[Goose]

The newer Russian offensive near Kharkiv has petered out and Ukraine has made some limited gains in counter attacks.

Russia has made very small advances near Chasiv Yar in the east but overall the last few weeks have been pretty stable, though Russia has still been trying small piecemeal assaults.

This high ground is critical to Ukraine's defense. Bakhumt was politically important because both Ukraine and Russia decided it was. Chasiv Yar is a different category. It is good that Russia have been held to almost a standstill there, but the pressure is still on. Ukraine needs a way to relieve the pressure. Russia can afford to be driven back. They would just need to try again. Ukraine does not have that luxury. Losing this high ground would expose their entire line of defense to continuously observed artillery fire. It would also give Russia a good jumping-off point for attacks into the rest of Donbas. It is tactically imperative that Ukraine keeps Russia off of Chasiv Yar. Let's hope they can.

[Goose]

The newer Russian offensive near Kharkiv has petered out and Ukraine has made some limited gains in counter attacks.

Russia has made very small advances near Chasiv Yar in the east but overall the last few weeks have been pretty stable, though Russia has still been trying small piecemeal assaults.

This high ground is critical to Ukraine's defense. Bakhumt was politically important because both Ukraine and Russia decided it was. Chasiv Yar is a different category. It is good that Russia have been held to almost a standstill there, but the pressure is still on. Ukraine needs a way to relieve the pressure. Russia can afford to be driven back. They would just need to try again. Ukraine does not have that luxury. Losing this high ground would expose their entire line of defense to continuously observed artillery fire. It would also give Russia a good jumping-off point for attacks into the rest of Donbas. It is tactically imperative that Ukraine keeps Russia off of Chasiv Yar. Let's hope they can.

[TrumpCard]

Does it seem likely that the battle for Chasiv Yar will follow a path similar to the battle for Bakhmut?  I recall Russia kept attacking in the face of enormous troop and equipment losses and some of the commentators criticized that strategy as futile.  But ultimately, Russia was able to take the town by making progress in tiny increments over a period of many months.  I wonder whether the Ukraine's current position on the high ground, combined with the new firepower from NATO, will help Ukraine achieve a different outcome in Chasiv Yar.

[TrumpCard]

Does it seem likely that the battle for Chasiv Yar will follow a path similar to the battle for Bakhmut?  I recall Russia kept attacking in the face of enormous troop and equipment losses and some of the commentators criticized that strategy as futile.  But ultimately, Russia was able to take the town by making progress in tiny increments over a period of many months.  I wonder whether the Ukraine's current position on the high ground, combined with the new firepower from NATO, will help Ukraine achieve a different outcome in Chasiv Yar.

[Goose]

Does it seem likely that the battle for Chasiv Yar will follow a path similar to the battle for Bakhmut?  I recall Russia kept attacking in the face of enormous troop and equipment losses and some of the commentators criticized that strategy as futile.  But ultimately, Russia was able to take the town by making progress in tiny increments over a period of many months.  I wonder whether the Ukraine's current position on the high ground, combined with the new firepower from NATO, will help Ukraine achieve a different outcome in Chasiv Yar.

Good question! IMO Russia did something very smart in the north-east. I don't think the "world" at large yet realizes how brilliant it was. These days with all the drone reconnaissance it is impossible achieve surprise  in an operation the size of the one Russia executed in the Kharkiv area. Ukraine had plenty of warning. They knew Russia appeared to be massing for an attack and what size it could be. Ukraine also knew that they couldn't use "western" weapons to disrupt those preparations inside Russia. Ukraine also knew they were critically short of artillery ammunition.

I would have liked to have been a fly on the wall while the Ukrainian NCA pondered this information. One approach would have been to transfer sufficient troops from the fighting in the "middle Donbas front" to defeat the prospective Russian advance in the north. That was problematic because 1) Ukrainian troops are still not very mobile 2) The situation on the other front was "serious" and the troops really couldn't be spared and (arguably most importantly) 3) Russia didn't actually have to do anything around Kharkiv. If Ukraine acted to meet the threat, Russia had already "won" and lost no troops doing it. In the event Ukraine forced Russia to actually execute the attack and as a result Ukraine lost some valuable territory. Ukraine also had to pull troops from the "other" front to stop the attack. The corresponding "good" effects are 1) Russia suffered disproportionate casualties and 2) The Russian units involved are now fixed in place to hold what they gained. They can't leave or Ukraine will take it all back.

So what does this have to do with Chasiv Yar? Ukraine is attempting to compensate for their lack of numbers (relative to Russia) by using (hopefully) superior firepower. This can cost Russia massive casualties. It can also temporarily slow Russia to a crawl (or slower) around Chasiv Yar. NATO would do the same, except NATO would use its air power to isolate the battlefield and to literally destroy the crawling Russian advance. Ukraine can't do this, or anything close. NATO would also rely on having striking forces in reserve that could counter-attack elsewhere, thereby doing to Russia what Russia did to Ukraine in the north-east. Ukraine unfortunately lacks any reserves at this point. Everything is committed. They can't even threaten a significant attack elsewhere (like in the south) to force Russia to change focus from Chasiv Yar. If Russia is willing to accept the massive casualties over the long time it will take to "crawl" into Chasiv Yar, IMO Ukraine doesn't presently have the firepower to stop them. It could take six months or more, but if nothing else changes Chasiv Yar will fall eventually.

There are some things being done to change the equation. Ukraine's new draft laws will have an effect and will possibly free up enough troops to allow a counter-attack elsewhere that Russia simply cannot ignore. How long this will take is anybodies guess. It is a race. All else remaining the same, if Ukraine can't generate enough offensive combat power to force Russia to divert forces elsewhere, Ukraine loses the war. It is just a question of time.

Another thing being attempted is the regeneration of the Ukrainian air force. Russia can't crawl forward if they can't supply their troops in the Chasiv Yar area. The Ukrainian air force can hopefully make that happen, eventually. Ukraine can't obtain enough ATACMS (or similar) to do an equivalent thing. They don't exist. F-16s can carry 4 MK-84 2000 lb bombs. An ATACMS warhead weighs 472 lbs. Obviously not "apples-to-apples" but it gives a perspective. The F-16 can also do this several times a day and never have to overfly the FEBA. JDAMs will go plenty far enough to mess up the Russian posits. Will Ukraine achieve enough capability to do this, and if so when? Will Chasiv Yar be in Ukrainian hands at that point?

Ukraine is also utilizing long range drone attacks to damage Russian civilian infrastructure (particularly oil refining and storage) and to hamper VKS operations against Ukrainian ground troops. These efforts are important and to some degree effective. The effect on the VKS could become a serious problem for Russia. They have just within the last nine months or so figured out how to meaningfully participate in this war. Ukraine admits they have become a significant problem. Unfortunately these long range attacks are neither frequent enough nor powerful enough to force Russia or the VKS out of the war. They are a "problem" but endurable.

IMO the real question is whether Russia has another force available to open yet another "significant" attack on Ukraine, perhaps in the south. If they do, Ukraine is IMO toast. They just don't have the bodies. In four or more months, they may, but right now they don't. Most "foreign" intelligence agencies don't think Russia has the wherewithal to do it, at least this summer. Let's hope they are right. From this point of view, Ukraine probably hopes Russia keeps banging away at Chasiv Yar. OTOH, the Russians aren't stupid. They know the situation quite well. I bet there is LOTS of internal pressure to stretch Ukraine even thinner and break through someplace NOW, before Ukraine's "new" troops show up.

Of course, there could be internal problems either in the Russian military or society of which we are unaware. Maybe the massive casualties will finally become "just too much". Not prudent to count on this though.

[Goose]

Does it seem likely that the battle for Chasiv Yar will follow a path similar to the battle for Bakhmut?  I recall Russia kept attacking in the face of enormous troop and equipment losses and some of the commentators criticized that strategy as futile.  But ultimately, Russia was able to take the town by making progress in tiny increments over a period of many months.  I wonder whether the Ukraine's current position on the high ground, combined with the new firepower from NATO, will help Ukraine achieve a different outcome in Chasiv Yar.

Good question! IMO Russia did something very smart in the north-east. I don't think the "world" at large yet realizes how brilliant it was. These days with all the drone reconnaissance it is impossible achieve surprise  in an operation the size of the one Russia executed in the Kharkiv area. Ukraine had plenty of warning. They knew Russia appeared to be massing for an attack and what size it could be. Ukraine also knew that they couldn't use "western" weapons to disrupt those preparations inside Russia. Ukraine also knew they were critically short of artillery ammunition.

