[M T]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC

But of course everyone who has responsibility or authority for that decision knew this.  So, it wasn't an error in timing.

[M T]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC

But of course everyone who has responsibility or authority for that decision knew this.  So, it wasn't an error in timing.

[Goose]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC

Indeed a bad time to stop shipping weapons. Unfortunately, even if we were still shipping weapons we have nothing to ship that will put a major dent in the drone barrage. Ukraine's F-16s are doing their best, but the number of planes (and especially pilots) are so inadequate they can only make a dent. Ukraine lost an aircraft and a pilot recently after he had taken down his seventh drone of the sortie. Apparently collided with some debris or possibly another drone. The F-16 can carry six missiles on "normal" weapons hardpoints. The last kill was probably with the gun. Easy to get too close. Sad really.

[Goose]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC

Indeed a bad time to stop shipping weapons. Unfortunately, even if we were still shipping weapons we have nothing to ship that will put a major dent in the drone barrage. Ukraine's F-16s are doing their best, but the number of planes (and especially pilots) are so inadequate they can only make a dent. Ukraine lost an aircraft and a pilot recently after he had taken down his seventh drone of the sortie. Apparently collided with some debris or possibly another drone. The F-16 can carry six missiles on "normal" weapons hardpoints. The last kill was probably with the gun. Easy to get too close. Sad really.

[GK3]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC

Indeed a bad time to stop shipping weapons. Unfortunately, even if we were still shipping weapons we have nothing to ship that will put a major dent in the drone barrage. Ukraine's F-16s are doing their best, but the number of planes (and especially pilots) are so inadequate they can only make a dent. Ukraine lost an aircraft and a pilot recently after he had taken down his seventh drone of the sortie. Apparently collided with some debris or possibly another drone. The F-16 can carry six missiles on "normal" weapons hardpoints. The last kill was probably with the gun. Easy to get too close. Sad really.

Yes, very sad indeed. Regrettably we have a history of getting involved and then baling out. From Vietnam to now there is no real reason for anyone to figure we will hang in for the end game.

[GK3]

Bad timing for the US to halt weapons transfers.

https://www.wsj.com/world/what-the-halt-..._permalink

The pace of drone strikes has increased dramatically over the last 12 months, from about 500 to over 5000.

BC

Indeed a bad time to stop shipping weapons. Unfortunately, even if we were still shipping weapons we have nothing to ship that will put a major dent in the drone barrage. Ukraine's F-16s are doing their best, but the number of planes (and especially pilots) are so inadequate they can only make a dent. Ukraine lost an aircraft and a pilot recently after he had taken down his seventh drone of the sortie. Apparently collided with some debris or possibly another drone. The F-16 can carry six missiles on "normal" weapons hardpoints. The last kill was probably with the gun. Easy to get too close. Sad really.

Yes, very sad indeed. Regrettably we have a history of getting involved and then baling out. From Vietnam to now there is no real reason for anyone to figure we will hang in for the end game.

[Goose]

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/26/u...es-russia/

Interesting article on two levels. First, it talks about EW still being useful in Ukraine. Fiber Optic drones haven't and won't take over, particularly the medium and long range surveillance/reconnaissance tasks. Flying fiber optic drones in a racetrack path at medium altitude just isn't possible. The article reveals that Ukraine has (somewhat unsurprisingly) followed Russian practice of using barrage noise as the backbone of their counter-drone EW. Russia however developed other jamming techniques to augment their baseline capabilities. These techniques (e.g. spot noise, swept spot noise and swept CW) were not particularly sophisticated but were more difficult to counter than simple barrage noise alone.
 
It appears Ukraine has not done that. It also appears Ukrainian jammers  do not "blink" and do not have wide-band acquisition receivers  to "find" the exact frequencies the control link for the Russian drones are using. This makes sense if one is using barrage noise only, because there is really nothing the operator (or the jammer itself) can do to take advantage of such information. The article appears to say the introduction of drones that use the 5.8 GHz ISM band is flummoxing Ukrainian jamming. First, jam the control link, not the video link. Second, adding another ISM band downlink is no big deal. The fact that was coming in the commercial drone space was well known. In fact it had been around for awhile, even in Mavic products. The telling statement is

Overall, it appears that EW is gradually losing the battle against frontline quadcopters,” Shutyi says, later adding: “The drone-vs-antidrone arms race continues, and simple setups like ‘antenna + jammer + power source’ no longer deliver the needed results.”

Well duh. The fact it ever did work can be mostly laid at the door of Russian ineptitude/lassitude. Using standard commercial drone control hardware sets a very low limit on what the drone can do in terms of ECCM. The fact this approach persists for so long on both sides is quite strange. Russian military grade reconnaissance drones suffer less from this problem every day, although by US standards they are still "simple". There are people in Ukraine that understand this. Surprising they aren't reacting more comprehensively.

A more "general" assertion made by the article reflects a common thread of thought from both Ukrainian and other sources that IMO is simply nonsense.

The bigger picture: Adapting to the drone age
The war in Ukraine has already rewritten several military doctrines:

• A shift from mobile to positional warfare
  
• Disappearance of traditional foot reconnaissance in favor of airborne surveillance
  
• Tanks and BMPs reduced to fire support roles
  
• Phasing out heavy machine guns on the line of contact due to their vulnerability to drones
  
• And now, the likely fading of infantry mortars and grenade launchers

 
These conditions are absolutely particular to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Positional warfare became the norm because from the beginning neither Ukraine nor Russia was capable of executing mobile warfare. Ukraine had an almost universally immobile army that did/does not even possess its own organic transport, let alone the training and support elements necessary for mobile warfare. Russia thought they could execute mobile warfare but due to lack of planning, air support, leadership and training (among other things) could not. Their organizational restructuring into Brigade Tactical Groups was also a disaster that was not revealed in the non-existent training. The inability of either side to execute mobile warfare drives all the other "rewriting of military doctrine" indicated in this article.
 
Ukraine subsequently received more NATO training and equipment. Their first attempt at mobile warfare in a major offensive failed, mostly because 1) it was into the teeth of strong Russian fixed fortifications 2) much of the mine clearance equipment did not arrive, 3) it takes more than just a few months training to build a mobile striking force, and 4) Russia was able to employ helicopter gunships effectively. These same Ukrainian units performed very effectively in the mobile assault into Kursk Oblast. The problem in Kursk was that their were no adequate exploitation forces available behind them to allow the mobile assault to continue. The Ukrainians were initially not stopped by Russian defenses but by lack of resources to exploit success.

It is undoubtedly true that tanks become indirect fire weapons when positional warfare and a static front is the norm. IFVs however become critical "battle taxis" to rotate and replace troops in embattled front lines. Heavy machine guns are used in Ukraine as an important anti-drone weapon, among other things. They aren't going anywhere. Obviously the article asserts these "facts" without much support for each particular conclusion.

One only needs to look at the Israel-Iran conflict to demonstrate that the above "rewriting" is nonsense. None of these "facts" apply to this completely different war which was never positional in any sense. Of course, drawing sweeping conclusions that infantry and armor is now irrelevant from the Israel-Iran war would be nonsense too, even though these types of forces were not used in the conflict. Attack drones were used by special forces inside Iran. That certainly doesn't mean they will be solely used that way in future wars.
 
Drawing "universal truths" from particular conflicts has always been very error prone. The statement that every nations military is always preparing to re-fight the last war is somewhat true. The proliferation of blogs and modern communication exacerbates this tendency. I again cite rams on capital ships driven by conclusions drawn from the Battle of Lissa (1866). Ram bows were prominent on battleships built through the early 1900s, even though none of these rams were ever used in battle subsequently. A clear example of a special case erroneously leading to general conclusions. IMO far, far too much of this is going on in the public discussions. [sarcasm]We are indeed fortunate that currently our Defense Department is not driven by any study of other nation's capabilities and believes that a form of American Bushido will make up for any lack of capability we may actually have. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025...roops.html[/sarcasm].

[Goose]

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/26/u...es-russia/

Interesting article on two levels. First, it talks about EW still being useful in Ukraine. Fiber Optic drones haven't and won't take over, particularly the medium and long range surveillance/reconnaissance tasks. Flying fiber optic drones in a racetrack path at medium altitude just isn't possible. The article reveals that Ukraine has (somewhat unsurprisingly) followed Russian practice of using barrage noise as the backbone of their counter-drone EW. Russia however developed other jamming techniques to augment their baseline capabilities. These techniques (e.g. spot noise, swept spot noise and swept CW) were not particularly sophisticated but were more difficult to counter than simple barrage noise alone.
 
It appears Ukraine has not done that. It also appears Ukrainian jammers  do not "blink" and do not have wide-band acquisition receivers  to "find" the exact frequencies the control link for the Russian drones are using. This makes sense if one is using barrage noise only, because there is really nothing the operator (or the jammer itself) can do to take advantage of such information. The article appears to say the introduction of drones that use the 5.8 GHz ISM band is flummoxing Ukrainian jamming. First, jam the control link, not the video link. Second, adding another ISM band downlink is no big deal. The fact that was coming in the commercial drone space was well known. In fact it had been around for awhile, even in Mavic products. The telling statement is

Overall, it appears that EW is gradually losing the battle against frontline quadcopters,” Shutyi says, later adding: “The drone-vs-antidrone arms race continues, and simple setups like ‘antenna + jammer + power source’ no longer deliver the needed results.”

Well duh. The fact it ever did work can be mostly laid at the door of Russian ineptitude/lassitude. Using standard commercial drone control hardware sets a very low limit on what the drone can do in terms of ECCM. The fact this approach persists for so long on both sides is quite strange. Russian military grade reconnaissance drones suffer less from this problem every day, although by US standards they are still "simple". There are people in Ukraine that understand this. Surprising they aren't reacting more comprehensively.

A more "general" assertion made by the article reflects a common thread of thought from both Ukrainian and other sources that IMO is simply nonsense.

