(06-10-2025, 01:07 PM)GK3 Wrote: Our less than enthusiastic support of the Article 5 currently is probably very good for Western Europe and they see the need to rebuild their military, England and Germany seem particularly inclined in this direction.
While I do believe that Western Europe sees the need to rebuild their military forces, I think our less than total commitment to Article 5 is a catastrophe. There are several reasons this is the case. If the US doesn't respond, can NATO "win"? If a large part of the European body politic decides the answer is "no", their nations will be unwilling to participate in a losing war. Even if the public in any given nation thinks NATO can win if they all stick together, the question then becomes "Will everybody participate?". It then becomes a "game theory" problem and Europe has a very long history of not trusting each other, for good reason. Without the US being there as the "adult in the room" it is very probable some nations will at least try to sit it out. This exact problem existed when France left the active military wing of NATO. The rest of Europe wasn't sure France would fight. At that time the fact the US certainly would ensured NATO still was a credible force. Otherwise, it would not have been.
NATO has also accepted former Warsaw pact states that can contribute little to NATOs military strength while at the same time presenting attractive targets to Russia. Many of the "original" NATO countries feel little affection or sense of obligation to these countries. Europe did just fine with these states as Russian satellites. IMO Berlin and Paris are not going to war for Bulgaria no matter what Article 5 says unless the US does too. During the Cold War Russia's Communist ideology gave European states good reason to believe that Russia would not stop at a few nearby territorial acquisitions. That is no longer the case. Many Europeans find it credible that Russia would take Ukraine and that would be it. Same argument applies to Bulgaria, Romania and probably Hungary and Slovakia. The Czech Republic and Poland are a different case. The Germany government would see the necessity to fight for both, but given the current strength of its forces it is unclear to me they could or would. If Germany won't, nobody else can as Germany is "in the way". Finland is IMO also at risk of abandonment. Sweden would undoubtedly want to help them, but would not do it alone. Who else would feel a moral obligation to honor their collective defense commitment? If the US will not it gives everybody else the moral cover to do the same.
It must also be recognized that before 1945 Russia was part of the European "balance of power". At various times Russia was allied with Britain, France, and Germany, occasionally more than one at the same time. One of the fundamental contributions of NATO was the isolation of Russia from "the concert of Europe". If the US cannot be relied upon to "answer the bell", one or more NATO nations may chose to break that isolation and ally themselves with Russia. Their calculus may be that this is their best course to avoid war and obtain cheap fuels. This would be even more attractive if it brings no diplomatic consequences from the US. In today's world aligning with Russia may be a rational act, or at least appear to be.
It has been 34 years since the end of the Cold War. A generation has grown up in Europe that didn't believe they would ever fight a war. Germany abolished conscription in 2011 after 20 years of nothing like UMT. France stopped UMT in 1996. Italy stopped in 2005. The important fact is nobody really thought a war in Europe was possible. One important "side effect" of NATO is that military conflict between NATO nations became unthinkable. We were all "on the same side". If the US is no longer present to champion that theory, the various European nations may no longer feel the solidarity, but in any case their populations do not (present tense) support the creation of strong military. The Ukraine war changed the calculus. War in Europe was not just possible, it was happening. That (and not the US commitment wavering) is primarily why the European nations are (or at least attempting) increasing their military spending. However, it is far from clear their populations understand what will be required and accept the fact many of their children must be ready to fight a war.
The administrations admonitions about defense spending in 2017 got some lip service but little action. After Russia invaded Ukraine, that progressively changed. Many of the PIGS are going to be unable to do much, because their economies aren't strong enough to do so. Portugal 1.55% of GDP in 2024, Italy 1.61% in 2024, Spain 1.28% in 2024. Greece does much better, 3.08% in 2024. The UK has always been slightly above 2%, France broke 2% of GDP in 2023, Germany broke 2% the same year. While promises to increase this spending to 2.5% and more abound, the reality is that all these European nations have domestic problems and political constraints that make a 0.5% increase in their defense spending unlikely. More importantly, these nations have no credible means to increase the manning of their armed forces. The UK is in a particularly bad way, having to "lay up" several warships for lack of crews. Many specialist go to sea "back to back", moved from one returning ship to another deploying ship with no shore leave in between. During the Cold War, the BRD fielded 12 divisions and the DDR fielded 3. Today, the combined Germany fields 2 and change. There is no substitute for people, especially when fighting Russia. NATO has way too few service personnel and no way ahead to fix that problem. This isn't a problem caused by the US commitment wavering, but it matters more because the much larger number of already organized and trained US manpower will not be available.
Quote:While the Baltic States are probably not considered much more than a bump in the road, I wonder how easy it would really be for Russia. They have found making headway in Ukraine far more difficult than they planned despite the fact Ukraine has no real airpower to bother them. By invading the Baltic States I would assume that the combined NATO air forces would be committed to the fray. Something Russia has not had to deal with in the Ukrainian conflict.
A lot may depend on how much of a surprise such a Russian attack achieves. How quickly the NATO nations (sans the US) could make a decision to fight is very questionable. Being democracies the government must at a minimum take into consideration how much public support such an action would have. Given that any nation fighting for the Baltics would become a target for Russian missile retaliation, how many will sign up, and how quickly? The command structure would also have lots of "holes" if all the US pieces aren't there. The Baltic States have the misfortune to be near a part of Russia that contained the best and largest Russian IADS system. Protecting Leningrad was important. S-400 missiles launched from Russian territory can dominate the entire Baltic States airspace. Kaliningrad also has powerful air defense capability, although quite a few S-400s have been transferred to the south. Presumably if an attack on the Baltics was on offer, that would be reversed.
Until a successful SEAD operation can be executed much of NATO air would have a very difficult time operating near, let alone in the Baltics. The somewhat "good news" is that Norway has 52 F-35As operational. The Dutch have 49 F-35As. Even better, the Norwegian Air Force has demonstrated the ability to write coherent ATOs for a SEAD operation. They have obviously never executed one. How "ready" are both nations to execute SEAD in Russian territory? How ready are their populations for the inevitable Russian missile retaliation? If you bomb Russia you have to expect that reply. Can they be ready to execute "in time"? How many F-35A aircraft could be spared from national air defense requirements? How "ready" is the Dutch component?
Quote:After watching the Russian efforts the last two years I would have to wonder how they would fare in a conflict with a peer military.
They wouldn't be fighting a "peer" military. What they would be fighting is a coalition of nations with vastly disparate capabilities that have limited ability to work together and no common set of operations. Coalition warfare has its problems. It also has its strengths. Nobody can possibly know how well NATO will perform without the US being a major participant. Everybody takes turns in the various leadership positions during exercises, but very few exercises take place without at least some US participation. None of these nations have any relevant actual combat experience. The UK and France contributed to the First Gulf War, but almost all of the planning and logistics was supplied by the US. The UK Chief of the Defence Staff a few years ago said that the UK couldn't fight unless the US supplied the transportation and logistics. Didn't go over well, but unfortunately may be accurate.
