[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/white-house-p...45020.html

This report is very disturbing. Apparently it is only now that the US is becoming cognizant of the manpower disparity with Russia? Were they asleep since Feb 24 of 2022? The US also seems unaware that Ukraine has a very different view of conscription than we do in the US. Ukraine treats the ages from 18 to about 27 as the time for procreation. After you have "had your chance", then you can be drafted. For that reason dropping the draft age to 25 in Ukraine was politically very difficult and took "forever".

In the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation the draft age was/is 18-19 and everybody serves (at least in theory). In theory draftees cannot be ordered to serve outside Russia, although that has not been rigorously observed in the current war. It is true that few ethnic Russian draftees go to Ukraine. There are plenty of slots in the rest of the Russian military for them It is equally true that draftees are often coerced into becoming "contract" soldiers who can be freely sent to Ukraine. Russia tries fairly hard to use only contract soldiers in Ukraine. They are paying top dollar to do so. The belief is that those who take Putin's schilling and are subsequently killed have nothing to complain about. They knew what they were signing up for. Koreans are costing them too, but much less than Russians. 

The US OTOH drafts the youngest cadre first. In WW II married men were not drafted at all until 1943. After 1943 married men could be drafted if the pool of single men was exhausted taking into account "family responsibilities".  Few men with children were drafted. A form of this exemption existed throughout the Vietnam war. It is a very different approach.

The political battle in the legislature to lower the draft age in Ukraine clearly indicates the current Ukrainian administration probably lacks the political capital to lower it further. An appeal to patriotism might work, but it also might convince the Ukrainian nation that the war is lost and they should quit now. The time to do this was back in 2022 when there was lots of enthusiasm in the population. Certainly one can argue Ukraine is in extremis and actions considered radical in peacetime are called for. That was true years ago as well but not done.

Ukraine has been unable to effectively train and absorb the additional troops provided by the first lowering of the draft age. According to the "veterans" these troops either won't fight or are so poorly trained they are a danger to unit. Providing a mob of untrained disorganized troops will not help much. It will simply allow the Russian artillery to produce more mass casualties that have to be evacuated. Unless something equally drastic can be done to train the new draftees, that will be their fate. What does the US propose to make that happen? Not looking good on the manpower front.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/white-house-p...45020.html

This report is very disturbing. Apparently it is only now that the US is becoming cognizant of the manpower disparity with Russia? Were they asleep since Feb 24 of 2022? The US also seems unaware that Ukraine has a very different view of conscription than we do in the US. Ukraine treats the ages from 18 to about 27 as the time for procreation. After you have "had your chance", then you can be drafted. For that reason dropping the draft age to 25 in Ukraine was politically very difficult and took "forever".

In the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation the draft age was/is 18-19 and everybody serves (at least in theory). In theory draftees cannot be ordered to serve outside Russia, although that has not been rigorously observed in the current war. It is true that few ethnic Russian draftees go to Ukraine. There are plenty of slots in the rest of the Russian military for them It is equally true that draftees are often coerced into becoming "contract" soldiers who can be freely sent to Ukraine. Russia tries fairly hard to use only contract soldiers in Ukraine. They are paying top dollar to do so. The belief is that those who take Putin's schilling and are subsequently killed have nothing to complain about. They knew what they were signing up for. Koreans are costing them too, but much less than Russians. 

The US OTOH drafts the youngest cadre first. In WW II married men were not drafted at all until 1943. After 1943 married men could be drafted if the pool of single men was exhausted taking into account "family responsibilities".  Few men with children were drafted. A form of this exemption existed throughout the Vietnam war. It is a very different approach.

The political battle in the legislature to lower the draft age in Ukraine clearly indicates the current Ukrainian administration probably lacks the political capital to lower it further. An appeal to patriotism might work, but it also might convince the Ukrainian nation that the war is lost and they should quit now. The time to do this was back in 2022 when there was lots of enthusiasm in the population. Certainly one can argue Ukraine is in extremis and actions considered radical in peacetime are called for. That was true years ago as well but not done.

Ukraine has been unable to effectively train and absorb the additional troops provided by the first lowering of the draft age. According to the "veterans" these troops either won't fight or are so poorly trained they are a danger to unit. Providing a mob of untrained disorganized troops will not help much. It will simply allow the Russian artillery to produce more mass casualties that have to be evacuated. Unless something equally drastic can be done to train the new draftees, that will be their fate. What does the US propose to make that happen? Not looking good on the manpower front.

[BostonCard]

In the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation the draft age was/is 18-19 and everybody serves (at least in theory). In theory draftees cannot be ordered to serve outside Russia, although that has not been rigorously observed in the current war. It is true that few ethnic Russian draftees go to Ukraine. There are plenty of slots in the rest of the Russian military for them It is equally true that draftees are often coerced into becoming "contract" soldiers who can be freely sent to Ukraine. Russia tries fairly hard to use only contract soldiers in Ukraine. They are paying top dollar to do so. The belief is that those who take Putin's schilling and are subsequently killed have nothing to complain about. They knew what they were signing up for. Koreans are costing them too, but much less than Russians. 

Since Russia "annexed" Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, for the purposes of Russian law, would fighting in those regions be considered serving "outside Russia"?

BC

[BostonCard]

In the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation the draft age was/is 18-19 and everybody serves (at least in theory). In theory draftees cannot be ordered to serve outside Russia, although that has not been rigorously observed in the current war. It is true that few ethnic Russian draftees go to Ukraine. There are plenty of slots in the rest of the Russian military for them It is equally true that draftees are often coerced into becoming "contract" soldiers who can be freely sent to Ukraine. Russia tries fairly hard to use only contract soldiers in Ukraine. They are paying top dollar to do so. The belief is that those who take Putin's schilling and are subsequently killed have nothing to complain about. They knew what they were signing up for. Koreans are costing them too, but much less than Russians. 

Since Russia "annexed" Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, for the purposes of Russian law, would fighting in those regions be considered serving "outside Russia"?

BC

[Goose]

Since Russia "annexed" Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, for the purposes of Russian law, would fighting in those regions be considered serving "outside Russia"?

BC

It is not considered fighting "outside Russia" from a strictly legalistic point of view. There are conscripts serving in the logistics and support functions in all the annexed areas. This is mitigated by the fact Russia attempts to utilize conscripted "locals" wherever possible. It appears that residents of these areas may or may not have "Russian" passports and may or may not be considered full citizens. However, Putin does not push the point. Ethnic Russian conscripts are not used in areas where they can be easily killed. They are not sent in as "meat" attacks. Of course, there are no guarantees and some are killed. Losses due to operations happen even in support functions, and also happen inside Russia itself. Often (it appears) such soldiers are simply listed as "missing" essentially forever. That means the family doesn't get benefits nor are they actually sure what happened or where. Much more common is beating up/threatening the conscripts (including ethnic Russians) until they sign on as "contract" soldiers and can be sent anywhere. Of course conscripts generally are beaten regardless, but it is worse when there is a shortage of troops.

