[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-suffe...54303.html

There may be some hyperbole in the above article. However, since this is Zelenskiy speaking it some inherent credibility.

Zelenskiy said the situation in the east was "very tough", adding that half of Ukraine's brigades there were not equipped.
"So you lose a lot of people. You lose people because they are not in armed vehicles ... they don't have artillery, they don't have artillery rounds," said Zelenskiy, speaking in English. CNN said the interview had been conducted on Friday.
Zelenskiy said weapons aid packages promised by the United States and European nations were arriving very slowly.
"We need 14 brigades to be ready. Until now ... from these packages we didn't equip even four," he said.

We don't know what the Ukrainians planned to do with those 14 brigades. It is plausible that they intended to use them around Pokrovsk. They presumably cannot because they are not equipped. It must be said that planning "just in time" military logistics is fraught with risk. That said, if the US promised deliver on date X and didn't do so, that is our failure and our responsibility. OTOH Ukraine should by now have some idea that timelines for aid are often not met. The US and the NATO states still do not move "at the speed of war". The following link contains some interesting reading. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1epe546p5vo

Another point that IMO must be made as a "reality check". One might notice that Zelenskiy wasn't calling for more drones or more EW. He was calling for more artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery ammunition. Despite the "infatuation" the press seems to have with the advent of the drone as a tool in war, that isn't what is at the core of what is going on in Ukraine. That core is still troops, artillery, AFV, and ammunition. That is what will decide this war. Drones are a great tool and a force multiplier. They are not the key to victory. We need to be clear about that. IMO that sometimes gets lost in the enthusiasm for technology as an "answer" to the Ukraine war. It isn't and won't be, at least as long as the Ukrainians and Russians are doing the fighting on the ground.

There have also been several articles in the press commenting on the fact that the Russians were committing troops with no combat experience to the fight in Ukraine. Guess what. The 14 brigades  Zelenskiy referred to above don't have combat experience either. Both sides are looking for ways to increase the sheer numbers of their forces because neither side has a way to success other than brute force infantry fighting. Units will get "blooded" and there will be "unnecessary" casualties. This is a war being fought with a strange mixture of technologies. Russia ostensibly had the wherewithal to "win" without an infantry slogging match. They apparently did not actually possess the technology (and/or the ability to use it) that was required. Thus we have trench warfare accompanied by hypersonic missiles and loitering munitions. Simply crazy.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-suffe...54303.html

There may be some hyperbole in the above article. However, since this is Zelenskiy speaking it some inherent credibility.

Zelenskiy said the situation in the east was "very tough", adding that half of Ukraine's brigades there were not equipped.
"So you lose a lot of people. You lose people because they are not in armed vehicles ... they don't have artillery, they don't have artillery rounds," said Zelenskiy, speaking in English. CNN said the interview had been conducted on Friday.
Zelenskiy said weapons aid packages promised by the United States and European nations were arriving very slowly.
"We need 14 brigades to be ready. Until now ... from these packages we didn't equip even four," he said.

We don't know what the Ukrainians planned to do with those 14 brigades. It is plausible that they intended to use them around Pokrovsk. They presumably cannot because they are not equipped. It must be said that planning "just in time" military logistics is fraught with risk. That said, if the US promised deliver on date X and didn't do so, that is our failure and our responsibility. OTOH Ukraine should by now have some idea that timelines for aid are often not met. The US and the NATO states still do not move "at the speed of war". The following link contains some interesting reading. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1epe546p5vo

Another point that IMO must be made as a "reality check". One might notice that Zelenskiy wasn't calling for more drones or more EW. He was calling for more artillery, armored fighting vehicles, and artillery ammunition. Despite the "infatuation" the press seems to have with the advent of the drone as a tool in war, that isn't what is at the core of what is going on in Ukraine. That core is still troops, artillery, AFV, and ammunition. That is what will decide this war. Drones are a great tool and a force multiplier. They are not the key to victory. We need to be clear about that. IMO that sometimes gets lost in the enthusiasm for technology as an "answer" to the Ukraine war. It isn't and won't be, at least as long as the Ukrainians and Russians are doing the fighting on the ground.

There have also been several articles in the press commenting on the fact that the Russians were committing troops with no combat experience to the fight in Ukraine. Guess what. The 14 brigades  Zelenskiy referred to above don't have combat experience either. Both sides are looking for ways to increase the sheer numbers of their forces because neither side has a way to success other than brute force infantry fighting. Units will get "blooded" and there will be "unnecessary" casualties. This is a war being fought with a strange mixture of technologies. Russia ostensibly had the wherewithal to "win" without an infantry slogging match. They apparently did not actually possess the technology (and/or the ability to use it) that was required. Thus we have trench warfare accompanied by hypersonic missiles and loitering munitions. Simply crazy.

[BostonCard]

This should be a “gifted” version of the WSJ article:

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def..._permalink

BC

[BostonCard]

This should be a “gifted” version of the WSJ article:

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def..._permalink

BC

[Goose]

This should be a “gifted” version of the WSJ article:

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def..._permalink

BC

First, many thanks to BC for the gifted access to the article. My "take" on the article is not at all positive however. I find it to be exceedingly poorly reasoned and simply factually incorrect in a few important places. The author states that there are three "pillars" of the "West".

The first is to furnish Ukraine with weapons, intelligence and help with targeting. This has been an enormous initiative, comparable to the Lend-Lease program for U.S. allies in World War II and encompassing the contributions not just of the U.S., France, Britain and Germany but of dozens of other countries, from Canada to South Korea.

