[Goose]

Just keeping on doing what we have been doing, even when it isn't working has been in my opinion the hallmark of our war efforts since Vietnam. Even more worrisome in the Ukraine situation is that I am not sure we ever had an objective that we wanted to achieve and were willing to pay for other than the rather nebulous  "peace". I do not think that Putin has any intention of negotiating any kind of real peace that basically doesn't give him Ukraine or at least most of it. I am sure there is also the concern that if we get too involved then there will be direct US/NATO vs Russia conflict.
A big question is whether a direct NATO/Russian conflict is a foregone conclusion and we are just kicking the can down the road or there is some sort of off ramp that allows both sides to save face and not lose too much one way or the other, except of course all those Russian and Ukrainians  who have died or become wounded already.  Unfortunately, what works for NATO as a solution may well not work for Putin.  I do not think weakness or willing to settle for far less than he expected to achieve will work for Putin. My guess Putin is in it for the long haul or at least until he either wins or falls out of one of the Russian hotel windows.

I pretty much agree with every single line of the above. I totally agree that the previous administration did not have a clearly defined objective. In many of our "military" efforts the eventual problems were not military. The failures were caused by the US not realizing our primary "objective" (in so far as we had a well defined one) was political, not military. The military reached the objective they were assigned. However the military couldn't create a liberal democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan by defeating the indigenous military forces. The military can create conditions where such an outcome will be possible, but the rest of the "job" is political, social, and economic. The situation in Vietnam was worse because in that case the US had both unclear military and political objectives. We "fixed" the military objectives part in later conflicts but still failed to set political objectives and create a plan to attain them.
 
In Ukraine the US military is not directly involved. We are supplying material, intelligence and advice. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam there is a government in place (imperfect though it undoubtedly is) that is friendly to the US, has the support of the people, and is reasonably democratic. This is a very "big deal" in that we aren't looking at a nation-building scenario and all that implies. Our initial goal was (IMO) to prevent the country from being quickly overrun by Russia, period. Most of the world, including lots of our own military, believed we would quickly fail in that goal and the war would be over. That didn't happen, partly because Russia incompetently prepared and executed their attack, partly because Ukraine came together and fought bravely despite many material disadvantages, and partly because the West, particularly the US, provided immediate material and intelligence assistance. IMO there was never subsequently a "what now?" thought-out plan of military and political objectives formulated, formally adopted, and articulated to (at a minimum) those executing it. Therefore it was impossible to link the means we intended to use with the undefined objectives. We are still in that state.

[Goose]

Just keeping on doing what we have been doing, even when it isn't working has been in my opinion the hallmark of our war efforts since Vietnam. Even more worrisome in the Ukraine situation is that I am not sure we ever had an objective that we wanted to achieve and were willing to pay for other than the rather nebulous  "peace". I do not think that Putin has any intention of negotiating any kind of real peace that basically doesn't give him Ukraine or at least most of it. I am sure there is also the concern that if we get too involved then there will be direct US/NATO vs Russia conflict.
A big question is whether a direct NATO/Russian conflict is a foregone conclusion and we are just kicking the can down the road or there is some sort of off ramp that allows both sides to save face and not lose too much one way or the other, except of course all those Russian and Ukrainians  who have died or become wounded already.  Unfortunately, what works for NATO as a solution may well not work for Putin.  I do not think weakness or willing to settle for far less than he expected to achieve will work for Putin. My guess Putin is in it for the long haul or at least until he either wins or falls out of one of the Russian hotel windows.

I pretty much agree with every single line of the above. I totally agree that the previous administration did not have a clearly defined objective. In many of our "military" efforts the eventual problems were not military. The failures were caused by the US not realizing our primary "objective" (in so far as we had a well defined one) was political, not military. The military reached the objective they were assigned. However the military couldn't create a liberal democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan by defeating the indigenous military forces. The military can create conditions where such an outcome will be possible, but the rest of the "job" is political, social, and economic. The situation in Vietnam was worse because in that case the US had both unclear military and political objectives. We "fixed" the military objectives part in later conflicts but still failed to set political objectives and create a plan to attain them.
 
In Ukraine the US military is not directly involved. We are supplying material, intelligence and advice. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam there is a government in place (imperfect though it undoubtedly is) that is friendly to the US, has the support of the people, and is reasonably democratic. This is a very "big deal" in that we aren't looking at a nation-building scenario and all that implies. Our initial goal was (IMO) to prevent the country from being quickly overrun by Russia, period. Most of the world, including lots of our own military, believed we would quickly fail in that goal and the war would be over. That didn't happen, partly because Russia incompetently prepared and executed their attack, partly because Ukraine came together and fought bravely despite many material disadvantages, and partly because the West, particularly the US, provided immediate material and intelligence assistance. IMO there was never subsequently a "what now?" thought-out plan of military and political objectives formulated, formally adopted, and articulated to (at a minimum) those executing it. Therefore it was impossible to link the means we intended to use with the undefined objectives. We are still in that state.

[Mick]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

[Mick]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

[Leftcoast]

Well, if the objective was to drain the Russian military of men and materiel then that goal has been accomplished. The world has seen that three years in Russia hasn't been able to vanquish a bordering country, establish air superiority, or even incrementally advance without falling back on WW2 era mass artillery and WW1 era trench warfare.

As always, getting OUT of a war is much harder than getting into one, whether you are a combatant or providing support.  Sometimes there is no "right" answer but there are many, many wrong ones.

[Leftcoast]

Well, if the objective was to drain the Russian military of men and materiel then that goal has been accomplished. The world has seen that three years in Russia hasn't been able to vanquish a bordering country, establish air superiority, or even incrementally advance without falling back on WW2 era mass artillery and WW1 era trench warfare.

As always, getting OUT of a war is much harder than getting into one, whether you are a combatant or providing support.  Sometimes there is no "right" answer but there are many, many wrong ones.

[dabigv13]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

Well, the rub is the "materially increasing chance of nuclear response" bit. I think doing anything more than what was done could have increased that chance, though I think even if we sent US pilots and jets to establish a no-fly zone or something more directly interventionist, Russia at most would have set off a nuke elsewhere, rather than in Ukraine.

I would have been in favor of that, but I imagine it would be an big political loser to send US pilots into potential danger like that, so probably never a realistic possibility.

Sending jets and training pilots sooner would have helped somewhat but even so I think the war would still be ongoing in a pretty similar way even with that.

The US only has so much influence. If Putin wants to spend a lot of blood and treasure in an ideological war to restore the Russian empire, hard for us to dissuade him of that.

[dabigv13]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

Well, the rub is the "materially increasing chance of nuclear response" bit. I think doing anything more than what was done could have increased that chance, though I think even if we sent US pilots and jets to establish a no-fly zone or something more directly interventionist, Russia at most would have set off a nuke elsewhere, rather than in Ukraine.

I would have been in favor of that, but I imagine it would be an big political loser to send US pilots into potential danger like that, so probably never a realistic possibility.

Sending jets and training pilots sooner would have helped somewhat but even so I think the war would still be ongoing in a pretty similar way even with that.

The US only has so much influence. If Putin wants to spend a lot of blood and treasure in an ideological war to restore the Russian empire, hard for us to dissuade him of that.

[GK3]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

As others have already said, it is a complex question.  There are few things that would be likely to be the really wrong things to do.  First, NO "advisors" on the ground or in the air. That would be a good example of mission creep that Russia might not stand for.  I am sure we have a few people advising at the highest level, and perhaps some tech trainers, but we have to stay away from attaching people to their combat units. I think the biggest thing Ukraine needs is better and/or more air defense weapons and more ability to conduct SEAD operations. Russia seems intend on trying to destroy the Ukrainian populace's willing to continue to support the battle. I think we need as much clarity regarding Putin's situation as we can get.  If Putin really can't survive failing to take Ukraine or enough of it to say he did, it could get messy.