Certainly there are and have been lots of conscripts serving in Crimea. Warships are also considered "Russian territory" and therefore conscripts can be sent to sea. Some of the personnel lost on the Moskva were conscripts. That was one reason for Russia claiming for a long time that nobody died.

[Goose]

Since Russia "annexed" Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, for the purposes of Russian law, would fighting in those regions be considered serving "outside Russia"?

BC

It is not considered fighting "outside Russia" from a strictly legalistic point of view. There are conscripts serving in the logistics and support functions in all the annexed areas. This is mitigated by the fact Russia attempts to utilize conscripted "locals" wherever possible. It appears that residents of these areas may or may not have "Russian" passports and may or may not be considered full citizens. However, Putin does not push the point. Ethnic Russian conscripts are not used in areas where they can be easily killed. They are not sent in as "meat" attacks. Of course, there are no guarantees and some are killed. Losses due to operations happen even in support functions, and also happen inside Russia itself. Often (it appears) such soldiers are simply listed as "missing" essentially forever. That means the family doesn't get benefits nor are they actually sure what happened or where. Much more common is beating up/threatening the conscripts (including ethnic Russians) until they sign on as "contract" soldiers and can be sent anywhere. Of course conscripts generally are beaten regardless, but it is worse when there is a shortage of troops.

Certainly there are and have been lots of conscripts serving in Crimea. Warships are also considered "Russian territory" and therefore conscripts can be sent to sea. Some of the personnel lost on the Moskva were conscripts. That was one reason for Russia claiming for a long time that nobody died.

[Mick]

Apparently, the value of the ruble (rouble) has fallen like a rock, dropping 8.5% on Wednesday and 35% since August, much faster than expected.

Kremlin tries to reassure panicking Russians over collapsing rouble

Interest rates are currently 21% in Russia (highest in two decades) and the Russian Central Bank intends to respond to the fall by increasing interest rates to 25%. They have suspended currency trading until 2025 amidst a rising sense of dread.

[Mick]

Apparently, the value of the ruble (rouble) has fallen like a rock, dropping 8.5% on Wednesday and 35% since August, much faster than expected.

Kremlin tries to reassure panicking Russians over collapsing rouble

Interest rates are currently 21% in Russia (highest in two decades) and the Russian Central Bank intends to respond to the fall by increasing interest rates to 25%. They have suspended currency trading until 2025 amidst a rising sense of dread.

[dabigv13]

Apparently Russia had been using foreign currency reserves to buy rubles to keep the price up, but these are now depleted and so the drop in value has accelerated.

It's certainly a pressure point for Russia. The lower ruble value will make their petroleum exports even more desirable however. I'm not sure if they have more export capacity, and Ukraine has been doing their best to blow up that export infrastructure.

In other good news, Syrian regime forces and their Russian allies have suffered a big blow, and rebel forces have captured a regime base, along with weapons, and at least a couple tanks, and are now positioned only a couple miles from Aleppo. Many videos and photos of dead or captured Russian SOF and drone operators.

[dabigv13]

Apparently Russia had been using foreign currency reserves to buy rubles to keep the price up, but these are now depleted and so the drop in value has accelerated.

It's certainly a pressure point for Russia. The lower ruble value will make their petroleum exports even more desirable however. I'm not sure if they have more export capacity, and Ukraine has been doing their best to blow up that export infrastructure.

In other good news, Syrian regime forces and their Russian allies have suffered a big blow, and rebel forces have captured a regime base, along with weapons, and at least a couple tanks, and are now positioned only a couple miles from Aleppo. Many videos and photos of dead or captured Russian SOF and drone operators.

[Goose]

Apparently Russia had been using foreign currency reserves to buy rubles to keep the price up, but these are now depleted and so the drop in value has accelerated.

It's certainly a pressure point for Russia. The lower ruble value will make their petroleum exports even more desirable however.
I'm not sure if they have more export capacity, and Ukraine has been doing their best to blow up that export infrastructure.

I am not sure the price of Russian oil will actually drop. Russia is suffering from both very high interest rates AND severe inflation. I think Russia still insists on being paid in rubles for their exports. Russia will simply increase the price in rubles to offset the reduction in the value of the ruble. That won't change the actual "dollar" price their customers have to pay, so they won't lose any market share by doing that. Of course, Russia could always (in theory at least) increase the quantity of their exports by dropping the price. That is true no matter what the exchange rate may be. Right now I think Russia could produce more export crude oil, but the available fleet of tankers is limited by sanctions. Probably little or no excess capacity there

In other good news, Syrian regime forces and their Russian allies have suffered a big blow, and rebel forces have captured a regime base, along with weapons, and at least a couple tanks, and are now positioned only a couple miles from Aleppo. Many videos and photos of dead or captured Russian SOF and drone operators.

Indeed more good news! Thanks for the post. It led me to look at https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/27/middleeas...index.html It sounds like this isn't (yet) a "big" deal, but right now Russia doesn't have much ability to assist the Assad regime. The fact some of the wealthy are fleeing Aleppo makes one wonder if the regime may be in more trouble than it appears. It would be nice if Russia simply decided to leave Syria. Not probable, but if things get worse I wouldn't rule it out. Russia doesn't want to lose what assets it has already committed. Being on the losing side would also not be a good look.

UPDATE: https://defence-blog.com/russian-elite-f...el-attack/ talks more about Russian casualties and Russian involvement.

[Goose]

Apparently Russia had been using foreign currency reserves to buy rubles to keep the price up, but these are now depleted and so the drop in value has accelerated.

It's certainly a pressure point for Russia. The lower ruble value will make their petroleum exports even more desirable however.
I'm not sure if they have more export capacity, and Ukraine has been doing their best to blow up that export infrastructure.

I am not sure the price of Russian oil will actually drop. Russia is suffering from both very high interest rates AND severe inflation. I think Russia still insists on being paid in rubles for their exports. Russia will simply increase the price in rubles to offset the reduction in the value of the ruble. That won't change the actual "dollar" price their customers have to pay, so they won't lose any market share by doing that. Of course, Russia could always (in theory at least) increase the quantity of their exports by dropping the price. That is true no matter what the exchange rate may be. Right now I think Russia could produce more export crude oil, but the available fleet of tankers is limited by sanctions. Probably little or no excess capacity there

In other good news, Syrian regime forces and their Russian allies have suffered a big blow, and rebel forces have captured a regime base, along with weapons, and at least a couple tanks, and are now positioned only a couple miles from Aleppo. Many videos and photos of dead or captured Russian SOF and drone operators.

Indeed more good news! Thanks for the post. It led me to look at https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/27/middleeas...index.html It sounds like this isn't (yet) a "big" deal, but right now Russia doesn't have much ability to assist the Assad regime. The fact some of the wealthy are fleeing Aleppo makes one wonder if the regime may be in more trouble than it appears. It would be nice if Russia simply decided to leave Syria. Not probable, but if things get worse I wouldn't rule it out. Russia doesn't want to lose what assets it has already committed. Being on the losing side would also not be a good look.

