Should be said that it will be very difficult for Ukraine to hold this territory for a substantial period of time given they can't use HIMARS or ATACMS on Russian soil.
Outside Topic Way OT: Ukraine
(08-07-2024, 08:31 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Interesting reports of a Ukranian offensive in the Kursk region:I obviously am not privy to Ukraine's thinking. Ukraine has shown in the past that they are willing and able to identify "weak spots" in the Russian defenses and are willing to exploit them. This lead to the major gains in the north east starting with Kupyansk and going from there. IMO Ukraine saw an opportunity and took it. Ukraine realized that at a minimum it would force Russia to redeploy its assets to protect the border more effectively. The effect will undoubtedly be much larger than the cause. That is IMO the main reason for this assault. Ukraine was fortunately able to locate a place where an offensive action would cause Russia many more casualties than it would Ukraine. The "cost" was bearable by a Ukrainian military that is short on personnel. Russia moved as many assets as it could to support offensive actions in the north east. Ukraine made them pay.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...024-08-07/
Unlike previous incursions, this seems to be the regular Ukrainian military and in force rather then smaller militias. Videos of leopards and strykers have been circulating, with air defense for protection. One video of a Ukrainian BUK being destroyed.
I wonder what their main objective is:
Capture and hold Russian Territory for leverage in negotiations?
Propoganda/morale boost?
Force Russia to divert forces from other areas? All of the above?
It seems to be too involved to just be a "raid and get out" incursion like previous ones that were reported.
Being a bit of an optimist I also note that Ukraine executed a successful "combined arms" operation including providing air cover (via SAMs). This is the first time they have actually done that successfully. Granted, it was on a small scale, but this can be regarded as a "learning experience". If we see more of these it will indicate that is the case. It was indeed a leap of faith last summer when Ukraine attempted a very large "combined arms" operation without either the command staff or the troops having any experience at all in doing such an operation.
Gaining experience, especially if it is "low cost" and forces a major tactical redeployment by Russia is a big win. A significant increase in confidence at all levels in the units involved will also result. They will be "keen" to do it again. The fact there was a success will lift the general morale level, but not a lot. Ukraine still has problems defending in the north east. They aren't yet ready or able to dictate the "when and where" to Russia through Ukrainian action. If they can survive the winter without losing too much territory in the north, they may be able to turn things around in spring. Ukraine may accomplish this either by direct attacks in the north or by successful attacks elsewhere that depletes Russian forces in the north. I suspect Ukraine intends the latter. If one attempts to "make sense" of what Ukraine is doing on the ground, that seems to be the "plan". Of course, there may be no plan and opportunism may be the ruling factor. I hope not, but who knows? Ukraine is fighting hard in Kherson and inflicting significant attrition in Crimea, both air defense and logistics. AFAIK not much is going on in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. That may be inviting Russia to transfer forces out and make an offensive there by Ukraine in the spring feasible. It also may be that Ukraine just doesn't have the manpower to do more.
(08-07-2024, 08:31 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Interesting reports of a Ukranian offensive in the Kursk region:I obviously am not privy to Ukraine's thinking. Ukraine has shown in the past that they are willing and able to identify "weak spots" in the Russian defenses and are willing to exploit them. This lead to the major gains in the north east starting with Kupyansk and going from there. IMO Ukraine saw an opportunity and took it. Ukraine realized that at a minimum it would force Russia to redeploy its assets to protect the border more effectively. The effect will undoubtedly be much larger than the cause. That is IMO the main reason for this assault. Ukraine was fortunately able to locate a place where an offensive action would cause Russia many more casualties than it would Ukraine. The "cost" was bearable by a Ukrainian military that is short on personnel. Russia moved as many assets as it could to support offensive actions in the north east. Ukraine made them pay.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...024-08-07/
Unlike previous incursions, this seems to be the regular Ukrainian military and in force rather then smaller militias. Videos of leopards and strykers have been circulating, with air defense for protection. One video of a Ukrainian BUK being destroyed.
I wonder what their main objective is:
Capture and hold Russian Territory for leverage in negotiations?
Propoganda/morale boost?
Force Russia to divert forces from other areas? All of the above?
It seems to be too involved to just be a "raid and get out" incursion like previous ones that were reported.
Being a bit of an optimist I also note that Ukraine executed a successful "combined arms" operation including providing air cover (via SAMs). This is the first time they have actually done that successfully. Granted, it was on a small scale, but this can be regarded as a "learning experience". If we see more of these it will indicate that is the case. It was indeed a leap of faith last summer when Ukraine attempted a very large "combined arms" operation without either the command staff or the troops having any experience at all in doing such an operation.
Gaining experience, especially if it is "low cost" and forces a major tactical redeployment by Russia is a big win. A significant increase in confidence at all levels in the units involved will also result. They will be "keen" to do it again. The fact there was a success will lift the general morale level, but not a lot. Ukraine still has problems defending in the north east. They aren't yet ready or able to dictate the "when and where" to Russia through Ukrainian action. If they can survive the winter without losing too much territory in the north, they may be able to turn things around in spring. Ukraine may accomplish this either by direct attacks in the north or by successful attacks elsewhere that depletes Russian forces in the north. I suspect Ukraine intends the latter. If one attempts to "make sense" of what Ukraine is doing on the ground, that seems to be the "plan". Of course, there may be no plan and opportunism may be the ruling factor. I hope not, but who knows? Ukraine is fighting hard in Kherson and inflicting significant attrition in Crimea, both air defense and logistics. AFAIK not much is going on in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. That may be inviting Russia to transfer forces out and make an offensive there by Ukraine in the spring feasible. It also may be that Ukraine just doesn't have the manpower to do more.
08-07-2024, 09:49 AM
(08-07-2024, 09:17 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-07-2024, 08:31 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Interesting reports of a Ukranian offensive in the Kursk region:I obviously am not privy to Ukraine's thinking. Ukraine has shown in the past that they are willing and able to identify "weak spots" in the Russian defenses and are willing to exploit them. This lead to the major gains in the north east starting with Kupyansk and going from there. IMO Ukraine saw an opportunity and took it. Ukraine realized that at a minimum it would force Russia to redeploy its assets to protect the border more effectively. The effect will undoubtedly be much larger than the cause. That is IMO the main reason for this assault. Ukraine was fortunately able to locate a place where an offensive action would cause Russia many more casualties than it would Ukraine. The "cost" was bearable by a Ukrainian military that is short on personnel. Russia moved as many assets as it could to support offensive actions in the north east. Ukraine made them pay.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...024-08-07/
Unlike previous incursions, this seems to be the regular Ukrainian military and in force rather then smaller militias. Videos of leopards and strykers have been circulating, with air defense for protection. One video of a Ukrainian BUK being destroyed.
I wonder what their main objective is:
Capture and hold Russian Territory for leverage in negotiations?
Propoganda/morale boost?
Force Russia to divert forces from other areas? All of the above?
It seems to be too involved to just be a "raid and get out" incursion like previous ones that were reported.