This is patent nonsense. Consider the following from https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/...iet-union/

During World War II, the Soviet Union received almost 15,000 U.S.-built aircraft under the lend-lease program.

Ukraine right now is scheduled to receive maybe 50 F-16s from several smaller NATO countries. The US is supplying none.
From https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/ar...tern-front

Those shipments included 400,000 vehicles, 14,000 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, 8,000 tractors, 4.5 million tons of food, and 2.7 million tons of petroleum products, as well as millions of blankets, uniforms, and boots, and 107,000 tons of cotton.

The US has supplied 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. The idea that the US is providing anything the scale of lend-lease is absurd. I am sure Ukraine would very much appreciate receiving 1% of those 15,000 aircraft. Not happening. The author goes on to state that the West is proud of their commitment. Fine, but nowhere in the document does the author even attempt to demonstrate that this "commitment" is adequate to achieve any particular outcome, let alone the "desired outcome". That  "desired outcome" is never defined explicitly so it is left to our imagination whether the actual contributions of "the West" are sufficient to reach it.

The second "pillar" is the bilateral agreements that "tighten ties to Ukraine". 

The shared goal of these pacts is to end the war on the best terms possible for Ukraine and to ensure a peaceful future by making the country powerful enough that Russia will never invade again.

Of course, none of these bilateral agreements actually commit anybody to do anything in particular. They set ambitious "goals" for postwar security. They do nothing to directly affect the current conflict and the author makes no claim that they do. How is that a "pillar" of anything? It is very relevant to recall the Trilateral Statement where both the US and the UK UNILATERALLY guaranteed the sovereignty of Ukraine. If I were a Ukrainian, I would accept any such agreements as a big "maybe, if we feel like it".

The third "pillar" is that "Ukraine is entering Europe". Exactly how that affects the current war is never actually stated, but the closest it comes is

But Ukraine is not giving up on Europe, and Europe can no longer afford the benign neglect it cultivated for Ukraine in the 1990s and even after the Russian invasion of 2014. Europe’s own well-being depends on its ability to integrate Ukraine. It would be a catastrophe for Europe if Ukraine became a failed state or a Russian colony the size of Texas, bordering five members of the EU and NATO.

I am willing to believe that statement is true, although the author asserts it without proof or even a supporting argument. However, it is pretty definite and demonstrable that several European countries (Hungary and Fico-led Slovakia) do not believe that statement is true. In fact, they believe the opposite. It is also clearly true that the Alternative für Deutschland and Rassemblement National are not in favor of supporting Ukraine. These parties are already in a position to make it very difficult for France and Germany to continue even their present support of Ukraine, let alone increase it. The SPD in Germany is also becoming a bit "wobbly" on exactly what it is willing to do and is also firmly indicating it wants the war in Ukraine to end. It is unclear how much they care about the terms. In short, even granting the authors assertion that the EU needs to make sure Ukraine "wins" to some extent, it is very unclear that the EU can and will do "enough" to prevent that outcome. The author makes absolutely no attempt to demonstrate they will.

The author then argues that these pillars have "worked", basically because Ukraine is still fighting. The direct connection to these pillars is unclear.
The author states

In February 2022, Russia occupied some 11% of Ukrainian territory. After the deaths of countless Russian soldiers, Russia now occupies just some 18% of Ukrainian territory. The numbers chart Russia’s humiliation in this war—its strategic quandary and ultimate dead end.

It is nice to state Russia is humiliated, in a strategic quandary, and at an ultimate dead end. However, the facts supplied in no way demonstrate any of the above. In fact, it demonstrates the opposite (if anything). Russia has gained 7% more Ukrainian territory. While that is "disappointing" to those who thought Russia should do better, it in no way supports the idea Russia will have to quit. If the war continues as it currently is, Russia will eventually "win", not Ukraine. What the author needed to show is that Ukraine can force Russia to quit fighting given the current situation. He makes no attempt to do that, he merely states without any rationale that Russia is at a "dead end".
(continued in next post)

[Goose]

This should be a “gifted” version of the WSJ article:

https://www.wsj.com/world/ignore-the-def..._permalink

BC

First, many thanks to BC for the gifted access to the article. My "take" on the article is not at all positive however. I find it to be exceedingly poorly reasoned and simply factually incorrect in a few important places. The author states that there are three "pillars" of the "West".

The first is to furnish Ukraine with weapons, intelligence and help with targeting. This has been an enormous initiative, comparable to the Lend-Lease program for U.S. allies in World War II and encompassing the contributions not just of the U.S., France, Britain and Germany but of dozens of other countries, from Canada to South Korea.

This is patent nonsense. Consider the following from https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/...iet-union/

During World War II, the Soviet Union received almost 15,000 U.S.-built aircraft under the lend-lease program.

Ukraine right now is scheduled to receive maybe 50 F-16s from several smaller NATO countries. The US is supplying none.
From https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/ar...tern-front

Those shipments included 400,000 vehicles, 14,000 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, 8,000 tractors, 4.5 million tons of food, and 2.7 million tons of petroleum products, as well as millions of blankets, uniforms, and boots, and 107,000 tons of cotton.