UPDATE: https://defence-blog.com/russian-elite-f...el-attack/ talks more about Russian casualties and Russian involvement.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/pentagon-unli...01968.html

No surprise here. The "military industrial complex" hasn't been robust for quite some years. Some "big" players have done very well financially but also have definitely under-performed in what they actually delivered. These organizations are at least as sclerotic as the US procurement system. Of course nobody has actually decided this situation is dangerous. Fixing it isn't even on the table. We can take some solace in the fact Europe is, in general, worse.

Best quote from the article:

For months, the US has run into the limits of its ability to replenish its own weapons inventories, which limited what the Biden administration has been able to send Ukraine. The US has been growing its capacity to produce critical munitions, such as 155mm artillery shells, since virtually the beginning of the war nearly three years ago, but the ramp up in production is not yet complete.

Three Years! This effort is targeted to producing one million plus rounds a year. As a reference, "As an example, Allied guns fired 2,710,248 rounds in June, 1953, and 2,000,982 rounds in July 1953". Even after the three year effort, we are nowhere near the ability to replicate what was done in 1953. It is true the US does not intend to rely on tube artillery nearly as much as we did previously. The USAF and systems like the MLRS reduce our dependence on artillery. However, that only works if we have "enough" of that. We no longer even make the MLRS cluster munitions that were used so effectively in Desert Storm.

The article https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals...gs-Change/ IMO contains some important insights into the problems.  From this article, published in 2023:

Simplifying this analysis to only 155 mm rounds means the 2022 daily average artillery fire rate of 30,000 rounds is almost ten times current U.S. monthly 155 mm production (3,250 per month) or just less than a year. The United States has already provided Ukraine over 800,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition while Ukraine is asking for 250,000 per month.10 Though the Pentagon believes it can expand 155 mm manufacturing, the war has nevertheless consumed at least six years of 155 mm production.

This was in 2022. Things are worse today.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/pentagon-unli...01968.html

No surprise here. The "military industrial complex" hasn't been robust for quite some years. Some "big" players have done very well financially but also have definitely under-performed in what they actually delivered. These organizations are at least as sclerotic as the US procurement system. Of course nobody has actually decided this situation is dangerous. Fixing it isn't even on the table. We can take some solace in the fact Europe is, in general, worse.

Best quote from the article:

For months, the US has run into the limits of its ability to replenish its own weapons inventories, which limited what the Biden administration has been able to send Ukraine. The US has been growing its capacity to produce critical munitions, such as 155mm artillery shells, since virtually the beginning of the war nearly three years ago, but the ramp up in production is not yet complete.

Three Years! This effort is targeted to producing one million plus rounds a year. As a reference, "As an example, Allied guns fired 2,710,248 rounds in June, 1953, and 2,000,982 rounds in July 1953". Even after the three year effort, we are nowhere near the ability to replicate what was done in 1953. It is true the US does not intend to rely on tube artillery nearly as much as we did previously. The USAF and systems like the MLRS reduce our dependence on artillery. However, that only works if we have "enough" of that. We no longer even make the MLRS cluster munitions that were used so effectively in Desert Storm.

The article https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals...gs-Change/ IMO contains some important insights into the problems.  From this article, published in 2023:

Simplifying this analysis to only 155 mm rounds means the 2022 daily average artillery fire rate of 30,000 rounds is almost ten times current U.S. monthly 155 mm production (3,250 per month) or just less than a year. The United States has already provided Ukraine over 800,000 rounds of 155 mm ammunition while Ukraine is asking for 250,000 per month.10 Though the Pentagon believes it can expand 155 mm manufacturing, the war has nevertheless consumed at least six years of 155 mm production.

This was in 2022. Things are worse today.

[Hurlburt88]

Ran across this today.  No idea how credible this person is.   What resonates with me is from this and other sources the crescendo of references to "weariness" from Ukraine, and that to end this conflicts both sides will need to accept bitter pills.  

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articl...52012.html

[Hurlburt88]

Ran across this today.  No idea how credible this person is.   What resonates with me is from this and other sources the crescendo of references to "weariness" from Ukraine, and that to end this conflicts both sides will need to accept bitter pills.  

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articl...52012.html

[dabigv13]

Rebel forces have been seen in the center of Aleppo. The whole city likely to fall by tonight, with reports of large pockets of Syrian forces caught behind rebel lines and negotiating to surrender. Rebel forces on videos with captured tanks, MANPADS, and lots of other formerly Russian goodies.

Regime aligned sources have remarked on "foreign" fighters with the rebels. This can probably be read as Ukrainian intelligence. Syrian forces have attempted counter attacks, but rebel FPV drones have been very disruptive in their rear to these efforts at counterattack and reinforcement.

With Assad's Russian and Iranian supporters preoccupied, Syrian regime forces seem unable to stem this attack. Where they have fought they have lost, and otherwise they have been retreating. Russian air support seems very limited at the moment, not seeming to make any tactical attacks at the front line but a few terror attacks on civilians in rebel held areas.

[dabigv13]

Rebel forces have been seen in the center of Aleppo. The whole city likely to fall by tonight, with reports of large pockets of Syrian forces caught behind rebel lines and negotiating to surrender. Rebel forces on videos with captured tanks, MANPADS, and lots of other formerly Russian goodies.

Regime aligned sources have remarked on "foreign" fighters with the rebels. This can probably be read as Ukrainian intelligence. Syrian forces have attempted counter attacks, but rebel FPV drones have been very disruptive in their rear to these efforts at counterattack and reinforcement.

With Assad's Russian and Iranian supporters preoccupied, Syrian regime forces seem unable to stem this attack. Where they have fought they have lost, and otherwise they have been retreating. Russian air support seems very limited at the moment, not seeming to make any tactical attacks at the front line but a few terror attacks on civilians in rebel held areas.

[Goose]

Ran across this today.  No idea how credible this person is.   What resonates with me is from this and other sources the crescendo of references to "weariness" from Ukraine, and that to end this conflicts both sides will need to accept bitter pills.  

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articl...52012.html

There is indeed "weariness" in Ukraine. The populace, and more importantly the troops are now deeply doubting that victory is possible. As things stand, they are correct. In that the article is undoubtedly correct. The article is also correct that it is very likely Putin has no motivation to agree to a cease-fire along the proposed lines. He is winning, he knows it and everybody else knows it.

The one thing Putin may actually need is the lifting of sanctions. His economy is in bad shape and getting worse. If anything will stop Russia, this is it. Putin may blink, but I doubt it. What I greatly fear is that Putin will make lifting sanctions a prerequisite to STARTING negotiations. I fear that the west, led by nobody, will give in on that score. If we do, Putin will get what he wanted without actually agreeing to anything. The war will go on with Russia re-invigorated.