The bigger picture: Adapting to the drone age
The war in Ukraine has already rewritten several military doctrines:

• A shift from mobile to positional warfare
  
• Disappearance of traditional foot reconnaissance in favor of airborne surveillance
  
• Tanks and BMPs reduced to fire support roles
  
• Phasing out heavy machine guns on the line of contact due to their vulnerability to drones
  
• And now, the likely fading of infantry mortars and grenade launchers

 
These conditions are absolutely particular to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Positional warfare became the norm because from the beginning neither Ukraine nor Russia was capable of executing mobile warfare. Ukraine had an almost universally immobile army that did/does not even possess its own organic transport, let alone the training and support elements necessary for mobile warfare. Russia thought they could execute mobile warfare but due to lack of planning, air support, leadership and training (among other things) could not. Their organizational restructuring into Brigade Tactical Groups was also a disaster that was not revealed in the non-existent training. The inability of either side to execute mobile warfare drives all the other "rewriting of military doctrine" indicated in this article.
 
Ukraine subsequently received more NATO training and equipment. Their first attempt at mobile warfare in a major offensive failed, mostly because 1) it was into the teeth of strong Russian fixed fortifications 2) much of the mine clearance equipment did not arrive, 3) it takes more than just a few months training to build a mobile striking force, and 4) Russia was able to employ helicopter gunships effectively. These same Ukrainian units performed very effectively in the mobile assault into Kursk Oblast. The problem in Kursk was that their were no adequate exploitation forces available behind them to allow the mobile assault to continue. The Ukrainians were initially not stopped by Russian defenses but by lack of resources to exploit success.

It is undoubtedly true that tanks become indirect fire weapons when positional warfare and a static front is the norm. IFVs however become critical "battle taxis" to rotate and replace troops in embattled front lines. Heavy machine guns are used in Ukraine as an important anti-drone weapon, among other things. They aren't going anywhere. Obviously the article asserts these "facts" without much support for each particular conclusion.

One only needs to look at the Israel-Iran conflict to demonstrate that the above "rewriting" is nonsense. None of these "facts" apply to this completely different war which was never positional in any sense. Of course, drawing sweeping conclusions that infantry and armor is now irrelevant from the Israel-Iran war would be nonsense too, even though these types of forces were not used in the conflict. Attack drones were used by special forces inside Iran. That certainly doesn't mean they will be solely used that way in future wars.
 
Drawing "universal truths" from particular conflicts has always been very error prone. The statement that every nations military is always preparing to re-fight the last war is somewhat true. The proliferation of blogs and modern communication exacerbates this tendency. I again cite rams on capital ships driven by conclusions drawn from the Battle of Lissa (1866). Ram bows were prominent on battleships built through the early 1900s, even though none of these rams were ever used in battle subsequently. A clear example of a special case erroneously leading to general conclusions. IMO far, far too much of this is going on in the public discussions. [sarcasm]We are indeed fortunate that currently our Defense Department is not driven by any study of other nation's capabilities and believes that a form of American Bushido will make up for any lack of capability we may actually have. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025...roops.html[/sarcasm].

[M T]

Russia keeps getting its nose bloodied...
    Deputy Russian Navy chief killed in strike near Ukraine border

Unconfirmed reports from Russian and Ukrainian military-linked Telegram channels suggest the deaths [Major General Mikhail Gudkov and 10 others] were the result of a Ukrainian missile strike on a Russian command post near the town of Korenevo, around 30km (19 miles) from the border.

[M T]

Russia keeps getting its nose bloodied...
    Deputy Russian Navy chief killed in strike near Ukraine border

Unconfirmed reports from Russian and Ukrainian military-linked Telegram channels suggest the deaths [Major General Mikhail Gudkov and 10 others] were the result of a Ukrainian missile strike on a Russian command post near the town of Korenevo, around 30km (19 miles) from the border.

[GK3]

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/26/u...es-russia/

Interesting article on two levels. First, it talks about EW still being useful in Ukraine. Fiber Optic drones haven't and won't take over, particularly the medium and long range surveillance/reconnaissance tasks. Flying fiber optic drones in a racetrack path at medium altitude just isn't possible. The article reveals that Ukraine has (somewhat unsurprisingly) followed Russian practice of using barrage noise as the backbone of their counter-drone EW. Russia however developed other jamming techniques to augment their baseline capabilities. These techniques (e.g. spot noise, swept spot noise and swept CW) were not particularly sophisticated but were more difficult to counter than simple barrage noise alone.
 
It appears Ukraine has not done that. It also appears Ukrainian jammers  do not "blink" and do not have wide-band acquisition receivers  to "find" the exact frequencies the control link for the Russian drones are using. This makes sense if one is using barrage noise only, because there is really nothing the operator (or the jammer itself) can do to take advantage of such information. The article appears to say the introduction of drones that use the 5.8 GHz ISM band is flummoxing Ukrainian jamming. First, jam the control link, not the video link. Second, adding another ISM band downlink is no big deal. The fact that was coming in the commercial drone space was well known. In fact it had been around for awhile, even in Mavic products. The telling statement is

Overall, it appears that EW is gradually losing the battle against frontline quadcopters,” Shutyi says, later adding: “The drone-vs-antidrone arms race continues, and simple setups like ‘antenna + jammer + power source’ no longer deliver the needed results.”

Well duh. The fact it ever did work can be mostly laid at the door of Russian ineptitude/lassitude. Using standard commercial drone control hardware sets a very low limit on what the drone can do in terms of ECCM. The fact this approach persists for so long on both sides is quite strange. Russian military grade reconnaissance drones suffer less from this problem every day, although by US standards they are still "simple". There are people in Ukraine that understand this. Surprising they aren't reacting more comprehensively.

A more "general" assertion made by the article reflects a common thread of thought from both Ukrainian and other sources that IMO is simply nonsense.

The bigger picture: Adapting to the drone age
The war in Ukraine has already rewritten several military doctrines:

• A shift from mobile to positional warfare
  
• Disappearance of traditional foot reconnaissance in favor of airborne surveillance
  
• Tanks and BMPs reduced to fire support roles
  
• Phasing out heavy machine guns on the line of contact due to their vulnerability to drones
  
• And now, the likely fading of infantry mortars and grenade launchers

 
These conditions are absolutely particular to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Positional warfare became the norm because from the beginning neither Ukraine nor Russia was capable of executing mobile warfare. Ukraine had an almost universally immobile army that did/does not even possess its own organic transport, let alone the training and support elements necessary for mobile warfare. Russia thought they could execute mobile warfare but due to lack of planning, air support, leadership and training (among other things) could not. Their organizational restructuring into Brigade Tactical Groups was also a disaster that was not revealed in the non-existent training. The inability of either side to execute mobile warfare drives all the other "rewriting of military doctrine" indicated in this article.
 
Ukraine subsequently received more NATO training and equipment. Their first attempt at mobile warfare in a major offensive failed, mostly because 1) it was into the teeth of strong Russian fixed fortifications 2) much of the mine clearance equipment did not arrive, 3) it takes more than just a few months training to build a mobile striking force, and 4) Russia was able to employ helicopter gunships effectively. These same Ukrainian units performed very effectively in the mobile assault into Kursk Oblast. The problem in Kursk was that their were no adequate exploitation forces available behind them to allow the mobile assault to continue. The Ukrainians were initially not stopped by Russian defenses but by lack of resources to exploit success.

It is undoubtedly true that tanks become indirect fire weapons when positional warfare and a static front is the norm. IFVs however become critical "battle taxis" to rotate and replace troops in embattled front lines. Heavy machine guns are used in Ukraine as an important anti-drone weapon, among other things. They aren't going anywhere. Obviously the article asserts these "facts" without much support for each particular conclusion.

One only needs to look at the Israel-Iran conflict to demonstrate that the above "rewriting" is nonsense. None of these "facts" apply to this completely different war which was never positional in any sense. Of course, drawing sweeping conclusions that infantry and armor is now irrelevant from the Israel-Iran war would be nonsense too, even though these types of forces were not used in the conflict. Attack drones were used by special forces inside Iran. That certainly doesn't mean they will be solely used that way in future wars.
 
Drawing "universal truths" from particular conflicts has always been very error prone. The statement that every nations military is always preparing to re-fight the last war is somewhat true. The proliferation of blogs and modern communication exacerbates this tendency. I again cite rams on capital ships driven by conclusions drawn from the Battle of Lissa (1866). Ram bows were prominent on battleships built through the early 1900s, even though none of these rams were ever used in battle subsequently. A clear example of a special case erroneously leading to general conclusions. IMO far, far too much of this is going on in the public discussions. [sarcasm]We are indeed fortunate that currently our Defense Department is not driven by any study of other nation's capabilities and believes that a form of American Bushido will make up for any lack of capability we may actually have. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025...roops.html[/sarcasm].

As time goes on in the war, all that has been proved is that neither side has any real ability to launch a serious mobile spearhead against the other side.  The lack of artillery, air support and advanced "softening" of the opposing side makes any kind of serious effort at mobile warfare difficult.  This comment does not take into account the ability to lay and remove mines in the face of an attack. 

I do not think that the Ukrainian conflict counts as a peer vs peer conflict.  Ukraine is under gunned and under manned when compared to Russia but they are hanging in there. If Putin decided to strike through the Baltic States and Poland I think things would be much different. The impact of NATO airpower would be much different than the current situation.  Russia was helped in its fight with Germany in WWII by the fact that the tactics that Hitler dictated played into Russian strength. The outcomes of wars are often dictated by who does the dumbest things.   Germany lost a half million men at the battle of Stalingrad. No one knows how that campaign would have worked out if German forces were allowed to withdraw. 