I ran across this article and was shocked to see that a single Patriot battery retails for 1 Billion dollars. I guess I am completely out of touch with the high cost of going to war in today's world. That said, I have no idea of how many missiles one gets for 1 billion. I hope it is a lot.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/11/world...raine.html

One more edit: While not a fan, I have to like the concept of selling stuff to NATO and then having them move the stuff on to Ukraine, if it actually ends up working that way. That NATO countries are willing to do this is indicative of their change in attitude on defense and Russia. My only question is what is Ukraine going to shoot those patriots at? While I am sure they can keep Russian aircraft further at bay, but cheap drones obviously will not be their target. What do we have that can help with targeting the drone swarms Russia is launching. I think anything we can to support Ukrainian efforts at SEAD/DEAD would be money well spent by who ever spends it.

[GK3]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

As others have already said, it is a complex question.  There are few things that would be likely to be the really wrong things to do.  First, NO "advisors" on the ground or in the air. That would be a good example of mission creep that Russia might not stand for.  I am sure we have a few people advising at the highest level, and perhaps some tech trainers, but we have to stay away from attaching people to their combat units. I think the biggest thing Ukraine needs is better and/or more air defense weapons and more ability to conduct SEAD operations. Russia seems intend on trying to destroy the Ukrainian populace's willing to continue to support the battle. I think we need as much clarity regarding Putin's situation as we can get.  If Putin really can't survive failing to take Ukraine or enough of it to say he did, it could get messy.

I ran across this article and was shocked to see that a single Patriot battery retails for 1 Billion dollars. I guess I am completely out of touch with the high cost of going to war in today's world. That said, I have no idea of how many missiles one gets for 1 billion. I hope it is a lot.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/11/world...raine.html

One more edit: While not a fan, I have to like the concept of selling stuff to NATO and then having them move the stuff on to Ukraine, if it actually ends up working that way. That NATO countries are willing to do this is indicative of their change in attitude on defense and Russia. My only question is what is Ukraine going to shoot those patriots at? While I am sure they can keep Russian aircraft further at bay, but cheap drones obviously will not be their target. What do we have that can help with targeting the drone swarms Russia is launching. I think anything we can to support Ukrainian efforts at SEAD/DEAD would be money well spent by who ever spends it.

[Goose]

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

First, the US and Ukraine have to mutually decide what outcomes are "acceptable". Whatever else happens, Ukraine will insist on some kind of "real" security activities (not just words) that will keep Russia out of whatever becomes "Ukraine" going forward. Otherwise, both Ukraine and "the West" should just let Russia take over now, because that will be the inevitable result in very short order. If the US is not willing to materially participate in such an arrangement, we must tell Ukraine that unequivocally ASAP.
 
These security activities are the show-stopper for both Ukraine and Russia but in opposite directions. Russia will accept a "peace" that will in short order allow them to occupy "the rest" of Ukraine. If the US is unwilling to let that happen, we need to plan accordingly. Assuming that is the case, we need to make it crystal clear to Putin that is the case. We also have to publicly and clearly reserve the right to do whatever we think is necessary to ensure Ukraine can exist without Russian military intervention hanging over their heads. That doesn't mean we are going to nuke Putin, but it does mean we aren't taking that off the table. Russia likes to play the brinkmanship game. We have to let them know we aren't playing a game and that such threats are pointless.
 
Direct intervention in this war would be a military confrontation with Russia. The US has determined that while preserving Ukrainian independence and a "rules based" international system is in the national interest it is not worth such a confrontation. Since that is the case the US has limited options. The US needs a plan that will force Russia to make peace in Ukraine. The best weapons we have available are economic. We have already used some of them. We need to use all of them. We should use these weapons in concert with a diplomatic offensive to let all the nations of the world what we are doing and why we are doing it. We should emphasize that none of these actions are directed against any nation besides Russia, and that any pain it is causing will stop if Russia stops.
 
In particular, the US should use any banking sanctions that are being kept "in reserve". There is also a bill in the Senate that would place a 500% tariff on nations that import Russian oil. I don't think tariffs are appropriate tools to solve non-economic conflicts. I instead favor a flat embargo on all trade with countries that buy Russian oil. The obvious target is India, but there are others (like China) that would be affected. This economic warfare is the only tool we have that can directly affect Russia's ability to continue the war. We should use all of it. I also favor taking actions against the "shadow fleet" wherever reasonably possible.
 
The US has to redouble its efforts to prevent semiconductors (particularly ones made by Altera and AMD-Xilinx) from making their way into Russia. We used to do a much, much better job of that. We can do so again if the effort is made. Some parts that are now EAR99 definitely should not be. Hate to say it, because the status quo is much easier for me. That is one reason I am aware of the difference. Without these semiconductors and others like them it will be impossible for Russia to build its ballistic missiles. This effort is actually critically important.
 
The current missile/drone barrage against Ukraine needs to be addressed. It is important that everybody involved, particularly Ukraine, understands that ground-based missile defenses will never fully work and will be disproportionately expensive compared to offensive ballistic missiles. The idea of "more air defense" isn't going to cut it no matter how much is provided. There are things we can and should do however that will allow Ukraine to continue fighting.
 
Defending against air-breathing vehicles, both manned and unmanned, can be provided. This defense best comes from an air force. Ukraine has an embryonic force that is totally inadequate to the task. IMO the first thing the US should do is allow Ukraine to hire both former and current USAF F-16 pilots to man the F-16 aircraft Ukraine already has. Current USAF pilots will resign their commissions with the understanding they will continue to accrue service years while they are in Ukraine. They can (if the wish) resume their careers after they return. If done correctly this will greatly complicate Russia's ability to strike Ukraine with drones and cruise missiles. After this "Flying Tigers" approach is in place and working, attempts should be made to get more F-16s for Ukraine. We have a lot of them on their way to the boneyard. Sell them to Ukraine (or Denmark who can then give them to Ukraine). The US and the "West" should also expand their training of Ukrainian pilots. Training just "a few" each year will never be adequate. Eventually all the pilots in Ukraine must be Ukrainians, but that is several years away, best case.
 
Once the Ukrainian air force has a "critical mass" of pilots Ukraine can begin using this force for offense, not just defense. Ukraine can at least locally suppress Russian air defenses and do real damage to Russian logistics. This will be a big change to the status quo. It also means that Russia will have to actively protect every part of its front lines from attacks by the UAF, something it does not now need to do. That will put even more strain on the Russian military system and clearly send the message to the Russian public that things are going in the wrong direction for them in Ukraine. Nothing is more demoralizing than being bombed and having no way to respond. Ukraine's troops have seen a lot of that. When the Russian troops experience it themselves they may not respond to Putin's liking.
 
More Patriot batteries and missiles should also be provided with the understanding they should normally engage only ballistic missile targets. Additionally, Russia should be informed that for every Iskander or equivalent missile they fire into Ukraine, Ukraine will be sold a PrSM to fire at military targets of their choice. The price will not be disclosed :-). This will allow Ukraine to use their reconnaissance drones flying inside Russia as well as their superb HUMINT to target high-value military targets. The PrSM can reach them due to its superior range as compared to the ATACMS. This approach ties the damage Ukraine can do directly to the damage Russia attempts to do. IMO this is about the best we can do to defend against the Russian ballistic missile barrage. It will allow Ukraine to shoot back, which may help morale and buy time for the economic sanctions to shut down the Russian war machine.
 
For some reason Russia hasn't unleashed the rather substantial troop buildup they have achieved. I have been noting this for over 3 months now. It may be that Russia has something up its sleeve for August-September, but it is getting a little late in the year for that. It also seems improbable that Putin believes the US administration will "soon" force Ukraine to virtually surrender to stop the war. Therefore IMO the US must INCREASE the shipments of artillery ammunition and similar material to Ukraine. It should be done publicly with some fan-fare so its continuity will not be in doubt. The recent  cutoff of this (and other types) of aid by the current administration sent exactly the wrong message to Putin and the world. It has to be made clear the US isn't going to abandon Ukraine if indeed we don't intend to do so.
 
If we do these things IMO Ukraine will outlast Russia. Ukraine gets lots of aid from outside the country. Russia does not. Both nations economies are severely impacted by the war. All things being "equal", Russia needs more GDP per capita than Ukraine does. Russians are used to having a comparably "better life". Russia is now spending lots of its accumulated national wealth fund on this war. When that is gone, something has to give. It is possible that economics will force Russia to accept a cease-fire (but not a peace) that doesn't grant them what they want in Ukraine but gives Russia time to "rebuild" for the "final push". Ukraine is acutely aware of this possibility. Hopefully the US is as well.
 