The hypothesis that the US can force negotiations by giving Ukraine more aid is a delusion. We simply do not have enough SAM capability to actually protect Ukraine if we gave them everything we have. Ukraine also doesn't have the trained personnel to operate them anyway, at least on short notice. We also don't have the 155mm ammunition to do the job, even if we gave 100% of what we have to Ukraine. What might have worked would be if we gave them all the M270/HIMARS we had and enough cluster munitions to just wipe the Russian infantry off the face of the earth when it was attacking in the open. That saves troops. Unfortunately due to severely misguided policies we have very little of our original cluster munitions left and they are no longer manufactured. Ukraine might be in good shape for a couple of months. After that, nada. The "replacement" metal blocks warheads are nowhere near as effective and we don't have enough of them anyway. Unitary warheads are even more ill suited to dealing with troops in the open. We simply are not resourced or structured to fight a prolonged land war against a "near peer" opponent, and there is no indication we could quickly remedy that. The idea we could transfer enough resources to Ukraine so that they could do so "immediately" is even more far-fetched.

Take a look at https://armyhistory.org/the-gulf-war-and...-artillery. It has a lot to say, particularly about training. Remember, these comments were about a US military that was arguably at or near its "peak". The current one  is much smaller, not nearly as well trained, and does not possess the massive stock of modern weapons it did in 1991. The TL;DR is

Almost forty years ago, there used to be a quotation attributed to GEN George S. Patton plastered on several classroom walls at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, OK. The quotation read: “I don’t have to tell you who won the war. You know.  The artillery did.”
Those words do not describe the field artillery of the Gulf War. Far from it. The predominant fires of the war came from the air, particularly the brilliant campaign planned and conducted by the U.S. Air Force and executed by a joint force of bombers, fighters, and guided missiles. If artillery can be said to have played a critical role, it was the air defense artillery, specifically the Patriot missile batteries, who played it.

This was written by a US general of artillery. Even in 1991 we couldn't do what the author of the OP's article suggests. We know it, Ukraine knows it, and Putin knows it. Unfortunately we can't give Ukraine a trained and adequate air force. We have enough aircraft and bombs/ASM of various types to do so. We can make more of these, albeit slower than desirable. Due to the fact we did not properly anticipate the need for Ukraine to have a formidable air force, we did not start training Ukrainian pilots early enough and in adequate quantity to allow us to invoke that strategy.

Ukraine isn't a viable country without much of the territory Russia occupies at present. On top of that, once negotiations result in a "rump" Ukraine, nobody is going to have any interest in defending the resultant state, either Ukrainians themselves of "the west". A destroyed bankrupt country isn't a good candidate to develop a strong defense. The EU and the US didn't do that when Ukraine was "whole" and we had promised to defend them, twice. Why would Putin believe we would now? Why would Ukraine believe it? That is why Zelenskyy is so insistent on being a NATO member. He believes that would force the NATO alliance to honor its promises. IMO that is far from a sure thing. Moot point anyway because there are at least three NATO countries that will vote "no" to Ukraine's membership. This time it isn't a ploy, as it was with Sweden. They really mean it. The US military isn't all that keen on it either.

[Goose]

Ran across this today.  No idea how credible this person is.   What resonates with me is from this and other sources the crescendo of references to "weariness" from Ukraine, and that to end this conflicts both sides will need to accept bitter pills.  

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articl...52012.html

There is indeed "weariness" in Ukraine. The populace, and more importantly the troops are now deeply doubting that victory is possible. As things stand, they are correct. In that the article is undoubtedly correct. The article is also correct that it is very likely Putin has no motivation to agree to a cease-fire along the proposed lines. He is winning, he knows it and everybody else knows it.

The one thing Putin may actually need is the lifting of sanctions. His economy is in bad shape and getting worse. If anything will stop Russia, this is it. Putin may blink, but I doubt it. What I greatly fear is that Putin will make lifting sanctions a prerequisite to STARTING negotiations. I fear that the west, led by nobody, will give in on that score. If we do, Putin will get what he wanted without actually agreeing to anything. The war will go on with Russia re-invigorated.

The hypothesis that the US can force negotiations by giving Ukraine more aid is a delusion. We simply do not have enough SAM capability to actually protect Ukraine if we gave them everything we have. Ukraine also doesn't have the trained personnel to operate them anyway, at least on short notice. We also don't have the 155mm ammunition to do the job, even if we gave 100% of what we have to Ukraine. What might have worked would be if we gave them all the M270/HIMARS we had and enough cluster munitions to just wipe the Russian infantry off the face of the earth when it was attacking in the open. That saves troops. Unfortunately due to severely misguided policies we have very little of our original cluster munitions left and they are no longer manufactured. Ukraine might be in good shape for a couple of months. After that, nada. The "replacement" metal blocks warheads are nowhere near as effective and we don't have enough of them anyway. Unitary warheads are even more ill suited to dealing with troops in the open. We simply are not resourced or structured to fight a prolonged land war against a "near peer" opponent, and there is no indication we could quickly remedy that. The idea we could transfer enough resources to Ukraine so that they could do so "immediately" is even more far-fetched.

Take a look at https://armyhistory.org/the-gulf-war-and...-artillery. It has a lot to say, particularly about training. Remember, these comments were about a US military that was arguably at or near its "peak". The current one  is much smaller, not nearly as well trained, and does not possess the massive stock of modern weapons it did in 1991. The TL;DR is

Almost forty years ago, there used to be a quotation attributed to GEN George S. Patton plastered on several classroom walls at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, OK. The quotation read: “I don’t have to tell you who won the war. You know.  The artillery did.”
Those words do not describe the field artillery of the Gulf War. Far from it. The predominant fires of the war came from the air, particularly the brilliant campaign planned and conducted by the U.S. Air Force and executed by a joint force of bombers, fighters, and guided missiles. If artillery can be said to have played a critical role, it was the air defense artillery, specifically the Patriot missile batteries, who played it.

This was written by a US general of artillery. Even in 1991 we couldn't do what the author of the OP's article suggests. We know it, Ukraine knows it, and Putin knows it. Unfortunately we can't give Ukraine a trained and adequate air force. We have enough aircraft and bombs/ASM of various types to do so. We can make more of these, albeit slower than desirable. Due to the fact we did not properly anticipate the need for Ukraine to have a formidable air force, we did not start training Ukrainian pilots early enough and in adequate quantity to allow us to invoke that strategy.

Ukraine isn't a viable country without much of the territory Russia occupies at present. On top of that, once negotiations result in a "rump" Ukraine, nobody is going to have any interest in defending the resultant state, either Ukrainians themselves of "the west". A destroyed bankrupt country isn't a good candidate to develop a strong defense. The EU and the US didn't do that when Ukraine was "whole" and we had promised to defend them, twice. Why would Putin believe we would now? Why would Ukraine believe it? That is why Zelenskyy is so insistent on being a NATO member. He believes that would force the NATO alliance to honor its promises. IMO that is far from a sure thing. Moot point anyway because there are at least three NATO countries that will vote "no" to Ukraine's membership. This time it isn't a ploy, as it was with Sweden. They really mean it. The US military isn't all that keen on it either.

[dabigv13]

I think the supposition that Ukraine is not a viable country without the territory that Russia holds is incorrect and unsupported. Presently held Ukrainian territory has natural resources, plentiful agriculturally productive land, several large Black Sea ports, and overland connections to multiple European countries.

