[fullmetal]

The Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General CQ Brown, has been fired.  The Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, and the Air Force's vice chief of staff, General James Slife, have also been fired.  A retired three-star general has been nominated to take General Brown's position as chair of the Joint Chiefs.

[fullmetal]

The Chariman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General CQ Brown, has been fired.  The Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, and the Air Force's vice chief of staff, General James Slife, have also been fired.  A retired three-star general has been nominated to take General Brown's position as chair of the Joint Chiefs.

[cardcrimson]

Our allies (for now) and other countries that use US military tech will surely take interest in this as well. I imagine Europe will be working on developing their domestic defense industry in this new era.

And that's a bad thing, because. . . .?

[cardcrimson]

Our allies (for now) and other countries that use US military tech will surely take interest in this as well. I imagine Europe will be working on developing their domestic defense industry in this new era.

And that's a bad thing, because. . . .?

[dabigv13]

Well it would be a good thing for Europe. But it would be bad for US arms manufacturers and their stockholders if Europe starts buying domestic instead of from us.

[dabigv13]

Well it would be a good thing for Europe. But it would be bad for US arms manufacturers and their stockholders if Europe starts buying domestic instead of from us.

[martyup]

It's always ugly watching the sausage being made.  

Zelensky said on Friday that officials from his country and the U.S. were working on concluding an economic deal to ensure that the accord worked and was fair to Kyiv.  Zelensky explained that American and Ukrainian ambassadors are drafting up an initial agreement, suggesting that a final deal would be established.

Let's hope that this will lead to the end the bloodshed in Ukraine and give Ukraine the security they need to protect themselves going forward.

[martyup]

It's always ugly watching the sausage being made.  

Zelensky said on Friday that officials from his country and the U.S. were working on concluding an economic deal to ensure that the accord worked and was fair to Kyiv.  Zelensky explained that American and Ukrainian ambassadors are drafting up an initial agreement, suggesting that a final deal would be established.

Let's hope that this will lead to the end the bloodshed in Ukraine and give Ukraine the security they need to protect themselves going forward.

[Hurlburt88]

one person's view (Geopolitical Futures founder)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-okIcAADYE

and here is a WJS article . . . I think/hope free

https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-putin-ru..._permalink

A ton to think about. I guess I just wish that we had made more 155mm shells over the last few years so Ukraine would be in a better position now . . .

[Hurlburt88]

one person's view (Geopolitical Futures founder)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-okIcAADYE

and here is a WJS article . . . I think/hope free

https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-putin-ru..._permalink

A ton to think about. I guess I just wish that we had made more 155mm shells over the last few years so Ukraine would be in a better position now . . .

[Goose]

A couple of F-16 articles. First https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/20/7499278/ reports on an F-16 directly supporting ground troops. This is "new", as previous reports seemed to indicate the F-16s were exclusively dedicated to anti-drone warfare. It may be the arrival of a more jets has allowed Ukraine to branch out a bit. Fly low, zoom and toss. Now if there were only enough of them (and it was 2023 instead of 2025). Oh well.

Second F-16 article is literally true but still mostly BS. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/14/7498420/ Link-16 isn't an IFF system. It is a data distribution system. It is certainly true that if the Ukrainian Patriot battery had Link-16 capability it would have had a Link-16 battlespace picture available. However, if the F-16 did not have Link-16 capability it wouldn't necessarily be identified (or even present) in that picture. Its presence in that picture at all might just be due to the Patriot battery detecting it as an unidentified contact. Do we know the F-16s sent to Ukraine still have Link-16 capability? I would think it even more likely it would be removed from the F-16. Patriot batteries don't come all that near the FEBA let alone cross it. F-16s OTOH have a very non-zero probability of doing both. Removing Link-16 capability for security purposes obviously makes more sense for the F-16 than it does Patriot batteries.

IMO the much more relevant question would be "Was the NATO mode 4 (or 5) IFF retained on the F-16s and the Patriots?". Russia undoubtedly already has examples of this hardware, so losing one wouldn't be a "big deal". They probably have copies of all the relevant STANAGs as well. However, without appropriate settings Russian knowledge of the system design wouldn't help them. They couldn't "spoof" a valid interrogator signal. A Patriot with appropriate settings could send an interrogation message in the direction of the F-16 that a similarly equipped F-16 would respond to with a properly encoded response message. This is especially true for an F-16 flying well inside Ukrainian (friendly) air space. This is the main purpose of IFF. The absence of IFF is what the article should be complaining about.