Is this a "good" plan? Not really, because economic strangulation is never an ideal weapon. Given that direct intervention is off the table, given that we are already committed to Ukraine's survival, and given that we missed the opportunities early on when Russia was not performing well militarily, this is the best I can do.

[Goose]

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

First, the US and Ukraine have to mutually decide what outcomes are "acceptable". Whatever else happens, Ukraine will insist on some kind of "real" security activities (not just words) that will keep Russia out of whatever becomes "Ukraine" going forward. Otherwise, both Ukraine and "the West" should just let Russia take over now, because that will be the inevitable result in very short order. If the US is not willing to materially participate in such an arrangement, we must tell Ukraine that unequivocally ASAP.
 
These security activities are the show-stopper for both Ukraine and Russia but in opposite directions. Russia will accept a "peace" that will in short order allow them to occupy "the rest" of Ukraine. If the US is unwilling to let that happen, we need to plan accordingly. Assuming that is the case, we need to make it crystal clear to Putin that is the case. We also have to publicly and clearly reserve the right to do whatever we think is necessary to ensure Ukraine can exist without Russian military intervention hanging over their heads. That doesn't mean we are going to nuke Putin, but it does mean we aren't taking that off the table. Russia likes to play the brinkmanship game. We have to let them know we aren't playing a game and that such threats are pointless.
 
Direct intervention in this war would be a military confrontation with Russia. The US has determined that while preserving Ukrainian independence and a "rules based" international system is in the national interest it is not worth such a confrontation. Since that is the case the US has limited options. The US needs a plan that will force Russia to make peace in Ukraine. The best weapons we have available are economic. We have already used some of them. We need to use all of them. We should use these weapons in concert with a diplomatic offensive to let all the nations of the world what we are doing and why we are doing it. We should emphasize that none of these actions are directed against any nation besides Russia, and that any pain it is causing will stop if Russia stops.
 
In particular, the US should use any banking sanctions that are being kept "in reserve". There is also a bill in the Senate that would place a 500% tariff on nations that import Russian oil. I don't think tariffs are appropriate tools to solve non-economic conflicts. I instead favor a flat embargo on all trade with countries that buy Russian oil. The obvious target is India, but there are others (like China) that would be affected. This economic warfare is the only tool we have that can directly affect Russia's ability to continue the war. We should use all of it. I also favor taking actions against the "shadow fleet" wherever reasonably possible.
 
The US has to redouble its efforts to prevent semiconductors (particularly ones made by Altera and AMD-Xilinx) from making their way into Russia. We used to do a much, much better job of that. We can do so again if the effort is made. Some parts that are now EAR99 definitely should not be. Hate to say it, because the status quo is much easier for me. That is one reason I am aware of the difference. Without these semiconductors and others like them it will be impossible for Russia to build its ballistic missiles. This effort is actually critically important.
 
The current missile/drone barrage against Ukraine needs to be addressed. It is important that everybody involved, particularly Ukraine, understands that ground-based missile defenses will never fully work and will be disproportionately expensive compared to offensive ballistic missiles. The idea of "more air defense" isn't going to cut it no matter how much is provided. There are things we can and should do however that will allow Ukraine to continue fighting.
 
Defending against air-breathing vehicles, both manned and unmanned, can be provided. This defense best comes from an air force. Ukraine has an embryonic force that is totally inadequate to the task. IMO the first thing the US should do is allow Ukraine to hire both former and current USAF F-16 pilots to man the F-16 aircraft Ukraine already has. Current USAF pilots will resign their commissions with the understanding they will continue to accrue service years while they are in Ukraine. They can (if the wish) resume their careers after they return. If done correctly this will greatly complicate Russia's ability to strike Ukraine with drones and cruise missiles. After this "Flying Tigers" approach is in place and working, attempts should be made to get more F-16s for Ukraine. We have a lot of them on their way to the boneyard. Sell them to Ukraine (or Denmark who can then give them to Ukraine). The US and the "West" should also expand their training of Ukrainian pilots. Training just "a few" each year will never be adequate. Eventually all the pilots in Ukraine must be Ukrainians, but that is several years away, best case.
 
Once the Ukrainian air force has a "critical mass" of pilots Ukraine can begin using this force for offense, not just defense. Ukraine can at least locally suppress Russian air defenses and do real damage to Russian logistics. This will be a big change to the status quo. It also means that Russia will have to actively protect every part of its front lines from attacks by the UAF, something it does not now need to do. That will put even more strain on the Russian military system and clearly send the message to the Russian public that things are going in the wrong direction for them in Ukraine. Nothing is more demoralizing than being bombed and having no way to respond. Ukraine's troops have seen a lot of that. When the Russian troops experience it themselves they may not respond to Putin's liking.
 
More Patriot batteries and missiles should also be provided with the understanding they should normally engage only ballistic missile targets. Additionally, Russia should be informed that for every Iskander or equivalent missile they fire into Ukraine, Ukraine will be sold a PrSM to fire at military targets of their choice. The price will not be disclosed :-). This will allow Ukraine to use their reconnaissance drones flying inside Russia as well as their superb HUMINT to target high-value military targets. The PrSM can reach them due to its superior range as compared to the ATACMS. This approach ties the damage Ukraine can do directly to the damage Russia attempts to do. IMO this is about the best we can do to defend against the Russian ballistic missile barrage. It will allow Ukraine to shoot back, which may help morale and buy time for the economic sanctions to shut down the Russian war machine.
 
For some reason Russia hasn't unleashed the rather substantial troop buildup they have achieved. I have been noting this for over 3 months now. It may be that Russia has something up its sleeve for August-September, but it is getting a little late in the year for that. It also seems improbable that Putin believes the US administration will "soon" force Ukraine to virtually surrender to stop the war. Therefore IMO the US must INCREASE the shipments of artillery ammunition and similar material to Ukraine. It should be done publicly with some fan-fare so its continuity will not be in doubt. The recent  cutoff of this (and other types) of aid by the current administration sent exactly the wrong message to Putin and the world. It has to be made clear the US isn't going to abandon Ukraine if indeed we don't intend to do so.
 
If we do these things IMO Ukraine will outlast Russia. Ukraine gets lots of aid from outside the country. Russia does not. Both nations economies are severely impacted by the war. All things being "equal", Russia needs more GDP per capita than Ukraine does. Russians are used to having a comparably "better life". Russia is now spending lots of its accumulated national wealth fund on this war. When that is gone, something has to give. It is possible that economics will force Russia to accept a cease-fire (but not a peace) that doesn't grant them what they want in Ukraine but gives Russia time to "rebuild" for the "final push". Ukraine is acutely aware of this possibility. Hopefully the US is as well.
 
Is this a "good" plan? Not really, because economic strangulation is never an ideal weapon. Given that direct intervention is off the table, given that we are already committed to Ukraine's survival, and given that we missed the opportunities early on when Russia was not performing well militarily, this is the best I can do.

[GK3]

More nonsense; https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/hegs...ance-memo/
Every squad to be equipped with drones?  Who carries them and their payload?  What do you leave behind so you can carry them?  I can understand the desire to get these things out there, but at the squad level?  What is my weapons platoon doing?  Why not put the drones there, fits far better for most missions I would think. 
Here is what most infantry squad members today have to deal with:


So what do you leave behind to carry a single drone?

Keep in mind that the average non combat loadout weighs close to 70 lbs, a combat loadout can weigh over 100, maybe as high as 120.  I say put the drones in the weapons platoon and do away with a mortar or two.  

I offer this as a fairly current explanation of what our infantrymen carry today.
https://www.google.com/search?q=what+doe...e&ie=UTF-8

Drones are nice, I am an admitted fan of the concept, but they have their time and place. Open terrain, desert, scattered forest OK, dense forests or jungles like Vietnam then not so much.