Being a bit of an optimist I also note that Ukraine executed a successful "combined arms" operation including providing air cover (via SAMs). This is the first time they have actually done that successfully. Granted, it was on a small scale, but this can be regarded as a "learning experience". If we see more of these it will indicate that is the case. It was indeed a leap of faith last summer when Ukraine attempted a very large "combined arms" operation without either the command staff or the troops having any experience at all in doing such an operation.
Gaining experience, especially if it is "low cost" and forces a major tactical redeployment by Russia is a big win. A significant increase in confidence at all levels in the units involved will also result. They will be "keen" to do it again. The fact there was a success will lift the general morale level, but not a lot. Ukraine still has problems defending in the north east. They aren't yet ready or able to dictate the "when and where" to Russia through Ukrainian action. If they can survive the winter without losing too much territory in the north, they may be able to turn things around in spring. Ukraine may accomplish this either by direct attacks in the north or by successful attacks elsewhere that depletes Russian forces in the north. I suspect Ukraine intends the latter. If one attempts to "make sense" of what Ukraine is doing on the ground, that seems to be the "plan". Of course, there may be no plan and opportunism may be the ruling factor. I hope not, but who knows? Ukraine is fighting hard in Kherson and inflicting significant attrition in Crimea, both air defense and logistics. AFAIK not much is going on in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. That may be inviting Russia to transfer forces out and make an offensive there by Ukraine in the spring feasible. It also may be that Ukraine just doesn't have the manpower to do more.
It appears Ukraine has penetrated to within 30 km's of a major Russian nuclear power plant. They wouldn't have to attack the plant itself, but the distribution network around the plant could well be reachable with the right weapons. Anything the Ukraine forces can do that takes some pressure off their other forces is good. It could possibly make possible use of F 16's if there are not S 400 or S300 batteries in the local area.
(08-07-2024, 09:17 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-07-2024, 08:31 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Interesting reports of a Ukranian offensive in the Kursk region:I obviously am not privy to Ukraine's thinking. Ukraine has shown in the past that they are willing and able to identify "weak spots" in the Russian defenses and are willing to exploit them. This lead to the major gains in the north east starting with Kupyansk and going from there. IMO Ukraine saw an opportunity and took it. Ukraine realized that at a minimum it would force Russia to redeploy its assets to protect the border more effectively. The effect will undoubtedly be much larger than the cause. That is IMO the main reason for this assault. Ukraine was fortunately able to locate a place where an offensive action would cause Russia many more casualties than it would Ukraine. The "cost" was bearable by a Ukrainian military that is short on personnel. Russia moved as many assets as it could to support offensive actions in the north east. Ukraine made them pay.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...024-08-07/
Unlike previous incursions, this seems to be the regular Ukrainian military and in force rather then smaller militias. Videos of leopards and strykers have been circulating, with air defense for protection. One video of a Ukrainian BUK being destroyed.
I wonder what their main objective is:
Capture and hold Russian Territory for leverage in negotiations?
Propoganda/morale boost?
Force Russia to divert forces from other areas? All of the above?
It seems to be too involved to just be a "raid and get out" incursion like previous ones that were reported.
Being a bit of an optimist I also note that Ukraine executed a successful "combined arms" operation including providing air cover (via SAMs). This is the first time they have actually done that successfully. Granted, it was on a small scale, but this can be regarded as a "learning experience". If we see more of these it will indicate that is the case. It was indeed a leap of faith last summer when Ukraine attempted a very large "combined arms" operation without either the command staff or the troops having any experience at all in doing such an operation.
Gaining experience, especially if it is "low cost" and forces a major tactical redeployment by Russia is a big win. A significant increase in confidence at all levels in the units involved will also result. They will be "keen" to do it again. The fact there was a success will lift the general morale level, but not a lot. Ukraine still has problems defending in the north east. They aren't yet ready or able to dictate the "when and where" to Russia through Ukrainian action. If they can survive the winter without losing too much territory in the north, they may be able to turn things around in spring. Ukraine may accomplish this either by direct attacks in the north or by successful attacks elsewhere that depletes Russian forces in the north. I suspect Ukraine intends the latter. If one attempts to "make sense" of what Ukraine is doing on the ground, that seems to be the "plan". Of course, there may be no plan and opportunism may be the ruling factor. I hope not, but who knows? Ukraine is fighting hard in Kherson and inflicting significant attrition in Crimea, both air defense and logistics. AFAIK not much is going on in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. That may be inviting Russia to transfer forces out and make an offensive there by Ukraine in the spring feasible. It also may be that Ukraine just doesn't have the manpower to do more.
It appears Ukraine has penetrated to within 30 km's of a major Russian nuclear power plant. They wouldn't have to attack the plant itself, but the distribution network around the plant could well be reachable with the right weapons. Anything the Ukraine forces can do that takes some pressure off their other forces is good. It could possibly make possible use of F 16's if there are not S 400 or S300 batteries in the local area.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/e-2d-refuelin...00347.html
I post this not because of E-2D refueling (although that may interest some of you), but rather because of the great slide further down in the article illustrating the use of the E-2 as part of the Naval Integrated Fire Control - Counter Air (NIFC-CA). This slide illustrates the E-2 down-linking the radar picture to the controlling platform, in this case a AEGIS ship with SM-6 missiles. The ship can't even "see" the target because of the radar horizon. The mountains in the slide are an embellishment. The curvature of the earth is enough. The ship gets the data from the E-2 and launches the missile "blind". The ship tracks the missile and uses the uplink on the ship to "correct" the missile based on the E-2 picture for as long as it can. The missile then "goes active" (possibly after a programmed delay to conserve power) and homes in on the target by itself. As the article states, this allows using the SAM (the SM-6) out at its maximum range. This ability is a "game changer". Operating at lower altitude no longer protects enemy air from long range SAMs.
Substitute "Patriot battery" for the ship and "PAC-3 MSE" for SM-6 and "ASC 890" for E-2D and you have what Ukraine should be able to do "very soon". The US has demonstrated interoperability between the Patriot battery and both the E-2C and E-3 AWACS. I believe (though I am not sure) the same has been demonstrated with the E-7 Wedgetail. I post the following link with trepidation, because much of what it says is absolute nonsense. However its speculation is "interesting". https://www.eurasiantimes.com/australias...ite-likel/. The point is the technology and software exists for Patriot to do this now. The ASC 890 may not have latest software capability yet. However, they do have Link-16 which is fundamentally all that is needed. The following article describes using this capability with the F-16. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/what-mak...98885.html. Both these capabilities will really "put the hurt" to Russian air operations. The Patriot involvement greatly augments the F-16 capability because of the PAC-3 MSE range advantage over an AMRAAM. Both are important, but driving Russian air as far back as possible is a big win.
I have previously talked about the notional capability of the A-50 to do the same things with the S-400. Russia claims they can do this, but nobody has ever seen them do it AFAIK, even experimentally. As previously stated it will only "work" with 9M96 and beyond versions of the SA-400 missiles. Fortunately these are supposedly much less plentiful than the SARH type of S-400 missiles. OTOH there is no inherent reason Russia can't do this. It isn't exactly "cutting edge" technology. Ukraine has to be prepared for it if they do. The longer the war goes on, the more probable it becomes they will.