Of course, IFF may have been available but not being used. Neither Russia nor Ukraine have been using IFF in this war because they both use the same, compromised legacy system. The fact there was such capability for NATO compatible equipment may have not been utilized (for whatever reasons).

[Goose]

A couple of F-16 articles. First https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/20/7499278/ reports on an F-16 directly supporting ground troops. This is "new", as previous reports seemed to indicate the F-16s were exclusively dedicated to anti-drone warfare. It may be the arrival of a more jets has allowed Ukraine to branch out a bit. Fly low, zoom and toss. Now if there were only enough of them (and it was 2023 instead of 2025). Oh well.

Second F-16 article is literally true but still mostly BS. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/14/7498420/ Link-16 isn't an IFF system. It is a data distribution system. It is certainly true that if the Ukrainian Patriot battery had Link-16 capability it would have had a Link-16 battlespace picture available. However, if the F-16 did not have Link-16 capability it wouldn't necessarily be identified (or even present) in that picture. Its presence in that picture at all might just be due to the Patriot battery detecting it as an unidentified contact. Do we know the F-16s sent to Ukraine still have Link-16 capability? I would think it even more likely it would be removed from the F-16. Patriot batteries don't come all that near the FEBA let alone cross it. F-16s OTOH have a very non-zero probability of doing both. Removing Link-16 capability for security purposes obviously makes more sense for the F-16 than it does Patriot batteries.

IMO the much more relevant question would be "Was the NATO mode 4 (or 5) IFF retained on the F-16s and the Patriots?". Russia undoubtedly already has examples of this hardware, so losing one wouldn't be a "big deal". They probably have copies of all the relevant STANAGs as well. However, without appropriate settings Russian knowledge of the system design wouldn't help them. They couldn't "spoof" a valid interrogator signal. A Patriot with appropriate settings could send an interrogation message in the direction of the F-16 that a similarly equipped F-16 would respond to with a properly encoded response message. This is especially true for an F-16 flying well inside Ukrainian (friendly) air space. This is the main purpose of IFF. The absence of IFF is what the article should be complaining about.

Of course, IFF may have been available but not being used. Neither Russia nor Ukraine have been using IFF in this war because they both use the same, compromised legacy system. The fact there was such capability for NATO compatible equipment may have not been utilized (for whatever reasons).

[BostonCard]

You’ve been given free access to this article from The Economist as a gift. You can open the link five times within seven days. After that it will expire.

Donald Trump makes Ukraine an offer it can’t refuse
https://econ.st/3XfYqh0

This article (should be gifted) sheds some light at the apparent confusion on the “deal” on offer by the administration for future mineral rights.  The TL;DR version is that the confusion is arising because there are multiple plans floated by different people in the administration.

BC

[BostonCard]

You’ve been given free access to this article from The Economist as a gift. You can open the link five times within seven days. After that it will expire.

Donald Trump makes Ukraine an offer it can’t refuse
https://econ.st/3XfYqh0

This article (should be gifted) sheds some light at the apparent confusion on the “deal” on offer by the administration for future mineral rights.  The TL;DR version is that the confusion is arising because there are multiple plans floated by different people in the administration.

BC

[ADPinWDC]

The overriding priority is ending the bloodshed.   Ukraine must preserve its young men. 
Russia can be motivated to end the conflict, but wields a superior roster of Missiles, drones and MIRVs.  
Ukraine has drones... with limited range and payloads, and lacks 200,000 more soldiers to fling against the vicious machine.    
So, what will Russia require to agree to an Armistice?    

The only equals at the table are Russia and USA.   
No other party has the wherewithal to impose their will.  Europe does not.  Ukraine does not.  

A "Nice world" of salons and protocols in Europe does not exist, and they seem to prove that with each lunch they assemble.  
Then, Macron visits Trump on Monday -- probably on peacekeeping troops.  [But, Macron's hold on France is wobbling greatly]  
So does Starmer visit from UK on Thursday, perhaps the least effective leader that NATO could send.  

Mark Rutte at NATO is articulate but can only use persuasion, not force.  
Merz, now in Germany, will take several weeks to consolidate his Chancellorship domestically (with SPD, Greens).  
Trump has an affinity for Duda in Poland, personally, but Duda's term ends in June.  Polish voters face a crowded field. 
-- but Poland will still come down to Civic Union (centre-left; Tusk) vs PiS Law & Justice (hard right nationalist).  
Europe faces a real problem sending a messenger with enough wheelbase that Trump will listen to.  
... watch very conservative Markus Söder, the head of Bavaria's CSU within the CDU alliance, to emerge as a "Trump Whisperer".