[GK3]

More nonsense; https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/hegs...ance-memo/
Every squad to be equipped with drones?  Who carries them and their payload?  What do you leave behind so you can carry them?  I can understand the desire to get these things out there, but at the squad level?  What is my weapons platoon doing?  Why not put the drones there, fits far better for most missions I would think. 
Here is what most infantry squad members today have to deal with:


So what do you leave behind to carry a single drone?

Keep in mind that the average non combat loadout weighs close to 70 lbs, a combat loadout can weigh over 100, maybe as high as 120.  I say put the drones in the weapons platoon and do away with a mortar or two.  

I offer this as a fairly current explanation of what our infantrymen carry today.
https://www.google.com/search?q=what+doe...e&ie=UTF-8

Drones are nice, I am an admitted fan of the concept, but they have their time and place. Open terrain, desert, scattered forest OK, dense forests or jungles like Vietnam then not so much.

[Goose]

More nonsense;https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/hegseth-signs-unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-memo/
Every squad to be equipped with drones?  Who carries them and their payload?  What do you leave behind so you can carry them?  I can understand the desire to get these things out there, but at the squad level?  What is my weapons platoon doing?  Why not put the drones there, fits far better for most missions I would think. 
Here is what most infantry squad members today have to deal with:


So what do you leave behind to carry a single drone?

Keep in mind that the average non combat loadout weighs close to 70 lbs, a combat loadout can weigh over 100, maybe as high as 120.  I say put the drones in the weapons platoon and do away with a mortar or two.

I totally agree that the weapons platoon at the company level is where the one-way attack drones belong in the US Army. This is clearly true in mechanized units where the weapons platoon has mortar carriers. The extra weight of the drones can be traded off for 120 mm ammunition or the 81 mm dismountable mortar. IMO there is really no question that is the correct group to handle the attack drone capability. For light infantry formations, special forces, and the USMC the weapons platoon is still probably where they belong, but as you point out there is a significant trade-off. It isn't just the drone. If it is an FPV device you also need a viewing screen and a control console. That has to be carried as well. IMO the "best" loadout will have to be determined by war games at the NTC. There may be cases where no drones at all are carried, there may be cases where no mortars are carried, depending on the situation.
 
The situation is even more complicated than it first appears. If the drone is being used for reconnaissance, the weapons platoon probably isn't the best place for it to be in the TO. Possibly it should be part of the headquarters platoon. If the drone is the electric quadcopter type, it needs recharging after use. The 15C operating it can't do without that very long at all. He needs a generator of some kind, even if is hand-cranked. The headquarters company probably has at least a reliable generator for the radios, so that seems like the place to have the reconnaissance drones.
 
This needs to be thought out. The memo from the SecDef seems to indicate he is fine with the troops figuring out something themselves and making that doctrine, much as happened in Ukraine and Russia. While I am 100% on board involving the troops early and often in deciding what the US Army needs just leaving it to happenstance is obviously a bad idea. SecDef seems to believe that all of the Army's weapons development problems stem from too many regulations and too much risk aversion. IMO that is only a small part of the story. There is also plenty of fuzzy thinking at the highest levels coupled with too many leaders that believe they know exactly what is needed but are unwilling to put their ideas to the test BEFORE deciding what to buy. A very long, sad story. It seems the current SecDef is determined to add his name to the above list.

Ukraine and Russia both operate their drone units at the battalion level. These units can be attached to specific companies or operated as stand-alone entities. This choice is partly due to the "usual" Soviet practice for such "special purpose" units and to the fact the war in Ukraine is an ad-hoc "happening". The Ukrainians started out with separate units because they were actually private citizens helping the army, not part of the army itself.

Drones are nice, I am an admitted fan of the concept, but they have their time and place. Open terrain, desert, scattered forest OK, dense forests or jungles like Vietnam then not so much.

Amen! Drones have a role to play. Exactly what that role is will evolve very quickly, as it already has been. It isn't just terrain. As you point out for light infantry, everything you bring displaces other things you didn't. Realistic exercises at the NTC can sort a lot of this out, if the leadership is actually willing to listen.

[Goose]

More nonsense;https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/hegseth-signs-unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-memo/
Every squad to be equipped with drones?  Who carries them and their payload?  What do you leave behind so you can carry them?  I can understand the desire to get these things out there, but at the squad level?  What is my weapons platoon doing?  Why not put the drones there, fits far better for most missions I would think. 
Here is what most infantry squad members today have to deal with:


So what do you leave behind to carry a single drone?

Keep in mind that the average non combat loadout weighs close to 70 lbs, a combat loadout can weigh over 100, maybe as high as 120.  I say put the drones in the weapons platoon and do away with a mortar or two.

I totally agree that the weapons platoon at the company level is where the one-way attack drones belong in the US Army. This is clearly true in mechanized units where the weapons platoon has mortar carriers. The extra weight of the drones can be traded off for 120 mm ammunition or the 81 mm dismountable mortar. IMO there is really no question that is the correct group to handle the attack drone capability. For light infantry formations, special forces, and the USMC the weapons platoon is still probably where they belong, but as you point out there is a significant trade-off. It isn't just the drone. If it is an FPV device you also need a viewing screen and a control console. That has to be carried as well. IMO the "best" loadout will have to be determined by war games at the NTC. There may be cases where no drones at all are carried, there may be cases where no mortars are carried, depending on the situation.
 
The situation is even more complicated than it first appears. If the drone is being used for reconnaissance, the weapons platoon probably isn't the best place for it to be in the TO. Possibly it should be part of the headquarters platoon. If the drone is the electric quadcopter type, it needs recharging after use. The 15C operating it can't do without that very long at all. He needs a generator of some kind, even if is hand-cranked. The headquarters company probably has at least a reliable generator for the radios, so that seems like the place to have the reconnaissance drones.
 
This needs to be thought out. The memo from the SecDef seems to indicate he is fine with the troops figuring out something themselves and making that doctrine, much as happened in Ukraine and Russia. While I am 100% on board involving the troops early and often in deciding what the US Army needs just leaving it to happenstance is obviously a bad idea. SecDef seems to believe that all of the Army's weapons development problems stem from too many regulations and too much risk aversion. IMO that is only a small part of the story. There is also plenty of fuzzy thinking at the highest levels coupled with too many leaders that believe they know exactly what is needed but are unwilling to put their ideas to the test BEFORE deciding what to buy. A very long, sad story. It seems the current SecDef is determined to add his name to the above list.

Ukraine and Russia both operate their drone units at the battalion level. These units can be attached to specific companies or operated as stand-alone entities. This choice is partly due to the "usual" Soviet practice for such "special purpose" units and to the fact the war in Ukraine is an ad-hoc "happening". The Ukrainians started out with separate units because they were actually private citizens helping the army, not part of the army itself.

Drones are nice, I am an admitted fan of the concept, but they have their time and place. Open terrain, desert, scattered forest OK, dense forests or jungles like Vietnam then not so much.

Amen! Drones have a role to play. Exactly what that role is will evolve very quickly, as it already has been. It isn't just terrain. As you point out for light infantry, everything you bring displaces other things you didn't. Realistic exercises at the NTC can sort a lot of this out, if the leadership is actually willing to listen.

[GK3]

More nonsense;https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/hegseth-signs-unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-memo/
Every squad to be equipped with drones?  Who carries them and their payload?  What do you leave behind so you can carry them?  I can understand the desire to get these things out there, but at the squad level?  What is my weapons platoon doing?  Why not put the drones there, fits far better for most missions I would think. 
Here is what most infantry squad members today have to deal with:


So what do you leave behind to carry a single drone?

Keep in mind that the average non combat loadout weighs close to 70 lbs, a combat loadout can weigh over 100, maybe as high as 120.  I say put the drones in the weapons platoon and do away with a mortar or two.

I totally agree that the weapons platoon at the company level is where the one-way attack drones belong in the US Army. This is clearly true in mechanized units where the weapons platoon has mortar carriers. The extra weight of the drones can be traded off for 120 mm ammunition or the 81 mm dismountable mortar. IMO there is really no question that is the correct group to handle the attack drone capability. For light infantry formations, special forces, and the USMC the weapons platoon is still probably where they belong, but as you point out there is a significant trade-off. It isn't just the drone. If it is an FPV device you also need a viewing screen and a control console. That has to be carried as well. IMO the "best" loadout will have to be determined by war games at the NTC. There may be cases where no drones at all are carried, there may be cases where no mortars are carried, depending on the situation.
 