IMO the fact that Ukraine is still in this war is a great credit to its leadership and its people and the willingness of the West to come to its aide. I still fail to understand how Russia failed to take Kiev at the beginning of the war.  The great Russian Ogre has been around a long time.  They are the Big Bad Wolf if you figure they will use nuclear weapons, not so much if those weapons are not involved.
Russia's greatest military asset has always been its vast landmass. That landmass is only lightly populate. No matter how you want to cut it up, that Landmass is Russia's only advantage. NATO has vastly more men under arms, more planes and whatever else. Now that we seem to paying less attention to Europe, they are responding by upping their defense budgets.
I am not sure Russia is even able to go on a war footing economically versus NATO.
Many, many years ago when I arrived in Germany as 2nd Lt, my CO explained to me that if the Russians came through Fulda Gap, we could expect Russian paratroops coming out of the night sky, fortunately that never happened.

[GK3]

https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/26/u...es-russia/

Interesting article on two levels. First, it talks about EW still being useful in Ukraine. Fiber Optic drones haven't and won't take over, particularly the medium and long range surveillance/reconnaissance tasks. Flying fiber optic drones in a racetrack path at medium altitude just isn't possible. The article reveals that Ukraine has (somewhat unsurprisingly) followed Russian practice of using barrage noise as the backbone of their counter-drone EW. Russia however developed other jamming techniques to augment their baseline capabilities. These techniques (e.g. spot noise, swept spot noise and swept CW) were not particularly sophisticated but were more difficult to counter than simple barrage noise alone.
 
It appears Ukraine has not done that. It also appears Ukrainian jammers  do not "blink" and do not have wide-band acquisition receivers  to "find" the exact frequencies the control link for the Russian drones are using. This makes sense if one is using barrage noise only, because there is really nothing the operator (or the jammer itself) can do to take advantage of such information. The article appears to say the introduction of drones that use the 5.8 GHz ISM band is flummoxing Ukrainian jamming. First, jam the control link, not the video link. Second, adding another ISM band downlink is no big deal. The fact that was coming in the commercial drone space was well known. In fact it had been around for awhile, even in Mavic products. The telling statement is

Overall, it appears that EW is gradually losing the battle against frontline quadcopters,” Shutyi says, later adding: “The drone-vs-antidrone arms race continues, and simple setups like ‘antenna + jammer + power source’ no longer deliver the needed results.”

Well duh. The fact it ever did work can be mostly laid at the door of Russian ineptitude/lassitude. Using standard commercial drone control hardware sets a very low limit on what the drone can do in terms of ECCM. The fact this approach persists for so long on both sides is quite strange. Russian military grade reconnaissance drones suffer less from this problem every day, although by US standards they are still "simple". There are people in Ukraine that understand this. Surprising they aren't reacting more comprehensively.

A more "general" assertion made by the article reflects a common thread of thought from both Ukrainian and other sources that IMO is simply nonsense.

The bigger picture: Adapting to the drone age
The war in Ukraine has already rewritten several military doctrines:

• A shift from mobile to positional warfare
  
• Disappearance of traditional foot reconnaissance in favor of airborne surveillance
  
• Tanks and BMPs reduced to fire support roles
  
• Phasing out heavy machine guns on the line of contact due to their vulnerability to drones
  
• And now, the likely fading of infantry mortars and grenade launchers

 
These conditions are absolutely particular to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Positional warfare became the norm because from the beginning neither Ukraine nor Russia was capable of executing mobile warfare. Ukraine had an almost universally immobile army that did/does not even possess its own organic transport, let alone the training and support elements necessary for mobile warfare. Russia thought they could execute mobile warfare but due to lack of planning, air support, leadership and training (among other things) could not. Their organizational restructuring into Brigade Tactical Groups was also a disaster that was not revealed in the non-existent training. The inability of either side to execute mobile warfare drives all the other "rewriting of military doctrine" indicated in this article.
 
Ukraine subsequently received more NATO training and equipment. Their first attempt at mobile warfare in a major offensive failed, mostly because 1) it was into the teeth of strong Russian fixed fortifications 2) much of the mine clearance equipment did not arrive, 3) it takes more than just a few months training to build a mobile striking force, and 4) Russia was able to employ helicopter gunships effectively. These same Ukrainian units performed very effectively in the mobile assault into Kursk Oblast. The problem in Kursk was that their were no adequate exploitation forces available behind them to allow the mobile assault to continue. The Ukrainians were initially not stopped by Russian defenses but by lack of resources to exploit success.

It is undoubtedly true that tanks become indirect fire weapons when positional warfare and a static front is the norm. IFVs however become critical "battle taxis" to rotate and replace troops in embattled front lines. Heavy machine guns are used in Ukraine as an important anti-drone weapon, among other things. They aren't going anywhere. Obviously the article asserts these "facts" without much support for each particular conclusion.

One only needs to look at the Israel-Iran conflict to demonstrate that the above "rewriting" is nonsense. None of these "facts" apply to this completely different war which was never positional in any sense. Of course, drawing sweeping conclusions that infantry and armor is now irrelevant from the Israel-Iran war would be nonsense too, even though these types of forces were not used in the conflict. Attack drones were used by special forces inside Iran. That certainly doesn't mean they will be solely used that way in future wars.
 
Drawing "universal truths" from particular conflicts has always been very error prone. The statement that every nations military is always preparing to re-fight the last war is somewhat true. The proliferation of blogs and modern communication exacerbates this tendency. I again cite rams on capital ships driven by conclusions drawn from the Battle of Lissa (1866). Ram bows were prominent on battleships built through the early 1900s, even though none of these rams were ever used in battle subsequently. A clear example of a special case erroneously leading to general conclusions. IMO far, far too much of this is going on in the public discussions. [sarcasm]We are indeed fortunate that currently our Defense Department is not driven by any study of other nation's capabilities and believes that a form of American Bushido will make up for any lack of capability we may actually have. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025...roops.html[/sarcasm].

As time goes on in the war, all that has been proved is that neither side has any real ability to launch a serious mobile spearhead against the other side.  The lack of artillery, air support and advanced "softening" of the opposing side makes any kind of serious effort at mobile warfare difficult.  This comment does not take into account the ability to lay and remove mines in the face of an attack. 

I do not think that the Ukrainian conflict counts as a peer vs peer conflict.  Ukraine is under gunned and under manned when compared to Russia but they are hanging in there. If Putin decided to strike through the Baltic States and Poland I think things would be much different. The impact of NATO airpower would be much different than the current situation.  Russia was helped in its fight with Germany in WWII by the fact that the tactics that Hitler dictated played into Russian strength. The outcomes of wars are often dictated by who does the dumbest things.   Germany lost a half million men at the battle of Stalingrad. No one knows how that campaign would have worked out if German forces were allowed to withdraw. 

IMO the fact that Ukraine is still in this war is a great credit to its leadership and its people and the willingness of the West to come to its aide. I still fail to understand how Russia failed to take Kiev at the beginning of the war.  The great Russian Ogre has been around a long time.  They are the Big Bad Wolf if you figure they will use nuclear weapons, not so much if those weapons are not involved.
Russia's greatest military asset has always been its vast landmass. That landmass is only lightly populate. No matter how you want to cut it up, that Landmass is Russia's only advantage. NATO has vastly more men under arms, more planes and whatever else. Now that we seem to paying less attention to Europe, they are responding by upping their defense budgets.
I am not sure Russia is even able to go on a war footing economically versus NATO.
Many, many years ago when I arrived in Germany as 2nd Lt, my CO explained to me that if the Russians came through Fulda Gap, we could expect Russian paratroops coming out of the night sky, fortunately that never happened.

[Goose]

As time goes on in the war, all that has been proved is that neither side has any real ability to launch a serious mobile spearhead against the other side.  The lack of artillery, air support and advanced "softening" of the opposing side makes any kind of serious effort at mobile warfare difficult.

Strongly agree. I would add that Ukraine in particular lacks the ability to quickly reinforce success. A "breakthrough" is useless if you can't pour forces through it. Ukraine doesn't have them and Russia moves too slowly to do so effectively.

This comment does not take into account the ability to lay and remove mines in the face of an attack.

Good point. Russia is much better at that than Ukraine, at least partially because Ukraine signed the Ottawa Treaty. They have recently given notice of their withdrawal.

I do not think that the Ukrainian conflict counts as a peer vs peer conflict.  Ukraine is under gunned and under manned when compared to Russia but they are hanging in there. If Putin decided to strike through the Baltic States and Poland I think things would be much different. The impact of NATO airpower would be much different than the current situation.

Absolutely agree! Ukraine has done much better than anybody expected.

  Russia was helped in its fight with Germany in WWII by the fact that the tactics that Hitler dictated played into Russian strength. The outcomes of wars are often dictated by who does the dumbest things.   Germany lost a half million men at the battle of Stalingrad. No one knows how that campaign would have worked out if German forces were allowed to withdraw.

Very true. One also has to wonder what would have happened if Germany had elected to not fight in southern Russia at all. A very wide envelopment after taking Moscow had a lot to recommend it. Yes, getting the oil from the south would have taken longer, but the Russian leadership would have been beheaded and the lend-lease supplies through Murmansk cut off.

IMO the fact that Ukraine is still in this war is a great credit to its leadership and its people and the willingness of the West to come to its aide. I still fail to understand how Russia failed to take Kiev at the beginning of the war.

I think Ukrainian leadership, particularly in the person of Zelenskyy has been beyond outstanding. The people of Ukraine have indeed stepped up.

The great Russian Ogre has been around a long time.  They are the Big Bad Wolf if you figure they will use nuclear weapons, not so much if those weapons are not involved.
Russia's greatest military asset has always been its vast landmass. That landmass is only lightly populate.  No matter how you want to cut it up, that Landmass is Russia's only advantage.

Russia has an additional significant advantage. Both its Army and its people are willing to take horrific casualties and suffer economic disaster while still fighting on. NATO in general lacks that stoic willingness to die in massive numbers simply waiting for the other side to run out of troops. Fortunately for Ukraine, they have more than a bit of the "Russian" stoicism.. Otherwise Ukraine would have given up long ago.