[ADPinWDC]

The overriding priority is ending the bloodshed.   Ukraine must preserve its young men. 
Russia can be motivated to end the conflict, but wields a superior roster of Missiles, drones and MIRVs.  
Ukraine has drones... with limited range and payloads, and lacks 200,000 more soldiers to fling against the vicious machine.    
So, what will Russia require to agree to an Armistice?    

The only equals at the table are Russia and USA.   
No other party has the wherewithal to impose their will.  Europe does not.  Ukraine does not.  

A "Nice world" of salons and protocols in Europe does not exist, and they seem to prove that with each lunch they assemble.  
Then, Macron visits Trump on Monday -- probably on peacekeeping troops.  [But, Macron's hold on France is wobbling greatly]  
So does Starmer visit from UK on Thursday, perhaps the least effective leader that NATO could send.  

Mark Rutte at NATO is articulate but can only use persuasion, not force.  
Merz, now in Germany, will take several weeks to consolidate his Chancellorship domestically (with SPD, Greens).  
Trump has an affinity for Duda in Poland, personally, but Duda's term ends in June.  Polish voters face a crowded field. 
-- but Poland will still come down to Civic Union (centre-left; Tusk) vs PiS Law & Justice (hard right nationalist).  
Europe faces a real problem sending a messenger with enough wheelbase that Trump will listen to.  
... watch very conservative Markus Söder, the head of Bavaria's CSU within the CDU alliance, to emerge as a "Trump Whisperer".

[BostonCard]

We can agree that ending the bloodshed should be a priority, but a cease fire that merely postpones a repeat Russian invasion doesn’t do much.  Maybe if this were its first rodeo dealing with Russia, Ukraine might be willing to accept peace at whatever terms were offered, but having signed the Minsk agreement in 2014, only to see it collapse a year later, and then Minsk II which was not worth the paper it was printed on when Russia invaded in 2022.

Once (well, twice) bitten, thrice shy?  Can you blame Ukraine for pushing not just a cease fire at any cost, but a cease fire with credible security guarantees?  Add to that the fact that Russian demands have been for Ukraine to limit the size of its army, and the calculus goes something like does Ukraine give up territory slowly (Russia is thought to have captured 1,609 sq mi in all of 2024, which is a territory barely larger than Rhode Island), and hope they can survive a battle of attrition with a 1:2 casualty ratio long enough that its negotiating posture improves, or get a cease fire now, and hope that Russia doesn’t rebuild and attack again.  Add to that the fact that it is reasonable to expect Russian interference in any future election, and  I do not envy Zelensky’s position, as he is between a rock and a hard place.

We’ll see what sort of cease fire Putin is willing to accept.  I believe he feels that he can carry out the war indefinitely, even if it leads to capturing Ukraine 2000 sq miles a year (at that pace, it would take about 100 years to take the rest of Ukraine, though of course at some point well before that Ukrainian defense will crumble).  So he has little incentive to offer Ukraine a bargain they would be willing to accept.

BC

[BostonCard]

We can agree that ending the bloodshed should be a priority, but a cease fire that merely postpones a repeat Russian invasion doesn’t do much.  Maybe if this were its first rodeo dealing with Russia, Ukraine might be willing to accept peace at whatever terms were offered, but having signed the Minsk agreement in 2014, only to see it collapse a year later, and then Minsk II which was not worth the paper it was printed on when Russia invaded in 2022.

Once (well, twice) bitten, thrice shy?  Can you blame Ukraine for pushing not just a cease fire at any cost, but a cease fire with credible security guarantees?  Add to that the fact that Russian demands have been for Ukraine to limit the size of its army, and the calculus goes something like does Ukraine give up territory slowly (Russia is thought to have captured 1,609 sq mi in all of 2024, which is a territory barely larger than Rhode Island), and hope they can survive a battle of attrition with a 1:2 casualty ratio long enough that its negotiating posture improves, or get a cease fire now, and hope that Russia doesn’t rebuild and attack again.  Add to that the fact that it is reasonable to expect Russian interference in any future election, and  I do not envy Zelensky’s position, as he is between a rock and a hard place.