I would have liked to have been a fly on the wall while the Ukrainian NCA pondered this information. One approach would have been to transfer sufficient troops from the fighting in the "middle Donbas front" to defeat the prospective Russian advance in the north. That was problematic because 1) Ukrainian troops are still not very mobile 2) The situation on the other front was "serious" and the troops really couldn't be spared and (arguably most importantly) 3) Russia didn't actually have to do anything around Kharkiv. If Ukraine acted to meet the threat, Russia had already "won" and lost no troops doing it. In the event Ukraine forced Russia to actually execute the attack and as a result Ukraine lost some valuable territory. Ukraine also had to pull troops from the "other" front to stop the attack. The corresponding "good" effects are 1) Russia suffered disproportionate casualties and 2) The Russian units involved are now fixed in place to hold what they gained. They can't leave or Ukraine will take it all back.

So what does this have to do with Chasiv Yar? Ukraine is attempting to compensate for their lack of numbers (relative to Russia) by using (hopefully) superior firepower. This can cost Russia massive casualties. It can also temporarily slow Russia to a crawl (or slower) around Chasiv Yar. NATO would do the same, except NATO would use its air power to isolate the battlefield and to literally destroy the crawling Russian advance. Ukraine can't do this, or anything close. NATO would also rely on having striking forces in reserve that could counter-attack elsewhere, thereby doing to Russia what Russia did to Ukraine in the north-east. Ukraine unfortunately lacks any reserves at this point. Everything is committed. They can't even threaten a significant attack elsewhere (like in the south) to force Russia to change focus from Chasiv Yar. If Russia is willing to accept the massive casualties over the long time it will take to "crawl" into Chasiv Yar, IMO Ukraine doesn't presently have the firepower to stop them. It could take six months or more, but if nothing else changes Chasiv Yar will fall eventually.

There are some things being done to change the equation. Ukraine's new draft laws will have an effect and will possibly free up enough troops to allow a counter-attack elsewhere that Russia simply cannot ignore. How long this will take is anybodies guess. It is a race. All else remaining the same, if Ukraine can't generate enough offensive combat power to force Russia to divert forces elsewhere, Ukraine loses the war. It is just a question of time.

Another thing being attempted is the regeneration of the Ukrainian air force. Russia can't crawl forward if they can't supply their troops in the Chasiv Yar area. The Ukrainian air force can hopefully make that happen, eventually. Ukraine can't obtain enough ATACMS (or similar) to do an equivalent thing. They don't exist. F-16s can carry 4 MK-84 2000 lb bombs. An ATACMS warhead weighs 472 lbs. Obviously not "apples-to-apples" but it gives a perspective. The F-16 can also do this several times a day and never have to overfly the FEBA. JDAMs will go plenty far enough to mess up the Russian posits. Will Ukraine achieve enough capability to do this, and if so when? Will Chasiv Yar be in Ukrainian hands at that point?

Ukraine is also utilizing long range drone attacks to damage Russian civilian infrastructure (particularly oil refining and storage) and to hamper VKS operations against Ukrainian ground troops. These efforts are important and to some degree effective. The effect on the VKS could become a serious problem for Russia. They have just within the last nine months or so figured out how to meaningfully participate in this war. Ukraine admits they have become a significant problem. Unfortunately these long range attacks are neither frequent enough nor powerful enough to force Russia or the VKS out of the war. They are a "problem" but endurable.

IMO the real question is whether Russia has another force available to open yet another "significant" attack on Ukraine, perhaps in the south. If they do, Ukraine is IMO toast. They just don't have the bodies. In four or more months, they may, but right now they don't. Most "foreign" intelligence agencies don't think Russia has the wherewithal to do it, at least this summer. Let's hope they are right. From this point of view, Ukraine probably hopes Russia keeps banging away at Chasiv Yar. OTOH, the Russians aren't stupid. They know the situation quite well. I bet there is LOTS of internal pressure to stretch Ukraine even thinner and break through someplace NOW, before Ukraine's "new" troops show up.

Of course, there could be internal problems either in the Russian military or society of which we are unaware. Maybe the massive casualties will finally become "just too much". Not prudent to count on this though.

[GK3]

Does it seem likely that the battle for Chasiv Yar will follow a path similar to the battle for Bakhmut?  I recall Russia kept attacking in the face of enormous troop and equipment losses and some of the commentators criticized that strategy as futile.  But ultimately, Russia was able to take the town by making progress in tiny increments over a period of many months.  I wonder whether the Ukraine's current position on the high ground, combined with the new firepower from NATO, will help Ukraine achieve a different outcome in Chasiv Yar.

Good question! IMO Russia did something very smart in the north-east. I don't think the "world" at large yet realizes how brilliant it was. These days with all the drone reconnaissance it is impossible achieve surprise  in an operation the size of the one Russia executed in the Kharkiv area. Ukraine had plenty of warning. They knew Russia appeared to be massing for an attack and what size it could be. Ukraine also knew that they couldn't use "western" weapons to disrupt those preparations inside Russia. Ukraine also knew they were critically short of artillery ammunition.

I would have liked to have been a fly on the wall while the Ukrainian NCA pondered this information. One approach would have been to transfer sufficient troops from the fighting in the "middle Donbas front" to defeat the prospective Russian advance in the north. That was problematic because 1) Ukrainian troops are still not very mobile 2) The situation on the other front was "serious" and the troops really couldn't be spared and (arguably most importantly) 3) Russia didn't actually have to do anything around Kharkiv. If Ukraine acted to meet the threat, Russia had already "won" and lost no troops doing it. In the event Ukraine forced Russia to actually execute the attack and as a result Ukraine lost some valuable territory. Ukraine also had to pull troops from the "other" front to stop the attack. The corresponding "good" effects are 1) Russia suffered disproportionate casualties and 2) The Russian units involved are now fixed in place to hold what they gained. They can't leave or Ukraine will take it all back.

So what does this have to do with Chasiv Yar? Ukraine is attempting to compensate for their lack of numbers (relative to Russia) by using (hopefully) superior firepower. This can cost Russia massive casualties. It can also temporarily slow Russia to a crawl (or slower) around Chasiv Yar. NATO would do the same, except NATO would use its air power to isolate the battlefield and to literally destroy the crawling Russian advance. Ukraine can't do this, or anything close. NATO would also rely on having striking forces in reserve that could counter-attack elsewhere, thereby doing to Russia what Russia did to Ukraine in the north-east. Ukraine unfortunately lacks any reserves at this point. Everything is committed. They can't even threaten a significant attack elsewhere (like in the south) to force Russia to change focus from Chasiv Yar. If Russia is willing to accept the massive casualties over the long time it will take to "crawl" into Chasiv Yar, IMO Ukraine doesn't presently have the firepower to stop them. It could take six months or more, but if nothing else changes Chasiv Yar will fall eventually.

There are some things being done to change the equation. Ukraine's new draft laws will have an effect and will possibly free up enough troops to allow a counter-attack elsewhere that Russia simply cannot ignore. How long this will take is anybodies guess. It is a race. All else remaining the same, if Ukraine can't generate enough offensive combat power to force Russia to divert forces elsewhere, Ukraine loses the war. It is just a question of time.

Another thing being attempted is the regeneration of the Ukrainian air force. Russia can't crawl forward if they can't supply their troops in the Chasiv Yar area. The Ukrainian air force can hopefully make that happen, eventually. Ukraine can't obtain enough ATACMS (or similar) to do an equivalent thing. They don't exist. F-16s can carry 4 MK-84 2000 lb bombs. An ATACMS warhead weighs 472 lbs. Obviously not "apples-to-apples" but it gives a perspective. The F-16 can also do this several times a day and never have to overfly the FEBA. JDAMs will go plenty far enough to mess up the Russian posits. Will Ukraine achieve enough capability to do this, and if so when? Will Chasiv Yar be in Ukrainian hands at that point?

Ukraine is also utilizing long range drone attacks to damage Russian civilian infrastructure (particularly oil refining and storage) and to hamper VKS operations against Ukrainian ground troops. These efforts are important and to some degree effective. The effect on the VKS could become a serious problem for Russia. They have just within the last nine months or so figured out how to meaningfully participate in this war. Ukraine admits they have become a significant problem. Unfortunately these long range attacks are neither frequent enough nor powerful enough to force Russia or the VKS out of the war. They are a "problem" but endurable.

IMO the real question is whether Russia has another force available to open yet another "significant" attack on Ukraine, perhaps in the south. If they do, Ukraine is IMO toast. They just don't have the bodies. In four or more months, they may, but right now they don't. Most "foreign" intelligence agencies don't think Russia has the wherewithal to do it, at least this summer. Let's hope they are right. From this point of view, Ukraine probably hopes Russia keeps banging away at Chasiv Yar. OTOH, the Russians aren't stupid. They know the situation quite well. I bet there is LOTS of internal pressure to stretch Ukraine even thinner and break through someplace NOW, before Ukraine's "new" troops show up.