NATO has vastly more men under arms, more planes and whatever else.  Now that we seem to paying less attention to Europe, they are responding by upping their defense budgets.

According to Google AI NATO nations have a total of 3.44 million active military personnel. Of these, 1.3 million are American. 0.48 million are Turks. These personnel are part of several different militaries that have diverse philosophies and skill sets. It is unclear how many (and even if) these various nations would contribute to defend Germany, let alone the Baltic states. Lots of these troops are also otherwise committed. Russia (according to the same Google AI) has 2.4 million men under arms. Obviously in both cases reserve formations are being counted. It also will matter how fast troops can be committed to the fight. In the Baltic States, Poland, etc Russia is a lot closer than Turkey and certainly the US. I am not nearly as sanguine as you are about our ability to match Russia's numbers. NATO needs to be "better", because we can't count on "bigger". Just like before. Except the Bundeswehr is not even a shadow of what it was and the 4 British divisions of the AOTR no longer exist. I hope NATO has months to prepare and a REFORGER can (and will) happen in that time. Otherwise, things could at best get very dicey.
 
IMO the increase in NATO budgets is almost entirely due to the war in Ukraine and the realization that it could happen to them. The US no longer being a reliable ally is a problem of a different nature and not that much of a driver toward increased expenditures. If Russia hadn't invaded Ukraine the NATO countries wouldn't be increasing their budgets. Finland and Sweden probably wouldn't be members. No need, period. A much more serious problem is that the populace of most NATO countries isn't interested in fighting a war. They are also reluctant to spend the money required to prepare for one. After German reunification it was assumed that would never again be required. UMT was abolished. Even with the "Russian threat", nobody is running to the recruiting offices to join up. It is entirely possible that if Ukraine is absorbed into Russia and Putin appears to stand down (at least for the moment) the NATO nations will go back to spending little on defense. 

I am not sure Russia is even able to go on a war footing economically versus NATO.

I am sure they can, but it will be slow. NATO wants to (probably needs to) win before it matters.

Many, many years ago when I arrived in Germany as 2nd Lt, my CO explained to me that if the Russians came through Fulda Gap, we could expect Russian paratroops coming out of the night sky, fortunately that never happened.

Fortunate indeed. Part of the reason it didn't happen was because you and others like you were there. It also helped that the Bundeswehr was deadly serious.

[Goose]

As time goes on in the war, all that has been proved is that neither side has any real ability to launch a serious mobile spearhead against the other side.  The lack of artillery, air support and advanced "softening" of the opposing side makes any kind of serious effort at mobile warfare difficult.

Strongly agree. I would add that Ukraine in particular lacks the ability to quickly reinforce success. A "breakthrough" is useless if you can't pour forces through it. Ukraine doesn't have them and Russia moves too slowly to do so effectively.

This comment does not take into account the ability to lay and remove mines in the face of an attack.

Good point. Russia is much better at that than Ukraine, at least partially because Ukraine signed the Ottawa Treaty. They have recently given notice of their withdrawal.

I do not think that the Ukrainian conflict counts as a peer vs peer conflict.  Ukraine is under gunned and under manned when compared to Russia but they are hanging in there. If Putin decided to strike through the Baltic States and Poland I think things would be much different. The impact of NATO airpower would be much different than the current situation.

Absolutely agree! Ukraine has done much better than anybody expected.

  Russia was helped in its fight with Germany in WWII by the fact that the tactics that Hitler dictated played into Russian strength. The outcomes of wars are often dictated by who does the dumbest things.   Germany lost a half million men at the battle of Stalingrad. No one knows how that campaign would have worked out if German forces were allowed to withdraw.

Very true. One also has to wonder what would have happened if Germany had elected to not fight in southern Russia at all. A very wide envelopment after taking Moscow had a lot to recommend it. Yes, getting the oil from the south would have taken longer, but the Russian leadership would have been beheaded and the lend-lease supplies through Murmansk cut off.

IMO the fact that Ukraine is still in this war is a great credit to its leadership and its people and the willingness of the West to come to its aide. I still fail to understand how Russia failed to take Kiev at the beginning of the war.

I think Ukrainian leadership, particularly in the person of Zelenskyy has been beyond outstanding. The people of Ukraine have indeed stepped up.

The great Russian Ogre has been around a long time.  They are the Big Bad Wolf if you figure they will use nuclear weapons, not so much if those weapons are not involved.
Russia's greatest military asset has always been its vast landmass. That landmass is only lightly populate.  No matter how you want to cut it up, that Landmass is Russia's only advantage.

Russia has an additional significant advantage. Both its Army and its people are willing to take horrific casualties and suffer economic disaster while still fighting on. NATO in general lacks that stoic willingness to die in massive numbers simply waiting for the other side to run out of troops. Fortunately for Ukraine, they have more than a bit of the "Russian" stoicism.. Otherwise Ukraine would have given up long ago.

NATO has vastly more men under arms, more planes and whatever else.  Now that we seem to paying less attention to Europe, they are responding by upping their defense budgets.

According to Google AI NATO nations have a total of 3.44 million active military personnel. Of these, 1.3 million are American. 0.48 million are Turks. These personnel are part of several different militaries that have diverse philosophies and skill sets. It is unclear how many (and even if) these various nations would contribute to defend Germany, let alone the Baltic states. Lots of these troops are also otherwise committed. Russia (according to the same Google AI) has 2.4 million men under arms. Obviously in both cases reserve formations are being counted. It also will matter how fast troops can be committed to the fight. In the Baltic States, Poland, etc Russia is a lot closer than Turkey and certainly the US. I am not nearly as sanguine as you are about our ability to match Russia's numbers. NATO needs to be "better", because we can't count on "bigger". Just like before. Except the Bundeswehr is not even a shadow of what it was and the 4 British divisions of the AOTR no longer exist. I hope NATO has months to prepare and a REFORGER can (and will) happen in that time. Otherwise, things could at best get very dicey.
 
IMO the increase in NATO budgets is almost entirely due to the war in Ukraine and the realization that it could happen to them. The US no longer being a reliable ally is a problem of a different nature and not that much of a driver toward increased expenditures. If Russia hadn't invaded Ukraine the NATO countries wouldn't be increasing their budgets. Finland and Sweden probably wouldn't be members. No need, period. A much more serious problem is that the populace of most NATO countries isn't interested in fighting a war. They are also reluctant to spend the money required to prepare for one. After German reunification it was assumed that would never again be required. UMT was abolished. Even with the "Russian threat", nobody is running to the recruiting offices to join up. It is entirely possible that if Ukraine is absorbed into Russia and Putin appears to stand down (at least for the moment) the NATO nations will go back to spending little on defense. 

I am not sure Russia is even able to go on a war footing economically versus NATO.

I am sure they can, but it will be slow. NATO wants to (probably needs to) win before it matters.

Many, many years ago when I arrived in Germany as 2nd Lt, my CO explained to me that if the Russians came through Fulda Gap, we could expect Russian paratroops coming out of the night sky, fortunately that never happened.

Fortunate indeed. Part of the reason it didn't happen was because you and others like you were there. It also helped that the Bundeswehr was deadly serious.

[GK3]

As time goes on in the war, all that has been proved is that neither side has any real ability to launch a serious mobile spearhead against the other side.  The lack of artillery, air support and advanced "softening" of the opposing side makes any kind of serious effort at mobile warfare difficult.

Strongly agree. I would add that Ukraine in particular lacks the ability to quickly reinforce success. A "breakthrough" is useless if you can't pour forces through it. Ukraine doesn't have them and Russia moves too slowly to do so effectively.

This comment does not take into account the ability to lay and remove mines in the face of an attack.

Good point. Russia is much better at that than Ukraine, at least partially because Ukraine signed the Ottawa Treaty. They have recently given notice of their withdrawal.

I do not think that the Ukrainian conflict counts as a peer vs peer conflict.  Ukraine is under gunned and under manned when compared to Russia but they are hanging in there. If Putin decided to strike through the Baltic States and Poland I think things would be much different. The impact of NATO airpower would be much different than the current situation.

Absolutely agree! Ukraine has done much better than anybody expected.

  Russia was helped in its fight with Germany in WWII by the fact that the tactics that Hitler dictated played into Russian strength. The outcomes of wars are often dictated by who does the dumbest things.   Germany lost a half million men at the battle of Stalingrad. No one knows how that campaign would have worked out if German forces were allowed to withdraw.

Very true. One also has to wonder what would have happened if Germany had elected to not fight in southern Russia at all. A very wide envelopment after taking Moscow had a lot to recommend it. Yes, getting the oil from the south would have taken longer, but the Russian leadership would have been beheaded and the lend-lease supplies through Murmansk cut off.

IMO the fact that Ukraine is still in this war is a great credit to its leadership and its people and the willingness of the West to come to its aide. I still fail to understand how Russia failed to take Kiev at the beginning of the war.

I think Ukrainian leadership, particularly in the person of Zelenskyy has been beyond outstanding. The people of Ukraine have indeed stepped up.

The great Russian Ogre has been around a long time.  They are the Big Bad Wolf if you figure they will use nuclear weapons, not so much if those weapons are not involved.
Russia's greatest military asset has always been its vast landmass. That landmass is only lightly populate.  No matter how you want to cut it up, that Landmass is Russia's only advantage.

Russia has an additional significant advantage. Both its Army and its people are willing to take horrific casualties and suffer economic disaster while still fighting on. NATO in general lacks that stoic willingness to die in massive numbers simply waiting for the other side to run out of troops. Fortunately for Ukraine, they have more than a bit of the "Russian" stoicism.. Otherwise Ukraine would have given up long ago.

NATO has vastly more men under arms, more planes and whatever else.  Now that we seem to paying less attention to Europe, they are responding by upping their defense budgets.