We’ll see what sort of cease fire Putin is willing to accept.  I believe he feels that he can carry out the war indefinitely, even if it leads to capturing Ukraine 2000 sq miles a year (at that pace, it would take about 100 years to take the rest of Ukraine, though of course at some point well before that Ukrainian defense will crumble).  So he has little incentive to offer Ukraine a bargain they would be willing to accept.

BC

[TrumpCard]

The U.S. should go to Russia and say, "sorry, we tried really hard to get Zelensky to cave, but he didn't fall for it.  turns out you'll actually have to give up some of the land you stole."

[TrumpCard]

The U.S. should go to Russia and say, "sorry, we tried really hard to get Zelensky to cave, but he didn't fall for it.  turns out you'll actually have to give up some of the land you stole."

[BostonCard]

Per ISW (which may or may not be a neutral source), the Russian position basically hasn’t moved from the proposal they made in Istanbul in early 2022.  The main provisions of that proposal were:

• Ukraine would have to amend its constitution to remove a clause committing to the pursuit of NATO membership and add a commitment to permanent neutrality
  
• Russian was to become an official language
  
• Russian armed forces would be capped at 85,000 troops and restricted to 342 tanks, 519 pieces of artillery, and missiles with ranges under 40 km
  
• Banning of the provision of foreign weapons or armed forces
  
• Ukraine’s neutrality would be guaranteed by the US, UK, China, France, and Russia, but all would have to agree on a response to a violation (which essentially gave Russia a veto over any action)
  
• All bilateral security agreements with Ukraine would be cancelled
  

If that reporting is accurate, I can see why Ukraine is, shall we say, hesitant of any deal.

BC

[BostonCard]

Per ISW (which may or may not be a neutral source), the Russian position basically hasn’t moved from the proposal they made in Istanbul in early 2022.  The main provisions of that proposal were:

• Ukraine would have to amend its constitution to remove a clause committing to the pursuit of NATO membership and add a commitment to permanent neutrality
  
• Russian was to become an official language
  
• Russian armed forces would be capped at 85,000 troops and restricted to 342 tanks, 519 pieces of artillery, and missiles with ranges under 40 km
  
• Banning of the provision of foreign weapons or armed forces
  
• Ukraine’s neutrality would be guaranteed by the US, UK, China, France, and Russia, but all would have to agree on a response to a violation (which essentially gave Russia a veto over any action)
  
• All bilateral security agreements with Ukraine would be cancelled
  

If that reporting is accurate, I can see why Ukraine is, shall we say, hesitant of any deal.

BC

[GK3]

Per ISW (which may or may not be a neutral source), the Russian position basically hasn’t moved from the proposal they made in Istanbul in early 2022.  The main provisions of that proposal were:

• Ukraine would have to amend its constitution to remove a clause committing to the pursuit of NATO membership and add a commitment to permanent neutrality
  
• Russian was to become an official language
  
• Russian armed forces would be capped at 85,000 troops and restricted to 342 tanks, 519 pieces of artillery, and missiles with ranges under 40 km
  
• Banning of the provision of foreign weapons or armed forces
  
• Ukraine’s neutrality would be guaranteed by the US, UK, China, France, and Russia, but all would have to agree on a response to a violation (which essentially gave Russia a veto over any action)
  
• All bilateral security agreements with Ukraine would be cancelled
  

If that reporting is accurate, I can see why Ukraine is, shall we say, hesitant of any deal.

BC

Very True!  Any deal dependent on a Putin led Russia adhering to any agreement is a pipe dream. Now Putin is not a Spring Chicken and no one is sure how long he will be around.  I feel certain that Putin feels that Ukraine is a historic part of Russia and as long as he runs Russia, he is going to do all he can to do to take over the Ukraine. I am certain he will not give up any part of Kursk occupied by Ukraine.  So what does Ukraine get out of a peace treaty?  Probably only a temporary cessation of hostilities. I believe the rare minerals deposits are generally undeveloped and it will take a major investment to make them productive.  Should we really trust the Russians to allow us to develop those deposits and then profit from them?  My guess they will be happy for us to pay to do the work and then they can take them.