The situation is even more complicated than it first appears. If the drone is being used for reconnaissance, the weapons platoon probably isn't the best place for it to be in the TO. Possibly it should be part of the headquarters platoon. If the drone is the electric quadcopter type, it needs recharging after use. The 15C operating it can't do without that very long at all. He needs a generator of some kind, even if is hand-cranked. The headquarters company probably has at least a reliable generator for the radios, so that seems like the place to have the reconnaissance drones.
 
This needs to be thought out. The memo from the SecDef seems to indicate he is fine with the troops figuring out something themselves and making that doctrine, much as happened in Ukraine and Russia. While I am 100% on board involving the troops early and often in deciding what the US Army needs just leaving it to happenstance is obviously a bad idea. SecDef seems to believe that all of the Army's weapons development problems stem from too many regulations and too much risk aversion. IMO that is only a small part of the story. There is also plenty of fuzzy thinking at the highest levels coupled with too many leaders that believe they know exactly what is needed but are unwilling to put their ideas to the test BEFORE deciding what to buy. A very long, sad story. It seems the current SecDef is determined to add his name to the above list.

Ukraine and Russia both operate their drone units at the battalion level. These units can be attached to specific companies or operated as stand-alone entities. This choice is partly due to the "usual" Soviet practice for such "special purpose" units and to the fact the war in Ukraine is an ad-hoc "happening". The Ukrainians started out with separate units because they were actually private citizens helping the army, not part of the army itself.

Drones are nice, I am an admitted fan of the concept, but they have their time and place. Open terrain, desert, scattered forest OK, dense forests or jungles like Vietnam then not so much.

Amen! Drones have a role to play. Exactly what that role is will evolve very quickly, as it already has been. It isn't just terrain. As you point out for light infantry, everything you bring displaces other things you didn't. Realistic exercises at the NTC can sort a lot of this out, if the leadership is actually willing to listen.

I agree completely with your comments, particularly testing everything at the NTC.  Every potential operational theater will have different issues that have to be considered and hardware and tactical and strategic philosophies need to be tested across the board.  You do not want to be the Company or Battalion commander  whose senior NCO comes and asks, " Sir,  What the you know what am I supposed to do with this stuff?" and your reply is "What stuff?"

George S. Patton Jr is credited with once saying that he who sweats more in training will bleed less in battle. The time to figure out how to use all these fancy new toys is in training, not in the middle of combat.  That said, far too often that is not the way things work out.

Headquarters Company is almost certainly where the recon stuff should be operated from.

[GK3]

More nonsense;https://breakingdefense.com/2025/07/hegseth-signs-unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-memo/
Every squad to be equipped with drones?  Who carries them and their payload?  What do you leave behind so you can carry them?  I can understand the desire to get these things out there, but at the squad level?  What is my weapons platoon doing?  Why not put the drones there, fits far better for most missions I would think. 
Here is what most infantry squad members today have to deal with:


So what do you leave behind to carry a single drone?

Keep in mind that the average non combat loadout weighs close to 70 lbs, a combat loadout can weigh over 100, maybe as high as 120.  I say put the drones in the weapons platoon and do away with a mortar or two.

I totally agree that the weapons platoon at the company level is where the one-way attack drones belong in the US Army. This is clearly true in mechanized units where the weapons platoon has mortar carriers. The extra weight of the drones can be traded off for 120 mm ammunition or the 81 mm dismountable mortar. IMO there is really no question that is the correct group to handle the attack drone capability. For light infantry formations, special forces, and the USMC the weapons platoon is still probably where they belong, but as you point out there is a significant trade-off. It isn't just the drone. If it is an FPV device you also need a viewing screen and a control console. That has to be carried as well. IMO the "best" loadout will have to be determined by war games at the NTC. There may be cases where no drones at all are carried, there may be cases where no mortars are carried, depending on the situation.
 
The situation is even more complicated than it first appears. If the drone is being used for reconnaissance, the weapons platoon probably isn't the best place for it to be in the TO. Possibly it should be part of the headquarters platoon. If the drone is the electric quadcopter type, it needs recharging after use. The 15C operating it can't do without that very long at all. He needs a generator of some kind, even if is hand-cranked. The headquarters company probably has at least a reliable generator for the radios, so that seems like the place to have the reconnaissance drones.
 
This needs to be thought out. The memo from the SecDef seems to indicate he is fine with the troops figuring out something themselves and making that doctrine, much as happened in Ukraine and Russia. While I am 100% on board involving the troops early and often in deciding what the US Army needs just leaving it to happenstance is obviously a bad idea. SecDef seems to believe that all of the Army's weapons development problems stem from too many regulations and too much risk aversion. IMO that is only a small part of the story. There is also plenty of fuzzy thinking at the highest levels coupled with too many leaders that believe they know exactly what is needed but are unwilling to put their ideas to the test BEFORE deciding what to buy. A very long, sad story. It seems the current SecDef is determined to add his name to the above list.

Ukraine and Russia both operate their drone units at the battalion level. These units can be attached to specific companies or operated as stand-alone entities. This choice is partly due to the "usual" Soviet practice for such "special purpose" units and to the fact the war in Ukraine is an ad-hoc "happening". The Ukrainians started out with separate units because they were actually private citizens helping the army, not part of the army itself.

Drones are nice, I am an admitted fan of the concept, but they have their time and place. Open terrain, desert, scattered forest OK, dense forests or jungles like Vietnam then not so much.

Amen! Drones have a role to play. Exactly what that role is will evolve very quickly, as it already has been. It isn't just terrain. As you point out for light infantry, everything you bring displaces other things you didn't. Realistic exercises at the NTC can sort a lot of this out, if the leadership is actually willing to listen.

I agree completely with your comments, particularly testing everything at the NTC.  Every potential operational theater will have different issues that have to be considered and hardware and tactical and strategic philosophies need to be tested across the board.  You do not want to be the Company or Battalion commander  whose senior NCO comes and asks, " Sir,  What the you know what am I supposed to do with this stuff?" and your reply is "What stuff?"

George S. Patton Jr is credited with once saying that he who sweats more in training will bleed less in battle. The time to figure out how to use all these fancy new toys is in training, not in the middle of combat.  That said, far too often that is not the way things work out.

Headquarters Company is almost certainly where the recon stuff should be operated from.

[Goose]

Along the same lines: https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-ne...e_vignette
Since apparently this system has been tested and works against the current commercial drones, we are buying it. Of course, the RF commanded military drones are fleeing the ISM bands, so how adaptable these new systems will be is an interesting question. Remembering the other article saying that in Ukraine "Jamming has failed" and that a receiver, antenna, and power supply are not enough, I hope that isn't what we just bought, although I suspect it is. In any case this kind of system is ineffective against fiber optic drones, even if it has sophisticated wide-band capability.

[Goose]

Along the same lines: https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-ne...e_vignette
Since apparently this system has been tested and works against the current commercial drones, we are buying it. Of course, the RF commanded military drones are fleeing the ISM bands, so how adaptable these new systems will be is an interesting question. Remembering the other article saying that in Ukraine "Jamming has failed" and that a receiver, antenna, and power supply are not enough, I hope that isn't what we just bought, although I suspect it is. In any case this kind of system is ineffective against fiber optic drones, even if it has sophisticated wide-band capability.

[Goose]

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...ast-guard/
Some evidence the Italians are listening to you, or vise versa. This new class of ships is obviously aimed as an augmentation/improvement  for the two Dattilo class ships they already have. Those ships are 12 years old, so they are undoubtedly good for another 20 (at least).  How many of the new design they intend to build is unknown at this time. The number 6 has been bandied about, but that is like the administration's two weeks. The current contract is for one, and I can't find any evidence there are "options" for more.

[Goose]

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...ast-guard/
Some evidence the Italians are listening to you, or vise versa. This new class of ships is obviously aimed as an augmentation/improvement  for the two Dattilo class ships they already have. Those ships are 12 years old, so they are undoubtedly good for another 20 (at least).  How many of the new design they intend to build is unknown at this time. The number 6 has been bandied about, but that is like the administration's two weeks. The current contract is for one, and I can't find any evidence there are "options" for more.