Of course, there could be internal problems either in the Russian military or society of which we are unaware. Maybe the massive casualties will finally become "just too much". Not prudent to count on this though.

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

[GK3]

Does it seem likely that the battle for Chasiv Yar will follow a path similar to the battle for Bakhmut?  I recall Russia kept attacking in the face of enormous troop and equipment losses and some of the commentators criticized that strategy as futile.  But ultimately, Russia was able to take the town by making progress in tiny increments over a period of many months.  I wonder whether the Ukraine's current position on the high ground, combined with the new firepower from NATO, will help Ukraine achieve a different outcome in Chasiv Yar.

Good question! IMO Russia did something very smart in the north-east. I don't think the "world" at large yet realizes how brilliant it was. These days with all the drone reconnaissance it is impossible achieve surprise  in an operation the size of the one Russia executed in the Kharkiv area. Ukraine had plenty of warning. They knew Russia appeared to be massing for an attack and what size it could be. Ukraine also knew that they couldn't use "western" weapons to disrupt those preparations inside Russia. Ukraine also knew they were critically short of artillery ammunition.

I would have liked to have been a fly on the wall while the Ukrainian NCA pondered this information. One approach would have been to transfer sufficient troops from the fighting in the "middle Donbas front" to defeat the prospective Russian advance in the north. That was problematic because 1) Ukrainian troops are still not very mobile 2) The situation on the other front was "serious" and the troops really couldn't be spared and (arguably most importantly) 3) Russia didn't actually have to do anything around Kharkiv. If Ukraine acted to meet the threat, Russia had already "won" and lost no troops doing it. In the event Ukraine forced Russia to actually execute the attack and as a result Ukraine lost some valuable territory. Ukraine also had to pull troops from the "other" front to stop the attack. The corresponding "good" effects are 1) Russia suffered disproportionate casualties and 2) The Russian units involved are now fixed in place to hold what they gained. They can't leave or Ukraine will take it all back.

So what does this have to do with Chasiv Yar? Ukraine is attempting to compensate for their lack of numbers (relative to Russia) by using (hopefully) superior firepower. This can cost Russia massive casualties. It can also temporarily slow Russia to a crawl (or slower) around Chasiv Yar. NATO would do the same, except NATO would use its air power to isolate the battlefield and to literally destroy the crawling Russian advance. Ukraine can't do this, or anything close. NATO would also rely on having striking forces in reserve that could counter-attack elsewhere, thereby doing to Russia what Russia did to Ukraine in the north-east. Ukraine unfortunately lacks any reserves at this point. Everything is committed. They can't even threaten a significant attack elsewhere (like in the south) to force Russia to change focus from Chasiv Yar. If Russia is willing to accept the massive casualties over the long time it will take to "crawl" into Chasiv Yar, IMO Ukraine doesn't presently have the firepower to stop them. It could take six months or more, but if nothing else changes Chasiv Yar will fall eventually.

There are some things being done to change the equation. Ukraine's new draft laws will have an effect and will possibly free up enough troops to allow a counter-attack elsewhere that Russia simply cannot ignore. How long this will take is anybodies guess. It is a race. All else remaining the same, if Ukraine can't generate enough offensive combat power to force Russia to divert forces elsewhere, Ukraine loses the war. It is just a question of time.

Another thing being attempted is the regeneration of the Ukrainian air force. Russia can't crawl forward if they can't supply their troops in the Chasiv Yar area. The Ukrainian air force can hopefully make that happen, eventually. Ukraine can't obtain enough ATACMS (or similar) to do an equivalent thing. They don't exist. F-16s can carry 4 MK-84 2000 lb bombs. An ATACMS warhead weighs 472 lbs. Obviously not "apples-to-apples" but it gives a perspective. The F-16 can also do this several times a day and never have to overfly the FEBA. JDAMs will go plenty far enough to mess up the Russian posits. Will Ukraine achieve enough capability to do this, and if so when? Will Chasiv Yar be in Ukrainian hands at that point?

Ukraine is also utilizing long range drone attacks to damage Russian civilian infrastructure (particularly oil refining and storage) and to hamper VKS operations against Ukrainian ground troops. These efforts are important and to some degree effective. The effect on the VKS could become a serious problem for Russia. They have just within the last nine months or so figured out how to meaningfully participate in this war. Ukraine admits they have become a significant problem. Unfortunately these long range attacks are neither frequent enough nor powerful enough to force Russia or the VKS out of the war. They are a "problem" but endurable.

IMO the real question is whether Russia has another force available to open yet another "significant" attack on Ukraine, perhaps in the south. If they do, Ukraine is IMO toast. They just don't have the bodies. In four or more months, they may, but right now they don't. Most "foreign" intelligence agencies don't think Russia has the wherewithal to do it, at least this summer. Let's hope they are right. From this point of view, Ukraine probably hopes Russia keeps banging away at Chasiv Yar. OTOH, the Russians aren't stupid. They know the situation quite well. I bet there is LOTS of internal pressure to stretch Ukraine even thinner and break through someplace NOW, before Ukraine's "new" troops show up.

Of course, there could be internal problems either in the Russian military or society of which we are unaware. Maybe the massive casualties will finally become "just too much". Not prudent to count on this though.

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

[Goose]

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

Russian planning generally speaking << Russian reality :). It might be nice if that "accident" should happen. Unfortunately IMO it isn't going to. Putin has enemies alright. Some of them, particularly in the FSB could undoubtedly get him killed. But then what? Nobody in that organization has the public presence to rally the populace to support them. It is partly the nature of the work they do and greatly because Putin gets rid of anybody who is even approaching enough popularity to replace him. Like Saddam, Putin has created a society with no other leaders but himself. Russians have been saying for years "If not Putin, who?".

If Putin dies a natural or assisted death IMO it is quite likely a multi-polar civil war will break out. It may be large and very violent or small and merely violent, but it will happen. This undoubtedly will be great for Ukraine in at least the very short term. What it would mean for the world going forward is very unpredictable.

[Goose]

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

Russian planning generally speaking << Russian reality :). It might be nice if that "accident" should happen. Unfortunately IMO it isn't going to. Putin has enemies alright. Some of them, particularly in the FSB could undoubtedly get him killed. But then what? Nobody in that organization has the public presence to rally the populace to support them. It is partly the nature of the work they do and greatly because Putin gets rid of anybody who is even approaching enough popularity to replace him. Like Saddam, Putin has created a society with no other leaders but himself. Russians have been saying for years "If not Putin, who?".

If Putin dies a natural or assisted death IMO it is quite likely a multi-polar civil war will break out. It may be large and very violent or small and merely violent, but it will happen. This undoubtedly will be great for Ukraine in at least the very short term. What it would mean for the world going forward is very unpredictable.

[Mick]

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

Russian planning generally speaking << Russian reality :). It might be nice if that "accident" should happen. Unfortunately IMO it isn't going to. Putin has enemies alright. Some of them, particularly in the FSB could undoubtedly get him killed. But then what? Nobody in that organization has the public presence to rally the populace to support them. It is partly the nature of the work they do and greatly because Putin gets rid of anybody who is even approaching enough popularity to replace him. Like Saddam, Putin has created a society with no other leaders but himself. Russians have been saying for years "If not Putin, who?".

If Putin dies a natural or assisted death IMO it is quite likely a multi-polar civil war will break out. It may be large and very violent or small and merely violent, but it will happen. This undoubtedly will be great for Ukraine in at least the very short term. What it would mean for the world going forward is very unpredictable.

I was under the impression that the half-dozen or so of Putin's likely successors were even more hard-line than Putin. Is that the case?

[Mick]

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

Russian planning generally speaking << Russian reality :). It might be nice if that "accident" should happen. Unfortunately IMO it isn't going to. Putin has enemies alright. Some of them, particularly in the FSB could undoubtedly get him killed. But then what? Nobody in that organization has the public presence to rally the populace to support them. It is partly the nature of the work they do and greatly because Putin gets rid of anybody who is even approaching enough popularity to replace him. Like Saddam, Putin has created a society with no other leaders but himself. Russians have been saying for years "If not Putin, who?".

If Putin dies a natural or assisted death IMO it is quite likely a multi-polar civil war will break out. It may be large and very violent or small and merely violent, but it will happen. This undoubtedly will be great for Ukraine in at least the very short term. What it would mean for the world going forward is very unpredictable.

I was under the impression that the half-dozen or so of Putin's likely successors were even more hard-line than Putin. Is that the case?

[Goose]

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

Russian planning generally speaking << Russian reality :). It might be nice if that "accident" should happen. Unfortunately IMO it isn't going to. Putin has enemies alright. Some of them, particularly in the FSB could undoubtedly get him killed. But then what? Nobody in that organization has the public presence to rally the populace to support them. It is partly the nature of the work they do and greatly because Putin gets rid of anybody who is even approaching enough popularity to replace him. Like Saddam, Putin has created a society with no other leaders but himself. Russians have been saying for years "If not Putin, who?".