[GK3]

Per ISW (which may or may not be a neutral source), the Russian position basically hasn’t moved from the proposal they made in Istanbul in early 2022.  The main provisions of that proposal were:

• Ukraine would have to amend its constitution to remove a clause committing to the pursuit of NATO membership and add a commitment to permanent neutrality
  
• Russian was to become an official language
  
• Russian armed forces would be capped at 85,000 troops and restricted to 342 tanks, 519 pieces of artillery, and missiles with ranges under 40 km
  
• Banning of the provision of foreign weapons or armed forces
  
• Ukraine’s neutrality would be guaranteed by the US, UK, China, France, and Russia, but all would have to agree on a response to a violation (which essentially gave Russia a veto over any action)
  
• All bilateral security agreements with Ukraine would be cancelled
  

If that reporting is accurate, I can see why Ukraine is, shall we say, hesitant of any deal.

BC

Very True!  Any deal dependent on a Putin led Russia adhering to any agreement is a pipe dream. Now Putin is not a Spring Chicken and no one is sure how long he will be around.  I feel certain that Putin feels that Ukraine is a historic part of Russia and as long as he runs Russia, he is going to do all he can to do to take over the Ukraine. I am certain he will not give up any part of Kursk occupied by Ukraine.  So what does Ukraine get out of a peace treaty?  Probably only a temporary cessation of hostilities. I believe the rare minerals deposits are generally undeveloped and it will take a major investment to make them productive.  Should we really trust the Russians to allow us to develop those deposits and then profit from them?  My guess they will be happy for us to pay to do the work and then they can take them.

[Genuine Realist]

You’ve been given free access to this article from The Economist as a gift. You can open the link five times within seven days. After that it will expire.

Donald Trump makes Ukraine an offer it can’t refuse
https://econ.st/3XfYqh0

This article (should be gifted) sheds some light at the apparent confusion on the “deal” on offer by the administration for future mineral rights.  The TL;DR version is that the confusion is arising because there are multiple plans floated by different people in the administration.

BC

Thanks for the article, but it unfortunately it is not neutral - loaded language and the usual anonymous sources. Finding unbiased coverage in the age of controversy is really difficult.

[Genuine Realist]

You’ve been given free access to this article from The Economist as a gift. You can open the link five times within seven days. After that it will expire.

Donald Trump makes Ukraine an offer it can’t refuse
https://econ.st/3XfYqh0

This article (should be gifted) sheds some light at the apparent confusion on the “deal” on offer by the administration for future mineral rights.  The TL;DR version is that the confusion is arising because there are multiple plans floated by different people in the administration.

BC

Thanks for the article, but it unfortunately it is not neutral - loaded language and the usual anonymous sources. Finding unbiased coverage in the age of controversy is really difficult.

[BostonCard]

The article is mostly sourced from Ukrainian officials, so they will have their point of view.  They are labeled as “Ukrainian official”.

I don’t think the factual basis is much in dispute; I do think there were multiple different versions of a deal on offer, which is why you at once see Ukrainians reject outright (one version of the) deal and negotiate (over a different version).  Of course, whether the characterization of the deals as “bad” and “disastrous” is accurate is, of course, a matter of opinion, but I don’t doubt that the deals on offer are at best a bitter pill to swallow from a Ukrainian perspective.  No question one person’s bitter pill is another’s life-saving medicine, and we do have American sources telling their counterparts that they should take the deal.

BC

[BostonCard]

The article is mostly sourced from Ukrainian officials, so they will have their point of view.  They are labeled as “Ukrainian official”.

I don’t think the factual basis is much in dispute; I do think there were multiple different versions of a deal on offer, which is why you at once see Ukrainians reject outright (one version of the) deal and negotiate (over a different version).  Of course, whether the characterization of the deals as “bad” and “disastrous” is accurate is, of course, a matter of opinion, but I don’t doubt that the deals on offer are at best a bitter pill to swallow from a Ukrainian perspective.  No question one person’s bitter pill is another’s life-saving medicine, and we do have American sources telling their counterparts that they should take the deal.

BC

[Goose]

Per ISW (which may or may not be a neutral source), the Russian position basically hasn’t moved from the proposal they made in Istanbul in early 2022.  The main provisions of that proposal were:

• Ukraine would have to amend its constitution to remove a clause committing to the pursuit of NATO membership and add a commitment to permanent neutrality
  
• Russian was to become an official language
  
• Russian armed forces would be capped at 85,000 troops and restricted to 342 tanks, 519 pieces of artillery, and missiles with ranges under 40 km
  
• Banning of the provision of foreign weapons or armed forces
  
• Ukraine’s neutrality would be guaranteed by the US, UK, China, France, and Russia, but all would have to agree on a response to a violation (which essentially gave Russia a veto over any action)
  
• All bilateral security agreements with Ukraine would be cancelled
  

If that reporting is accurate, I can see why Ukraine is, shall we say, hesitant of any deal.