I post this not because of E-2D refueling (although that may interest some of you), but rather because of the great slide further down in the article illustrating the use of the E-2 as part of the Naval Integrated Fire Control - Counter Air (NIFC-CA). This slide illustrates the E-2 down-linking the radar picture to the controlling platform, in this case a AEGIS ship with SM-6 missiles. The ship can't even "see" the target because of the radar horizon. The mountains in the slide are an embellishment. The curvature of the earth is enough. The ship gets the data from the E-2 and launches the missile "blind". The ship tracks the missile and uses the uplink on the ship to "correct" the missile based on the E-2 picture for as long as it can. The missile then "goes active" (possibly after a programmed delay to conserve power) and homes in on the target by itself. As the article states, this allows using the SAM (the SM-6) out at its maximum range. This ability is a "game changer". Operating at lower altitude no longer protects enemy air from long range SAMs.
Substitute "Patriot battery" for the ship and "PAC-3 MSE" for SM-6 and "ASC 890" for E-2D and you have what Ukraine should be able to do "very soon". The US has demonstrated interoperability between the Patriot battery and both the E-2C and E-3 AWACS. I believe (though I am not sure) the same has been demonstrated with the E-7 Wedgetail. I post the following link with trepidation, because much of what it says is absolute nonsense. However its speculation is "interesting". https://www.eurasiantimes.com/australias...ite-likel/. The point is the technology and software exists for Patriot to do this now. The ASC 890 may not have latest software capability yet. However, they do have Link-16 which is fundamentally all that is needed. The following article describes using this capability with the F-16. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/what-mak...98885.html. Both these capabilities will really "put the hurt" to Russian air operations. The Patriot involvement greatly augments the F-16 capability because of the PAC-3 MSE range advantage over an AMRAAM. Both are important, but driving Russian air as far back as possible is a big win.
I have previously talked about the notional capability of the A-50 to do the same things with the S-400. Russia claims they can do this, but nobody has ever seen them do it AFAIK, even experimentally. As previously stated it will only "work" with 9M96 and beyond versions of the SA-400 missiles. Fortunately these are supposedly much less plentiful than the SARH type of S-400 missiles. OTOH there is no inherent reason Russia can't do this. It isn't exactly "cutting edge" technology. Ukraine has to be prepared for it if they do. The longer the war goes on, the more probable it becomes they will.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/e-2d-refuelin...00347.html
I post this not because of E-2D refueling (although that may interest some of you), but rather because of the great slide further down in the article illustrating the use of the E-2 as part of the Naval Integrated Fire Control - Counter Air (NIFC-CA). This slide illustrates the E-2 down-linking the radar picture to the controlling platform, in this case a AEGIS ship with SM-6 missiles. The ship can't even "see" the target because of the radar horizon. The mountains in the slide are an embellishment. The curvature of the earth is enough. The ship gets the data from the E-2 and launches the missile "blind". The ship tracks the missile and uses the uplink on the ship to "correct" the missile based on the E-2 picture for as long as it can. The missile then "goes active" (possibly after a programmed delay to conserve power) and homes in on the target by itself. As the article states, this allows using the SAM (the SM-6) out at its maximum range. This ability is a "game changer". Operating at lower altitude no longer protects enemy air from long range SAMs.
Substitute "Patriot battery" for the ship and "PAC-3 MSE" for SM-6 and "ASC 890" for E-2D and you have what Ukraine should be able to do "very soon". The US has demonstrated interoperability between the Patriot battery and both the E-2C and E-3 AWACS. I believe (though I am not sure) the same has been demonstrated with the E-7 Wedgetail. I post the following link with trepidation, because much of what it says is absolute nonsense. However its speculation is "interesting". https://www.eurasiantimes.com/australias...ite-likel/. The point is the technology and software exists for Patriot to do this now. The ASC 890 may not have latest software capability yet. However, they do have Link-16 which is fundamentally all that is needed. The following article describes using this capability with the F-16. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/what-mak...98885.html. Both these capabilities will really "put the hurt" to Russian air operations. The Patriot involvement greatly augments the F-16 capability because of the PAC-3 MSE range advantage over an AMRAAM. Both are important, but driving Russian air as far back as possible is a big win.
I have previously talked about the notional capability of the A-50 to do the same things with the S-400. Russia claims they can do this, but nobody has ever seen them do it AFAIK, even experimentally. As previously stated it will only "work" with 9M96 and beyond versions of the SA-400 missiles. Fortunately these are supposedly much less plentiful than the SARH type of S-400 missiles. OTOH there is no inherent reason Russia can't do this. It isn't exactly "cutting edge" technology. Ukraine has to be prepared for it if they do. The longer the war goes on, the more probable it becomes they will.
I post this not because of E-2D refueling (although that may interest some of you), but rather because of the great slide further down in the article illustrating the use of the E-2 as part of the Naval Integrated Fire Control - Counter Air (NIFC-CA). This slide illustrates the E-2 down-linking the radar picture to the controlling platform, in this case a AEGIS ship with SM-6 missiles. The ship can't even "see" the target because of the radar horizon. The mountains in the slide are an embellishment. The curvature of the earth is enough. The ship gets the data from the E-2 and launches the missile "blind". The ship tracks the missile and uses the uplink on the ship to "correct" the missile based on the E-2 picture for as long as it can. The missile then "goes active" (possibly after a programmed delay to conserve power) and homes in on the target by itself. As the article states, this allows using the SAM (the SM-6) out at its maximum range. This ability is a "game changer". Operating at lower altitude no longer protects enemy air from long range SAMs.
Substitute "Patriot battery" for the ship and "PAC-3 MSE" for SM-6 and "ASC 890" for E-2D and you have what Ukraine should be able to do "very soon". The US has demonstrated interoperability between the Patriot battery and both the E-2C and E-3 AWACS. I believe (though I am not sure) the same has been demonstrated with the E-7 Wedgetail. I post the following link with trepidation, because much of what it says is absolute nonsense. However its speculation is "interesting". https://www.eurasiantimes.com/australias...ite-likel/. The point is the technology and software exists for Patriot to do this now. The ASC 890 may not have latest software capability yet. However, they do have Link-16 which is fundamentally all that is needed. The following article describes using this capability with the F-16. https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/what-mak...98885.html. Both these capabilities will really "put the hurt" to Russian air operations. The Patriot involvement greatly augments the F-16 capability because of the PAC-3 MSE range advantage over an AMRAAM. Both are important, but driving Russian air as far back as possible is a big win.
I have previously talked about the notional capability of the A-50 to do the same things with the S-400. Russia claims they can do this, but nobody has ever seen them do it AFAIK, even experimentally. As previously stated it will only "work" with 9M96 and beyond versions of the SA-400 missiles. Fortunately these are supposedly much less plentiful than the SARH type of S-400 missiles. OTOH there is no inherent reason Russia can't do this. It isn't exactly "cutting edge" technology. Ukraine has to be prepared for it if they do. The longer the war goes on, the more probable it becomes they will.