The US has supplied 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. The idea that the US is providing anything the scale of lend-lease is absurd. I am sure Ukraine would very much appreciate receiving 1% of those 15,000 aircraft. Not happening. The author goes on to state that the West is proud of their commitment. Fine, but nowhere in the document does the author even attempt to demonstrate that this "commitment" is adequate to achieve any particular outcome, let alone the "desired outcome". That  "desired outcome" is never defined explicitly so it is left to our imagination whether the actual contributions of "the West" are sufficient to reach it.

The second "pillar" is the bilateral agreements that "tighten ties to Ukraine". 

The shared goal of these pacts is to end the war on the best terms possible for Ukraine and to ensure a peaceful future by making the country powerful enough that Russia will never invade again.

Of course, none of these bilateral agreements actually commit anybody to do anything in particular. They set ambitious "goals" for postwar security. They do nothing to directly affect the current conflict and the author makes no claim that they do. How is that a "pillar" of anything? It is very relevant to recall the Trilateral Statement where both the US and the UK UNILATERALLY guaranteed the sovereignty of Ukraine. If I were a Ukrainian, I would accept any such agreements as a big "maybe, if we feel like it".

The third "pillar" is that "Ukraine is entering Europe". Exactly how that affects the current war is never actually stated, but the closest it comes is

But Ukraine is not giving up on Europe, and Europe can no longer afford the benign neglect it cultivated for Ukraine in the 1990s and even after the Russian invasion of 2014. Europe’s own well-being depends on its ability to integrate Ukraine. It would be a catastrophe for Europe if Ukraine became a failed state or a Russian colony the size of Texas, bordering five members of the EU and NATO.

I am willing to believe that statement is true, although the author asserts it without proof or even a supporting argument. However, it is pretty definite and demonstrable that several European countries (Hungary and Fico-led Slovakia) do not believe that statement is true. In fact, they believe the opposite. It is also clearly true that the Alternative für Deutschland and Rassemblement National are not in favor of supporting Ukraine. These parties are already in a position to make it very difficult for France and Germany to continue even their present support of Ukraine, let alone increase it. The SPD in Germany is also becoming a bit "wobbly" on exactly what it is willing to do and is also firmly indicating it wants the war in Ukraine to end. It is unclear how much they care about the terms. In short, even granting the authors assertion that the EU needs to make sure Ukraine "wins" to some extent, it is very unclear that the EU can and will do "enough" to prevent that outcome. The author makes absolutely no attempt to demonstrate they will.

The author then argues that these pillars have "worked", basically because Ukraine is still fighting. The direct connection to these pillars is unclear.
The author states

In February 2022, Russia occupied some 11% of Ukrainian territory. After the deaths of countless Russian soldiers, Russia now occupies just some 18% of Ukrainian territory. The numbers chart Russia’s humiliation in this war—its strategic quandary and ultimate dead end.

It is nice to state Russia is humiliated, in a strategic quandary, and at an ultimate dead end. However, the facts supplied in no way demonstrate any of the above. In fact, it demonstrates the opposite (if anything). Russia has gained 7% more Ukrainian territory. While that is "disappointing" to those who thought Russia should do better, it in no way supports the idea Russia will have to quit. If the war continues as it currently is, Russia will eventually "win", not Ukraine. What the author needed to show is that Ukraine can force Russia to quit fighting given the current situation. He makes no attempt to do that, he merely states without any rationale that Russia is at a "dead end".
(continued in next post)

[Goose]

(Continued)
The author then makes statements drawing a parallel between the war in Ukraine to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War is apparently something this author has written books about. I haven't read any of them, but IMO the conclusions he draws need to be examined closely. He states

For the U.S. and other countries committed to Ukraine, the Cold War holds valuable lessons. Its essence was the containment of Soviet power, which was always messy and difficult. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, many thought that the Soviet Union was pulling ahead in the 1970s, that it was gaining ground and self-confidence and might win the Cold War. By the 1980s, the fallacy of such reasoning was apparent, underscoring the value of not reading too much into news cycles and of not inferring too much from the status quo. Now the West is again containing the spread of Russian power. This is a strategic necessity, and it will demand Cold War-style patience. In Ukraine, such patience will be rewarded.

First of all, the author was a high school student when the Cold War ended. He wasn't old enough in the 1980s to know anything about what was "apparent" in the 1980s, even the late 1980s. He would need to quote references and reports by people from that era to support his statements. These reports are at best very thin on the ground and he cites none of them. In point of fact, the "collapse" of the Soviet Union was predicted by virtually nobody. Even while it was happening the "end result" was vastly unclear.

The author also apparently believes that the collapse of the USSR was an inevitable consequence of the US and the West policies containing the spread of Russian power for the 74 years from 1917 to 1991. He also apparently believes the situation in Ukraine is somehow parallel to those years. The idea that the "fall" of the USSR was "inevitable" is very arguable. It is unquestionably true that the decisions made by the Russian leadership resulted in consequences they did not expect or intend. They could have made other choices. If the leader of the USSR at the time was Stalin (or even Khrushchev) instead of Michael Gorbachev it is very probable the results would have been very different. Putin is not Gorbachev.

That said, this is merely the gorilla in the room. The planetary mass is that during the Cold War the US and Russia were not actually shooting at each other. Both sides could let their proxies fight but at no time was these conflicts existential for either party. The Ukrainian war is arguably existential for Russia. The US could lose in Vietnam or even Korea and still be basically unaffected. The USSR could lose in Afghanistan and survive it. If Putin loses in Ukraine, it is very probable he can't survive it. His rule is a personal one, not an ideologically based one. There is no "next man up".