If Putin dies a natural or assisted death IMO it is quite likely a multi-polar civil war will break out. It may be large and very violent or small and merely violent, but it will happen. This undoubtedly will be great for Ukraine in at least the very short term. What it would mean for the world going forward is very unpredictable.

I was under the impression that the half-dozen or so of Putin's likely successors were even more hard-line than Putin. Is that the case?

I don't know, and I doubt anybody really does. These "potential successors" are undoubtedly staking out positions based on what they believe is politically expedient right now. In many cases it may be they think a "hard line" helps them politically right now. Some of them may actually be guided by Putin in order to modulate public opinion. In any case, if any one of these people gain power the political calculus for them will change radically. What they will actually do is unpredictable. That makes them potentially more dangerous than them actually being "hard-line" ideologically. They may read the domestic or international political situation wrong and do something really stupid.

[Goose]

Russian losses, at least from my one man view point have been astronomic.  I cannot believe Russian planning assuned anything like this.  Which makes me wonder if losses of this magnitude coninue, might Putin be in danger of walking out of an open window?

https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-i...asualties/

Russian planning generally speaking << Russian reality :). It might be nice if that "accident" should happen. Unfortunately IMO it isn't going to. Putin has enemies alright. Some of them, particularly in the FSB could undoubtedly get him killed. But then what? Nobody in that organization has the public presence to rally the populace to support them. It is partly the nature of the work they do and greatly because Putin gets rid of anybody who is even approaching enough popularity to replace him. Like Saddam, Putin has created a society with no other leaders but himself. Russians have been saying for years "If not Putin, who?".

If Putin dies a natural or assisted death IMO it is quite likely a multi-polar civil war will break out. It may be large and very violent or small and merely violent, but it will happen. This undoubtedly will be great for Ukraine in at least the very short term. What it would mean for the world going forward is very unpredictable.

I was under the impression that the half-dozen or so of Putin's likely successors were even more hard-line than Putin. Is that the case?

I don't know, and I doubt anybody really does. These "potential successors" are undoubtedly staking out positions based on what they believe is politically expedient right now. In many cases it may be they think a "hard line" helps them politically right now. Some of them may actually be guided by Putin in order to modulate public opinion. In any case, if any one of these people gain power the political calculus for them will change radically. What they will actually do is unpredictable. That makes them potentially more dangerous than them actually being "hard-line" ideologically. They may read the domestic or international political situation wrong and do something really stupid.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-needs...01596.html
IMO this article once again highlights an important fact. Ukraine can't win fighting the war Russia wants. It also can't execute a "forever" war fought at the current level of intensity. Ukraine will run out of men, material, and morale before Russia does. I do not agree with the the article that the west being too slow to adapt to "new" Russian tactics is a major factor. It may arguably be true, but isn't a major factor. The failure to deliver weapons quickly enough (or even as promised) and allowing Ukraine to use them for maximum effect from day 1 is a major factor.

Ukraine, the US and NATO allowed Russia to build up massive fortifications protected by immense minefields in southern Ukraine. Virtually nothing was done to make that so costly in casualties that it couldn't be done. Big mistake. Then these same actors allowed/executed an offensive against these finished fortifications lacking anywhere near enough effective mine clearance equipment. What was promised was inadequate and what was promised was not delivered. There was also no plan for suppression of fire from these fortifications while the "approach" phase of the battle was fought. As Ukraine pointed out (subsequently, at least in public) NATO would have used their air power to suppress these fortifications. Ukraine had no air force that could do this. OK, what was plan B? There wasn't one. Ukraine just tried to force their way through and accept the cost. They couldn't do it.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/small-drones-...00908.html
IMO the public focus on FPV drones is more than a bit misplaced and gives an incorrect impression of the correlation of forces. One article said (paraphrase) "80% of the casualties on the front line are caused by FPV drones". I am virtually certain this is nonsense. Kiev wasn't screaming about the lack of FPV drones. They were screaming for 155 mm ammunition.

The war in Ukraine is in many ways "weird". We are seeing trench warfare from WW I coupled with state of the art FPV weaponry. This is enabled by (among other thing) the virtually complete lack (on both sides) of effective strategic and tactical air power. It is also caused by the fact that is the way Russia wants to fight. Their attempts at mobile warfare failed, mostly due to their own incompetence. Ukrainian resistance certainly played a role, but Russia massively under-performed.  Russia therefore fell back to massed artillery and infantry, both of which they had. Ukraine OTOH initially lacked the means to even attempt mobile warfare. The west subsequently tried to give them the means, but training an army to fight "a different way" is not a 6 month job. So, we see "modulated" trench warfare. Historically, artillery is the queen of battles in such situations and causes by far the majority of the casualties. In WW I trench warfare 60% of the casualties were caused by artillery. In WW II, where warfare was much more mobile, according to the LA Times

In World War II, shrapnel (fragments from exploding artillery shells) caused 53% of U.S. battle deaths and 62% of the wounds. In Korea, shrapnel caused 59% of the deaths and 61% of the wounds.

No reason at all to believe the war in Ukraine is any different, especially give both sides prodigious expenditure of artillery ammunition.

None of the above attempts to say drones are "useless". They are obviously not useless. One major use is reconnaissance to find targets for artillery, correct their fire, and asses its effects. This is actually a "big deal" and matters a whole lot. These drones aren't directly killing anybody but are exceptionally dangerous. As the Ukrainian troops have indicated, they hide from the Orlan-10s not because it will kill them but rather because the artillery it directs very well may. Drones clearly do have uses as weapons, particularly the larger ones that have ranges of 50-100 km. Drones, like tactical ballistic missiles, cannot provide the persistence and mass of firepower artillery can. They can however be much more "surgical" and directly hit important targets. When employed in "swarms" they can also provide some significant mass. More importantly, these weapons can hit targets well beyond the range of artillery.

FPV drone actions make it  onto X and YouTube all the time because the video is a easily available byproduct of such drones. It is also a novel form of warfare.  However, the Ukrainian USVs that have sunk Russian ships are much more tactically important. We sometimes get videos from them, but not all that often. Equally important are the drone swarms that target S-400 systems. No videos there. Equally frustratingly we hear all kinds of contradictory stories from both Russia and Ukraine about how many drones were used and how many were shot down. In reality, the public has no idea what is actually happening in this regard. 

The French general is IMO correct. Drone warfare is in its infancy. Evolution is going fast and will continue. Threat evaluations made today will undoubtedly be wrong in six months, let alone five years. We are now seeing anti-drone drones. The real scary possibility is drones with significant AI target recognition capabilities operating autonomously. These drones would be immune to EW.  In any case, we have to beware of the "Battle of Lissa" syndrome. This battle took place during a time when naval forces were radically changing. Steam had significantly but not totally replaced sail, some ships were armored, some were not. Some ships had guns in turrets, some still had guns in broadsides. Some guns were rifled, some were not.  During the battle, two ships were sunk by ramming, but none by gunfire. For the next 50 years ships were constructed with specially designed and reinforced bows to allow ramming other warships. Everybody was absolutely sure that rams were the "wave of the future". Of course, no major warship subsequently was ever sunk by an enemy ramming it. It was a totally bogus evaluation that did not take into consideration dynamic state of naval architecture at the time of the battle. It also didn't take into consideration the specific state of the combatants. While the ram bows were never actually used in action against the enemy, the British in particular did manage to sink several of the own capital ships with them due to accidental collisions :-).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-needs...01596.html
IMO this article once again highlights an important fact. Ukraine can't win fighting the war Russia wants. It also can't execute a "forever" war fought at the current level of intensity. Ukraine will run out of men, material, and morale before Russia does. I do not agree with the the article that the west being too slow to adapt to "new" Russian tactics is a major factor. It may arguably be true, but isn't a major factor. The failure to deliver weapons quickly enough (or even as promised) and allowing Ukraine to use them for maximum effect from day 1 is a major factor.

Ukraine, the US and NATO allowed Russia to build up massive fortifications protected by immense minefields in southern Ukraine. Virtually nothing was done to make that so costly in casualties that it couldn't be done. Big mistake. Then these same actors allowed/executed an offensive against these finished fortifications lacking anywhere near enough effective mine clearance equipment. What was promised was inadequate and what was promised was not delivered. There was also no plan for suppression of fire from these fortifications while the "approach" phase of the battle was fought. As Ukraine pointed out (subsequently, at least in public) NATO would have used their air power to suppress these fortifications. Ukraine had no air force that could do this. OK, what was plan B? There wasn't one. Ukraine just tried to force their way through and accept the cost. They couldn't do it.