(08-07-2024, 09:49 AM)GK3 Wrote:(08-07-2024, 09:17 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-07-2024, 08:31 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Interesting reports of a Ukranian offensive in the Kursk region:I obviously am not privy to Ukraine's thinking. Ukraine has shown in the past that they are willing and able to identify "weak spots" in the Russian defenses and are willing to exploit them. This lead to the major gains in the north east starting with Kupyansk and going from there. IMO Ukraine saw an opportunity and took it. Ukraine realized that at a minimum it would force Russia to redeploy its assets to protect the border more effectively. The effect will undoubtedly be much larger than the cause. That is IMO the main reason for this assault. Ukraine was fortunately able to locate a place where an offensive action would cause Russia many more casualties than it would Ukraine. The "cost" was bearable by a Ukrainian military that is short on personnel. Russia moved as many assets as it could to support offensive actions in the north east. Ukraine made them pay.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...024-08-07/
Unlike previous incursions, this seems to be the regular Ukrainian military and in force rather then smaller militias. Videos of leopards and strykers have been circulating, with air defense for protection. One video of a Ukrainian BUK being destroyed.
I wonder what their main objective is:
Capture and hold Russian Territory for leverage in negotiations?
Propoganda/morale boost?
Force Russia to divert forces from other areas? All of the above?
It seems to be too involved to just be a "raid and get out" incursion like previous ones that were reported.
Being a bit of an optimist I also note that Ukraine executed a successful "combined arms" operation including providing air cover (via SAMs). This is the first time they have actually done that successfully. Granted, it was on a small scale, but this can be regarded as a "learning experience". If we see more of these it will indicate that is the case. It was indeed a leap of faith last summer when Ukraine attempted a very large "combined arms" operation without either the command staff or the troops having any experience at all in doing such an operation.
Gaining experience, especially if it is "low cost" and forces a major tactical redeployment by Russia is a big win. A significant increase in confidence at all levels in the units involved will also result. They will be "keen" to do it again. The fact there was a success will lift the general morale level, but not a lot. Ukraine still has problems defending in the north east. They aren't yet ready or able to dictate the "when and where" to Russia through Ukrainian action. If they can survive the winter without losing too much territory in the north, they may be able to turn things around in spring. Ukraine may accomplish this either by direct attacks in the north or by successful attacks elsewhere that depletes Russian forces in the north. I suspect Ukraine intends the latter. If one attempts to "make sense" of what Ukraine is doing on the ground, that seems to be the "plan". Of course, there may be no plan and opportunism may be the ruling factor. I hope not, but who knows? Ukraine is fighting hard in Kherson and inflicting significant attrition in Crimea, both air defense and logistics. AFAIK not much is going on in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. That may be inviting Russia to transfer forces out and make an offensive there by Ukraine in the spring feasible. It also may be that Ukraine just doesn't have the manpower to do more.
It appears Ukraine has penetrated to within 30 km's of a major Russian nuclear power plant. They wouldn't have to attack the plant itself, but the distribution network around the plant could well be reachable with the right weapons. Anything the Ukraine forces can do that takes some pressure off their other forces is good. It could possibly make possible use of F 16's if there are not S 400 or S300 batteries in the local area.
Russian aircraft are currently working over Kursk. Would expect Russian AD assets to keep Ukrainian aircraft out of the region.
This is from yesterday showing what I think are two Russian Su25s flying low over something burning in a road. Filmed by Russian civilian. Pretty dramatic footage
https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1820815277811986468
(This post was last modified: 08-07-2024, 11:05 AM by dabigv13.)
(08-07-2024, 09:49 AM)GK3 Wrote:(08-07-2024, 09:17 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-07-2024, 08:31 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Interesting reports of a Ukranian offensive in the Kursk region:I obviously am not privy to Ukraine's thinking. Ukraine has shown in the past that they are willing and able to identify "weak spots" in the Russian defenses and are willing to exploit them. This lead to the major gains in the north east starting with Kupyansk and going from there. IMO Ukraine saw an opportunity and took it. Ukraine realized that at a minimum it would force Russia to redeploy its assets to protect the border more effectively. The effect will undoubtedly be much larger than the cause. That is IMO the main reason for this assault. Ukraine was fortunately able to locate a place where an offensive action would cause Russia many more casualties than it would Ukraine. The "cost" was bearable by a Ukrainian military that is short on personnel. Russia moved as many assets as it could to support offensive actions in the north east. Ukraine made them pay.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukr...024-08-07/
Unlike previous incursions, this seems to be the regular Ukrainian military and in force rather then smaller militias. Videos of leopards and strykers have been circulating, with air defense for protection. One video of a Ukrainian BUK being destroyed.
I wonder what their main objective is:
Capture and hold Russian Territory for leverage in negotiations?
Propoganda/morale boost?
Force Russia to divert forces from other areas? All of the above?
It seems to be too involved to just be a "raid and get out" incursion like previous ones that were reported.
Being a bit of an optimist I also note that Ukraine executed a successful "combined arms" operation including providing air cover (via SAMs). This is the first time they have actually done that successfully. Granted, it was on a small scale, but this can be regarded as a "learning experience". If we see more of these it will indicate that is the case. It was indeed a leap of faith last summer when Ukraine attempted a very large "combined arms" operation without either the command staff or the troops having any experience at all in doing such an operation.
Gaining experience, especially if it is "low cost" and forces a major tactical redeployment by Russia is a big win. A significant increase in confidence at all levels in the units involved will also result. They will be "keen" to do it again. The fact there was a success will lift the general morale level, but not a lot. Ukraine still has problems defending in the north east. They aren't yet ready or able to dictate the "when and where" to Russia through Ukrainian action. If they can survive the winter without losing too much territory in the north, they may be able to turn things around in spring. Ukraine may accomplish this either by direct attacks in the north or by successful attacks elsewhere that depletes Russian forces in the north. I suspect Ukraine intends the latter. If one attempts to "make sense" of what Ukraine is doing on the ground, that seems to be the "plan". Of course, there may be no plan and opportunism may be the ruling factor. I hope not, but who knows? Ukraine is fighting hard in Kherson and inflicting significant attrition in Crimea, both air defense and logistics. AFAIK not much is going on in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. That may be inviting Russia to transfer forces out and make an offensive there by Ukraine in the spring feasible. It also may be that Ukraine just doesn't have the manpower to do more.
It appears Ukraine has penetrated to within 30 km's of a major Russian nuclear power plant. They wouldn't have to attack the plant itself, but the distribution network around the plant could well be reachable with the right weapons. Anything the Ukraine forces can do that takes some pressure off their other forces is good. It could possibly make possible use of F 16's if there are not S 400 or S300 batteries in the local area.
Russian aircraft are currently working over Kursk. Would expect Russian AD assets to keep Ukrainian aircraft out of the region.