[GK3]

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...ast-guard/
Some evidence the Italians are listening to you, or vise versa. This new class of ships is obviously aimed as an augmentation/improvement  for the two Dattilo class ships they already have. Those ships are 12 years old, so they are undoubtedly good for another 20 (at least).  How many of the new design they intend to build is unknown at this time. The number 6 has been bandied about, but that is like the administration's two weeks. The current contract is for one, and I can't find any evidence there are "options" for more.

Here is another innovator who seems to want to turn old style military procurement on its head.  Sure sounds like a good idea to me.  155mm guns capable of shooting out to a range of 96 miles. I can see a lot of the old style hardware producers bad mouthing his development, but it would sure seem to give small  more nimble players a chance at the big bucks.

https://www.businessinsider.com/meet-tec...tre-2025-7

[GK3]

The Italian government might want to increase its military expenditures focused on its coast guard, not so much to deter Russia but to deter migrants coming across the Mediterranean Sea.

BC

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/202...ast-guard/
Some evidence the Italians are listening to you, or vise versa. This new class of ships is obviously aimed as an augmentation/improvement  for the two Dattilo class ships they already have. Those ships are 12 years old, so they are undoubtedly good for another 20 (at least).  How many of the new design they intend to build is unknown at this time. The number 6 has been bandied about, but that is like the administration's two weeks. The current contract is for one, and I can't find any evidence there are "options" for more.

Here is another innovator who seems to want to turn old style military procurement on its head.  Sure sounds like a good idea to me.  155mm guns capable of shooting out to a range of 96 miles. I can see a lot of the old style hardware producers bad mouthing his development, but it would sure seem to give small  more nimble players a chance at the big bucks.

https://www.businessinsider.com/meet-tec...tre-2025-7

[Mick]

Question for Goose and anyone else who cares to answer: how does the Ukrainian war impact the military strategy of the Chinese, particularly as they seem to be getting more and more aggressive in the South Pacific. Also curious as to your thoughts on the reactions of the other south Pacific nations...

How China’s Military Is Flexing Its Power in the Pacific - WSJ

[Mick]

Question for Goose and anyone else who cares to answer: how does the Ukrainian war impact the military strategy of the Chinese, particularly as they seem to be getting more and more aggressive in the South Pacific. Also curious as to your thoughts on the reactions of the other south Pacific nations...

How China’s Military Is Flexing Its Power in the Pacific - WSJ

[Goose]

Question for Goose and anyone else who cares to answer: how does the Ukrainian war impact the military strategy of the Chinese, particularly as they seem to be getting more and more aggressive in the South Pacific. Also curious as to your thoughts on the reactions of the other south Pacific nations...

How China’s Military Is Flexing Its Power in the Pacific - WSJ

IMO the war in Ukraine affects Chinese military strategy and tactics only very peripherally, if at all. The conflict China is most "anticipating" in a notional attempt to defeat and occupy Taiwan isn't going to be trench warfare. It will primarily be a naval and air war all the way through. China needs to suppress Taiwan's defenses to the point it can effect a successful amphibious landing on Taiwan. It must then be able to supply and reinforce that landing as necessary. To do that China also has to cut Taiwan off from resupply by its allies via sea and air. If it accomplishes these goals, Taiwan inevitably falls due to lack of military supplies, if nothing else. Totally different than the Ukrainian war.
 
The land battle on Taiwan, if it comes to that, will be won by the side that can maintain its air and sea lines of communication with the island. China has a big advantage in that it is much, much closer than the US, or even Korea and Japan. China is also quite certain that the US is not going to attempt an invasion of the Chinese mainland in response to a Taiwan scenario, and if we should be so foolish I am sure their response will be "Bring it on" :-).

[Goose]

Question for Goose and anyone else who cares to answer: how does the Ukrainian war impact the military strategy of the Chinese, particularly as they seem to be getting more and more aggressive in the South Pacific. Also curious as to your thoughts on the reactions of the other south Pacific nations...

How China’s Military Is Flexing Its Power in the Pacific - WSJ

IMO the war in Ukraine affects Chinese military strategy and tactics only very peripherally, if at all. The conflict China is most "anticipating" in a notional attempt to defeat and occupy Taiwan isn't going to be trench warfare. It will primarily be a naval and air war all the way through. China needs to suppress Taiwan's defenses to the point it can effect a successful amphibious landing on Taiwan. It must then be able to supply and reinforce that landing as necessary. To do that China also has to cut Taiwan off from resupply by its allies via sea and air. If it accomplishes these goals, Taiwan inevitably falls due to lack of military supplies, if nothing else. Totally different than the Ukrainian war.
 
The land battle on Taiwan, if it comes to that, will be won by the side that can maintain its air and sea lines of communication with the island. China has a big advantage in that it is much, much closer than the US, or even Korea and Japan. China is also quite certain that the US is not going to attempt an invasion of the Chinese mainland in response to a Taiwan scenario, and if we should be so foolish I am sure their response will be "Bring it on" :-).

[M T]

OTOH, while the military action will be quite different, the gauging of the will of the countries is probably relevant. 

For instance, if China simply blockaded Taiwan, how would other countries react and for hiw long until they got tired of it?  For that matter, how would the other countries implement and execute non-military options (embargoes, etc)

[M T]

OTOH, while the military action will be quite different, the gauging of the will of the countries is probably relevant. 

For instance, if China simply blockaded Taiwan, how would other countries react and for hiw long until they got tired of it?  For that matter, how would the other countries implement and execute non-military options (embargoes, etc)

[Goose]

https://www.sfgate.com/tech/article/appl...772874.php

For those interested in the rare earths supply. The Mountain Pass mine switched years ago to solvent extraction instead of foam flotation. This was done for environmental reasons, as solvent extraction is generally more expensive than flotation. The solvent extraction process isn't great environmentally as such, but it produces much, much less volume of pollutants. Flotation produces lots and lots of "contaminated" water, thereby giving it a larger environmental "footprint".
 
Solvent extraction is more expensive per ton of ore processed than flotation. With high grade ore that greater expense may be insignificant. As the ore grade goes down the relative disadvantage of solvent extraction increases rapidly. At some point, the graphs cross and solvent extraction becomes financially untenable. Mountain Pass (MP) mine has been around for "awhile". Lots of ore has already been pulled out, but there is lots of ore still in the ground. Normally the "high grade" ore is extracted first, in so far as possible. That may mean MP will be fighting some economic factors. China has different standards regarding environmental damage. I expect they continue to use legacy flotation techniques for the vast majority of their rare earth mines. MP would be too if it was environmentally possible. That competitive advantage was a major factor in  MP ceasing production previously. This issue won't go away.

OTOH the recycling of batteries is fairly well suited to solvent extraction processes. That is just about the only way to do such recycling. You can't feed batteries to a ball mill. It isn't like crushing ore. The good news is the battery "ore grade" is fixed by the battery design. You know what the costs of extraction will be and they will remain consistent. Building a solvent extraction plant to recycle batteries is expensive and probably has fairly low margins. It is also very sensitive to the exact price of the extracted rare earths. That is why there is presently very limited ability to recycle EV batteries :-). MP involving itself in that process is clearly a "win" for them. They have a solvent extraction plant anyway. Eventually they may make more money extracting Chinese rare earths from used batteries than they do from mining their own ore :-).

[Goose]

https://www.sfgate.com/tech/article/appl...772874.php

For those interested in the rare earths supply. The Mountain Pass mine switched years ago to solvent extraction instead of foam flotation. This was done for environmental reasons, as solvent extraction is generally more expensive than flotation. The solvent extraction process isn't great environmentally as such, but it produces much, much less volume of pollutants. Flotation produces lots and lots of "contaminated" water, thereby giving it a larger environmental "footprint".
 