Ukraine and Russia are obviously in an existential "hot" war. Unlike the Cold War that the US and Russia "fought", Ukraine and Russia are killing lots of their people. Ukraine is seeing its infrastructure destroyed progressively. Ukraine is now starting to inflict similar damage on Russia, although at much lower levels. Russia has seen massive casualties. However, they have secured an indigenous  supply of artillery ammunition that will allow them to maintain at least a 3:1 superiority over Ukraine indefinitely. Any shells they get from the DPRK is a bonus. Russia has also started to successfully ramp up production of Iskander and similar missiles. This link isn't "new" but it is relevant. https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/r...rcna158883. Russia is importing ballistic missiles from Iran. It also both build and imports drones from Iran. It also imports ballistic missiles from the DPRK.

Ukraine imports a very limited number of ballistic missiles from the US that it can't fire into Russia except under very limited conditions. Ukraine is also doing some indigenous "good things" to improve its ability to strike into Russia. We could (and have :-) go on and on about the relative correlation of forces. However, it is absolutely clear that neither Russia nor Ukraine can keep fighting for 74 more years at this level. Looking at a "never ending war", Russia has to be the favorite with a GDP that is 14 times that of Ukraine (2022) and a population that is 3.8 times as large. This doesn't mean Ukraine can't win, but it does mean playing the "long game" as the author suggests simply will not work for Ukraine. It may work OK eventually for the West, because the West can possibly endure a Ukraine that becomes a Russian vassal state. Russia may find themselves in an impossible situation even if they win. Counting on that is a bad idea though. The author previously made the argument that the EU couldn't allow that outcome.

Lastly the author considers two cases as the possible outcomes of the US election. One possible outcome is that the new president increases aid and allows permission for Ukraine to be more aggressive. The other was that something like the current situation continues. The author motivated the idea that congress would not allow less. That may be true, but as we found out in 2024 it is sufficient that the Speaker be unwilling to bring an aid bill forward to a vote. While staying clear of the Terry rule, I would argue that it is far from certain that with a different president this roadblock could or would be removable, as it finally was in 2024. 

FOOTNOTE:
The author states:

Too much attention is paid to the weaponry Ukraine lacks and to the areas in which its military has fallen short. But the country has a growing military arsenal, from defense-industrial capacity that will come online in 2025 to the lived experience of its soldiers and officers, who are on the avant-garde of 21st-century warfare.

Anybody that believes the war in Ukraine represents generalized 21st-century warfare is at best sadly mistaken. A fight between China and the US would bear NO resemblance  to the war in Ukraine. The "lived experience" of a fight between two countries that virtually don't have an air force is "typical" of nothing. The war in Ukraine is a very specific situation with unique characteristics. That doesn't mean that nothing can be learned from it, but conclusions must carefully be evaluated in terms of their applicability to other conflicts. See my previous diatribe about the battle of Lissa

[Goose]

(Continued)
The author then makes statements drawing a parallel between the war in Ukraine to the Cold War. The end of the Cold War is apparently something this author has written books about. I haven't read any of them, but IMO the conclusions he draws need to be examined closely. He states

For the U.S. and other countries committed to Ukraine, the Cold War holds valuable lessons. Its essence was the containment of Soviet power, which was always messy and difficult. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, many thought that the Soviet Union was pulling ahead in the 1970s, that it was gaining ground and self-confidence and might win the Cold War. By the 1980s, the fallacy of such reasoning was apparent, underscoring the value of not reading too much into news cycles and of not inferring too much from the status quo. Now the West is again containing the spread of Russian power. This is a strategic necessity, and it will demand Cold War-style patience. In Ukraine, such patience will be rewarded.

First of all, the author was a high school student when the Cold War ended. He wasn't old enough in the 1980s to know anything about what was "apparent" in the 1980s, even the late 1980s. He would need to quote references and reports by people from that era to support his statements. These reports are at best very thin on the ground and he cites none of them. In point of fact, the "collapse" of the Soviet Union was predicted by virtually nobody. Even while it was happening the "end result" was vastly unclear.

The author also apparently believes that the collapse of the USSR was an inevitable consequence of the US and the West policies containing the spread of Russian power for the 74 years from 1917 to 1991. He also apparently believes the situation in Ukraine is somehow parallel to those years. The idea that the "fall" of the USSR was "inevitable" is very arguable. It is unquestionably true that the decisions made by the Russian leadership resulted in consequences they did not expect or intend. They could have made other choices. If the leader of the USSR at the time was Stalin (or even Khrushchev) instead of Michael Gorbachev it is very probable the results would have been very different. Putin is not Gorbachev.

That said, this is merely the gorilla in the room. The planetary mass is that during the Cold War the US and Russia were not actually shooting at each other. Both sides could let their proxies fight but at no time was these conflicts existential for either party. The Ukrainian war is arguably existential for Russia. The US could lose in Vietnam or even Korea and still be basically unaffected. The USSR could lose in Afghanistan and survive it. If Putin loses in Ukraine, it is very probable he can't survive it. His rule is a personal one, not an ideologically based one. There is no "next man up".