This is from yesterday showing what I think are two Russian Su25s flying low over something burning in a road. Filmed by Russian civilian. Pretty dramatic footage
https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1820815277811986468
08-07-2024, 11:22 AM
(08-07-2024, 11:04 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Russian aircraft are currently working over Kursk. Would expect Russian AD assets to keep Ukrainian aircraft out of the region.Agree. Certainly Ukraine isn't in any position to risk their very few new F-16s in this effort. The rest of the Ukrainian air assets are equally to valuable to risk a full scale air battle for this offensive. Ukraine has deployed some SAM assets but is unclear to me how many, how many are lost, and whether there are any operational Ukrainian AD assets still there.
Quote:This is from yesterday showing what I think are two Russian Su25s flying low over something burning in a road. Filmed by Russian civilian. Pretty dramatic footageThe airplanes do look like SU-25s to me too. In theory they could be Ukrainian, though I doubt they are. If the Ukrainian troops are in the area SU-25s flying that low should be great targets for MANPADS. Ukraine has them, for sure. Too low for BUKs and such.
https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1820815277811986468
(08-07-2024, 11:04 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Russian aircraft are currently working over Kursk. Would expect Russian AD assets to keep Ukrainian aircraft out of the region.Agree. Certainly Ukraine isn't in any position to risk their very few new F-16s in this effort. The rest of the Ukrainian air assets are equally to valuable to risk a full scale air battle for this offensive. Ukraine has deployed some SAM assets but is unclear to me how many, how many are lost, and whether there are any operational Ukrainian AD assets still there.
Quote:This is from yesterday showing what I think are two Russian Su25s flying low over something burning in a road. Filmed by Russian civilian. Pretty dramatic footageThe airplanes do look like SU-25s to me too. In theory they could be Ukrainian, though I doubt they are. If the Ukrainian troops are in the area SU-25s flying that low should be great targets for MANPADS. Ukraine has them, for sure. Too low for BUKs and such.
https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1820815277811986468
08-07-2024, 01:01 PM
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821266556732764613
LMAO
Quote:A resident of Sudzha basically confirming Ukrainian presence inside the town:
“I was just in the center. Everything is more or less intact. The prosecutor's office is destroyed. The city administration is flying the Ukrainian flag. There are many soldiers and equipment. A soldier called me over, checked my documents, and wasn't rude. I asked, "What should we do?" He said, "Learn the Ukrainian anthem and prepare for a referendum."
LMAO
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821266556732764613
LMAO
Quote:A resident of Sudzha basically confirming Ukrainian presence inside the town:
“I was just in the center. Everything is more or less intact. The prosecutor's office is destroyed. The city administration is flying the Ukrainian flag. There are many soldiers and equipment. A soldier called me over, checked my documents, and wasn't rude. I asked, "What should we do?" He said, "Learn the Ukrainian anthem and prepare for a referendum."
LMAO
08-07-2024, 01:25 PM
(08-07-2024, 01:01 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821266556732764613Indeed great "humor", but it might also be "serious" enough that Russia has to respond and respond with "overwhelming force". That will at least require moving many forces Russia would like to use elsewhere. One wonders if Ukraine has a "plan" here to hit Russian forces as they move to their staging areas and as they deploy. If properly resourced such actions could seriously damage the Russian military and at the very least embarrass the Russian government (i.e. Putin). OTOH Ukraine may intend to pull out when Russia brings pressure. That is OK too, because it will disrupt Russian offensive power until winter sets in. It also reminds Russia that Ukraine can simply return if Russia does not improve the border defense.
Quote:A resident of Sudzha basically confirming Ukrainian presence inside the town:
“I was just in the center. Everything is more or less intact. The prosecutor's office is destroyed. The city administration is flying the Ukrainian flag. There are many soldiers and equipment. A soldier called me over, checked my documents, and wasn't rude. I asked, "What should we do?" He said, "Learn the Ukrainian anthem and prepare for a referendum."
LMAO
(08-07-2024, 01:01 PM)dabigv13 Wrote: https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821266556732764613Indeed great "humor", but it might also be "serious" enough that Russia has to respond and respond with "overwhelming force". That will at least require moving many forces Russia would like to use elsewhere. One wonders if Ukraine has a "plan" here to hit Russian forces as they move to their staging areas and as they deploy. If properly resourced such actions could seriously damage the Russian military and at the very least embarrass the Russian government (i.e. Putin). OTOH Ukraine may intend to pull out when Russia brings pressure. That is OK too, because it will disrupt Russian offensive power until winter sets in. It also reminds Russia that Ukraine can simply return if Russia does not improve the border defense.
Quote:A resident of Sudzha basically confirming Ukrainian presence inside the town:
“I was just in the center. Everything is more or less intact. The prosecutor's office is destroyed. The city administration is flying the Ukrainian flag. There are many soldiers and equipment. A soldier called me over, checked my documents, and wasn't rude. I asked, "What should we do?" He said, "Learn the Ukrainian anthem and prepare for a referendum."
LMAO
08-08-2024, 09:16 AM
Another key difference between this incursion and the prior activities of the freedom of russia militia: Silence from Ukraine.
During the prior incursions, there was clearly a big propaganda component, with lots of pictures taken and posted on social media. This time? Nothing coming from Ukrainian sources, much more reminiscent of the Kharkiv offensive.
During the prior incursions, there was clearly a big propaganda component, with lots of pictures taken and posted on social media. This time? Nothing coming from Ukrainian sources, much more reminiscent of the Kharkiv offensive.
Another key difference between this incursion and the prior activities of the freedom of russia militia: Silence from Ukraine.
During the prior incursions, there was clearly a big propaganda component, with lots of pictures taken and posted on social media. This time? Nothing coming from Ukrainian sources, much more reminiscent of the Kharkiv offensive.
During the prior incursions, there was clearly a big propaganda component, with lots of pictures taken and posted on social media. This time? Nothing coming from Ukrainian sources, much more reminiscent of the Kharkiv offensive.
Yeah this definitely is different from the prior raids into Russia. The use of multiple regular and "elite" Ukrainian units for one, as opposed to Russians fighting for Ukraine. And much better resourced. The number of large groups of soldiers surrendering is also new.
Claims today from Russia that Ukrainian helicopters are operating now over Russian border for resupply and evacuation. Russian sources also claim further deep penetrations, with fighting 30km from border in places. Ukraine seems to be moving fast and bypassing fortified defenses. Lots of speculation that Ukraine has used the incursions to infiltrate smaller SOF teams that may be the source of some of the deeper fighting but may also pop up in some surprising ways in days ahead.
Rail infrastructure and the Kursk nuclear power plant seem like interesting potential targets in the area. Still seems like it would be hard for Ukraine to hold all this territory.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821581836717576317
Ukraine has definitely achieved surprise and have the initiative. But is this a Battle of the Bulge type last gasp offensive? Or just a larger raid? Still hard to see where this goes.
Claims today from Russia that Ukrainian helicopters are operating now over Russian border for resupply and evacuation. Russian sources also claim further deep penetrations, with fighting 30km from border in places. Ukraine seems to be moving fast and bypassing fortified defenses. Lots of speculation that Ukraine has used the incursions to infiltrate smaller SOF teams that may be the source of some of the deeper fighting but may also pop up in some surprising ways in days ahead.