BC

The situation for Ukraine is stark indeed. I think they could agree to permanent neutrality and no NATO membership. However, without the military force to back up their neutrality it will be meaningless. Anybody who wants to do so could occupy their country. Ukraine could never agree to such restrictions. Whether Ukraine could build a force that would deter others, particularly Russia, is another question.

It has been clearly demonstrated by hard experience that the US, France, and UK (and the rest of the EU for that matter) are unwilling to commit troops to defend Ukraine (in the absence of a wider conflict already existing). Even if Russia didn't veto such action, it isn't happening. Ever.

That leaves Ukraine no choices that don't involve self-extinction, unless a miracle happens e.g. Putin dies and Russia abandons the war.

The US had a chance to commit weapons and money to Ukraine early on in this war that could have defeated Russia. Russia was not ready for what happened to them in Ukraine. If Ukraine had a minimal air force in 2023, which it could have, and adequate medium range missiles to prevent Russia from fortifying the south, Ukraine could have forced Russia out of Crimea. As it was, with US dithering and lack of focus, Ukraine had to assault a well built set of concrete fortifications arrayed in depth. They tried, but failed. Obviously the US had no real strategic plan for Ukraine to win. We maybe had a plan for them not to lose quickly. Apparently some thought Russia would give up under those conditions. They won't, because they realized that their victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.

The lesson we need to learn (and seemingly never do) is that we should never enter a war, even by proxy, unless we have a clear definition of victory and a plan the compels that outcome. It can't involve assumptions about the other sides behavior. What if the enemy doesn't do what you expect him to do? If we can't define victory and/or have no plan to compel that outcome, stay out of it. Plans can fail and require reconsideration, but we must have one to start with. We did not.

[Goose]

Per ISW (which may or may not be a neutral source), the Russian position basically hasn’t moved from the proposal they made in Istanbul in early 2022.  The main provisions of that proposal were:

• Ukraine would have to amend its constitution to remove a clause committing to the pursuit of NATO membership and add a commitment to permanent neutrality
  
• Russian was to become an official language
  
• Russian armed forces would be capped at 85,000 troops and restricted to 342 tanks, 519 pieces of artillery, and missiles with ranges under 40 km
  
• Banning of the provision of foreign weapons or armed forces
  
• Ukraine’s neutrality would be guaranteed by the US, UK, China, France, and Russia, but all would have to agree on a response to a violation (which essentially gave Russia a veto over any action)
  
• All bilateral security agreements with Ukraine would be cancelled
  

If that reporting is accurate, I can see why Ukraine is, shall we say, hesitant of any deal.

BC

The situation for Ukraine is stark indeed. I think they could agree to permanent neutrality and no NATO membership. However, without the military force to back up their neutrality it will be meaningless. Anybody who wants to do so could occupy their country. Ukraine could never agree to such restrictions. Whether Ukraine could build a force that would deter others, particularly Russia, is another question.

It has been clearly demonstrated by hard experience that the US, France, and UK (and the rest of the EU for that matter) are unwilling to commit troops to defend Ukraine (in the absence of a wider conflict already existing). Even if Russia didn't veto such action, it isn't happening. Ever.

That leaves Ukraine no choices that don't involve self-extinction, unless a miracle happens e.g. Putin dies and Russia abandons the war.

The US had a chance to commit weapons and money to Ukraine early on in this war that could have defeated Russia. Russia was not ready for what happened to them in Ukraine. If Ukraine had a minimal air force in 2023, which it could have, and adequate medium range missiles to prevent Russia from fortifying the south, Ukraine could have forced Russia out of Crimea. As it was, with US dithering and lack of focus, Ukraine had to assault a well built set of concrete fortifications arrayed in depth. They tried, but failed. Obviously the US had no real strategic plan for Ukraine to win. We maybe had a plan for them not to lose quickly. Apparently some thought Russia would give up under those conditions. They won't, because they realized that their victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.