Ukraine and Russia are obviously in an existential "hot" war. Unlike the Cold War that the US and Russia "fought", Ukraine and Russia are killing lots of their people. Ukraine is seeing its infrastructure destroyed progressively. Ukraine is now starting to inflict similar damage on Russia, although at much lower levels. Russia has seen massive casualties. However, they have secured an indigenous  supply of artillery ammunition that will allow them to maintain at least a 3:1 superiority over Ukraine indefinitely. Any shells they get from the DPRK is a bonus. Russia has also started to successfully ramp up production of Iskander and similar missiles. This link isn't "new" but it is relevant. https://www.nbcnews.com/investigations/r...rcna158883. Russia is importing ballistic missiles from Iran. It also both build and imports drones from Iran. It also imports ballistic missiles from the DPRK.

Ukraine imports a very limited number of ballistic missiles from the US that it can't fire into Russia except under very limited conditions. Ukraine is also doing some indigenous "good things" to improve its ability to strike into Russia. We could (and have :-) go on and on about the relative correlation of forces. However, it is absolutely clear that neither Russia nor Ukraine can keep fighting for 74 more years at this level. Looking at a "never ending war", Russia has to be the favorite with a GDP that is 14 times that of Ukraine (2022) and a population that is 3.8 times as large. This doesn't mean Ukraine can't win, but it does mean playing the "long game" as the author suggests simply will not work for Ukraine. It may work OK eventually for the West, because the West can possibly endure a Ukraine that becomes a Russian vassal state. Russia may find themselves in an impossible situation even if they win. Counting on that is a bad idea though. The author previously made the argument that the EU couldn't allow that outcome.

Lastly the author considers two cases as the possible outcomes of the US election. One possible outcome is that the new president increases aid and allows permission for Ukraine to be more aggressive. The other was that something like the current situation continues. The author motivated the idea that congress would not allow less. That may be true, but as we found out in 2024 it is sufficient that the Speaker be unwilling to bring an aid bill forward to a vote. While staying clear of the Terry rule, I would argue that it is far from certain that with a different president this roadblock could or would be removable, as it finally was in 2024. 

FOOTNOTE:
The author states:

Too much attention is paid to the weaponry Ukraine lacks and to the areas in which its military has fallen short. But the country has a growing military arsenal, from defense-industrial capacity that will come online in 2025 to the lived experience of its soldiers and officers, who are on the avant-garde of 21st-century warfare.

Anybody that believes the war in Ukraine represents generalized 21st-century warfare is at best sadly mistaken. A fight between China and the US would bear NO resemblance  to the war in Ukraine. The "lived experience" of a fight between two countries that virtually don't have an air force is "typical" of nothing. The war in Ukraine is a very specific situation with unique characteristics. That doesn't mean that nothing can be learned from it, but conclusions must carefully be evaluated in terms of their applicability to other conflicts. See my previous diatribe about the battle of Lissa

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-orders-...48784.html

Can Russia do it? I don't know but I wouldn't bet against it. Do they need to do it? Good question, but I think the answer must be yes. The Ukrainian incursion has stretched Russian manpower beyond where the military is "comfortable". Ukraine is attempting to increase its numbers. Russia burns through troops must faster. For that reason, Russia always needs "more".

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-exten...26504.html

Hard to know what this means. It is probable Ukraine's "new" troops need more training to survive in the very lethal defensive battles they are fighting. US Army training for an 11B lasts 14 weeks, which is just a tad over 3 months. Ukraine seems to think their guys need "more". My guess is that the 3 months they were getting just wasn't very "good". Ukraine has obviously needed to expand their training pipeline considerably. Getting soldiers who are qualified trainers when you are desperate for troops isn't easy. Traditionally the "Russian" training establishments aren't very good and rely on OJT once recruits are posted to their units. That doesn't work if you unit is heavily engaged in combat.

It also must be said that Ukrainian recruits have a much easier time deserting than NATO soldiers would. They are fighting in their own land and can simply go home. It also seems the stigma associated with deserting is much lower in Ukraine. They have even "decriminalized" the first time you do it. It is one thing to run away from a battle because you are scared. It is another to not gather yourself and return. Often in the US military such failure to fight was overlooked if you came back of your own accord. It is also true that in WW II many US troops never fired their weapon. The army went to great lengths to "train that out" of troops in subsequent wars. It mostly worked it seems.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-orders-...48784.html

Can Russia do it? I don't know but I wouldn't bet against it. Do they need to do it? Good question, but I think the answer must be yes. The Ukrainian incursion has stretched Russian manpower beyond where the military is "comfortable". Ukraine is attempting to increase its numbers. Russia burns through troops must faster. For that reason, Russia always needs "more".

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-exten...26504.html

Hard to know what this means. It is probable Ukraine's "new" troops need more training to survive in the very lethal defensive battles they are fighting. US Army training for an 11B lasts 14 weeks, which is just a tad over 3 months. Ukraine seems to think their guys need "more". My guess is that the 3 months they were getting just wasn't very "good". Ukraine has obviously needed to expand their training pipeline considerably. Getting soldiers who are qualified trainers when you are desperate for troops isn't easy. Traditionally the "Russian" training establishments aren't very good and rely on OJT once recruits are posted to their units. That doesn't work if you unit is heavily engaged in combat.

It also must be said that Ukrainian recruits have a much easier time deserting than NATO soldiers would. They are fighting in their own land and can simply go home. It also seems the stigma associated with deserting is much lower in Ukraine. They have even "decriminalized" the first time you do it. It is one thing to run away from a battle because you are scared. It is another to not gather yourself and return. Often in the US military such failure to fight was overlooked if you came back of your own accord. It is also true that in WW II many US troops never fired their weapon. The army went to great lengths to "train that out" of troops in subsequent wars. It mostly worked it seems.