Rail infrastructure and the Kursk nuclear power plant seem like interesting potential targets in the area. Still seems like it would be hard for Ukraine to hold all this territory.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821581836717576317
Ukraine has definitely achieved surprise and have the initiative. But is this a Battle of the Bulge type last gasp offensive? Or just a larger raid? Still hard to see where this goes.
(This post was last modified: 08-08-2024, 09:55 AM by dabigv13.)
Yeah this definitely is different from the prior raids into Russia. The use of multiple regular and "elite" Ukrainian units for one, as opposed to Russians fighting for Ukraine. And much better resourced. The number of large groups of soldiers surrendering is also new.
Claims today from Russia that Ukrainian helicopters are operating now over Russian border for resupply and evacuation. Russian sources also claim further deep penetrations, with fighting 30km from border in places. Ukraine seems to be moving fast and bypassing fortified defenses. Lots of speculation that Ukraine has used the incursions to infiltrate smaller SOF teams that may be the source of some of the deeper fighting but may also pop up in some surprising ways in days ahead.
Rail infrastructure and the Kursk nuclear power plant seem like interesting potential targets in the area. Still seems like it would be hard for Ukraine to hold all this territory.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821581836717576317
Ukraine has definitely achieved surprise and have the initiative. But is this a Battle of the Bulge type last gasp offensive? Or just a larger raid? Still hard to see where this goes.
Claims today from Russia that Ukrainian helicopters are operating now over Russian border for resupply and evacuation. Russian sources also claim further deep penetrations, with fighting 30km from border in places. Ukraine seems to be moving fast and bypassing fortified defenses. Lots of speculation that Ukraine has used the incursions to infiltrate smaller SOF teams that may be the source of some of the deeper fighting but may also pop up in some surprising ways in days ahead.
Rail infrastructure and the Kursk nuclear power plant seem like interesting potential targets in the area. Still seems like it would be hard for Ukraine to hold all this territory.
https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1821581836717576317
Ukraine has definitely achieved surprise and have the initiative. But is this a Battle of the Bulge type last gasp offensive? Or just a larger raid? Still hard to see where this goes.
08-08-2024, 09:50 AM
(08-08-2024, 09:16 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Another key difference between this incursion and the prior activities of the freedom of russia militia: Silence from Ukraine.This mission clearly is "different". It isn't "freedom of Russia militia". Actually, IMO there is still a big "propaganda component". Ukraine has long realized that letting the Russian milblogers speculate generates much more FAD among the Russians than anything Ukraine could show or say. In this case, as in others, silence is a weapon. It has the added advantages of 1) maintaining operational security and 2) not placing Ukraine in a situation where defeats or inaccurate, overly optimistic reports will degrade their credibility. The world and Russia know from experience that lots of Ukrainian victories/accomplishments (like the referenced Kharkiv offensive) were accompanied by silence. The silence gives Russians a sinking feeling of "here we go again". It things don't work out so well, Ukraine hasn't lied to anybody.
During the prior incursions, there was clearly a big propaganda component, with lots of pictures taken and posted on social media. This time? Nothing coming from Ukrainian sources, much more reminiscent of the Kharkiv offensive.
(08-08-2024, 09:16 AM)gocard14 Wrote: Another key difference between this incursion and the prior activities of the freedom of russia militia: Silence from Ukraine.This mission clearly is "different". It isn't "freedom of Russia militia". Actually, IMO there is still a big "propaganda component". Ukraine has long realized that letting the Russian milblogers speculate generates much more FAD among the Russians than anything Ukraine could show or say. In this case, as in others, silence is a weapon. It has the added advantages of 1) maintaining operational security and 2) not placing Ukraine in a situation where defeats or inaccurate, overly optimistic reports will degrade their credibility. The world and Russia know from experience that lots of Ukrainian victories/accomplishments (like the referenced Kharkiv offensive) were accompanied by silence. The silence gives Russians a sinking feeling of "here we go again". It things don't work out so well, Ukraine hasn't lied to anybody.
During the prior incursions, there was clearly a big propaganda component, with lots of pictures taken and posted on social media. This time? Nothing coming from Ukrainian sources, much more reminiscent of the Kharkiv offensive.
Quote:An intelligence source says that Ukraine has been reassured by the early successes of the operation, which, he claims, has thrown Russia into paralysis. Russia is now using elite soldiers in dangerous ways to stem the advance, he says. Ukraine on the other hand is only advancing where it made sense. “The Russians are making very stupid errors and it’s all down to their corrupt top-down management which prioritises good news over the truth.” The Kursk incursion, which follows reverses in Kyiv, Kharkiv region and Kherson, represents the “fourth big failure” of Russia’s generals in mechanised, manoeuvre warfare. “We’ve now got options and the Russians know it.”
Previous cross-border raids were mostly led by Ukraine’s military intelligence. On this occasion, the operation is more closely associated with Ukraine’s much-criticised new commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky, with regular army units joining these raids for the first time. With stakes this high, General Syrsky’s career may well be riding on it. Reports from frontline Ukrainian hospitals suggest that casualty figures are already mounting. People may still question whether it was wise to devote so many troops to the incursion while critical frontlines are thin. The answer will depend on the operation’s success.
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/08...nto-russia
(This post was last modified: 08-08-2024, 10:14 AM by dabigv13.)
Quote:An intelligence source says that Ukraine has been reassured by the early successes of the operation, which, he claims, has thrown Russia into paralysis. Russia is now using elite soldiers in dangerous ways to stem the advance, he says. Ukraine on the other hand is only advancing where it made sense. “The Russians are making very stupid errors and it’s all down to their corrupt top-down management which prioritises good news over the truth.” The Kursk incursion, which follows reverses in Kyiv, Kharkiv region and Kherson, represents the “fourth big failure” of Russia’s generals in mechanised, manoeuvre warfare. “We’ve now got options and the Russians know it.”
Previous cross-border raids were mostly led by Ukraine’s military intelligence. On this occasion, the operation is more closely associated with Ukraine’s much-criticised new commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky, with regular army units joining these raids for the first time. With stakes this high, General Syrsky’s career may well be riding on it. Reports from frontline Ukrainian hospitals suggest that casualty figures are already mounting. People may still question whether it was wise to devote so many troops to the incursion while critical frontlines are thin. The answer will depend on the operation’s success.
https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/08...nto-russia
08-08-2024, 11:11 AM
Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
08-08-2024, 11:39 AM
(08-08-2024, 11:11 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.This can be great, or it can be "problematic". We don't know what Ukraine's intentions are. Do they intend to occupy and defend themselves in Russian territory? If so, how many assets do they intend to commit to that effort? If the advance exceeds what Ukraine wants to/can defend, it will require retreating from these forward positions. That is fine too as long as you killed many more Russians than Ukrainians doing it. If not, it isn't worth it. It is also possible for Ukraine to defend "forward" with the idea of a slow retreat that will kill lots of Russians and occupy even more in the effort. That can be tricky, but it might be part of the plan.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
My real concern at this point is can Ukraine supply their troops that far forward in Russia? The terrain doesn't seem to contain lots of roads. The 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway runs parallel to the current front line and Ukraine is advancing in both directions along it. The only road leading into Ukraine is the R-200/H07. For Ukraine to stay where they are (let alone advance further) they must have at least intermittent air superiority along that road. Ukraine may do this by SAMs and MANPADS, but they will have to do it if they intend to stay. Otherwise their logistics will be impossible.