The lesson we need to learn (and seemingly never do) is that we should never enter a war, even by proxy, unless we have a clear definition of victory and a plan the compels that outcome. It can't involve assumptions about the other sides behavior. What if the enemy doesn't do what you expect him to do? If we can't define victory and/or have no plan to compel that outcome, stay out of it. Plans can fail and require reconsideration, but we must have one to start with. We did not.

[fullmetal]

The lack of conviction and will from the US in the early phase of this conflict (take from that what you will) is a shameful mark on a nation supposedly committed to freedom and democracy.  There may yet be a way out of this mess, but it's not clear if we as a nation will make a choice to go there.

[fullmetal]

The lack of conviction and will from the US in the early phase of this conflict (take from that what you will) is a shameful mark on a nation supposedly committed to freedom and democracy.  There may yet be a way out of this mess, but it's not clear if we as a nation will make a choice to go there.

[BostonCard]

The US had a chance to commit weapons and money to Ukraine early on in this war that could have defeated Russia. Russia was not ready for what happened to them in Ukraine. If Ukraine had a minimal air force in 2023, which it could have, and adequate medium range missiles to prevent Russia from fortifying the south, Ukraine could have forced Russia out of Crimea. As it was, with US dithering and lack of focus, Ukraine had to assault a well built set of concrete fortifications arrayed in depth. They tried, but failed. Obviously the US had no real strategic plan for Ukraine to win. We maybe had a plan for them not to lose quickly. Apparently some thought Russia would give up under those conditions. They won't, because they realized that their victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.

The lesson we need to learn (and seemingly never do) is that we should never enter a war, even by proxy, unless we have a clear definition of victory and a plan the compels that outcome. It can't involve assumptions about the other sides behavior. What if the enemy doesn't do what you expect him to do? If we can't define victory and/or have no plan to compel that outcome, stay out of it. Plans can fail and require reconsideration, but we must have one to start with. We did not.

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.  The WSJ or NYTimes had a piece that described that sanctions as both more effective and less effective than hoped (if I find it again, I will post).

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.  As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

BC

[BostonCard]

The US had a chance to commit weapons and money to Ukraine early on in this war that could have defeated Russia. Russia was not ready for what happened to them in Ukraine. If Ukraine had a minimal air force in 2023, which it could have, and adequate medium range missiles to prevent Russia from fortifying the south, Ukraine could have forced Russia out of Crimea. As it was, with US dithering and lack of focus, Ukraine had to assault a well built set of concrete fortifications arrayed in depth. They tried, but failed. Obviously the US had no real strategic plan for Ukraine to win. We maybe had a plan for them not to lose quickly. Apparently some thought Russia would give up under those conditions. They won't, because they realized that their victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.

The lesson we need to learn (and seemingly never do) is that we should never enter a war, even by proxy, unless we have a clear definition of victory and a plan the compels that outcome. It can't involve assumptions about the other sides behavior. What if the enemy doesn't do what you expect him to do? If we can't define victory and/or have no plan to compel that outcome, stay out of it. Plans can fail and require reconsideration, but we must have one to start with. We did not.

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.  The WSJ or NYTimes had a piece that described that sanctions as both more effective and less effective than hoped (if I find it again, I will post).

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.  As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

BC

[ADPinWDC]

The harsh reality is that Ukraine cannot survive another year of attrition.   Russia can, however painful.

[ADPinWDC]

The harsh reality is that Ukraine cannot survive another year of attrition.   Russia can, however painful.

[Goose]

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.

I think you are correct. The people involved undoubtedly thought Russia would decide it wasn't worth the pain and quit. However, if our war plans ever rely on what decisions the enemy will make, they are hopelessly flawed. Our plan must create conditions such that our enemy has no choice at all. If they do have a choice our plan is just wishful thinking. If we can't make it physically impossible for Russia to keep fighting, they may very well do exactly that. That is our repeated error.

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

We would indeed have plenty of justification. The problem is there was no certainty at the start of the war that justification would exist. If lifting the restrictions was necessary to victory, we needed to decide on day -1 whether we would do so. If we wouldn't at that point, our war plan is flawed and we need a new one. If we can't generate a new one that will "work", do not enter the war. I agree that taking advantage of changing conditions is necessary and prudent, but if we have to rely on such changes, we are already in deep trouble.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.

You are of course correct. In war nothing is certain, and as I said Ukraine can chose to fight on and hope for a "miracle". That is also why you make your opponents play out bridge hands you know they will win if played correctly. They may make a mistake.  All kinds of things can happen, but Ukraine right now lacks the ability to control events. The one thing that Ukraine can do, at least for awhile, is keep fighting. That is why the USA and Russia can't end this war by themselves. Ukraine still has a vote.