According to Google AI NATO nations have a total of 3.44 million active military personnel. Of these, 1.3 million are American. 0.48 million are Turks. These personnel are part of several different militaries that have diverse philosophies and skill sets. It is unclear how many (and even if) these various nations would contribute to defend Germany, let alone the Baltic states. Lots of these troops are also otherwise committed. Russia (according to the same Google AI) has 2.4 million men under arms. Obviously in both cases reserve formations are being counted. It also will matter how fast troops can be committed to the fight. In the Baltic States, Poland, etc Russia is a lot closer than Turkey and certainly the US. I am not nearly as sanguine as you are about our ability to match Russia's numbers. NATO needs to be "better", because we can't count on "bigger". Just like before. Except the Bundeswehr is not even a shadow of what it was and the 4 British divisions of the AOTR no longer exist. I hope NATO has months to prepare and a REFORGER can (and will) happen in that time. Otherwise, things could at best get very dicey.
 
IMO the increase in NATO budgets is almost entirely due to the war in Ukraine and the realization that it could happen to them. The US no longer being a reliable ally is a problem of a different nature and not that much of a driver toward increased expenditures. If Russia hadn't invaded Ukraine the NATO countries wouldn't be increasing their budgets. Finland and Sweden probably wouldn't be members. No need, period. A much more serious problem is that the populace of most NATO countries isn't interested in fighting a war. They are also reluctant to spend the money required to prepare for one. After German reunification it was assumed that would never again be required. UMT was abolished. Even with the "Russian threat", nobody is running to the recruiting offices to join up. It is entirely possible that if Ukraine is absorbed into Russia and Putin appears to stand down (at least for the moment) the NATO nations will go back to spending little on defense. 

I am not sure Russia is even able to go on a war footing economically versus NATO.

I am sure they can, but it will be slow. NATO wants to (probably needs to) win before it matters.

Many, many years ago when I arrived in Germany as 2nd Lt, my CO explained to me that if the Russians came through Fulda Gap, we could expect Russian paratroops coming out of the night sky, fortunately that never happened.

Fortunate indeed. Part of the reason it didn't happen was because you and others like you were there. It also helped that the Bundeswehr was deadly serious.

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell. My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines. 
As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night. 

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

[GK3]

As time goes on in the war, all that has been proved is that neither side has any real ability to launch a serious mobile spearhead against the other side.  The lack of artillery, air support and advanced "softening" of the opposing side makes any kind of serious effort at mobile warfare difficult.

Strongly agree. I would add that Ukraine in particular lacks the ability to quickly reinforce success. A "breakthrough" is useless if you can't pour forces through it. Ukraine doesn't have them and Russia moves too slowly to do so effectively.

This comment does not take into account the ability to lay and remove mines in the face of an attack.

Good point. Russia is much better at that than Ukraine, at least partially because Ukraine signed the Ottawa Treaty. They have recently given notice of their withdrawal.

I do not think that the Ukrainian conflict counts as a peer vs peer conflict.  Ukraine is under gunned and under manned when compared to Russia but they are hanging in there. If Putin decided to strike through the Baltic States and Poland I think things would be much different. The impact of NATO airpower would be much different than the current situation.

Absolutely agree! Ukraine has done much better than anybody expected.

  Russia was helped in its fight with Germany in WWII by the fact that the tactics that Hitler dictated played into Russian strength. The outcomes of wars are often dictated by who does the dumbest things.   Germany lost a half million men at the battle of Stalingrad. No one knows how that campaign would have worked out if German forces were allowed to withdraw.

Very true. One also has to wonder what would have happened if Germany had elected to not fight in southern Russia at all. A very wide envelopment after taking Moscow had a lot to recommend it. Yes, getting the oil from the south would have taken longer, but the Russian leadership would have been beheaded and the lend-lease supplies through Murmansk cut off.

IMO the fact that Ukraine is still in this war is a great credit to its leadership and its people and the willingness of the West to come to its aide. I still fail to understand how Russia failed to take Kiev at the beginning of the war.

I think Ukrainian leadership, particularly in the person of Zelenskyy has been beyond outstanding. The people of Ukraine have indeed stepped up.

The great Russian Ogre has been around a long time.  They are the Big Bad Wolf if you figure they will use nuclear weapons, not so much if those weapons are not involved.
Russia's greatest military asset has always been its vast landmass. That landmass is only lightly populate.  No matter how you want to cut it up, that Landmass is Russia's only advantage.

Russia has an additional significant advantage. Both its Army and its people are willing to take horrific casualties and suffer economic disaster while still fighting on. NATO in general lacks that stoic willingness to die in massive numbers simply waiting for the other side to run out of troops. Fortunately for Ukraine, they have more than a bit of the "Russian" stoicism.. Otherwise Ukraine would have given up long ago.

NATO has vastly more men under arms, more planes and whatever else.  Now that we seem to paying less attention to Europe, they are responding by upping their defense budgets.

According to Google AI NATO nations have a total of 3.44 million active military personnel. Of these, 1.3 million are American. 0.48 million are Turks. These personnel are part of several different militaries that have diverse philosophies and skill sets. It is unclear how many (and even if) these various nations would contribute to defend Germany, let alone the Baltic states. Lots of these troops are also otherwise committed. Russia (according to the same Google AI) has 2.4 million men under arms. Obviously in both cases reserve formations are being counted. It also will matter how fast troops can be committed to the fight. In the Baltic States, Poland, etc Russia is a lot closer than Turkey and certainly the US. I am not nearly as sanguine as you are about our ability to match Russia's numbers. NATO needs to be "better", because we can't count on "bigger". Just like before. Except the Bundeswehr is not even a shadow of what it was and the 4 British divisions of the AOTR no longer exist. I hope NATO has months to prepare and a REFORGER can (and will) happen in that time. Otherwise, things could at best get very dicey.
 
IMO the increase in NATO budgets is almost entirely due to the war in Ukraine and the realization that it could happen to them. The US no longer being a reliable ally is a problem of a different nature and not that much of a driver toward increased expenditures. If Russia hadn't invaded Ukraine the NATO countries wouldn't be increasing their budgets. Finland and Sweden probably wouldn't be members. No need, period. A much more serious problem is that the populace of most NATO countries isn't interested in fighting a war. They are also reluctant to spend the money required to prepare for one. After German reunification it was assumed that would never again be required. UMT was abolished. Even with the "Russian threat", nobody is running to the recruiting offices to join up. It is entirely possible that if Ukraine is absorbed into Russia and Putin appears to stand down (at least for the moment) the NATO nations will go back to spending little on defense. 

I am not sure Russia is even able to go on a war footing economically versus NATO.

I am sure they can, but it will be slow. NATO wants to (probably needs to) win before it matters.

Many, many years ago when I arrived in Germany as 2nd Lt, my CO explained to me that if the Russians came through Fulda Gap, we could expect Russian paratroops coming out of the night sky, fortunately that never happened.

Fortunate indeed. Part of the reason it didn't happen was because you and others like you were there. It also helped that the Bundeswehr was deadly serious.

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell. My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines. 
As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night. 

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

[Mick]

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

Was thinking exactly the same thing. Also wonder how many of those countries without nuclear weapons will now seek nuclear weapons. Or biological weapons.

[Mick]

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

Was thinking exactly the same thing. Also wonder how many of those countries without nuclear weapons will now seek nuclear weapons. Or biological weapons.

[Goose]

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell.

I agree that right now Germany is willing to invest lots (relatively speaking) of money in strengthening their military. My concern is the tenor of German society. Since the end of the Cold War Germany has adopted an almost anti-military stanse. Part of that ethos was "Don't scare the Bear", which was adopted enthusiastically by (particularly the young) German society. Right now most of German society doesn't want to have a military at all. They are still emotionally in a state of denial, despite the events in Ukraine having raised intellectual awareness in some circles. To make the Bundeswehr the  force it used to be Germany needs troops. Getting those troops is going to be very, very difficult, if it is even possible. UMT is not politically possible in the near future, if ever. Even if Germany can raise their force levels it will be composed of individuals who lack the socially instilled military duty/ethos German troops possessed during the Cold War. The large cadre of professional, experienced, extremely competent and highly motivated NCOs that use to make the Bundeswehr "work" no longer exists. These are my real worries about the German military reconstituting itself.

My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines.

IMO you are correct. Russia can't control the air above the front lines in such a conflict. They probably can't do so behind their own lines either. This is a big difference from the situation in Ukraine. Back in the day the PVO was simply immense. The Russian GCI approach wasn't flashy but it would have made NATO interdiction efforts difficult. All that is gone. Russia has an air force, but nothing like what the Soviets had. Russia relies on SAMs and their IADS to protect their rear areas. As Israel recently demonstrated that won't work against an air force that understands SEAD and has stealthy aircraft to execute the mission. Granted, Iran isn't Russia. Russia would be a tougher nut to crack, but crack it would. We wouldn't get away without losses though, as Israel did. https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-showed...02706.html is worth a look.

As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night.

I agree with the last sentence for sure! I also don't think Russia can use the tactics they are employing in Ukraine with any success in a general full-scale engagement against NATO. However Russia has other options that attack NATO's distributed nature. The Baltic States are small enough that Russia may be able to swallow them quickly if NATO isn't 1) meaningfully forward deployed in the Baltics and 2) prepared to very quickly reinforce the Baltics. Right now, it is unclear NATO is capable of doing either and even less clear NATO has the political will to do so. If Russia states limited war aims and refrains from deep strikes into other NATO nations while attacking the Baltics, what will NATO do? IMO if the US does not actively enter into the conflict on essentially day one, no other NATO nation will either. NATO is quite capable of allowing a Russian victory by being stupid.
 
That is why it was critical that the US commitment to collective defense be (at least publicly) unconditional. If we reserve the right to question involvement on a case-by-case basis, so can everybody else. At a minimum, this process creates delay and uncertainty. In war, both can be fatal.
 
Air superiority wise, China is a different case entirely. Probably too off topic for this thread however.