(08-08-2024, 11:11 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.This can be great, or it can be "problematic". We don't know what Ukraine's intentions are. Do they intend to occupy and defend themselves in Russian territory? If so, how many assets do they intend to commit to that effort? If the advance exceeds what Ukraine wants to/can defend, it will require retreating from these forward positions. That is fine too as long as you killed many more Russians than Ukrainians doing it. If not, it isn't worth it. It is also possible for Ukraine to defend "forward" with the idea of a slow retreat that will kill lots of Russians and occupy even more in the effort. That can be tricky, but it might be part of the plan.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
My real concern at this point is can Ukraine supply their troops that far forward in Russia? The terrain doesn't seem to contain lots of roads. The 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway runs parallel to the current front line and Ukraine is advancing in both directions along it. The only road leading into Ukraine is the R-200/H07. For Ukraine to stay where they are (let alone advance further) they must have at least intermittent air superiority along that road. Ukraine may do this by SAMs and MANPADS, but they will have to do it if they intend to stay. Otherwise their logistics will be impossible.
08-08-2024, 11:42 AM
(08-08-2024, 10:03 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: The Kursk incursion, which follows reverses in Kyiv, Kharkiv region and Kherson, represents the “fourth big failure” of Russia’s generals in mechanised, manoeuvre warfare. “We’ve now got options and the Russians know it.”
The article is focused on Russia's failures against Ukraine, but let's not forget that Prigozhin's troops overran a large swath of terrain and a significant Russian city. Russia's forces can't be everywhere and there are downsides to amassing large forces in the Donetsk region.
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
(08-08-2024, 10:03 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: The Kursk incursion, which follows reverses in Kyiv, Kharkiv region and Kherson, represents the “fourth big failure” of Russia’s generals in mechanised, manoeuvre warfare. “We’ve now got options and the Russians know it.”
The article is focused on Russia's failures against Ukraine, but let's not forget that Prigozhin's troops overran a large swath of terrain and a significant Russian city. Russia's forces can't be everywhere and there are downsides to amassing large forces in the Donetsk region.
When I registered here in 2014, TrumpCard seemed like an apolitical user ID...
08-08-2024, 11:55 AM
(08-08-2024, 11:39 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-08-2024, 11:11 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.This can be great, or it can be "problematic". We don't know what Ukraine's intentions are. Do they intend to occupy and defend themselves in Russian territory? If so, how many assets do they intend to commit to that effort? If the advance exceeds what Ukraine wants to/can defend, it will require retreating from these forward positions. That is fine too as long as you killed many more Russians than Ukrainians doing it. If not, it isn't worth it. It is also possible for Ukraine to defend "forward" with the idea of a slow retreat that will kill lots of Russians and occupy even more in the effort. That can be tricky, but it might be part of the plan.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
My real concern at this point is can Ukraine supply their troops that far forward in Russia? The terrain doesn't seem to contain lots of roads. The 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway runs parallel to the current front line and Ukraine is advancing in both directions along it. The only road leading into Ukraine is the R-200/H07. For Ukraine to stay where they are (let alone advance further) they must have at least intermittent air superiority along that road. Ukraine may do this by SAMs and MANPADS, but they will have to do it if they intend to stay. Otherwise their logistics will be impossible.
I wonder if the short term logistical situation is partially mitigated by local supplies. These Russian towns have cars, gas, food, water, etc that can be used to fuel further advances.
You also have to wonder how Russia will respond when trying to retake territory. Their only effective method has been to flatten settlements with artillery and glide bombs. Are they willing to do that with Russian towns, some of which will still have civilians within them?
(08-08-2024, 11:39 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-08-2024, 11:11 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.This can be great, or it can be "problematic". We don't know what Ukraine's intentions are. Do they intend to occupy and defend themselves in Russian territory? If so, how many assets do they intend to commit to that effort? If the advance exceeds what Ukraine wants to/can defend, it will require retreating from these forward positions. That is fine too as long as you killed many more Russians than Ukrainians doing it. If not, it isn't worth it. It is also possible for Ukraine to defend "forward" with the idea of a slow retreat that will kill lots of Russians and occupy even more in the effort. That can be tricky, but it might be part of the plan.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
My real concern at this point is can Ukraine supply their troops that far forward in Russia? The terrain doesn't seem to contain lots of roads. The 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway runs parallel to the current front line and Ukraine is advancing in both directions along it. The only road leading into Ukraine is the R-200/H07. For Ukraine to stay where they are (let alone advance further) they must have at least intermittent air superiority along that road. Ukraine may do this by SAMs and MANPADS, but they will have to do it if they intend to stay. Otherwise their logistics will be impossible.
I wonder if the short term logistical situation is partially mitigated by local supplies. These Russian towns have cars, gas, food, water, etc that can be used to fuel further advances.
You also have to wonder how Russia will respond when trying to retake territory. Their only effective method has been to flatten settlements with artillery and glide bombs. Are they willing to do that with Russian towns, some of which will still have civilians within them?
08-08-2024, 02:16 PM
(08-08-2024, 11:39 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-08-2024, 11:11 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.This can be great, or it can be "problematic". We don't know what Ukraine's intentions are. Do they intend to occupy and defend themselves in Russian territory? If so, how many assets do they intend to commit to that effort? If the advance exceeds what Ukraine wants to/can defend, it will require retreating from these forward positions. That is fine too as long as you killed many more Russians than Ukrainians doing it. If not, it isn't worth it. It is also possible for Ukraine to defend "forward" with the idea of a slow retreat that will kill lots of Russians and occupy even more in the effort. That can be tricky, but it might be part of the plan.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
My real concern at this point is can Ukraine supply their troops that far forward in Russia? The terrain doesn't seem to contain lots of roads. The 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway runs parallel to the current front line and Ukraine is advancing in both directions along it. The only road leading into Ukraine is the R-200/H07. For Ukraine to stay where they are (let alone advance further) they must have at least intermittent air superiority along that road. Ukraine may do this by SAMs and MANPADS, but they will have to do it if they intend to stay. Otherwise their logistics will be impossible.
Isn't it more likely that this is a propaganda mission? In that case, the farther you go in and the more stuff you blow up the better! As long as you don't go so far in that you can't retreat...
(08-08-2024, 11:39 AM)Goose Wrote:(08-08-2024, 11:11 AM)dabigv13 Wrote: Some Ukrainian units have really advanced in the last 24 hours. This operation seems to be accelerating rather than slowing down, at least at this point.This can be great, or it can be "problematic". We don't know what Ukraine's intentions are. Do they intend to occupy and defend themselves in Russian territory? If so, how many assets do they intend to commit to that effort? If the advance exceeds what Ukraine wants to/can defend, it will require retreating from these forward positions. That is fine too as long as you killed many more Russians than Ukrainians doing it. If not, it isn't worth it. It is also possible for Ukraine to defend "forward" with the idea of a slow retreat that will kill lots of Russians and occupy even more in the effort. That can be tricky, but it might be part of the plan.