The territory that Russia holds is mostly a depopulated wasteland. For Ukraine to demine and rebuild it would be it's own costly undertaking.

The long term viability of the Ukrainian state is a question, but I don't think that would change a single bit even if Ukraine regained all of the territory they held in February 2022. If Ukraine does not get appropriate security guarantees and aid in rebuilding, then many Ukrainians will try to emigrate and that could be a spiral that is hard to recover from.

[dabigv13]

I think the supposition that Ukraine is not a viable country without the territory that Russia holds is incorrect and unsupported. Presently held Ukrainian territory has natural resources, plentiful agriculturally productive land, several large Black Sea ports, and overland connections to multiple European countries.

The territory that Russia holds is mostly a depopulated wasteland. For Ukraine to demine and rebuild it would be it's own costly undertaking.

The long term viability of the Ukrainian state is a question, but I don't think that would change a single bit even if Ukraine regained all of the territory they held in February 2022. If Ukraine does not get appropriate security guarantees and aid in rebuilding, then many Ukrainians will try to emigrate and that could be a spiral that is hard to recover from.

[Goose]

I think the supposition that Ukraine is not a viable country without the territory that Russia holds is incorrect and unsupported. 

Well, I have asserted this and supported this many times in this thread. Unfortunately I can do it again :-). Russia presently holds most of the Ukrainian territory that contained legacy "smokestack" industry. That is what the Donbas is all about. While this industry was largely obsolete it did contribute considerably to the Ukraine GDP. The steel production at Mariupol is the major "poster child" of that.

Presently held Ukrainian territory has natural resources,

Which ones are you referring to? The iron, other minerals, salt and coal that are currently "exploited" are in Donbas. Much of the newly discovered oil and gas areas are within the Russian controlled Ukrainian territory. Not that it matters, because the "big oil" companies that were involved had already pulled out of any effort to exploit these resources. The cost is very large and the risk of having Russia seize/destroy it is just too high. This was BEFORE the current war. The risks, the costs, and the pressures to reduce fossil fuel use render the reserves Ukraine has non-viable.  Ukraine does have other natural resources of various types but they are generally not available in commercially exploitable quantities. That is why they are not already "in production". The Soviet Union would develop any resource that had promise, even sometimes things that were very marginal. The low hanging fruit is already picked.

plentiful agriculturally productive land,

This is true, and has been Ukraine's major asset for many years. Unfortunately, grains and agricultural are "low margin" commodities. They are also bulky. Their commercial viability is extremely sensitive to transportation costs. This is also true for commodities like unrefined ore, although their bulk to weight ratio is better than say grain. The generally accepted cost ratios for shipping via truck, rail, and barge (ship) is 12-4-1, i.e. truck is 12 times as expensive as shipping by barge. Ukraine is blessed with a very good water transport route. Historically it is the dominant form of transport. The commodities took the shortest possible route to the river, by barge to Crimea and then onto ships. After 2014 that became impossible. For a while Mykolaiv was viable, but after 2022 it was not. From 2014 on Odesa became much more important. As can be seen from https://reliefweb.int/map/ukraine/ukrain...5-mar-2022 Odesa is served by two rail lines. It is about as far from the agricultural areas as it could be. It is even further from barge traffic. When Ukraine could use the railway across the southern part of the country (Mariupol-Mykolaiv-Odesa) barge transport still could cover lots of the way. Now that isn't possible.

https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/f...ne2024.pdf discusses in excruciating detail the current situation. Interestingly, it provides costs for shipping via Odesa, Izmail, and Constanta. The cost to a recipient in Alexandria Egypt was 40.5% transportation cost when shipped from Odesa, 48.2% from Izmail, 48.1% from Constanta to Tunis. Similar figures for US wheat are harder to find. However, the 60% of US wheat that moves on the Mississippi undoubtedly is at worst less than half that percentage. Canadian wheat that moves mostly by rail has numbers to China in the low to mid 30s. Obviously Ukraine is getting hammered by these noncompetitive transportation costs. This situation will not get better. The bottom line is that Ukraine took a big hit when they could no longer export from Crimean ports or Sea of Azov ports after 2014. Farmer's profits plummeted as the had to ship their products much further by rail. Four times the cost and longer distances. Today a significant part of the rail network is now inside Russian controlled territory. Ukraine was a very poor country BEFORE this all happened. Now, with much reduced industrial output and much higher transportation costs for their remaining export commodities it is hard to imagine how Ukraine can be viable. Yes, these commodities can be shipped. Can the farmers make enough money to stay in business? Those relatively close to rail transport and not too far from Odesa/Mykolaiv yes. The further away one is, things get worse. IMO it is  very doubtful most of the farmers far from the export points can survive. Some Ukrainian farms have already converted to growing seed oil crops, as they are cheaper to ship. Many farmers can't afford to do that or their land is ill suited for it.

several large Black Sea ports, and overland connections to multiple European countries.

AFAIK the only large Black Sea ports that will be available to Ukraine are Odesa and Mykolaiv. This assumes a "peace deal" that allows the port to re-open. Even if it does, it is still far from the source of many commodity production areas. https://gmk.center/en/news/the-resumptio...exporters/ is interesting. It states

The port of Mykolaiv acquired special importance for the company ArcelorMittal, which through it shipped its billets, wire rod and fittings. And 10 years before the start of the Russian invasion, in 2012, it itself became a stevedore and gradually increased transshipment at its terminal, which «in the best of times» reached 2 million tons, and ambitious plans provided for an increase in transshipment to 3 million tons in the future, «the report said.

Of course, the ArcelorMittal production facilities in Donbas are controlled by Russia. This reference must be to ArcelorMittal in Kryvyi Rih. Construction steel is pretty competitive. It isn't clear this facility has a future.

As far as overland connections to multiple European countries, they are mostly very unsuitable for commodity export (or anything really). The big problem is that the Ukraine rail network uses the Russian gauge of 1,520 mm. The "European" railroads use 1,435 mm. At Lviv, it can take up to five hours to replace the trucks on each car with the appropriate gauge (in each direction). It also takes labor, which is expensive. This is by the way a major problem with weapons shipment to Ukraine. Often the problem is "solved" by unloading the cargo from one train and reloading it into another. Kind of works with ammunition, not so much with grain. Getting the grain by rail to Lviv is the first expensive problem. The next expensive problem is that it is over 900 more km from Lviv to Gdansk by rail. Rotterdam is 1475 km from Lviv. The Ukrainian grain is then 4752 nautical miles from its destination in Alexandria. For reference, Odesa is 1393 nm from Alexandria. Pretty clear the Lviv route is not viable.

The routes into Hungary and Slovakia are in most ways worse. They have the same gauge change requirement. In general, they prefer transshipment, inappropriate for commodities. Most importantly, they don't go anywhere. They are both landlocked countries. During the current war Ukraine did ship commodities for local consumption inside these states, until the farmers blocked the lines in protest of being undercut by Ukrainian products. Obviously that isn't a viable long term solution. None of these routes are even considered in the USDA report, nor is Lviv. Pretty clear indication they are totally unsuited.