---

https://www.yahoo.com/news/small-drones-...00908.html
IMO the public focus on FPV drones is more than a bit misplaced and gives an incorrect impression of the correlation of forces. One article said (paraphrase) "80% of the casualties on the front line are caused by FPV drones". I am virtually certain this is nonsense. Kiev wasn't screaming about the lack of FPV drones. They were screaming for 155 mm ammunition.

The war in Ukraine is in many ways "weird". We are seeing trench warfare from WW I coupled with state of the art FPV weaponry. This is enabled by (among other thing) the virtually complete lack (on both sides) of effective strategic and tactical air power. It is also caused by the fact that is the way Russia wants to fight. Their attempts at mobile warfare failed, mostly due to their own incompetence. Ukrainian resistance certainly played a role, but Russia massively under-performed.  Russia therefore fell back to massed artillery and infantry, both of which they had. Ukraine OTOH initially lacked the means to even attempt mobile warfare. The west subsequently tried to give them the means, but training an army to fight "a different way" is not a 6 month job. So, we see "modulated" trench warfare. Historically, artillery is the queen of battles in such situations and causes by far the majority of the casualties. In WW I trench warfare 60% of the casualties were caused by artillery. In WW II, where warfare was much more mobile, according to the LA Times

In World War II, shrapnel (fragments from exploding artillery shells) caused 53% of U.S. battle deaths and 62% of the wounds. In Korea, shrapnel caused 59% of the deaths and 61% of the wounds.

No reason at all to believe the war in Ukraine is any different, especially give both sides prodigious expenditure of artillery ammunition.

None of the above attempts to say drones are "useless". They are obviously not useless. One major use is reconnaissance to find targets for artillery, correct their fire, and asses its effects. This is actually a "big deal" and matters a whole lot. These drones aren't directly killing anybody but are exceptionally dangerous. As the Ukrainian troops have indicated, they hide from the Orlan-10s not because it will kill them but rather because the artillery it directs very well may. Drones clearly do have uses as weapons, particularly the larger ones that have ranges of 50-100 km. Drones, like tactical ballistic missiles, cannot provide the persistence and mass of firepower artillery can. They can however be much more "surgical" and directly hit important targets. When employed in "swarms" they can also provide some significant mass. More importantly, these weapons can hit targets well beyond the range of artillery.

FPV drone actions make it  onto X and YouTube all the time because the video is a easily available byproduct of such drones. It is also a novel form of warfare.  However, the Ukrainian USVs that have sunk Russian ships are much more tactically important. We sometimes get videos from them, but not all that often. Equally important are the drone swarms that target S-400 systems. No videos there. Equally frustratingly we hear all kinds of contradictory stories from both Russia and Ukraine about how many drones were used and how many were shot down. In reality, the public has no idea what is actually happening in this regard. 

The French general is IMO correct. Drone warfare is in its infancy. Evolution is going fast and will continue. Threat evaluations made today will undoubtedly be wrong in six months, let alone five years. We are now seeing anti-drone drones. The real scary possibility is drones with significant AI target recognition capabilities operating autonomously. These drones would be immune to EW.  In any case, we have to beware of the "Battle of Lissa" syndrome. This battle took place during a time when naval forces were radically changing. Steam had significantly but not totally replaced sail, some ships were armored, some were not. Some ships had guns in turrets, some still had guns in broadsides. Some guns were rifled, some were not.  During the battle, two ships were sunk by ramming, but none by gunfire. For the next 50 years ships were constructed with specially designed and reinforced bows to allow ramming other warships. Everybody was absolutely sure that rams were the "wave of the future". Of course, no major warship subsequently was ever sunk by an enemy ramming it. It was a totally bogus evaluation that did not take into consideration dynamic state of naval architecture at the time of the battle. It also didn't take into consideration the specific state of the combatants. While the ram bows were never actually used in action against the enemy, the British in particular did manage to sink several of the own capital ships with them due to accidental collisions :-).

[dabigv13]

WSJ reporting that Russia was involved with an arson attack on German defense company Diehl, at a facility in Berlin producing air defense equipment.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian...y-c13b4ece

Seems like the German government would prefer to keep this quiet/unattributed, likely because admitting Russia is setting fires in your country's factories would seem to demand a more vigorous response than they would like to commit to.

[dabigv13]

WSJ reporting that Russia was involved with an arson attack on German defense company Diehl, at a facility in Berlin producing air defense equipment.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian...y-c13b4ece

Seems like the German government would prefer to keep this quiet/unattributed, likely because admitting Russia is setting fires in your country's factories would seem to demand a more vigorous response than they would like to commit to.

[Goose]

WSJ reporting that Russia was involved with an arson attack on German defense company Diehl, at a facility in Berlin producing air defense equipment.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian...y-c13b4ece

Seems like the German government would prefer to keep this quiet/unattributed, likely because admitting Russia is setting fires in your country's factories would seem to demand a more vigorous response than they would like to commit to.

Agree this is pretty egregious and no doubt Russia will keep doing it. OTOH I unfortunately understand the government's unwillingness to do much. Politically their coalition is in tatters. Public opinion is very divided. Their military is a joke and is not actually getting better rapidly. It may be inability as much as it is unwillingness.

[Goose]

WSJ reporting that Russia was involved with an arson attack on German defense company Diehl, at a facility in Berlin producing air defense equipment.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russian...y-c13b4ece

Seems like the German government would prefer to keep this quiet/unattributed, likely because admitting Russia is setting fires in your country's factories would seem to demand a more vigorous response than they would like to commit to.

Agree this is pretty egregious and no doubt Russia will keep doing it. OTOH I unfortunately understand the government's unwillingness to do much. Politically their coalition is in tatters. Public opinion is very divided. Their military is a joke and is not actually getting better rapidly. It may be inability as much as it is unwillingness.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-ships...31668.html

Another Hallelujah. This has been way too long coming. IMO the sea drones should have prioritized mines from the very beginning. The drones aren't destroyed in the effort. They RTB and do it again the next night. Lots of mines can be covertly placed with minimal loss of material. It makes a sustainable effort much easier.

Ukraine also should have placed mines in the Kerch strait and the Sea of Azov way back when it was doable. These mines have the ability to activate on a certain date. You can place them covertly over months and have them come online all at once. Mines in the strait would have caused havoc with commercial shipping. A minefield wouldn't necessarily sink many ships because the first one that was mined would stop all traffic. It could also have destroyed/sunk the ferries Russia is now using instead of the bridge.  Sweeping bottom mines is at best very time consuming. I doubt Russia is presently equipped in the Black Sea to do it. In the Baltic, they are. Russia and Ukraine didn't use them, they used floating mines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_60_CAPTOR
CAPTOR mines were particularly vicious because they can "chase down" the target even if it doesn't directly pass over the mine. Close counts. We should have literally tons of them to give away as we quit using them. Hopefully they aren't too old :-).

Mines are very hard to defend against, especially bottom mines. Mining harbor entrances will for certain damage if not sink the ships that use that harbor. Mining know submarine transit lanes also can yield great results. Mariners hate them because there is nothing they can really do to avoid them. If the mine is programmed for your signature and you get too close, you are toast. These mines can have ship counts and activation schedules. This means a ship may have transited them many times and you therefore have no idea they were there. Then one day, BOOM! Are there others? Where are they? When will they be activated?

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-ships...31668.html

Another Hallelujah. This has been way too long coming. IMO the sea drones should have prioritized mines from the very beginning. The drones aren't destroyed in the effort. They RTB and do it again the next night. Lots of mines can be covertly placed with minimal loss of material. It makes a sustainable effort much easier.

Ukraine also should have placed mines in the Kerch strait and the Sea of Azov way back when it was doable. These mines have the ability to activate on a certain date. You can place them covertly over months and have them come online all at once. Mines in the strait would have caused havoc with commercial shipping. A minefield wouldn't necessarily sink many ships because the first one that was mined would stop all traffic. It could also have destroyed/sunk the ferries Russia is now using instead of the bridge.  Sweeping bottom mines is at best very time consuming. I doubt Russia is presently equipped in the Black Sea to do it. In the Baltic, they are. Russia and Ukraine didn't use them, they used floating mines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_60_CAPTOR
CAPTOR mines were particularly vicious because they can "chase down" the target even if it doesn't directly pass over the mine. Close counts. We should have literally tons of them to give away as we quit using them. Hopefully they aren't too old :-).

Mines are very hard to defend against, especially bottom mines. Mining harbor entrances will for certain damage if not sink the ships that use that harbor. Mining know submarine transit lanes also can yield great results. Mariners hate them because there is nothing they can really do to avoid them. If the mine is programmed for your signature and you get too close, you are toast. These mines can have ship counts and activation schedules. This means a ship may have transited them many times and you therefore have no idea they were there. Then one day, BOOM! Are there others? Where are they? When will they be activated?