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

I am much less sanguine than you are about the long-term willingness of the NATO countries to strengthen themselves militarily. The politics of most of the NATO countries lean much more toward social welfare expenses than military expenses. We in the US have been trending in that direction as well. The US however has been a "superpower" for quite awhile and at least a significant part of the public "likes" that. Most NATO nations aren't interested in any such role and the few that might conceivably be (UK, France, Germany) can't afford the cost. It is unlikely Britain or France ever could. Their nuclear deterrent is their "safety net". The UK Army And the RN are vanishingly small and getting smaller. The French Army in the past 35 years has "tracked" the German army in size. I think there was a message in that. Germany right now is having some serious economic problems. They aren't the "powerhouse" they have been. That will affect their willingness and ability to rebuild their forces. I am more worried about their willingness :-).

[Goose]

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell.

I agree that right now Germany is willing to invest lots (relatively speaking) of money in strengthening their military. My concern is the tenor of German society. Since the end of the Cold War Germany has adopted an almost anti-military stanse. Part of that ethos was "Don't scare the Bear", which was adopted enthusiastically by (particularly the young) German society. Right now most of German society doesn't want to have a military at all. They are still emotionally in a state of denial, despite the events in Ukraine having raised intellectual awareness in some circles. To make the Bundeswehr the  force it used to be Germany needs troops. Getting those troops is going to be very, very difficult, if it is even possible. UMT is not politically possible in the near future, if ever. Even if Germany can raise their force levels it will be composed of individuals who lack the socially instilled military duty/ethos German troops possessed during the Cold War. The large cadre of professional, experienced, extremely competent and highly motivated NCOs that use to make the Bundeswehr "work" no longer exists. These are my real worries about the German military reconstituting itself.

My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines.

IMO you are correct. Russia can't control the air above the front lines in such a conflict. They probably can't do so behind their own lines either. This is a big difference from the situation in Ukraine. Back in the day the PVO was simply immense. The Russian GCI approach wasn't flashy but it would have made NATO interdiction efforts difficult. All that is gone. Russia has an air force, but nothing like what the Soviets had. Russia relies on SAMs and their IADS to protect their rear areas. As Israel recently demonstrated that won't work against an air force that understands SEAD and has stealthy aircraft to execute the mission. Granted, Iran isn't Russia. Russia would be a tougher nut to crack, but crack it would. We wouldn't get away without losses though, as Israel did. https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-showed...02706.html is worth a look.

As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night.

I agree with the last sentence for sure! I also don't think Russia can use the tactics they are employing in Ukraine with any success in a general full-scale engagement against NATO. However Russia has other options that attack NATO's distributed nature. The Baltic States are small enough that Russia may be able to swallow them quickly if NATO isn't 1) meaningfully forward deployed in the Baltics and 2) prepared to very quickly reinforce the Baltics. Right now, it is unclear NATO is capable of doing either and even less clear NATO has the political will to do so. If Russia states limited war aims and refrains from deep strikes into other NATO nations while attacking the Baltics, what will NATO do? IMO if the US does not actively enter into the conflict on essentially day one, no other NATO nation will either. NATO is quite capable of allowing a Russian victory by being stupid.
 
That is why it was critical that the US commitment to collective defense be (at least publicly) unconditional. If we reserve the right to question involvement on a case-by-case basis, so can everybody else. At a minimum, this process creates delay and uncertainty. In war, both can be fatal.
 
Air superiority wise, China is a different case entirely. Probably too off topic for this thread however.

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

I am much less sanguine than you are about the long-term willingness of the NATO countries to strengthen themselves militarily. The politics of most of the NATO countries lean much more toward social welfare expenses than military expenses. We in the US have been trending in that direction as well. The US however has been a "superpower" for quite awhile and at least a significant part of the public "likes" that. Most NATO nations aren't interested in any such role and the few that might conceivably be (UK, France, Germany) can't afford the cost. It is unlikely Britain or France ever could. Their nuclear deterrent is their "safety net". The UK Army And the RN are vanishingly small and getting smaller. The French Army in the past 35 years has "tracked" the German army in size. I think there was a message in that. Germany right now is having some serious economic problems. They aren't the "powerhouse" they have been. That will affect their willingness and ability to rebuild their forces. I am more worried about their willingness :-).

[Goose]

https://defence-blog.com/why-russian-tro...eir-armor/

Interesting article confirming the persistence of this habit. While the US gets lots of things "wrong", this isn't one of them.

[Goose]

https://defence-blog.com/why-russian-tro...eir-armor/

Interesting article confirming the persistence of this habit. While the US gets lots of things "wrong", this isn't one of them.

[BostonCard]

https://defence-blog.com/why-russian-tro...eir-armor/

Interesting article confirming the persistence of this habit. While the US gets lots of things "wrong", this isn't one of them.

LOL…

Russian manufacturers continue to tout the mobility and firepower of their platforms, but battlefield footage often tells another story—one where the safest place is outside the armor.

BC

---

I’m inclined to agree with Goose…

So far we haven’t seen electoral consequences of the “pledges” to increase defense spending.  But as the experience with Spain shows, which flat out refused to sign on shows, I think most NATO countries will struggle to get to the 3.5% expenditure level (not to mention the more maleable 1.5% indirect military expenditures), especially when the tradeoffs are in front of voters.  Once it is time to raise taxes or cut benefits, it’s going to become problematic for countries not directly in the Russian line of fire.

BC

[BostonCard]

https://defence-blog.com/why-russian-tro...eir-armor/

Interesting article confirming the persistence of this habit. While the US gets lots of things "wrong", this isn't one of them.

LOL…

Russian manufacturers continue to tout the mobility and firepower of their platforms, but battlefield footage often tells another story—one where the safest place is outside the armor.

BC

---

I’m inclined to agree with Goose…

So far we haven’t seen electoral consequences of the “pledges” to increase defense spending.  But as the experience with Spain shows, which flat out refused to sign on shows, I think most NATO countries will struggle to get to the 3.5% expenditure level (not to mention the more maleable 1.5% indirect military expenditures), especially when the tradeoffs are in front of voters.  Once it is time to raise taxes or cut benefits, it’s going to become problematic for countries not directly in the Russian line of fire.

BC

[Goose]

https://defence-blog.com/why-russian-tro...eir-armor/

Interesting article confirming the persistence of this habit. While the US gets lots of things "wrong", this isn't one of them.

LOL…

Russian manufacturers continue to tout the mobility and firepower of their platforms, but battlefield footage often tells another story—one where the safest place is outside the armor.

BC

---

I’m inclined to agree with Goose…

So far we haven’t seen electoral consequences of the “pledges” to increase defense spending.  But as the experience with Spain shows, which flat out refused to sign on shows, I think most NATO countries will struggle to get to the 3.5% expenditure level (not to mention the more maleable 1.5% indirect military expenditures), especially when the tradeoffs are in front of voters.  Once it is time to raise taxes or cut benefits, it’s going to become problematic for countries not directly in the Russian line of fire.

BC

As far as Spain goes, the info I posted back on June 10 is IMO very relevant.

Many of the PIGS are going to be unable to do much, because their economies aren't strong enough to do so. Portugal 1.55% of GDP in 2024, Italy 1.61% in 2024, Spain 1.28% in 2024.  Greece does much better, 3.08% in 2024.

Italy has received "special permission" from NATO to spend 1.9% this year and not get yelled at. Italy is not allowed to increase borrowing because of EU rules. Arguably these countries don't much "matter", but the UK, France, Belgium and now Germany aren't in a great position to increase borrowing either. Germany is having to go through domestic legal hoops to even try. The political hoops are coming. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/german...-increase/

The Security Radar report discerned across Europe a mood expressed by the slogan “my country first.”

That doesn't include Ukraine and doesn't include NATO. It is a return to "Make <fill in country name here> great again". We have hundreds of years of European history demonstrating how that turned out.  AfD undoubtedly sees this as a big issue that can be used to punish the new CDU-CSU-SPD coalition.  All in all, not too encouraging.

[Goose]

https://defence-blog.com/why-russian-tro...eir-armor/

Interesting article confirming the persistence of this habit. While the US gets lots of things "wrong", this isn't one of them.

LOL…

Russian manufacturers continue to tout the mobility and firepower of their platforms, but battlefield footage often tells another story—one where the safest place is outside the armor.

BC

---

I’m inclined to agree with Goose…

So far we haven’t seen electoral consequences of the “pledges” to increase defense spending.  But as the experience with Spain shows, which flat out refused to sign on shows, I think most NATO countries will struggle to get to the 3.5% expenditure level (not to mention the more maleable 1.5% indirect military expenditures), especially when the tradeoffs are in front of voters.  Once it is time to raise taxes or cut benefits, it’s going to become problematic for countries not directly in the Russian line of fire.

BC

As far as Spain goes, the info I posted back on June 10 is IMO very relevant.

Many of the PIGS are going to be unable to do much, because their economies aren't strong enough to do so. Portugal 1.55% of GDP in 2024, Italy 1.61% in 2024, Spain 1.28% in 2024.  Greece does much better, 3.08% in 2024.

Italy has received "special permission" from NATO to spend 1.9% this year and not get yelled at. Italy is not allowed to increase borrowing because of EU rules. Arguably these countries don't much "matter", but the UK, France, Belgium and now Germany aren't in a great position to increase borrowing either. Germany is having to go through domestic legal hoops to even try. The political hoops are coming. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/german...-increase/

The Security Radar report discerned across Europe a mood expressed by the slogan “my country first.”

That doesn't include Ukraine and doesn't include NATO. It is a return to "Make <fill in country name here> great again". We have hundreds of years of European history demonstrating how that turned out.  AfD undoubtedly sees this as a big issue that can be used to punish the new CDU-CSU-SPD coalition.  All in all, not too encouraging.

[BostonCard]

How much of Greece’s military expenditure is actually aimed at another NATO member (Türkiye)?