[dabigv13]

Perhaps the largest explosions of the war thus far. Ukraine hit a large Russian arsenal with a drone attack tonight.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1836263950616277454

[dabigv13]

Perhaps the largest explosions of the war thus far. Ukraine hit a large Russian arsenal with a drone attack tonight.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1836263950616277454

[M T]

Perhaps the largest explosions of the war thus war. Ukraine hit a large Russian arsenal with a drone attack tonight.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1836263950616277454

I wonder if it was big enough to register on seismometers.

[M T]

Perhaps the largest explosions of the war thus war. Ukraine hit a large Russian arsenal with a drone attack tonight.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1836263950616277454

I wonder if it was big enough to register on seismometers.

[dabigv13]

Yes it did.

https://x.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1836277692489953575

[dabigv13]

Yes it did.

https://x.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1836277692489953575

[Goose]

Great news! It is indeed a legitimate question how such an explosion could happen in a "properly constructed" ammunition store. In theory each "igloo" can explode without setting off any others. However, it is almost certain that Russia had overloaded the site by storing much more explosive material than it was designed to hold. Much of that material might have been stored in simple warehouses, not purpose built storage bunkers. Once something of that size goes off sympathetic detonation of everything else is entirely possible.

Maybe we will get more details, maybe we won't. In any case, this is great news. It will undoubtedly leave at least a temporary "hole" (no pun intended) in the Russian ammunition supplies. It will certainly leave a permanent dent in the Russian military psyche. If something like this is possible, what isn't?

[Goose]

Great news! It is indeed a legitimate question how such an explosion could happen in a "properly constructed" ammunition store. In theory each "igloo" can explode without setting off any others. However, it is almost certain that Russia had overloaded the site by storing much more explosive material than it was designed to hold. Much of that material might have been stored in simple warehouses, not purpose built storage bunkers. Once something of that size goes off sympathetic detonation of everything else is entirely possible.

Maybe we will get more details, maybe we won't. In any case, this is great news. It will undoubtedly leave at least a temporary "hole" (no pun intended) in the Russian ammunition supplies. It will certainly leave a permanent dent in the Russian military psyche. If something like this is possible, what isn't?

[Mick]

Question for Goose and others knowledgeable on the Ukraine/Russia war:

Is either side capable of biological warfare? Would either side consider it?

[Mick]

Question for Goose and others knowledgeable on the Ukraine/Russia war:

Is either side capable of biological warfare? Would either side consider it?

[Goose]

Question for Goose and others knowledgeable on the Ukraine/Russia war:

Is either side capable of biological warfare? Would either side consider it?

Russia certainly is. Ukraine probably is not and would have to put forth lots of effort to acquire the capability. Neither side is very likely to use it. One reason is that many possible diseases can easily spread from Ukraine to Russia as well as visa-versa. You don't want your troops operating in contaminated areas. The other is that the opprobrium associated with such action would trump any benefits obtained.

The reason chemical and biological weapons are seldom used in near-peer wars isn't that mankind is "civilized". It is rather that the benefit/cost ratio is not favorable. In other words, don't use these weapons if the other side can reply in kind. Biological weapons are also very difficult to control. Most nations don't want to take the risk it harms them as much or more than the enemy.

[Goose]

Question for Goose and others knowledgeable on the Ukraine/Russia war:

Is either side capable of biological warfare? Would either side consider it?

Russia certainly is. Ukraine probably is not and would have to put forth lots of effort to acquire the capability. Neither side is very likely to use it. One reason is that many possible diseases can easily spread from Ukraine to Russia as well as visa-versa. You don't want your troops operating in contaminated areas. The other is that the opprobrium associated with such action would trump any benefits obtained.

The reason chemical and biological weapons are seldom used in near-peer wars isn't that mankind is "civilized". It is rather that the benefit/cost ratio is not favorable. In other words, don't use these weapons if the other side can reply in kind. Biological weapons are also very difficult to control. Most nations don't want to take the risk it harms them as much or more than the enemy.

[Hurlburt88]

another article on Russian drive for more personnel.   Should be free.  

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-incr...be94f95b1a

[Hurlburt88]

another article on Russian drive for more personnel.   Should be free.  

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-incr...be94f95b1a

[Goose]

another article on Russian drive for more personnel.   Should be free.  

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-incr...be94f95b1a

And another https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-embarki...09444.html

The analysis that Russia will take 12 months to "train" the new soldiers is contraindicated by the plentiful reports that Russia is sending vast quantities of troops to the front line with little or no training. For "meat attacks" no training is needed. As for the affect on the Russian labor force, from the link I posted

Artem Kochev, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, told BI that Russia's labor market would be less affected if military recruitment is done in a targeted fashion.
"Currently, new recruits can be split into two groups: indebted people with low socio-economic status, and prison convicts," Kochev said. "They either participate in the less productive branches of the economy or are not part of the labor market at all."

The above mentioned two groups are also the ones the society is willing to dispense with. Obviously there will be "issues" with lack of equipment , lack of uniforms etc. However, it must be remembered that back in the battle for Avdiivka Russian troops were sent to die carrying only shovels. This isn't a "new" phenomena.