[M T]

Do we know they aren’t placing mines in the  Karch Strait?  If you were in charge, wouldn’t you place all you want before setting off the first one?  Then use the mines as part of an offensive.

[M T]

Do we know they aren’t placing mines in the  Karch Strait?  If you were in charge, wouldn’t you place all you want before setting off the first one?  Then use the mines as part of an offensive.

[Treefence]

Goose, when you look at what Ukraine is able to accomplish as a country with a far inferior navy (to put it lightly) compared to Russia, does it worry you about the long term potential vulnerabilities of the US Navy?  So far with what the US is doing against the Houthis, I'm guessing we are more prepared than the Russians, but when I think of the manufacturing capabilities of a country like China, if they went all in on tactics/equipment inspired by Ukraine, but at an exponential scale, I would worry we'd have a significantly decrease ability to project power at the very least.

[Treefence]

Goose, when you look at what Ukraine is able to accomplish as a country with a far inferior navy (to put it lightly) compared to Russia, does it worry you about the long term potential vulnerabilities of the US Navy?  So far with what the US is doing against the Houthis, I'm guessing we are more prepared than the Russians, but when I think of the manufacturing capabilities of a country like China, if they went all in on tactics/equipment inspired by Ukraine, but at an exponential scale, I would worry we'd have a significantly decrease ability to project power at the very least.

[Goose]

Do we know they aren’t placing mines in the  Karch Strait?  If you were in charge, wouldn’t you place all you want before setting off the first one?  Then use the mines as part of an offensive.

We pretty much do know they are not doing so because Russia has gone to great lengths to ensure that sea drones can't get anywhere near the bridge. As a byproduct they can't get into the Sea of Azov either. It seems in this case Russia has done an adequate job. It is also possible (but IMO very improbable) Ukraine has found a way and will manage it. If they can, the first thing to mine isn't the strait but rather the approaches to the ferry landings. If/when we hear about ferries sinking we will know they managed. The strait will be a close second.

You are correct. There are good reasons to placing at least a "significant" minefield before activating it. Once the mines are detected your opponent will begin clearing the minefield and put mine countermeasures in place to avoid more mines being emplaced.  That said it is often wise to place a few mines in areas where you do NOT intend to emplace a minefield (at that time). Your opponent doesn't know your intentions and has to react accordingly. It may take them awhile to figure out there is no minefield there. After they leave, you then put in more mines, either a full field or just a few. It makes the opponents mariners very nervous :-). They are told an area is mined and to stay away. Later they are then told it is cleared. They start using it but then they are mined. Doesn't help trust and commerce much.

[Goose]

Do we know they aren’t placing mines in the  Karch Strait?  If you were in charge, wouldn’t you place all you want before setting off the first one?  Then use the mines as part of an offensive.

We pretty much do know they are not doing so because Russia has gone to great lengths to ensure that sea drones can't get anywhere near the bridge. As a byproduct they can't get into the Sea of Azov either. It seems in this case Russia has done an adequate job. It is also possible (but IMO very improbable) Ukraine has found a way and will manage it. If they can, the first thing to mine isn't the strait but rather the approaches to the ferry landings. If/when we hear about ferries sinking we will know they managed. The strait will be a close second.

You are correct. There are good reasons to placing at least a "significant" minefield before activating it. Once the mines are detected your opponent will begin clearing the minefield and put mine countermeasures in place to avoid more mines being emplaced.  That said it is often wise to place a few mines in areas where you do NOT intend to emplace a minefield (at that time). Your opponent doesn't know your intentions and has to react accordingly. It may take them awhile to figure out there is no minefield there. After they leave, you then put in more mines, either a full field or just a few. It makes the opponents mariners very nervous :-). They are told an area is mined and to stay away. Later they are then told it is cleared. They start using it but then they are mined. Doesn't help trust and commerce much.

[dabigv13]

This article from WSJ discusses Ukrainian sea drone deployment of mines, their attacks on Sevastopol harbor, and the attack on the Kerch bridge.

https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-i...a-ce35adfa

The mine laying capability seems to have been developed to counteract anti-drone netting and protections of Sevastopol harbor, and has been very effective, even damaging a Russian anti- mine ship.

Not mentioned in the article is Ukrainian deployment of anti-air missiles on these drones. Standoff weaponry such as MLRS and grenade launchers mentioned in passing.

The whole article is worth reading. I quoted in particular the mine aspect as it pertains to above discussion.

Ukraine has sunk or damaged around two dozen Russian ships of all sizes using explosive drones or mines delivered by low-slung craft about the size of a small fishing boat. Sea drones caused severe damage to a bridge from Russia to occupied Crimea that Russia used to supply its forces in Ukraine. Ukraine has also targeted Russian ships and port facilities with missiles provided by the West.

As a result, Russia has dispersed the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet far from Sevastopol. Ukraine has been able to restart exports worth billions from its main port of Odesa. Missiles launched from Russian ships take longer to reach Ukraine, giving air-defense crews critical extra time to intercept them. Russia has relocated reconnaissance planes, jet fighters, helicopters, aerial drones and electronic-jamming systems from the front lines to counter Ukraine’s sea drones, easing the pressure on Ukraine’s embattled ground forces.

.....
Lukashevych was already planning another operation. The Russians had built larger barriers at the entrance to the port in Sevastopol, all but ruling out sea-drone strikes there. So he came up with an alternative: laying sea mines.

Lukashevych’s team built a special SeaBaby that could lay mines that Ukraine had received from a Western partner. The so-called bottom mines are made of plastic and weigh about 400 pounds and are hard to find as they nestle into the mud under shallow water. They use acoustic and electromagnetic sensors to detect the presence of a ship, triggering a detonation. 

For a month and a half, the team tracked the routes taken by naval ships and civilian traffic, before sending a SeaBaby to lay two mines. On Sept. 14, the Samum, a guided-missile corvette, triggered one of the mines, which ripped a hole in its stern. The boat is still under repair in dry dock.

The SeaBaby went back and forth in the following weeks, covering more than 3,000 miles as it laid about 15 more mines. During one of the trips, detected by three Raptor-class patrol boats, it fired back with a grenade launcher, scattering the enemy craft.

On Oct. 11, an explosion tore into the side of the Pavel Derzhavin, a large patrol boat, as it was entering Sevastopol Bay. It limped into port for checks.

The Pavel Derzhavin was dispatched to another port for repairs on Oct. 13, but hit a mine as it left Sevastopol Bay. A large tugboat dispatched to rescue the ship, but also struck a mine and had to be towed back to port itself.

Days later, an explosion hit a modern anti-mine ship, one of only two in Russian service.

[dabigv13]

This article from WSJ discusses Ukrainian sea drone deployment of mines, their attacks on Sevastopol harbor, and the attack on the Kerch bridge.

https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-i...a-ce35adfa

The mine laying capability seems to have been developed to counteract anti-drone netting and protections of Sevastopol harbor, and has been very effective, even damaging a Russian anti- mine ship.

Not mentioned in the article is Ukrainian deployment of anti-air missiles on these drones. Standoff weaponry such as MLRS and grenade launchers mentioned in passing.

The whole article is worth reading. I quoted in particular the mine aspect as it pertains to above discussion.

Ukraine has sunk or damaged around two dozen Russian ships of all sizes using explosive drones or mines delivered by low-slung craft about the size of a small fishing boat. Sea drones caused severe damage to a bridge from Russia to occupied Crimea that Russia used to supply its forces in Ukraine. Ukraine has also targeted Russian ships and port facilities with missiles provided by the West.

As a result, Russia has dispersed the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet far from Sevastopol. Ukraine has been able to restart exports worth billions from its main port of Odesa. Missiles launched from Russian ships take longer to reach Ukraine, giving air-defense crews critical extra time to intercept them. Russia has relocated reconnaissance planes, jet fighters, helicopters, aerial drones and electronic-jamming systems from the front lines to counter Ukraine’s sea drones, easing the pressure on Ukraine’s embattled ground forces.

.....
Lukashevych was already planning another operation. The Russians had built larger barriers at the entrance to the port in Sevastopol, all but ruling out sea-drone strikes there. So he came up with an alternative: laying sea mines.

Lukashevych’s team built a special SeaBaby that could lay mines that Ukraine had received from a Western partner. The so-called bottom mines are made of plastic and weigh about 400 pounds and are hard to find as they nestle into the mud under shallow water. They use acoustic and electromagnetic sensors to detect the presence of a ship, triggering a detonation. 

For a month and a half, the team tracked the routes taken by naval ships and civilian traffic, before sending a SeaBaby to lay two mines. On Sept. 14, the Samum, a guided-missile corvette, triggered one of the mines, which ripped a hole in its stern. The boat is still under repair in dry dock.