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

[BostonCard]

How much of Greece’s military expenditure is actually aimed at another NATO member (Türkiye)?

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

[Goose]

How much of Greece’s military expenditure is actually aimed at another NATO member (Türkiye)?

Probably a lot of it, but the good news is that it would all be useful against external threats as well. The bad news is that in absolute dollars it isn't a big number.

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

As usual in Italy, nothing is simple. What the US regards (or used to anyway) as "Coast Guard" missions are split up differently in Italy. All the services involved have a military structure and in time of war revert to military control. The Marina Militare does a lot of it. One must remember that the US Sixth Fleet effectively abandoned the Mediterranean, leaving Italy all alone to assume the duties of "NATO South". This they did, but it has cost them a pile of money they didn't have. The latest product of this situation is the Trieste (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_la...ck_Trieste). Italy has been modernizing and augmenting their fleet to fill the gap the US departure left. It hasn't been easy, and it was explicitly done to deter Russia (and possible bad actors like Libya). As you suggest Italy is also quite aware of the need to control migration. The Marina Militare is therefore building six Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV). This new construction (https://www.navaltoday.com/2023/08/01/or...lian-navy/, https://www.navaltoday.com/2024/09/25/co...for%202027.) is going forward, although slower than one would wish. Fincantieri contracts can be maddening :-).
 
The Guardia Costiera (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corps_of_t...oast_Guard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_It...rd_vessels) is actually part of the Navy but has all kinds of reporting chains to "commercial" agencies in the government. This service did get a big "boost" for rescuing immigrants at sea back in 2013 with the arrival of two Dattilo class vessels (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dattilo-cl...rol_vessel). AFAIK that is the most recent augmentation of their capability. You have undoubtedly seen these ships in news reports loaded with migrants. The fact there are only two of them is indeed a problem.
 
Many law enforcement functions, especially smuggling of all kinds are in the remit of the Guardia di Finanza (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardia_di_Finanza). They have lots and lots of relatively small "cutters". They are actually pretty effective in what they do, but it is almost all "local" in nature.
 
If all this makes sense to you, write it down and publish it. Nobody else I know can explain it, even after imbibing lots of grappa.

[Goose]

How much of Greece’s military expenditure is actually aimed at another NATO member (Türkiye)?

Probably a lot of it, but the good news is that it would all be useful against external threats as well. The bad news is that in absolute dollars it isn't a big number.

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

As usual in Italy, nothing is simple. What the US regards (or used to anyway) as "Coast Guard" missions are split up differently in Italy. All the services involved have a military structure and in time of war revert to military control. The Marina Militare does a lot of it. One must remember that the US Sixth Fleet effectively abandoned the Mediterranean, leaving Italy all alone to assume the duties of "NATO South". This they did, but it has cost them a pile of money they didn't have. The latest product of this situation is the Trieste (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_la...ck_Trieste). Italy has been modernizing and augmenting their fleet to fill the gap the US departure left. It hasn't been easy, and it was explicitly done to deter Russia (and possible bad actors like Libya). As you suggest Italy is also quite aware of the need to control migration. The Marina Militare is therefore building six Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV). This new construction (https://www.navaltoday.com/2023/08/01/or...lian-navy/, https://www.navaltoday.com/2024/09/25/co...for%202027.) is going forward, although slower than one would wish. Fincantieri contracts can be maddening :-).
 
The Guardia Costiera (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corps_of_t...oast_Guard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_It...rd_vessels) is actually part of the Navy but has all kinds of reporting chains to "commercial" agencies in the government. This service did get a big "boost" for rescuing immigrants at sea back in 2013 with the arrival of two Dattilo class vessels (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dattilo-cl...rol_vessel). AFAIK that is the most recent augmentation of their capability. You have undoubtedly seen these ships in news reports loaded with migrants. The fact there are only two of them is indeed a problem.
 
Many law enforcement functions, especially smuggling of all kinds are in the remit of the Guardia di Finanza (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardia_di_Finanza). They have lots and lots of relatively small "cutters". They are actually pretty effective in what they do, but it is almost all "local" in nature.
 
If all this makes sense to you, write it down and publish it. Nobody else I know can explain it, even after imbibing lots of grappa.

[BostonCard]

Meanwhile, in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov is apparently at death’s door.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/03/world...74f24220a2

His 17-year-old son is apparently next in line for succession.  As the article notes, it would be funny if it weren’t sad.

BC

[BostonCard]

Meanwhile, in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov is apparently at death’s door.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/03/world...74f24220a2

His 17-year-old son is apparently next in line for succession.  As the article notes, it would be funny if it weren’t sad.

BC

[GK3]

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell.

I agree that right now Germany is willing to invest lots (relatively speaking) of money in strengthening their military. My concern is the tenor of German society. Since the end of the Cold War Germany has adopted an almost anti-military stanse. Part of that ethos was "Don't scare the Bear", which was adopted enthusiastically by (particularly the young) German society. Right now most of German society doesn't want to have a military at all. They are still emotionally in a state of denial, despite the events in Ukraine having raised intellectual awareness in some circles. To make the Bundeswehr the  force it used to be Germany needs troops. Getting those troops is going to be very, very difficult, if it is even possible. UMT is not politically possible in the near future, if ever. Even if Germany can raise their force levels it will be composed of individuals who lack the socially instilled military duty/ethos German troops possessed during the Cold War. The large cadre of professional, experienced, extremely competent and highly motivated NCOs that use to make the Bundeswehr "work" no longer exists. These are my real worries about the German military reconstituting itself.

My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines.

IMO you are correct. Russia can't control the air above the front lines in such a conflict. They probably can't do so behind their own lines either. This is a big difference from the situation in Ukraine. Back in the day the PVO was simply immense. The Russian GCI approach wasn't flashy but it would have made NATO interdiction efforts difficult. All that is gone. Russia has an air force, but nothing like what the Soviets had. Russia relies on SAMs and their IADS to protect their rear areas. As Israel recently demonstrated that won't work against an air force that understands SEAD and has stealthy aircraft to execute the mission. Granted, Iran isn't Russia. Russia would be a tougher nut to crack, but crack it would. We wouldn't get away without losses though, as Israel did. https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-showed...02706.html is worth a look.

As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night.

I agree with the last sentence for sure! I also don't think Russia can use the tactics they are employing in Ukraine with any success in a general full-scale engagement against NATO. However Russia has other options that attack NATO's distributed nature. The Baltic States are small enough that Russia may be able to swallow them quickly if NATO isn't 1) meaningfully forward deployed in the Baltics and 2) prepared to very quickly reinforce the Baltics. Right now, it is unclear NATO is capable of doing either and even less clear NATO has the political will to do so. If Russia states limited war aims and refrains from deep strikes into other NATO nations while attacking the Baltics, what will NATO do? IMO if the US does not actively enter into the conflict on essentially day one, no other NATO nation will either. NATO is quite capable of allowing a Russian victory by being stupid.
 
That is why it was critical that the US commitment to collective defense be (at least publicly) unconditional. If we reserve the right to question involvement on a case-by-case basis, so can everybody else. At a minimum, this process creates delay and uncertainty. In war, both can be fatal.
 
Air superiority wise, China is a different case entirely. Probably too off topic for this thread however.

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

I am much less sanguine than you are about the long-term willingness of the NATO countries to strengthen themselves militarily. The politics of most of the NATO countries lean much more toward social welfare expenses than military expenses. We in the US have been trending in that direction as well. The US however has been a "superpower" for quite awhile and at least a significant part of the public "likes" that. Most NATO nations aren't interested in any such role and the few that might conceivably be (UK, France, Germany) can't afford the cost. It is unlikely Britain or France ever could. Their nuclear deterrent is their "safety net". The UK Army And the RN are vanishingly small and getting smaller. The French Army in the past 35 years has "tracked" the German army in size. I think there was a message in that. Germany right now is having some serious economic problems. They aren't the "powerhouse" they have been. That will affect their willingness and ability to rebuild their forces. I am more worried about their willingness :-).

On paper, NATO should dominate Russia.  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293...omparison/
The airpower difference is extraordinary.  My guess the NATO air forces are probably better prepared to fight than the ground forces. 
Considering obvious targets, NATO defense industries are probably much more distributed that the Russian version and it could be much easier to hurt Russian production. 
From what I have read, Russia is thought to be able to produce 150 to 250 new tanks a year.  They have lost almost almost 11,000 tanks in the Ukraine, a staggering number. Their losses in APC's and artillery are equally staggering.  How many relatively modern main battle tanks do they have left?  Today, the Russian infantry do not have to worry about opposing airpower making their chose riding place a very unsafe place to be. 

As you point out, the political will of the NATO countries will be critical. That question may not be answered until a war has actually started. 

As Iran has just shown us, you can have what you think is a robust air defense system only to see it made worthless in short order.  

Plus Putin is not a young man. Would his successor embrace his goals?

There are so many what ifs, maybe's and political questions that we are just engaging in what theoretical maybe's which are interesting to think about, but don't solve much.

Even though I am old army guy, I saw enough of what combined airpower, helos and fast movers can do that I still think Russia would have a hard time combating the NATO advantage in this area.

One other thing, Poland seems to be buying South Korean K2 tanks now, now M1's. The K2 has certain advantages over the M1, but it still seems to me that the latest M1 is perhaps better suited to a European conflict on flat ground.

[GK3]

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell.

I agree that right now Germany is willing to invest lots (relatively speaking) of money in strengthening their military. My concern is the tenor of German society. Since the end of the Cold War Germany has adopted an almost anti-military stanse. Part of that ethos was "Don't scare the Bear", which was adopted enthusiastically by (particularly the young) German society. Right now most of German society doesn't want to have a military at all. They are still emotionally in a state of denial, despite the events in Ukraine having raised intellectual awareness in some circles. To make the Bundeswehr the  force it used to be Germany needs troops. Getting those troops is going to be very, very difficult, if it is even possible. UMT is not politically possible in the near future, if ever. Even if Germany can raise their force levels it will be composed of individuals who lack the socially instilled military duty/ethos German troops possessed during the Cold War. The large cadre of professional, experienced, extremely competent and highly motivated NCOs that use to make the Bundeswehr "work" no longer exists. These are my real worries about the German military reconstituting itself.