As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

I agree those issues are part of the Ukrainian calculus. However, I think the number one issue for Ukraine is how to structure their actions so their army is willing to keep fighting. That is a prerequisite to having any other choices to make. It may be there is no "pause" on the table. Even if Ukraine accepted all the current terms, bad as they are, Putin may then just add other conditions. I guess I am still hoping he will overplay his hand.

[Goose]

The US and Western Europe underestimated Russia's willingness to absorb pain both financially from sanctions and on the battlefield in the form of casualties.  Maybe we were naive in the extreme to do so, but I suspect if you had told people the outcome of both sanctions and of Ukraine on the battlefield three years ago they would have said that it was a massive success, and would be shocked that Russia had not negotiated an end to the war.

I think you are correct. The people involved undoubtedly thought Russia would decide it wasn't worth the pain and quit. However, if our war plans ever rely on what decisions the enemy will make, they are hopelessly flawed. Our plan must create conditions such that our enemy has no choice at all. If they do have a choice our plan is just wishful thinking. If we can't make it physically impossible for Russia to keep fighting, they may very well do exactly that. That is our repeated error.

I agree with your conclusion.  The plan seems to have been poorly war-gamed.  Someone, somewhere should have built a contingency plan (if x happens, we do y).  Sometimes despite best efforts you do lose, but it is totally fair to criticize us for leaving a lot on the table, afraid of crossing "red lines".  I think after Bucha and after Russian targeting of civilians, there would have been plenty of justification for lifting the self-imposed restrictions on what we provided to Ukraine and how they could use it.

We would indeed have plenty of justification. The problem is there was no certainty at the start of the war that justification would exist. If lifting the restrictions was necessary to victory, we needed to decide on day -1 whether we would do so. If we wouldn't at that point, our war plan is flawed and we need a new one. If we can't generate a new one that will "work", do not enter the war. I agree that taking advantage of changing conditions is necessary and prudent, but if we have to rely on such changes, we are already in deep trouble.

I do disagree with your statement that Russian victory is inevitable if they just keep at it.  Nothing in war is inevitable.  Certainly the most likely outcome is a slow but steady march west by Russian troops and eventual Ukrainian collapse if they keep at it.  But war is a non-linear process, and Russia may not be able to "keep at it" or at least not be able to keep at it without a general mobilization or further reorienting their economy in a way that the population may not tolerate.  Syria has shown us that the regime is fully in control, until it is not, and while I would not predict anything happening in Russia in 6 months, I would not have predicted anything happening in Syria 6 months ago.

You are of course correct. In war nothing is certain, and as I said Ukraine can chose to fight on and hope for a "miracle". That is also why you make your opponents play out bridge hands you know they will win if played correctly. They may make a mistake.  All kinds of things can happen, but Ukraine right now lacks the ability to control events. The one thing that Ukraine can do, at least for awhile, is keep fighting. That is why the USA and Russia can't end this war by themselves. Ukraine still has a vote.

As I said, the Ukrainian calculus probably is weighing whether the slow attrition of war versus a pause, largely on Russia's terms, will give them the best chance of survival as a nation.  I'm fairly certain no one knows.

I agree those issues are part of the Ukrainian calculus. However, I think the number one issue for Ukraine is how to structure their actions so their army is willing to keep fighting. That is a prerequisite to having any other choices to make. It may be there is no "pause" on the table. Even if Ukraine accepted all the current terms, bad as they are, Putin may then just add other conditions. I guess I am still hoping he will overplay his hand.

[BostonCard]

The harsh reality is that Ukraine cannot survive another year of attrition.   Russia can, however painful.

What is the basis for that statement? I don’t doubt the possibility that it is true, I’m just not sure of the certainty that it is true.  I have not seen similar predictions with that degree of confidence.


For example, here’s a Chatham House deep dive into possible outcomes of the war

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/fou...ants-peace

BC

[BostonCard]

The harsh reality is that Ukraine cannot survive another year of attrition.   Russia can, however painful.

What is the basis for that statement? I don’t doubt the possibility that it is true, I’m just not sure of the certainty that it is true.  I have not seen similar predictions with that degree of confidence.


For example, here’s a Chatham House deep dive into possible outcomes of the war

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/10/fou...ants-peace

BC