is designed to be used as part of an IADS where long-range acquisition radars detect the targets and designate them for individual batteries. It isn't being used that way in Ukraine. Each battery is acquiring its own targets. That undoubtedly degrades the effectiveness of the S-400 considerably. The SOPs may need to change.
It is also possible the crews were just not well trained. It may be they were sent to a "quiet" sector to work up and get ready for a move to the "real war" in a couple of months. If so, it didn't work out so well.
According to Newsweek on Sept 21, 2023 Russia had (on paper at least) 96 S-400 systems. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-s400-air...ne-1828058. The article said "Russia's S-400 Air Defense Systems Are Being Cut to Shreds". Those "shreds" still loom pretty large 9 months later. https://www.newsweek.com/how-many-s-400-...ia-1904353. Russia is supposedly down to 56 systems. Nobody (that is talking) really knows.
In reality neither Russia nor Ukraine has ever had an "impenetrable" air defense system precluding the operation of fixed wing aircraft in each other's airspace, particularly at low altitudes. Even if all 56 remaining Russian S-400s were committed to the fight that would be the case. What has been true is that the probability of running into an unexpectedly located SAM is high enough that neither side was willing to chance it. Attrition would be way too high. Once your pilots are dead you have no air force. Neither side has or has ever had a doctrine that their air force kills SAMs. ATACMS helps a lot (the USAF HATES it :-), but the reality is that to survive in a contested environment an air force needs a DEAD plan. SAM systems are vulnerable to attrition too and they don't move nearly as fast or as often as aircraft. They also don't work without radars that are just screaming "hit me". Hopefully the training the F-16 pilots are receiving includes that part of the syllabus.
Russia was fully aware that an IADS that depended entirely on SAM missiles wouldn't work. Geography and the radar horizon dictates this. They poured massive resources and skilled people into making the PVO an effective (arguably in the 1970s the most effective) part of their IADS. Russia developed the GCI to an art form. They can't afford to do that anymore and folded the PVO into the regular air force. What remains is vulnerable, but you have to make a plan to attack it.
The USAF uses stealth to perform the initial attack and it is, dare I say it, a "no brainer" on how we do it. It works. The subsequent air strikes use HARMs to clean up anything that survived somehow. It isn't efficient, but there are so many HARMs flying around nobody is turning on their radars. Ukraine isn't getting any F-35s (or even F-117s). Ukraine is going to have to do it the "old fashioned way". The good news is that there is no PVO to get in the way. The bad news is that the S-400 is a "challenge". Ukraine has ATACMS. That can help a lot, especially if the S-400 can't defend itself against them at all.
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