My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines.

IMO you are correct. Russia can't control the air above the front lines in such a conflict. They probably can't do so behind their own lines either. This is a big difference from the situation in Ukraine. Back in the day the PVO was simply immense. The Russian GCI approach wasn't flashy but it would have made NATO interdiction efforts difficult. All that is gone. Russia has an air force, but nothing like what the Soviets had. Russia relies on SAMs and their IADS to protect their rear areas. As Israel recently demonstrated that won't work against an air force that understands SEAD and has stealthy aircraft to execute the mission. Granted, Iran isn't Russia. Russia would be a tougher nut to crack, but crack it would. We wouldn't get away without losses though, as Israel did. https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-showed...02706.html is worth a look.

As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night.

I agree with the last sentence for sure! I also don't think Russia can use the tactics they are employing in Ukraine with any success in a general full-scale engagement against NATO. However Russia has other options that attack NATO's distributed nature. The Baltic States are small enough that Russia may be able to swallow them quickly if NATO isn't 1) meaningfully forward deployed in the Baltics and 2) prepared to very quickly reinforce the Baltics. Right now, it is unclear NATO is capable of doing either and even less clear NATO has the political will to do so. If Russia states limited war aims and refrains from deep strikes into other NATO nations while attacking the Baltics, what will NATO do? IMO if the US does not actively enter into the conflict on essentially day one, no other NATO nation will either. NATO is quite capable of allowing a Russian victory by being stupid.
 
That is why it was critical that the US commitment to collective defense be (at least publicly) unconditional. If we reserve the right to question involvement on a case-by-case basis, so can everybody else. At a minimum, this process creates delay and uncertainty. In war, both can be fatal.
 
Air superiority wise, China is a different case entirely. Probably too off topic for this thread however.

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

I am much less sanguine than you are about the long-term willingness of the NATO countries to strengthen themselves militarily. The politics of most of the NATO countries lean much more toward social welfare expenses than military expenses. We in the US have been trending in that direction as well. The US however has been a "superpower" for quite awhile and at least a significant part of the public "likes" that. Most NATO nations aren't interested in any such role and the few that might conceivably be (UK, France, Germany) can't afford the cost. It is unlikely Britain or France ever could. Their nuclear deterrent is their "safety net". The UK Army And the RN are vanishingly small and getting smaller. The French Army in the past 35 years has "tracked" the German army in size. I think there was a message in that. Germany right now is having some serious economic problems. They aren't the "powerhouse" they have been. That will affect their willingness and ability to rebuild their forces. I am more worried about their willingness :-).

On paper, NATO should dominate Russia.  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293...omparison/
The airpower difference is extraordinary.  My guess the NATO air forces are probably better prepared to fight than the ground forces. 
Considering obvious targets, NATO defense industries are probably much more distributed that the Russian version and it could be much easier to hurt Russian production. 
From what I have read, Russia is thought to be able to produce 150 to 250 new tanks a year.  They have lost almost almost 11,000 tanks in the Ukraine, a staggering number. Their losses in APC's and artillery are equally staggering.  How many relatively modern main battle tanks do they have left?  Today, the Russian infantry do not have to worry about opposing airpower making their chose riding place a very unsafe place to be. 

As you point out, the political will of the NATO countries will be critical. That question may not be answered until a war has actually started. 

As Iran has just shown us, you can have what you think is a robust air defense system only to see it made worthless in short order.  

Plus Putin is not a young man. Would his successor embrace his goals?

There are so many what ifs, maybe's and political questions that we are just engaging in what theoretical maybe's which are interesting to think about, but don't solve much.

Even though I am old army guy, I saw enough of what combined airpower, helos and fast movers can do that I still think Russia would have a hard time combating the NATO advantage in this area.

One other thing, Poland seems to be buying South Korean K2 tanks now, now M1's. The K2 has certain advantages over the M1, but it still seems to me that the latest M1 is perhaps better suited to a European conflict on flat ground.

[M T]

And Troy probably could prove the Greeks couldn’t defear them. And a war involving Vietnam and the US was a no-brainer. 

I am not allowed to comment on the current administration’s policies.

[M T]

And Troy probably could prove the Greeks couldn’t defear them. And a war involving Vietnam and the US was a no-brainer. 

I am not allowed to comment on the current administration’s policies.

[GK3]

How much of Greece’s military expenditure is actually aimed at another NATO member (Türkiye)?

Probably a lot of it, but the good news is that it would all be useful against external threats as well. The bad news is that in absolute dollars it isn't a big number.

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

As usual in Italy, nothing is simple. What the US regards (or used to anyway) as "Coast Guard" missions are split up differently in Italy. All the services involved have a military structure and in time of war revert to military control. The Marina Militare does a lot of it. One must remember that the US Sixth Fleet effectively abandoned the Mediterranean, leaving Italy all alone to assume the duties of "NATO South". This they did, but it has cost them a pile of money they didn't have. The latest product of this situation is the Trieste (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_la...ck_Trieste). Italy has been modernizing and augmenting their fleet to fill the gap the US departure left. It hasn't been easy, and it was explicitly done to deter Russia (and possible bad actors like Libya). As you suggest Italy is also quite aware of the need to control migration. The Marina Militare is therefore building six Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV). This new construction (https://www.navaltoday.com/2023/08/01/or...lian-navy/, https://www.navaltoday.com/2024/09/25/co...for%202027.) is going forward, although slower than one would wish. Fincantieri contracts can be maddening :-).
 
The Guardia Costiera (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corps_of_t...oast_Guard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_It...rd_vessels) is actually part of the Navy but has all kinds of reporting chains to "commercial" agencies in the government. This service did get a big "boost" for rescuing immigrants at sea back in 2013 with the arrival of two Dattilo class vessels (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dattilo-cl...rol_vessel). AFAIK that is the most recent augmentation of their capability. You have undoubtedly seen these ships in news reports loaded with migrants. The fact there are only two of them is indeed a problem.
 
Many law enforcement functions, especially smuggling of all kinds are in the remit of the Guardia di Finanza (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardia_di_Finanza). They have lots and lots of relatively small "cutters". They are actually pretty effective in what they do, but it is almost all "local" in nature.
 
If all this makes sense to you, write it down and publish it. Nobody else I know can explain it, even after imbibing lots of grappa.

I ran across this news article which I found very positive because it indicated that Ukraine was engaging in offensive air operations against Russian forces.  Then I could not find it anywhere else which makes me wonder if it is worth whatever paper it is written.  Makes for at least "I wish it were true" if it is not
https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/07/03/u...offensive/

[GK3]

How much of Greece’s military expenditure is actually aimed at another NATO member (Türkiye)?

Probably a lot of it, but the good news is that it would all be useful against external threats as well. The bad news is that in absolute dollars it isn't a big number.

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

As usual in Italy, nothing is simple. What the US regards (or used to anyway) as "Coast Guard" missions are split up differently in Italy. All the services involved have a military structure and in time of war revert to military control. The Marina Militare does a lot of it. One must remember that the US Sixth Fleet effectively abandoned the Mediterranean, leaving Italy all alone to assume the duties of "NATO South". This they did, but it has cost them a pile of money they didn't have. The latest product of this situation is the Trieste (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_la...ck_Trieste). Italy has been modernizing and augmenting their fleet to fill the gap the US departure left. It hasn't been easy, and it was explicitly done to deter Russia (and possible bad actors like Libya). As you suggest Italy is also quite aware of the need to control migration. The Marina Militare is therefore building six Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV). This new construction (https://www.navaltoday.com/2023/08/01/or...lian-navy/, https://www.navaltoday.com/2024/09/25/co...for%202027.) is going forward, although slower than one would wish. Fincantieri contracts can be maddening :-).
 
The Guardia Costiera (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corps_of_t...oast_Guard https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_It...rd_vessels) is actually part of the Navy but has all kinds of reporting chains to "commercial" agencies in the government. This service did get a big "boost" for rescuing immigrants at sea back in 2013 with the arrival of two Dattilo class vessels (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dattilo-cl...rol_vessel). AFAIK that is the most recent augmentation of their capability. You have undoubtedly seen these ships in news reports loaded with migrants. The fact there are only two of them is indeed a problem.
 
Many law enforcement functions, especially smuggling of all kinds are in the remit of the Guardia di Finanza (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardia_di_Finanza). They have lots and lots of relatively small "cutters". They are actually pretty effective in what they do, but it is almost all "local" in nature.
 
If all this makes sense to you, write it down and publish it. Nobody else I know can explain it, even after imbibing lots of grappa.

I ran across this news article which I found very positive because it indicated that Ukraine was engaging in offensive air operations against Russian forces.  Then I could not find it anywhere else which makes me wonder if it is worth whatever paper it is written.  Makes for at least "I wish it were true" if it is not
https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/07/03/u...offensive/

[GK3]

Another series of interesting articles on the economic impact of the war on Russia.  I have no idea as to the validity of the conclusions but hope those more educated can comment.
1.https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russias-war-chest-is-drying-up-how-sanctions-and-oil-prices-bite-into-the-national-wealth-fund-9599
2. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/the-war...d-ff1658bd
3. https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russia-ec...ef-2092918

[GK3]

Another series of interesting articles on the economic impact of the war on Russia.  I have no idea as to the validity of the conclusions but hope those more educated can comment.
1.https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/russias-war-chest-is-drying-up-how-sanctions-and-oil-prices-bite-into-the-national-wealth-fund-9599
2. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/the-war...d-ff1658bd
3. https://www.newsweek.com/putin-russia-ec...ef-2092918