Romania is a different case. Ukraine can ship commodities via rail into Romania, where they are then loaded on ships and exported from Romania via Constanta. The exports via Izmail also use Romanian rail. Of course, this is a circuitous route, but it does work. It is 8% more expensive than Odesa. Capacity is also limited.

In an industry where margins are small, a 40% transportation cost is unsustainable, especially when competitors have costs that are a fraction of that. The difference comes out of Ukrainian farmer's profits. Many of them can't afford it. 

The territory that Russia holds is mostly a depopulated wasteland. For Ukraine to demine and rebuild it would be it's own costly undertaking.

Agree. It will be difficult and expensive whether Ukraine does it or Russia does it.

The long term viability of the Ukrainian state is a question, but I don't think that would change a single bit even if Ukraine regained all of the territory they held in February 2022.

I don't agree here. First, lots of the territory Russia gained was not actively fought over. It is pretty intact. Berdiansk for example. The M-14 and the railroad is in heavy use by Russia today. The port of Mariupol is open. All of these would be assets Ukraine could immediately take advantage of to lower their transportation costs. There are also areas where reconstruction can be done with little effort that would deliver disproportionate benefit. Reconstruction doesn't have to happen all at once. There are many areas in the Donbas that are not worth the effort. The facilities are obsolete and the mines played out. Not worth it, now or ever.

If Ukraine does not get appropriate security guarantees and aid in rebuilding, then many Ukrainians will try to emigrate and that could be a spiral that is hard to recover from.

True. IMO if Ukraine is reduced to a rump state with Russia retaining its ill-gotten gains there is no way any security guarantees will mean anything. The facts will speak for themselves. If nobody is willing to protect Ukraine's rights today, why will they do so tomorrow? They won't, and everybody, including Putin, will know that. Thus your spiral. The economics alone would probably do the same thing as well. The "west" must stand up for Ukraine now, or there will be no "tomorrow" to do it.

[Goose]

I think the supposition that Ukraine is not a viable country without the territory that Russia holds is incorrect and unsupported. 

Well, I have asserted this and supported this many times in this thread. Unfortunately I can do it again :-). Russia presently holds most of the Ukrainian territory that contained legacy "smokestack" industry. That is what the Donbas is all about. While this industry was largely obsolete it did contribute considerably to the Ukraine GDP. The steel production at Mariupol is the major "poster child" of that.

Presently held Ukrainian territory has natural resources,

Which ones are you referring to? The iron, other minerals, salt and coal that are currently "exploited" are in Donbas. Much of the newly discovered oil and gas areas are within the Russian controlled Ukrainian territory. Not that it matters, because the "big oil" companies that were involved had already pulled out of any effort to exploit these resources. The cost is very large and the risk of having Russia seize/destroy it is just too high. This was BEFORE the current war. The risks, the costs, and the pressures to reduce fossil fuel use render the reserves Ukraine has non-viable.  Ukraine does have other natural resources of various types but they are generally not available in commercially exploitable quantities. That is why they are not already "in production". The Soviet Union would develop any resource that had promise, even sometimes things that were very marginal. The low hanging fruit is already picked.

plentiful agriculturally productive land,

This is true, and has been Ukraine's major asset for many years. Unfortunately, grains and agricultural are "low margin" commodities. They are also bulky. Their commercial viability is extremely sensitive to transportation costs. This is also true for commodities like unrefined ore, although their bulk to weight ratio is better than say grain. The generally accepted cost ratios for shipping via truck, rail, and barge (ship) is 12-4-1, i.e. truck is 12 times as expensive as shipping by barge. Ukraine is blessed with a very good water transport route. Historically it is the dominant form of transport. The commodities took the shortest possible route to the river, by barge to Crimea and then onto ships. After 2014 that became impossible. For a while Mykolaiv was viable, but after 2022 it was not. From 2014 on Odesa became much more important. As can be seen from https://reliefweb.int/map/ukraine/ukrain...5-mar-2022 Odesa is served by two rail lines. It is about as far from the agricultural areas as it could be. It is even further from barge traffic. When Ukraine could use the railway across the southern part of the country (Mariupol-Mykolaiv-Odesa) barge transport still could cover lots of the way. Now that isn't possible.

https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/f...ne2024.pdf discusses in excruciating detail the current situation. Interestingly, it provides costs for shipping via Odesa, Izmail, and Constanta. The cost to a recipient in Alexandria Egypt was 40.5% transportation cost when shipped from Odesa, 48.2% from Izmail, 48.1% from Constanta to Tunis. Similar figures for US wheat are harder to find. However, the 60% of US wheat that moves on the Mississippi undoubtedly is at worst less than half that percentage. Canadian wheat that moves mostly by rail has numbers to China in the low to mid 30s. Obviously Ukraine is getting hammered by these noncompetitive transportation costs. This situation will not get better. The bottom line is that Ukraine took a big hit when they could no longer export from Crimean ports or Sea of Azov ports after 2014. Farmer's profits plummeted as the had to ship their products much further by rail. Four times the cost and longer distances. Today a significant part of the rail network is now inside Russian controlled territory. Ukraine was a very poor country BEFORE this all happened. Now, with much reduced industrial output and much higher transportation costs for their remaining export commodities it is hard to imagine how Ukraine can be viable. Yes, these commodities can be shipped. Can the farmers make enough money to stay in business? Those relatively close to rail transport and not too far from Odesa/Mykolaiv yes. The further away one is, things get worse. IMO it is  very doubtful most of the farmers far from the export points can survive. Some Ukrainian farms have already converted to growing seed oil crops, as they are cheaper to ship. Many farmers can't afford to do that or their land is ill suited for it.

several large Black Sea ports, and overland connections to multiple European countries.

AFAIK the only large Black Sea ports that will be available to Ukraine are Odesa and Mykolaiv. This assumes a "peace deal" that allows the port to re-open. Even if it does, it is still far from the source of many commodity production areas. https://gmk.center/en/news/the-resumptio...exporters/ is interesting. It states

The port of Mykolaiv acquired special importance for the company ArcelorMittal, which through it shipped its billets, wire rod and fittings. And 10 years before the start of the Russian invasion, in 2012, it itself became a stevedore and gradually increased transshipment at its terminal, which «in the best of times» reached 2 million tons, and ambitious plans provided for an increase in transshipment to 3 million tons in the future, «the report said.

Of course, the ArcelorMittal production facilities in Donbas are controlled by Russia. This reference must be to ArcelorMittal in Kryvyi Rih. Construction steel is pretty competitive. It isn't clear this facility has a future.