The SeaBaby went back and forth in the following weeks, covering more than 3,000 miles as it laid about 15 more mines. During one of the trips, detected by three Raptor-class patrol boats, it fired back with a grenade launcher, scattering the enemy craft.

On Oct. 11, an explosion tore into the side of the Pavel Derzhavin, a large patrol boat, as it was entering Sevastopol Bay. It limped into port for checks.

The Pavel Derzhavin was dispatched to another port for repairs on Oct. 13, but hit a mine as it left Sevastopol Bay. A large tugboat dispatched to rescue the ship, but also struck a mine and had to be towed back to port itself.

Days later, an explosion hit a modern anti-mine ship, one of only two in Russian service.

[TrumpCard]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-ships...31668.html

Another Hallelujah. This has been way too long coming. IMO the sea drones should have prioritized mines from the very beginning. The drones aren't destroyed in the effort. They RTB and do it again the next night. Lots of mines can be covertly placed with minimal loss of material. It makes a sustainable effort much easier.

Ukraine also should have placed mines in the Kerch strait and the Sea of Azov way back when it was doable. These mines have the ability to activate on a certain date. You can place them covertly over months and have them come online all at once. Mines in the strait would have caused havoc with commercial shipping. A minefield wouldn't necessarily sink many ships because the first one that was mined would stop all traffic. It could also have destroyed/sunk the ferries Russia is now using instead of the bridge.  Sweeping bottom mines is at best very time consuming. I doubt Russia is presently equipped in the Black Sea to do it. In the Baltic, they are. Russia and Ukraine didn't use them, they used floating mines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_60_CAPTOR
CAPTOR mines were particularly vicious because they can "chase down" the target even if it doesn't directly pass over the mine. Close counts. We should have literally tons of them to give away as we quit using them. Hopefully they aren't too old :-).

Mines are very hard to defend against, especially bottom mines. Mining harbor entrances will for certain damage if not sink the ships that use that harbor. Mining know submarine transit lanes also can yield great results. Mariners hate them because there is nothing they can really do to avoid them. If the mine is programmed for your signature and you get too close, you are toast. These mines can have ship counts and activation schedules. This means a ship may have transited them many times and you therefore have no idea they were there. Then one day, BOOM! Are there others? Where are they? When will they be activated?

Is the corollary to this article that Russia also is mining Ukrainian shipping lanes so Ukraine won't have as much ability to ship grain and other exports as we've been hoping?

[TrumpCard]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-ships...31668.html

Another Hallelujah. This has been way too long coming. IMO the sea drones should have prioritized mines from the very beginning. The drones aren't destroyed in the effort. They RTB and do it again the next night. Lots of mines can be covertly placed with minimal loss of material. It makes a sustainable effort much easier.

Ukraine also should have placed mines in the Kerch strait and the Sea of Azov way back when it was doable. These mines have the ability to activate on a certain date. You can place them covertly over months and have them come online all at once. Mines in the strait would have caused havoc with commercial shipping. A minefield wouldn't necessarily sink many ships because the first one that was mined would stop all traffic. It could also have destroyed/sunk the ferries Russia is now using instead of the bridge.  Sweeping bottom mines is at best very time consuming. I doubt Russia is presently equipped in the Black Sea to do it. In the Baltic, they are. Russia and Ukraine didn't use them, they used floating mines.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_60_CAPTOR
CAPTOR mines were particularly vicious because they can "chase down" the target even if it doesn't directly pass over the mine. Close counts. We should have literally tons of them to give away as we quit using them. Hopefully they aren't too old :-).

Mines are very hard to defend against, especially bottom mines. Mining harbor entrances will for certain damage if not sink the ships that use that harbor. Mining know submarine transit lanes also can yield great results. Mariners hate them because there is nothing they can really do to avoid them. If the mine is programmed for your signature and you get too close, you are toast. These mines can have ship counts and activation schedules. This means a ship may have transited them many times and you therefore have no idea they were there. Then one day, BOOM! Are there others? Where are they? When will they be activated?

Is the corollary to this article that Russia also is mining Ukrainian shipping lanes so Ukraine won't have as much ability to ship grain and other exports as we've been hoping?

[Goose]

Is the corollary to this article that Russia also is mining Ukrainian shipping lanes so Ukraine won't have as much ability to ship grain and other exports as we've been hoping?

No, because Ukraine has no shipping lanes :-). All the grain shipments hug the Ukrainian coast until they reach Romanian territorial waters. From there to Bulgarian to Turkish territorial waters. It is a very short distance in Ukrainian waters and Russia has no viable way to mine it. Too shallow for submarines and too close to Ukrainian defenses for surface craft. Russia isn't going to mine NATO waters. That is an act of war that can't be ignored. It is a "slow" route, but it is safe. FWIW some small quantity of grain actually comes down the canal of the Danube and is not even shipped from Ukrainian ports.

[Goose]

Is the corollary to this article that Russia also is mining Ukrainian shipping lanes so Ukraine won't have as much ability to ship grain and other exports as we've been hoping?

No, because Ukraine has no shipping lanes :-). All the grain shipments hug the Ukrainian coast until they reach Romanian territorial waters. From there to Bulgarian to Turkish territorial waters. It is a very short distance in Ukrainian waters and Russia has no viable way to mine it. Too shallow for submarines and too close to Ukrainian defenses for surface craft. Russia isn't going to mine NATO waters. That is an act of war that can't be ignored. It is a "slow" route, but it is safe. FWIW some small quantity of grain actually comes down the canal of the Danube and is not even shipped from Ukrainian ports.

[Goose]

This article from WSJ discusses Ukrainian sea drone deployment of mines, their attacks on Sevastopol harbor, and the attack on the Kerch bridge.

https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-i...a-ce35adfa

The mine laying capability seems to have been developed to counteract anti-drone netting and protections of Sevastopol harbor, and has been very effective, even damaging a Russian anti- mine ship.

Not mentioned in the article is Ukrainian deployment of anti-air missiles on these drones. Standoff weaponry such as MLRS and grenade launchers mentioned in passing.

The whole article is worth reading. I quoted in particular the mine aspect as it pertains to above discussion.

Ukraine has sunk or damaged around two dozen Russian ships of all sizes using explosive drones or mines delivered by low-slung craft about the size of a small fishing boat. Sea drones caused severe damage to a bridge from Russia to occupied Crimea that Russia used to supply its forces in Ukraine. Ukraine has also targeted Russian ships and port facilities with missiles provided by the West.

As a result, Russia has dispersed the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet far from Sevastopol. Ukraine has been able to restart exports worth billions from its main port of Odesa. Missiles launched from Russian ships take longer to reach Ukraine, giving air-defense crews critical extra time to intercept them. Russia has relocated reconnaissance planes, jet fighters, helicopters, aerial drones and electronic-jamming systems from the front lines to counter Ukraine’s sea drones, easing the pressure on Ukraine’s embattled ground forces.

.....
Lukashevych was already planning another operation. The Russians had built larger barriers at the entrance to the port in Sevastopol, all but ruling out sea-drone strikes there. So he came up with an alternative: laying sea mines.

Lukashevych’s team built a special SeaBaby that could lay mines that Ukraine had received from a Western partner. The so-called bottom mines are made of plastic and weigh about 400 pounds and are hard to find as they nestle into the mud under shallow water. They use acoustic and electromagnetic sensors to detect the presence of a ship, triggering a detonation. 

For a month and a half, the team tracked the routes taken by naval ships and civilian traffic, before sending a SeaBaby to lay two mines. On Sept. 14, the Samum, a guided-missile corvette, triggered one of the mines, which ripped a hole in its stern. The boat is still under repair in dry dock.

The SeaBaby went back and forth in the following weeks, covering more than 3,000 miles as it laid about 15 more mines. During one of the trips, detected by three Raptor-class patrol boats, it fired back with a grenade launcher, scattering the enemy craft.

On Oct. 11, an explosion tore into the side of the Pavel Derzhavin, a large patrol boat, as it was entering Sevastopol Bay. It limped into port for checks.

The Pavel Derzhavin was dispatched to another port for repairs on Oct. 13, but hit a mine as it left Sevastopol Bay. A large tugboat dispatched to rescue the ship, but also struck a mine and had to be towed back to port itself.

Days later, an explosion hit a modern anti-mine ship, one of only two in Russian service.

Thanks for including the quote. I don't subscribe to the WSJ so I will have to wait for a reprint. There are apparently more mines out there waiting to sink something Russian. The payload estimate for the "surface warfare" Sea Baby is 1850 lbs. That could mean four 400 lb mines per trip, best case. Initially Ukraine was apparently carrying two, but that undoubtedly can be improved upon. I don't know what Russia is doing to prevent mines being placed around routes into the port of Novorossiysk. Presumably it is not in a state of defense (yet). It is a long way, but if Ukraine could build some "long range" mine-laying drones they could shut the port. That would get Russia's attention in a big way!