Can Russia source enough troops from the "desired" classes? Probably. However, many of them will die quickly. At some point Putin will run out of such "soldiers". Russia is already taking African migrants and "volunteers" from Cuba (and elsewhere). The question is "Can Russia overwhelm Ukraine by sheer numbers before Russia runs out of troops?". The answer is not obvious. Ukraine's morale will be a big component of the answer, and that is hard to estimate.

IMO it is prudent (actually necessary) to assume Russia can keep generating cannon fodder indefinitely.  It may not be true, but since we really can't estimate when it will no longer be so we must assume the worst. A plan to defeat this incompetent, inefficient, but immense army is necessary. Let's see what Zelenskyy proposes. It may lack detail in some areas due to security considerations, but it might be a "way ahead".

[Goose]

another article on Russian drive for more personnel.   Should be free.  

https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-incr...be94f95b1a

And another https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-embarki...09444.html

The analysis that Russia will take 12 months to "train" the new soldiers is contraindicated by the plentiful reports that Russia is sending vast quantities of troops to the front line with little or no training. For "meat attacks" no training is needed. As for the affect on the Russian labor force, from the link I posted

Artem Kochev, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, told BI that Russia's labor market would be less affected if military recruitment is done in a targeted fashion.
"Currently, new recruits can be split into two groups: indebted people with low socio-economic status, and prison convicts," Kochev said. "They either participate in the less productive branches of the economy or are not part of the labor market at all."

The above mentioned two groups are also the ones the society is willing to dispense with. Obviously there will be "issues" with lack of equipment , lack of uniforms etc. However, it must be remembered that back in the battle for Avdiivka Russian troops were sent to die carrying only shovels. This isn't a "new" phenomena.

Can Russia source enough troops from the "desired" classes? Probably. However, many of them will die quickly. At some point Putin will run out of such "soldiers". Russia is already taking African migrants and "volunteers" from Cuba (and elsewhere). The question is "Can Russia overwhelm Ukraine by sheer numbers before Russia runs out of troops?". The answer is not obvious. Ukraine's morale will be a big component of the answer, and that is hard to estimate.

IMO it is prudent (actually necessary) to assume Russia can keep generating cannon fodder indefinitely.  It may not be true, but since we really can't estimate when it will no longer be so we must assume the worst. A plan to defeat this incompetent, inefficient, but immense army is necessary. Let's see what Zelenskyy proposes. It may lack detail in some areas due to security considerations, but it might be a "way ahead".

[M T]

Is this anything very different than putting them in gas chambers or throwing them in a pit with lions?
———
On another topic, I guess I missed or didn’t catch the significance of some long range drone attacks by Ukraine in late May. These may be significant in decisions not to allow Ukraine to use western weapons to strike in Russia.  
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-07/...ing-radars

[M T]

Is this anything very different than putting them in gas chambers or throwing them in a pit with lions?
———
On another topic, I guess I missed or didn’t catch the significance of some long range drone attacks by Ukraine in late May. These may be significant in decisions not to allow Ukraine to use western weapons to strike in Russia.  
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-07/...ing-radars

[dabigv13]

Looks like Ukraine hit another large ammunition storage depot deep within Russia.

Ukraine's long range drone production and development has been impressive and could be a decisive factor as the war drags on. Russian air defense and protected ammunition storage bunker performance not so impressive. 

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1837336991538553035

----

And another one!

https://x.com/markito0171/status/1837364005729337604

Interesting thread with satellite photos.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1837359410479268180

[dabigv13]

Looks like Ukraine hit another large ammunition storage depot deep within Russia.

Ukraine's long range drone production and development has been impressive and could be a decisive factor as the war drags on. Russian air defense and protected ammunition storage bunker performance not so impressive. 

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1837336991538553035

----

And another one!

https://x.com/markito0171/status/1837364005729337604

Interesting thread with satellite photos.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1837359410479268180

[M T]

Looks like Ukraine hit another large ammunition storage depot deep within Russia.

Ukraine's long range drone production and development has been impressive and could be a decisive factor as the war drags on. Russian air defense and protected ammunition storage bunker performance not so impressive. 

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1837336991538553035

----
And another one!

https://x.com/markito0171/status/1837364005729337604

Interesting thread with satellite photos.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1837359410479268180

Your first post was 2 hours ago.  I have yet to find anything on Google News, Reuters, BBC,.

I see a claim published in Ukraine, crediting Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence, that the explosion 2 days ago may have exploded 2 to 3 months worth of artillery shells. But I'd take it with a grain of salt.

[M T]

Looks like Ukraine hit another large ammunition storage depot deep within Russia.

Ukraine's long range drone production and development has been impressive and could be a decisive factor as the war drags on. Russian air defense and protected ammunition storage bunker performance not so impressive. 

https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1837336991538553035

----
And another one!

https://x.com/markito0171/status/1837364005729337604

Interesting thread with satellite photos.

https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1837359410479268180

Your first post was 2 hours ago.  I have yet to find anything on Google News, Reuters, BBC,.

I see a claim published in Ukraine, crediting Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence, that the explosion 2 days ago may have exploded 2 to 3 months worth of artillery shells. But I'd take it with a grain of salt.

[dabigv13]

Here's how the Ukraine news cycle works. First will come the videos on Telegram, a social media site popular in Russia and Ukraine. Next they'll hit twitter. And then the reporters on twitter will write up stories. It can take some time. Some of the graphics above are satellite wildfire detection, confirming the geolocated videos.