As far as overland connections to multiple European countries, they are mostly very unsuitable for commodity export (or anything really). The big problem is that the Ukraine rail network uses the Russian gauge of 1,520 mm. The "European" railroads use 1,435 mm. At Lviv, it can take up to five hours to replace the trucks on each car with the appropriate gauge (in each direction). It also takes labor, which is expensive. This is by the way a major problem with weapons shipment to Ukraine. Often the problem is "solved" by unloading the cargo from one train and reloading it into another. Kind of works with ammunition, not so much with grain. Getting the grain by rail to Lviv is the first expensive problem. The next expensive problem is that it is over 900 more km from Lviv to Gdansk by rail. Rotterdam is 1475 km from Lviv. The Ukrainian grain is then 4752 nautical miles from its destination in Alexandria. For reference, Odesa is 1393 nm from Alexandria. Pretty clear the Lviv route is not viable.

The routes into Hungary and Slovakia are in most ways worse. They have the same gauge change requirement. In general, they prefer transshipment, inappropriate for commodities. Most importantly, they don't go anywhere. They are both landlocked countries. During the current war Ukraine did ship commodities for local consumption inside these states, until the farmers blocked the lines in protest of being undercut by Ukrainian products. Obviously that isn't a viable long term solution. None of these routes are even considered in the USDA report, nor is Lviv. Pretty clear indication they are totally unsuited.

Romania is a different case. Ukraine can ship commodities via rail into Romania, where they are then loaded on ships and exported from Romania via Constanta. The exports via Izmail also use Romanian rail. Of course, this is a circuitous route, but it does work. It is 8% more expensive than Odesa. Capacity is also limited.

In an industry where margins are small, a 40% transportation cost is unsustainable, especially when competitors have costs that are a fraction of that. The difference comes out of Ukrainian farmer's profits. Many of them can't afford it. 

The territory that Russia holds is mostly a depopulated wasteland. For Ukraine to demine and rebuild it would be it's own costly undertaking.

Agree. It will be difficult and expensive whether Ukraine does it or Russia does it.

The long term viability of the Ukrainian state is a question, but I don't think that would change a single bit even if Ukraine regained all of the territory they held in February 2022.

I don't agree here. First, lots of the territory Russia gained was not actively fought over. It is pretty intact. Berdiansk for example. The M-14 and the railroad is in heavy use by Russia today. The port of Mariupol is open. All of these would be assets Ukraine could immediately take advantage of to lower their transportation costs. There are also areas where reconstruction can be done with little effort that would deliver disproportionate benefit. Reconstruction doesn't have to happen all at once. There are many areas in the Donbas that are not worth the effort. The facilities are obsolete and the mines played out. Not worth it, now or ever.

If Ukraine does not get appropriate security guarantees and aid in rebuilding, then many Ukrainians will try to emigrate and that could be a spiral that is hard to recover from.

True. IMO if Ukraine is reduced to a rump state with Russia retaining its ill-gotten gains there is no way any security guarantees will mean anything. The facts will speak for themselves. If nobody is willing to protect Ukraine's rights today, why will they do so tomorrow? They won't, and everybody, including Putin, will know that. Thus your spiral. The economics alone would probably do the same thing as well. The "west" must stand up for Ukraine now, or there will be no "tomorrow" to do it.

[dabigv13]

That Ukraine's economy is in big trouble is not in dispute. But in your post you don't explain how that leads to Ukraine's nonviability as a state. 

Ukrainian GDP per capita could drop by ~40% from present levels and they'd be in the same league as countries like India, Bolivia, the Phillipines. Not wealthy countries but certainly viable states.

[dabigv13]

That Ukraine's economy is in big trouble is not in dispute. But in your post you don't explain how that leads to Ukraine's nonviability as a state. 

Ukrainian GDP per capita could drop by ~40% from present levels and they'd be in the same league as countries like India, Bolivia, the Phillipines. Not wealthy countries but certainly viable states.

[BostonCard]

I think the supposition that Ukraine is not a viable country without the territory that Russia holds is incorrect and unsupported. 

Well, I have asserted this and supported this many times in this thread. Unfortunately I can do it again :-). Russia presently holds most of the Ukrainian territory that contained legacy "smokestack" industry. That is what the Donbas is all about. While this industry was largely obsolete it did contribute considerably to the Ukraine GDP. The steel production at Mariupol is the major "poster child" of that.

Even if Ukraine could recover that territory, how much of that industry could be restarted?  Like, is the steel plant in Mariupol going to even be operational?  And if it could be restarted, will Ukraine have the population to run it?  The pre-war population of Mariupol was about 425,000; it is currently about 120,000.  I presume that the what’s left is mostly retirees; it is doubtful that many working age men are going to be there as they would have fought the Russians, been shipped to camps, or forced to fight for the Russians.  Given that a war is being fought in the territory, there will be tons (literally) of unexploded ordinance and mines pretty much everywhere.  My guess is that the loss of capital and labor in the region is staggering, so if Ukraine is not a viable country without those regions, then it would not be a viable country for many years even with the territory.  At this point, it would mostly serve as a buffer between what’s left of Ukraine and Russia.

BC

[BostonCard]

I think the supposition that Ukraine is not a viable country without the territory that Russia holds is incorrect and unsupported. 

Well, I have asserted this and supported this many times in this thread. Unfortunately I can do it again :-). Russia presently holds most of the Ukrainian territory that contained legacy "smokestack" industry. That is what the Donbas is all about. While this industry was largely obsolete it did contribute considerably to the Ukraine GDP. The steel production at Mariupol is the major "poster child" of that.

Even if Ukraine could recover that territory, how much of that industry could be restarted?  Like, is the steel plant in Mariupol going to even be operational?  And if it could be restarted, will Ukraine have the population to run it?  The pre-war population of Mariupol was about 425,000; it is currently about 120,000.  I presume that the what’s left is mostly retirees; it is doubtful that many working age men are going to be there as they would have fought the Russians, been shipped to camps, or forced to fight for the Russians.  Given that a war is being fought in the territory, there will be tons (literally) of unexploded ordinance and mines pretty much everywhere.  My guess is that the loss of capital and labor in the region is staggering, so if Ukraine is not a viable country without those regions, then it would not be a viable country for many years even with the territory.  At this point, it would mostly serve as a buffer between what’s left of Ukraine and Russia.

BC

[dabigv13]

Assad forces in Syria continue to crumble. After losing Aleppo in less than three days, they are continuing to pull back. There does not appear to be any firm defensive lines. Russia's only Mediterranean port in serious danger, and they might not be able to do much to stop it. Rebel forces are now capturing large amounts of abandoned weaponry. Momentum is not on Assad's side. The various rebel factions for now seem to be playing nice. If that continues Assad is in big trouble. He obviously is aware of that, having fled to Russia with his family. That's a pretty negative prognostic factor for regime survival. Why die defending Damascus when the boss already left?

Liked this overview of the situation from WSJ

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/se...d-c3e693e8

[dabigv13]

Assad forces in Syria continue to crumble. After losing Aleppo in less than three days, they are continuing to pull back. There does not appear to be any firm defensive lines. Russia's only Mediterranean port in serious danger, and they might not be able to do much to stop it. Rebel forces are now capturing large amounts of abandoned weaponry. Momentum is not on Assad's side. The various rebel factions for now seem to be playing nice. If that continues Assad is in big trouble. He obviously is aware of that, having fled to Russia with his family. That's a pretty negative prognostic factor for regime survival. Why die defending Damascus when the boss already left?