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989
My real concern at this point is can Ukraine supply their troops that far forward in Russia? The terrain doesn't seem to contain lots of roads. The 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway runs parallel to the current front line and Ukraine is advancing in both directions along it. The only road leading into Ukraine is the R-200/H07. For Ukraine to stay where they are (let alone advance further) they must have at least intermittent air superiority along that road. Ukraine may do this by SAMs and MANPADS, but they will have to do it if they intend to stay. Otherwise their logistics will be impossible.
Isn't it more likely that this is a propaganda mission? In that case, the farther you go in and the more stuff you blow up the better! As long as you don't go so far in that you can't retreat...
08-08-2024, 02:18 PM
(08-08-2024, 11:55 AM)gocard14 Wrote: I wonder if the short term logistical situation is partially mitigated by local supplies. These Russian towns have cars, gas, food, water, etc that can be used to fuel further advances.Indeed that will help for awhile. Food and water are bulky, so anything the troops can obtain locally will be useful. Getting reliable and clean fuel would be nice but historically attempts to "live off the land" that way haven't worked. Too easy for retreating Russian troops to render the fuel unusable or just set it on fire. Civilians can do the same if they want to :-).
The problem will be ammunition (particularly artillery ammunition) and replacements. Both will be required in pretty large quantities. Ukraine also has had no time to really fortify any of the towns they occupy. The force being used is a mobile combined arms grouping, supposedly. Such forces require lots of logistics.
Quote:You also have to wonder how Russia will respond when trying to retake territory. Their only effective method has been to flatten settlements with artillery and glide bombs. Are they willing to do that with Russian towns, some of which will still have civilians within them?Indeed, but these Ukrainian towns were fortified pretty well by Ukrainian troops that intended to defend there. They know the area well, which also helps. That will not be true inside Russia, especially in so far as the offensive is a mobile striking force. Such a force doesn't want to EVER stop and defend. Much of its combat effectiveness is derived from striking unprepared (and hopefully inadequate and disorganized) enemy formations who also have had no time to fortify and "dig in" their defenses. The "follow up" forces are the ones who will fortify and defend. Does Ukraine have a "follow-up" force ready to do this and if so, how big?
Assuming Ukraine does intend to defend a lot of what it has recently taken, has time to dig in/fortify, and has enough troops, Russia will indeed have the dilemma you describe. IMO the Russians will try to cut Ukrainian communications, not slug it out in a destructive "Stalingrad" battle. That is what a "sane" Russian would do. Get the VVS off their dead ass and bomb Ukrainian communications to the point Ukraine has to pull back. This fight will be inside Russia, so Ukraine will only have whatever air defense assets it could bring to the area. It will be interesting to see what Russia does if things play out this way.
(08-08-2024, 11:55 AM)gocard14 Wrote: I wonder if the short term logistical situation is partially mitigated by local supplies. These Russian towns have cars, gas, food, water, etc that can be used to fuel further advances.Indeed that will help for awhile. Food and water are bulky, so anything the troops can obtain locally will be useful. Getting reliable and clean fuel would be nice but historically attempts to "live off the land" that way haven't worked. Too easy for retreating Russian troops to render the fuel unusable or just set it on fire. Civilians can do the same if they want to :-).
The problem will be ammunition (particularly artillery ammunition) and replacements. Both will be required in pretty large quantities. Ukraine also has had no time to really fortify any of the towns they occupy. The force being used is a mobile combined arms grouping, supposedly. Such forces require lots of logistics.
Quote:You also have to wonder how Russia will respond when trying to retake territory. Their only effective method has been to flatten settlements with artillery and glide bombs. Are they willing to do that with Russian towns, some of which will still have civilians within them?Indeed, but these Ukrainian towns were fortified pretty well by Ukrainian troops that intended to defend there. They know the area well, which also helps. That will not be true inside Russia, especially in so far as the offensive is a mobile striking force. Such a force doesn't want to EVER stop and defend. Much of its combat effectiveness is derived from striking unprepared (and hopefully inadequate and disorganized) enemy formations who also have had no time to fortify and "dig in" their defenses. The "follow up" forces are the ones who will fortify and defend. Does Ukraine have a "follow-up" force ready to do this and if so, how big?
Assuming Ukraine does intend to defend a lot of what it has recently taken, has time to dig in/fortify, and has enough troops, Russia will indeed have the dilemma you describe. IMO the Russians will try to cut Ukrainian communications, not slug it out in a destructive "Stalingrad" battle. That is what a "sane" Russian would do. Get the VVS off their dead ass and bomb Ukrainian communications to the point Ukraine has to pull back. This fight will be inside Russia, so Ukraine will only have whatever air defense assets it could bring to the area. It will be interesting to see what Russia does if things play out this way.
08-08-2024, 03:36 PM
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-for...19145.html
This article has lots of "good stuff" in it. In particular
This article has lots of "good stuff" in it. In particular
Quote:As we noted earlier, one of the goals could be to force Russia to pull troops out of the land they occupy in Ukraine.References all the previously checked boxes plus adding the "bargaining chip" thought. IMO there is no way in the world Russia will negotiate a peace or even a cease fire with Ukrainians present on Russian soil in "significant" numbers. Politically that would be viewed as admitting defeat. Putin will never do that.
That’s something our source with direct knowledge of the operations confirmed.
“The goal is to deconcentrate Russian forces,” said the source, adding that there is no planned end to this invasion.
“We will go as far as our logistics take us,” he posited.
Using this incident as a bargaining chip for any sort of peace negotiation, or pressure towards those ends, is also a possibility. The idea that Ukraine has successfully pushed relatively deep into Russian territory with a regular force and has persisted there is clearly a massive propaganda and psychological warfare win.
As for how long this lasts and how such a bold but risky operation will be viewed internally by Ukrainians at a time when the country is struggling to hold the lines within its own borders, time will tell.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukrainian-for...19145.html
This article has lots of "good stuff" in it. In particular
This article has lots of "good stuff" in it. In particular
Quote:As we noted earlier, one of the goals could be to force Russia to pull troops out of the land they occupy in Ukraine.References all the previously checked boxes plus adding the "bargaining chip" thought. IMO there is no way in the world Russia will negotiate a peace or even a cease fire with Ukrainians present on Russian soil in "significant" numbers. Politically that would be viewed as admitting defeat. Putin will never do that.
That’s something our source with direct knowledge of the operations confirmed.
“The goal is to deconcentrate Russian forces,” said the source, adding that there is no planned end to this invasion.
“We will go as far as our logistics take us,” he posited.
Using this incident as a bargaining chip for any sort of peace negotiation, or pressure towards those ends, is also a possibility. The idea that Ukraine has successfully pushed relatively deep into Russian territory with a regular force and has persisted there is clearly a massive propaganda and psychological warfare win.
As for how long this lasts and how such a bold but risky operation will be viewed internally by Ukrainians at a time when the country is struggling to hold the lines within its own borders, time will tell.
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