Solvent extraction is more expensive per ton of ore processed than flotation. With high grade ore that greater expense may be insignificant. As the ore grade goes down the relative disadvantage of solvent extraction increases rapidly. At some point, the graphs cross and solvent extraction becomes financially untenable. Mountain Pass (MP) mine has been around for "awhile". Lots of ore has already been pulled out, but there is lots of ore still in the ground. Normally the "high grade" ore is extracted first, in so far as possible. That may mean MP will be fighting some economic factors. China has different standards regarding environmental damage. I expect they continue to use legacy flotation techniques for the vast majority of their rare earth mines. MP would be too if it was environmentally possible. That competitive advantage was a major factor in  MP ceasing production previously. This issue won't go away.

OTOH the recycling of batteries is fairly well suited to solvent extraction processes. That is just about the only way to do such recycling. You can't feed batteries to a ball mill. It isn't like crushing ore. The good news is the battery "ore grade" is fixed by the battery design. You know what the costs of extraction will be and they will remain consistent. Building a solvent extraction plant to recycle batteries is expensive and probably has fairly low margins. It is also very sensitive to the exact price of the extracted rare earths. That is why there is presently very limited ability to recycle EV batteries :-). MP involving itself in that process is clearly a "win" for them. They have a solvent extraction plant anyway. Eventually they may make more money extracting Chinese rare earths from used batteries than they do from mining their own ore :-).

[M T]

While the term "war" is usually associated with kinetic actions, that may not suffice today.

Ukraine vs Russia (Ukrainian source) "Ukraine's intel paralyzes operations of one of largest drone manufacturers in Russia, sources say"
Russia vs the West (NSA, et al)  “Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies,”
China vs Taiwan (US cybersecurity company source) "Phish and Chips: China-Aligned Espionage Actors Ramp Up Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Targeting"

Meta note:  I found articles about these published yesterday in one online source (legit, but just a repeater of info).  A google search led to a gaggle of sites garbling similar stories (gee, thank you AI).  I chased down original sources so I know I'm not contributing to the garbage which could be echoes of disinformation.

[M T]

While the term "war" is usually associated with kinetic actions, that may not suffice today.

Ukraine vs Russia (Ukrainian source) "Ukraine's intel paralyzes operations of one of largest drone manufacturers in Russia, sources say"
Russia vs the West (NSA, et al)  “Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies,”
China vs Taiwan (US cybersecurity company source) "Phish and Chips: China-Aligned Espionage Actors Ramp Up Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Targeting"

Meta note:  I found articles about these published yesterday in one online source (legit, but just a repeater of info).  A google search led to a gaggle of sites garbling similar stories (gee, thank you AI).  I chased down original sources so I know I'm not contributing to the garbage which could be echoes of disinformation.

[GK3]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

When was the last time since Dec 7, 1941 have we put together a plan to actually WIN? We seem to think that we are destined to win because of simply who we  are.  No one else buys into that today except us. It is one thing to talk the talk, but that does not mean you can walk the talk. 

Another poster suggested that we allow American pilots to join the Ukraine Air force and fly the F16's we have given to Ukraine. The Flying Tigers revisited.

[GK3]

IMO the previous administration's policy was ill-advised because it did not articulate a plan for Ukraine to win. It became increasingly clear that no such plan existed, or if it did, it had failed. Confronted with that situation, no "new" plan was made. We just kept doing what we were doing and hoped that eventually Russia would quit. Hope is not a plan.

If it was entirely in your hands, and you wanted to give Ukraine the best possible chance of winning without materially increasing the chance of a nuclear response from Russia, what, specifically, would you recommend that the U. S. government / U. S. military do?

When was the last time since Dec 7, 1941 have we put together a plan to actually WIN? We seem to think that we are destined to win because of simply who we  are.  No one else buys into that today except us. It is one thing to talk the talk, but that does not mean you can walk the talk. 

Another poster suggested that we allow American pilots to join the Ukraine Air force and fly the F16's we have given to Ukraine. The Flying Tigers revisited.

[BostonCard]

I think we have to be clear here that “we” are not fighting Russia and we shouldn’t.  “We” are trying to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but in the end, it is Ukraine whose men and women are fighting and dying and Ukraine who is defending itself territory and ultimately Ukraine who will have to decide whether and how to continue fighting.  Thus, it isn’t for us to put together a plan to “win”; and honestly, given how they’ve fought the war to date, Ukraine has done a pretty phenomenal job coming up with a plan to not lose, which given that they are outmanned and outgunned and fighting a defensive war, is about all you can hope for.  Russia has been making very slow but steady gains, but we re talking about a net of 4,000 square miles in the last two years (out of a total area of 233,000 square miles), which is basically 1% of Ukranian territory a year, at a cost of about 1 million casualties since the war has started.

Since they are the ones with skin in the game, as long as they are willing to fight, we ought to continue to arm them to the extent that we can.  But also, because they are the ones with skin in the game, if they chose to make the painful concessions needed to bring peace, we should support that too, and we should help create the conditions such that if they did sign a cease fire with Russia, we should do all we can to prevent Russia from re-invading.

Right now, that’s all moot because it is clear that what Russia wants is a capitulation not a peace treaty, and so Ukraine fights on, in the hope that something will change in the Russian calculation about continuing to wage its war.

BC

[BostonCard]

I think we have to be clear here that “we” are not fighting Russia and we shouldn’t.  “We” are trying to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but in the end, it is Ukraine whose men and women are fighting and dying and Ukraine who is defending itself territory and ultimately Ukraine who will have to decide whether and how to continue fighting.  Thus, it isn’t for us to put together a plan to “win”; and honestly, given how they’ve fought the war to date, Ukraine has done a pretty phenomenal job coming up with a plan to not lose, which given that they are outmanned and outgunned and fighting a defensive war, is about all you can hope for.  Russia has been making very slow but steady gains, but we re talking about a net of 4,000 square miles in the last two years (out of a total area of 233,000 square miles), which is basically 1% of Ukranian territory a year, at a cost of about 1 million casualties since the war has started.

Since they are the ones with skin in the game, as long as they are willing to fight, we ought to continue to arm them to the extent that we can.  But also, because they are the ones with skin in the game, if they chose to make the painful concessions needed to bring peace, we should support that too, and we should help create the conditions such that if they did sign a cease fire with Russia, we should do all we can to prevent Russia from re-invading.

Right now, that’s all moot because it is clear that what Russia wants is a capitulation not a peace treaty, and so Ukraine fights on, in the hope that something will change in the Russian calculation about continuing to wage its war.

BC

[Goose]

I think we have to be clear here that “we” are not fighting Russia and we shouldn’t.  “We” are trying to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but in the end, it is Ukraine whose men and women are fighting and dying and Ukraine who is defending itself territory and ultimately Ukraine who will have to decide whether and how to continue fighting.  Thus, it isn’t for us to put together a plan to “win”; and honestly, given how they’ve fought the war to date, Ukraine has done a pretty phenomenal job coming up with a plan to not lose, which given that they are outmanned and outgunned and fighting a defensive war, is about all you can hope for.

I agree with lots of what you say here. Indeed we are not directly engaged in a shooting war with Russia, and most certainly the US has demonstrated we have no intention of being so engaged. The statement that "We are trying to enable Ukraine to defend itself" is of course true, but IMO incomplete. We are "helping" Ukraine not simply for "humanitarian reasons" but for reasons of our own national interest. The belief that this involvement helps our national interest must take in to account the probability of success. If there is no path for Ukraine to "win", how does our involvement serve the national interest? IMO intervention in a scenario where we are inevitably assigned to the "losing" side makes no sense.
 
We also must realize that we ARE involved in a war, even if we aren't losing troops. Our actions definitely do affect Ukraine's ability (and undoubtedly willingness) to fight. The success (or lack thereof) of our economic sanctions are certainly important to any chance of Ukraine having success in this war. I agree Ukraine is going to be required to do all the fighting and dying. They also ultimately have the power to decide when and if they will cease fighting. However, for both the sake of Ukraine and of the US/NATO there needs to be a combined vision of how this war can be ended. Having no path to victory (however that is defined) is clearly foolish. Fighting until Putin gives up all his gains in Ukraine is a plan if a reasonable way to ensure Ukraine can do that is also decided upon. Fighting until Putin is willing to stop on the current battle lines is also a plan if we have a way to ensure Ukraine can do that. However, unless the alliance of the US, NATO and Ukraine has a fairly well-defined way ahead that we all mostly agree upon it is highly unlikely Ukraine will survive or the US/NATO national interests will be advanced.
 