Sea Baby drones are small enough and low enough in the water they are hard to see. When maneuvering at reasonable speed (particularly when attacking) they do leave a very noticeable wake. Aircraft, particularly helicopters, should make short work of them. Unfortunately for Russia the vast majority of their helicopter-capable ships are underwater. Sea Baby drones are also far from noiseless. Back "in the day" Russia had a very strong maritime patrol program that used both TU-95s and IL-38s to drop vast arrays of sonobuoys. The saying was that the TU-95s flying to Cuba and back dropped so many buoys one could walk from Leningrad to Havana without getting their feet wet. Apparently Russia no longer has that capability, at least that we have seen. They also have nothing like SOSUS in the Black Sea. Some of their ships had "tails" (towed arrays), but most of them are not afloat anymore. The Kilos do not carry towed arrays. Their hull-mounted passive sonar probably isn't sensitive enough to hunt Sea Baby drones.

Sea Baby drones can minimize their wake and acoustic signature by going slow. That is why mine-laying is much safer for them. They already are going "back and forth" as the article states. They don't need to go fast. Remaining undetected is the goal. There are other mine-warfare technologies Ukraine can use. As an example, commercial ships that carry "innocent" cargo can also lay mines. That was done in both WW I and WW II. These mines in the shipping lanes really do deter trade as nobody knows how many, how they got there or who did it. Ukraine is inventive. They should pursue mine warfare at the highest priority.

[Goose]

This article from WSJ discusses Ukrainian sea drone deployment of mines, their attacks on Sevastopol harbor, and the attack on the Kerch bridge.

https://www.wsj.com/world/naval-drones-i...a-ce35adfa

The mine laying capability seems to have been developed to counteract anti-drone netting and protections of Sevastopol harbor, and has been very effective, even damaging a Russian anti- mine ship.

Not mentioned in the article is Ukrainian deployment of anti-air missiles on these drones. Standoff weaponry such as MLRS and grenade launchers mentioned in passing.

The whole article is worth reading. I quoted in particular the mine aspect as it pertains to above discussion.

Ukraine has sunk or damaged around two dozen Russian ships of all sizes using explosive drones or mines delivered by low-slung craft about the size of a small fishing boat. Sea drones caused severe damage to a bridge from Russia to occupied Crimea that Russia used to supply its forces in Ukraine. Ukraine has also targeted Russian ships and port facilities with missiles provided by the West.

As a result, Russia has dispersed the bulk of its Black Sea Fleet far from Sevastopol. Ukraine has been able to restart exports worth billions from its main port of Odesa. Missiles launched from Russian ships take longer to reach Ukraine, giving air-defense crews critical extra time to intercept them. Russia has relocated reconnaissance planes, jet fighters, helicopters, aerial drones and electronic-jamming systems from the front lines to counter Ukraine’s sea drones, easing the pressure on Ukraine’s embattled ground forces.

.....
Lukashevych was already planning another operation. The Russians had built larger barriers at the entrance to the port in Sevastopol, all but ruling out sea-drone strikes there. So he came up with an alternative: laying sea mines.

Lukashevych’s team built a special SeaBaby that could lay mines that Ukraine had received from a Western partner. The so-called bottom mines are made of plastic and weigh about 400 pounds and are hard to find as they nestle into the mud under shallow water. They use acoustic and electromagnetic sensors to detect the presence of a ship, triggering a detonation. 

For a month and a half, the team tracked the routes taken by naval ships and civilian traffic, before sending a SeaBaby to lay two mines. On Sept. 14, the Samum, a guided-missile corvette, triggered one of the mines, which ripped a hole in its stern. The boat is still under repair in dry dock.

The SeaBaby went back and forth in the following weeks, covering more than 3,000 miles as it laid about 15 more mines. During one of the trips, detected by three Raptor-class patrol boats, it fired back with a grenade launcher, scattering the enemy craft.

On Oct. 11, an explosion tore into the side of the Pavel Derzhavin, a large patrol boat, as it was entering Sevastopol Bay. It limped into port for checks.

The Pavel Derzhavin was dispatched to another port for repairs on Oct. 13, but hit a mine as it left Sevastopol Bay. A large tugboat dispatched to rescue the ship, but also struck a mine and had to be towed back to port itself.

Days later, an explosion hit a modern anti-mine ship, one of only two in Russian service.

Thanks for including the quote. I don't subscribe to the WSJ so I will have to wait for a reprint. There are apparently more mines out there waiting to sink something Russian. The payload estimate for the "surface warfare" Sea Baby is 1850 lbs. That could mean four 400 lb mines per trip, best case. Initially Ukraine was apparently carrying two, but that undoubtedly can be improved upon. I don't know what Russia is doing to prevent mines being placed around routes into the port of Novorossiysk. Presumably it is not in a state of defense (yet). It is a long way, but if Ukraine could build some "long range" mine-laying drones they could shut the port. That would get Russia's attention in a big way!

Sea Baby drones are small enough and low enough in the water they are hard to see. When maneuvering at reasonable speed (particularly when attacking) they do leave a very noticeable wake. Aircraft, particularly helicopters, should make short work of them. Unfortunately for Russia the vast majority of their helicopter-capable ships are underwater. Sea Baby drones are also far from noiseless. Back "in the day" Russia had a very strong maritime patrol program that used both TU-95s and IL-38s to drop vast arrays of sonobuoys. The saying was that the TU-95s flying to Cuba and back dropped so many buoys one could walk from Leningrad to Havana without getting their feet wet. Apparently Russia no longer has that capability, at least that we have seen. They also have nothing like SOSUS in the Black Sea. Some of their ships had "tails" (towed arrays), but most of them are not afloat anymore. The Kilos do not carry towed arrays. Their hull-mounted passive sonar probably isn't sensitive enough to hunt Sea Baby drones.

Sea Baby drones can minimize their wake and acoustic signature by going slow. That is why mine-laying is much safer for them. They already are going "back and forth" as the article states. They don't need to go fast. Remaining undetected is the goal. There are other mine-warfare technologies Ukraine can use. As an example, commercial ships that carry "innocent" cargo can also lay mines. That was done in both WW I and WW II. These mines in the shipping lanes really do deter trade as nobody knows how many, how they got there or who did it. Ukraine is inventive. They should pursue mine warfare at the highest priority.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/yak-52-kill-m...50621.html

Another great idea/adaptation by Ukraine. These YAK-52s don't have a radar. They have to acquire targets visually to shoot at them. They can be vectored toward their targets by radio, but since they are not real fast the range is limited. All that said, it works well. F-16s in this role will work even better for many reasons. That doesn't mean Ukraine should stop using YAK-52s (subject to de-confliction issues). It is a good use of skilled pilots who are too old to pull 6 Gs regularly :-). These pilots also can fly the plane from day 1. The will need some practice, but unfortunately the Russians will give them plenty of targets to learn on.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/yak-52-kill-m...50621.html

Another great idea/adaptation by Ukraine. These YAK-52s don't have a radar. They have to acquire targets visually to shoot at them. They can be vectored toward their targets by radio, but since they are not real fast the range is limited. All that said, it works well. F-16s in this role will work even better for many reasons. That doesn't mean Ukraine should stop using YAK-52s (subject to de-confliction issues). It is a good use of skilled pilots who are too old to pull 6 Gs regularly :-). These pilots also can fly the plane from day 1. The will need some practice, but unfortunately the Russians will give them plenty of targets to learn on.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/yak-52-kill-m...50621.html

Another great idea/adaptation by Ukraine. These YAK-52s don't have a radar. They have to acquire targets visually to shoot at them. They can be vectored toward their targets by radio, but since they are not real fast the range is limited. All that said, it works well. F-16s in this role will work even better for many reasons. That doesn't mean Ukraine should stop using YAK-52s (subject to de-confliction issues). It is a good use of skilled pilots who are too old to pull 6 Gs regularly :-). These pilots also can fly the plane from day 1. The will need some practice, but unfortunately the Russians will give them plenty of targets to learn on.

As they say, Necessity is the mother of invention.

[GK3]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/yak-52-kill-m...50621.html

Another great idea/adaptation by Ukraine. These YAK-52s don't have a radar. They have to acquire targets visually to shoot at them. They can be vectored toward their targets by radio, but since they are not real fast the range is limited. All that said, it works well. F-16s in this role will work even better for many reasons. That doesn't mean Ukraine should stop using YAK-52s (subject to de-confliction issues). It is a good use of skilled pilots who are too old to pull 6 Gs regularly :-). These pilots also can fly the plane from day 1. The will need some practice, but unfortunately the Russians will give them plenty of targets to learn on.

As they say, Necessity is the mother of invention.