These are consequential strikes.

[dabigv13]

Here's how the Ukraine news cycle works. First will come the videos on Telegram, a social media site popular in Russia and Ukraine. Next they'll hit twitter. And then the reporters on twitter will write up stories. It can take some time. Some of the graphics above are satellite wildfire detection, confirming the geolocated videos.

These are consequential strikes.

[fullmetal]

I wonder if that strike in Toropets, Tver (northwest of Moscow!) hurt the cause by demonstrating that Ukraine has operational reach even without unfettered use of Western, long-range weapons.  (They sent 100 drones to hit that munitions stockpile.)

[fullmetal]

I wonder if that strike in Toropets, Tver (northwest of Moscow!) hurt the cause by demonstrating that Ukraine has operational reach even without unfettered use of Western, long-range weapons.  (They sent 100 drones to hit that munitions stockpile.)

[Goose]

I wonder if that strike in Toropets, Tver (northwest of Moscow!) hurt the cause by demonstrating that Ukraine has operational reach even without unfettered use of Western, long-range weapons.  (They sent 100 drones to hit that munitions stockpile.)

There are a several missing pieces of information that would have a lot to do with why Ukraine still wants to use Western long range weapons. AFAIK we have no idea what kind of drones with what capabilities Ukraine used in their attack. It is quite possible that of those 100 drones only 20 or so were actually capable of doing damage and the rest were designed to simply absorb Russian air defenses. We have no real idea yet about how often Ukraine can launch such strikes. If it is once a month it isn't really going to be all that useful. Still important but not really able to change the game. Obviously Russia is going to respond by de-centralizing their ammunition storage. That will take time, cost money, and require better planning. Of course, if Russia does that they will become a better fighting force. This is just what nobody wants :-).

The Western long-range weapons are valuable against relatively ephemeral targets. Attacking an ammunition storage base that has been there since the 1940s allows planning for a simultaneous 100 drone strike to be made. A troop concentration or ammunition train doesn't necessarily exist for that long, often weeks at most. The ability to relatively quickly attack such targets will still be very valuable. FWIW the US considers targets that are (probably) vulnerable for about an hour or less as candidates for missile strikes. Anything that is expected to persists longer is generally handed to the Air Force. Ukraine doesn't have that option. Ukraine is also greatly assisted by Western sources (of one kind or another) to help with long range targeting. Ukraine may not be able to know how long some targets will persist. They need to hit them promptly, and Western missiles may be their only option.

[Goose]

I wonder if that strike in Toropets, Tver (northwest of Moscow!) hurt the cause by demonstrating that Ukraine has operational reach even without unfettered use of Western, long-range weapons.  (They sent 100 drones to hit that munitions stockpile.)

There are a several missing pieces of information that would have a lot to do with why Ukraine still wants to use Western long range weapons. AFAIK we have no idea what kind of drones with what capabilities Ukraine used in their attack. It is quite possible that of those 100 drones only 20 or so were actually capable of doing damage and the rest were designed to simply absorb Russian air defenses. We have no real idea yet about how often Ukraine can launch such strikes. If it is once a month it isn't really going to be all that useful. Still important but not really able to change the game. Obviously Russia is going to respond by de-centralizing their ammunition storage. That will take time, cost money, and require better planning. Of course, if Russia does that they will become a better fighting force. This is just what nobody wants :-).

The Western long-range weapons are valuable against relatively ephemeral targets. Attacking an ammunition storage base that has been there since the 1940s allows planning for a simultaneous 100 drone strike to be made. A troop concentration or ammunition train doesn't necessarily exist for that long, often weeks at most. The ability to relatively quickly attack such targets will still be very valuable. FWIW the US considers targets that are (probably) vulnerable for about an hour or less as candidates for missile strikes. Anything that is expected to persists longer is generally handed to the Air Force. Ukraine doesn't have that option. Ukraine is also greatly assisted by Western sources (of one kind or another) to help with long range targeting. Ukraine may not be able to know how long some targets will persist. They need to hit them promptly, and Western missiles may be their only option.

[dabigv13]

Well, they can do more than one a month since they just hit three depots in two days, and there is an ongoing strike in Crimea now.

Also it seems the depot at Tikhoretsk, which is more for short term storage as compared to the two GRAU arsenals hit in Tver region, had adjacent railway and airport infrastructure that was also destroyed. This was a depot that a lot of North Korean ammo was coming through.

Russia will certainly respond by decentralizing, but that will take time and will be much less efficient, and it will take a long time to replenish what was lost in these strikes. Making Russia transport and distribute smaller batches of ammunition will require even more distributed air defenses to (try to) protect it, will require them to devote more manpower and transport equipment to logistics. That's not Russia becoming a better fighting force IMHO.

[dabigv13]

Well, they can do more than one a month since they just hit three depots in two days, and there is an ongoing strike in Crimea now.

Also it seems the depot at Tikhoretsk, which is more for short term storage as compared to the two GRAU arsenals hit in Tver region, had adjacent railway and airport infrastructure that was also destroyed. This was a depot that a lot of North Korean ammo was coming through.

Russia will certainly respond by decentralizing, but that will take time and will be much less efficient, and it will take a long time to replenish what was lost in these strikes. Making Russia transport and distribute smaller batches of ammunition will require even more distributed air defenses to (try to) protect it, will require them to devote more manpower and transport equipment to logistics. That's not Russia becoming a better fighting force IMHO.