Liked this overview of the situation from WSJ

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/se...d-c3e693e8

[dabigv13]

Assad supposedly has just returned to Damascus from Russia, and now there are reports of fighting in central Damascus! Possible coup, or a rebel sleeper cell?? Things moving very quickly, but still very unclear.

What is clear is Syrian Rebels have taken the city of Hama and the nearby Russian airbase, almost without firing a shot. Regime forces have yet to make a stand, at least one that isn't quickly overrun.

[dabigv13]

Assad supposedly has just returned to Damascus from Russia, and now there are reports of fighting in central Damascus! Possible coup, or a rebel sleeper cell?? Things moving very quickly, but still very unclear.

What is clear is Syrian Rebels have taken the city of Hama and the nearby Russian airbase, almost without firing a shot. Regime forces have yet to make a stand, at least one that isn't quickly overrun.

[TrumpCard]

Are all potential outcomes in Syria still bad for the US?  I know we have designated the regime a state sponsor of terror and we’ve designated the main rebel group a terrorist organization (with origins in Al Qaeda). I’ve not heard anything indicating the Kurds are in a strong position in Syria. What can the US hope for in that country?

[TrumpCard]

Are all potential outcomes in Syria still bad for the US?  I know we have designated the regime a state sponsor of terror and we’ve designated the main rebel group a terrorist organization (with origins in Al Qaeda). I’ve not heard anything indicating the Kurds are in a strong position in Syria. What can the US hope for in that country?

[dabigv13]

That is an open question. The HTS leader, Jolani, has disavowed the AQ, and has made statements at least that say they will treat all minority groups humanely and safely, and those groups in regions run by HTS do not seem persecuted.

That being said, Kurdish SDF forces sent large reinforcements to the Kurdish enclaves near Aleppo, there were at least some skirmishes between HTS and SDF forces. The SDF reportedly captured the Aleppo airport which was mostly just abandoned by regime forces. This was a bit raw for the HTS which did all the heavy lifting on this offensive to allow the SDF to hold such a strategically important location. It appears there is some joint occupation there now. 

So at least early in this, the various opposition factions seem to mostly be playing nice, if not exactly operating in any sort of joint command.

I think any option is better than Assad, especially for the Syrian people who have been subjected to a tyrant bombing and gassing them. If Assad falls, Turkey seems a winner. Iran and Russia losers. The Kurds? The Israelis? The US? More open questions depending on how things play out.

[dabigv13]

That is an open question. The HTS leader, Jolani, has disavowed the AQ, and has made statements at least that say they will treat all minority groups humanely and safely, and those groups in regions run by HTS do not seem persecuted.

That being said, Kurdish SDF forces sent large reinforcements to the Kurdish enclaves near Aleppo, there were at least some skirmishes between HTS and SDF forces. The SDF reportedly captured the Aleppo airport which was mostly just abandoned by regime forces. This was a bit raw for the HTS which did all the heavy lifting on this offensive to allow the SDF to hold such a strategically important location. It appears there is some joint occupation there now. 

So at least early in this, the various opposition factions seem to mostly be playing nice, if not exactly operating in any sort of joint command.

I think any option is better than Assad, especially for the Syrian people who have been subjected to a tyrant bombing and gassing them. If Assad falls, Turkey seems a winner. Iran and Russia losers. The Kurds? The Israelis? The US? More open questions depending on how things play out.

[Mick]

This is true, and has been Ukraine's major asset for many years. Unfortunately, grains and agricultural are "low margin" commodities. They are also bulky. Their commercial viability is extremely sensitive to transportation costs. This is also true for commodities like unrefined ore, although their bulk to weight ratio is better than say grain. The generally accepted cost ratios for shipping via truck, rail, and barge (ship) is 12-4-1, i.e. truck is 12 times as expensive as shipping by barge. Ukraine is blessed with a very good water transport route. Historically it is the dominant form of transport. The commodities took the shortest possible route to the river, by barge to Crimea and then onto ships. After 2014 that became impossible. For a while Mykolaiv was viable, but after 2022 it was not. From 2014 on Odesa became much more important. As can be seen from https://reliefweb.int/map/ukraine/ukrain...5-mar-2022 Odesa is served by two rail lines. It is about as far from the agricultural areas as it could be. It is even further from barge traffic. When Ukraine could use the railway across the southern part of the country (Mariupol-Mykolaiv-Odesa) barge transport still could cover lots of the way. Now that isn't possible.

Train of thought, but I wonder if the U. S. will ever consider repealing the Jones Act, which mandates that interstate shipping via water transport be 75% owned by U. S. citizens, must be built in the USA, must fly the USA flag and be 75% manned by an American crew. In 1946, there 2,300 U. S. vessels in compliance with the Jones Act, today there is less than 100. Seems like it would really add to the economy if we repealed the Jones Act. We don't do this for air, rail or vehicular transport -- and maybe you keep the regulations -- but it seems this would give us a substantial boost.

What is the Jones Act? | Grassroot Institute of Hawaii

Peter Zeihan on reviving water transport in the USA - Repeats the 12:1 ratio.

[Mick]

This is true, and has been Ukraine's major asset for many years. Unfortunately, grains and agricultural are "low margin" commodities. They are also bulky. Their commercial viability is extremely sensitive to transportation costs. This is also true for commodities like unrefined ore, although their bulk to weight ratio is better than say grain. The generally accepted cost ratios for shipping via truck, rail, and barge (ship) is 12-4-1, i.e. truck is 12 times as expensive as shipping by barge. Ukraine is blessed with a very good water transport route. Historically it is the dominant form of transport. The commodities took the shortest possible route to the river, by barge to Crimea and then onto ships. After 2014 that became impossible. For a while Mykolaiv was viable, but after 2022 it was not. From 2014 on Odesa became much more important. As can be seen from https://reliefweb.int/map/ukraine/ukrain...5-mar-2022 Odesa is served by two rail lines. It is about as far from the agricultural areas as it could be. It is even further from barge traffic. When Ukraine could use the railway across the southern part of the country (Mariupol-Mykolaiv-Odesa) barge transport still could cover lots of the way. Now that isn't possible.

Train of thought, but I wonder if the U. S. will ever consider repealing the Jones Act, which mandates that interstate shipping via water transport be 75% owned by U. S. citizens, must be built in the USA, must fly the USA flag and be 75% manned by an American crew. In 1946, there 2,300 U. S. vessels in compliance with the Jones Act, today there is less than 100. Seems like it would really add to the economy if we repealed the Jones Act. We don't do this for air, rail or vehicular transport -- and maybe you keep the regulations -- but it seems this would give us a substantial boost.

What is the Jones Act? | Grassroot Institute of Hawaii

Peter Zeihan on reviving water transport in the USA - Repeats the 12:1 ratio.

[BostonCard]

Hopefully this clarifies things….

[BostonCard]

Hopefully this clarifies things….