IMO the Catholic definition of a "Just War" sheds some light on the current situation, and is always a good place to start in deciding that participating in a war can be justified. From https://www.catholic.com/qa/what-is-a-just-war

The Catechism of the Catholic Church lays out the conditions for just war in paragraph 2309:

• the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
  
• all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
  
• there must be serious prospects of success;
  
• the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.

The "serious prospect of success" must be present or it is not a just war, period. Fighting without a plan cannot yield a "serious prospect of success". That is on all members of the alliance, not just Ukraine.

Russia has been making very slow but steady gains, but we re talking about a net of 4,000 square miles in the last two years (out of a total area of 233,000 square miles), which is basically 1% of Ukranian territory a year, at a cost of about 1 million casualties since the war has started.

Since they are the ones with skin in the game, as long as they are willing to fight, we ought to continue to arm them to the extent that we can.  But also, because they are the ones with skin in the game, if they chose to make the painful concessions needed to bring peace, we should support that too, and we should help create the conditions such that if they did sign a cease fire with Russia, we should do all we can to prevent Russia from re-invading.

If Ukraine enters into negotiations with Russia and an agreement is reached, Ukraine certainly has the power to accept that agreement, whether the US and NATO likes it or not. Conversely, the US and NATO can withdraw their support if Ukraine refuses to sign an agreement with Russia that the US/NATO thinks they "should". That is just realpolitik. OTOH the prospect of a disconnect of this type is much greater if there is no agreement between the members allied with Ukraine on what outcomes are acceptable to all parties. It may be no real consensus is possible, but if that is the case the alliance will not last long anyway.
 
The decision to do "all possible" to prevent Russia from re-invading has already long been made, and that decision is that indeed we will not. We didn't do "all possible" in 2014, we didn't do it in 2022, and unless there is a profound change in the US electorate we wouldn't do it in 2026 either. Nobody, particularly not Putin, is going to believe we would be willing to send troops to help defend Ukraine (pre or post ceasefire) until we do exactly that. A replay of the current war isn't attractive to anybody. It is unclear what NATO or the US can do that would actually deter Russia from continuing to fight absent Ukraine actually "winning" the current war. What would we do in 2026 that we are unwilling to do today? If there is some such thing we should do it NOW while Russia is heavily engaged and has lots of economic and equipment issues. The next time they come for a "rump" Ukraine it will be with their eyes wide open.

Right now, that’s all moot because it is clear that what Russia wants is a capitulation not a peace treaty, and so Ukraine fights on, in the hope that something will change in the Russian calculation about continuing to wage its war.
 
BC

Except it isn't moot for the US and NATO. We have to decide what we are going to do going forward. At one point the administration seemed settled on a course of full disengagement. Now, at least for the moment, it is "more of the same", kind of, as long as somebody pays for it. IMO that policy makes no sense. We are either "in" or we are "out". It is not in our national interest to just be mercenary weapons suppliers. What is our policy, and why is that policy a "good idea"?

[Goose]

I think we have to be clear here that “we” are not fighting Russia and we shouldn’t.  “We” are trying to enable Ukraine to defend itself, but in the end, it is Ukraine whose men and women are fighting and dying and Ukraine who is defending itself territory and ultimately Ukraine who will have to decide whether and how to continue fighting.  Thus, it isn’t for us to put together a plan to “win”; and honestly, given how they’ve fought the war to date, Ukraine has done a pretty phenomenal job coming up with a plan to not lose, which given that they are outmanned and outgunned and fighting a defensive war, is about all you can hope for.

I agree with lots of what you say here. Indeed we are not directly engaged in a shooting war with Russia, and most certainly the US has demonstrated we have no intention of being so engaged. The statement that "We are trying to enable Ukraine to defend itself" is of course true, but IMO incomplete. We are "helping" Ukraine not simply for "humanitarian reasons" but for reasons of our own national interest. The belief that this involvement helps our national interest must take in to account the probability of success. If there is no path for Ukraine to "win", how does our involvement serve the national interest? IMO intervention in a scenario where we are inevitably assigned to the "losing" side makes no sense.
 
We also must realize that we ARE involved in a war, even if we aren't losing troops. Our actions definitely do affect Ukraine's ability (and undoubtedly willingness) to fight. The success (or lack thereof) of our economic sanctions are certainly important to any chance of Ukraine having success in this war. I agree Ukraine is going to be required to do all the fighting and dying. They also ultimately have the power to decide when and if they will cease fighting. However, for both the sake of Ukraine and of the US/NATO there needs to be a combined vision of how this war can be ended. Having no path to victory (however that is defined) is clearly foolish. Fighting until Putin gives up all his gains in Ukraine is a plan if a reasonable way to ensure Ukraine can do that is also decided upon. Fighting until Putin is willing to stop on the current battle lines is also a plan if we have a way to ensure Ukraine can do that. However, unless the alliance of the US, NATO and Ukraine has a fairly well-defined way ahead that we all mostly agree upon it is highly unlikely Ukraine will survive or the US/NATO national interests will be advanced.
 
IMO the Catholic definition of a "Just War" sheds some light on the current situation, and is always a good place to start in deciding that participating in a war can be justified. From https://www.catholic.com/qa/what-is-a-just-war

The Catechism of the Catholic Church lays out the conditions for just war in paragraph 2309:

• the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
  
• all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
  
• there must be serious prospects of success;
  
• the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition.

The "serious prospect of success" must be present or it is not a just war, period. Fighting without a plan cannot yield a "serious prospect of success". That is on all members of the alliance, not just Ukraine.

Russia has been making very slow but steady gains, but we re talking about a net of 4,000 square miles in the last two years (out of a total area of 233,000 square miles), which is basically 1% of Ukranian territory a year, at a cost of about 1 million casualties since the war has started.

Since they are the ones with skin in the game, as long as they are willing to fight, we ought to continue to arm them to the extent that we can.  But also, because they are the ones with skin in the game, if they chose to make the painful concessions needed to bring peace, we should support that too, and we should help create the conditions such that if they did sign a cease fire with Russia, we should do all we can to prevent Russia from re-invading.

If Ukraine enters into negotiations with Russia and an agreement is reached, Ukraine certainly has the power to accept that agreement, whether the US and NATO likes it or not. Conversely, the US and NATO can withdraw their support if Ukraine refuses to sign an agreement with Russia that the US/NATO thinks they "should". That is just realpolitik. OTOH the prospect of a disconnect of this type is much greater if there is no agreement between the members allied with Ukraine on what outcomes are acceptable to all parties. It may be no real consensus is possible, but if that is the case the alliance will not last long anyway.
 
The decision to do "all possible" to prevent Russia from re-invading has already long been made, and that decision is that indeed we will not. We didn't do "all possible" in 2014, we didn't do it in 2022, and unless there is a profound change in the US electorate we wouldn't do it in 2026 either. Nobody, particularly not Putin, is going to believe we would be willing to send troops to help defend Ukraine (pre or post ceasefire) until we do exactly that. A replay of the current war isn't attractive to anybody. It is unclear what NATO or the US can do that would actually deter Russia from continuing to fight absent Ukraine actually "winning" the current war. What would we do in 2026 that we are unwilling to do today? If there is some such thing we should do it NOW while Russia is heavily engaged and has lots of economic and equipment issues. The next time they come for a "rump" Ukraine it will be with their eyes wide open.

Right now, that’s all moot because it is clear that what Russia wants is a capitulation not a peace treaty, and so Ukraine fights on, in the hope that something will change in the Russian calculation about continuing to wage its war.
 
BC

Except it isn't moot for the US and NATO. We have to decide what we are going to do going forward. At one point the administration seemed settled on a course of full disengagement. Now, at least for the moment, it is "more of the same", kind of, as long as somebody pays for it. IMO that policy makes no sense. We are either "in" or we are "out". It is not in our national interest to just be mercenary weapons suppliers. What is our policy, and why is that policy a "good idea"?