[Goose]

OTOH, while the military action will be quite different, the gauging of the will of the countries is probably relevant. 

For instance, if China simply blockaded Taiwan, how would other countries react and for hiw long until they got tired of it?  For that matter, how would the other countries implement and execute non-military options (embargoes, etc)

The response of the "other countries",  particularly the US, Japan and South Korea would be a similar blockade of the Chinese coast. It wouldn't be "embargoes" etc. The US would also almost immediately attempt to run an escorted convoy through the Chinese blockade into a Taiwanese port. If the PLAN shoots at the convoy, it will become a war. Make them chose. If they back off, problem solved.
 
The reason this will be the response is that fairly quickly the ROC themselves will have to force a convoy through the blockade. China may well be willing to sink a ROC vessel, assuming Taiwan would be unwilling to immediately start a shooting war and not worrying too much if they do. A US national ship would be another thing entirely. Also, if the "other countries" wait for the naval/air battle to actually start before they bring their forces forward they will be arriving late into an already in motion war. Never a good idea. Before the war starts you can assume China isn't going to shoot at US ships on the way to the area. After it starts, that is obviously not the case.

[Goose]

OTOH, while the military action will be quite different, the gauging of the will of the countries is probably relevant. 

For instance, if China simply blockaded Taiwan, how would other countries react and for hiw long until they got tired of it?  For that matter, how would the other countries implement and execute non-military options (embargoes, etc)

The response of the "other countries",  particularly the US, Japan and South Korea would be a similar blockade of the Chinese coast. It wouldn't be "embargoes" etc. The US would also almost immediately attempt to run an escorted convoy through the Chinese blockade into a Taiwanese port. If the PLAN shoots at the convoy, it will become a war. Make them chose. If they back off, problem solved.
 
The reason this will be the response is that fairly quickly the ROC themselves will have to force a convoy through the blockade. China may well be willing to sink a ROC vessel, assuming Taiwan would be unwilling to immediately start a shooting war and not worrying too much if they do. A US national ship would be another thing entirely. Also, if the "other countries" wait for the naval/air battle to actually start before they bring their forces forward they will be arriving late into an already in motion war. Never a good idea. Before the war starts you can assume China isn't going to shoot at US ships on the way to the area. After it starts, that is obviously not the case.

[dabigv13]

Great post Goose which I agree completely with. And I think BC's post important too, especially that Russia, while still slowly advancing, is doing so at great cost and at a very slow rate. They are not inevitable victors.

It is not in our national interest to just be mercenary weapons suppliers.

I think the pragmatic approach given current US political realities is to try and get to a place where the administration can message internally that Europe is paying for top quality American weapons, actually enforce and step up Russian sanctions if the war continues, while the US is still providing intelligence support and hopefully some material support from existing funding lines which are still pretty substantial. I just don't see a lot of new funding being approved any time soon unfortunately.

[dabigv13]

Great post Goose which I agree completely with. And I think BC's post important too, especially that Russia, while still slowly advancing, is doing so at great cost and at a very slow rate. They are not inevitable victors.

It is not in our national interest to just be mercenary weapons suppliers.

I think the pragmatic approach given current US political realities is to try and get to a place where the administration can message internally that Europe is paying for top quality American weapons, actually enforce and step up Russian sanctions if the war continues, while the US is still providing intelligence support and hopefully some material support from existing funding lines which are still pretty substantial. I just don't see a lot of new funding being approved any time soon unfortunately.

[GK3]

Great post Goose which I agree completely with. And I think BC's post important too, especially that Russia, while still slowly advancing, is doing so at great cost and at a very slow rate. They are not inevitable victors.

It is not in our national interest to just be mercenary weapons suppliers.

I think the pragmatic approach given current US political realities is to try and get to a place where the administration can message internally that Europe is paying for top quality American weapons, actually enforce and step up Russian sanctions if the war continues, while the US is still providing intelligence support and hopefully some material support from existing funding lines which are still pretty substantial. I just don't see a lot of new funding being approved any time soon unfortunately.

I wonder what role is most important in our national interest? Money, Arms or Boots on the Ground, or all 3?  Have we ever clearly defined what our National Interests are?  They change, but they do not change much. Since 1963, how many ill fated adventures have gotten involved in only to look back at failure?  China seems to be doing its best to control the shallow waters that lie between China, South Korea, Japan, the Okinawa island chain, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. China seems to be trying to create its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. 
We do need to control the deep waters lying East of all these areas but I see no need to try and do anything but occasionally show the flag West of Taiwan.  No room to maneuver, too shallow and too close to China to risk some very expensive assets. 
None of that means anything unless we have a well thought out National Policy with plans to support it.
Russia on the other hand seems an even larger enigma. The big question, one which no seems to have an answer for is how long can Putin survive under current conditions?  And how bad are current conditions really?
I think our best bet now is to find ways to keep Ukraine supplied with at least a great part of what it needs and encourage Germany, Poland, the Baltic States to continue to invest in their military.  I suppose I could see declaring open season on the Shadow Fleet after making a clear announcement as to what will happen to those ships who haul Russian oil, but then that can lead to other complications.

[GK3]

Great post Goose which I agree completely with. And I think BC's post important too, especially that Russia, while still slowly advancing, is doing so at great cost and at a very slow rate. They are not inevitable victors.

It is not in our national interest to just be mercenary weapons suppliers.

I think the pragmatic approach given current US political realities is to try and get to a place where the administration can message internally that Europe is paying for top quality American weapons, actually enforce and step up Russian sanctions if the war continues, while the US is still providing intelligence support and hopefully some material support from existing funding lines which are still pretty substantial. I just don't see a lot of new funding being approved any time soon unfortunately.

I wonder what role is most important in our national interest? Money, Arms or Boots on the Ground, or all 3?  Have we ever clearly defined what our National Interests are?  They change, but they do not change much. Since 1963, how many ill fated adventures have gotten involved in only to look back at failure?  China seems to be doing its best to control the shallow waters that lie between China, South Korea, Japan, the Okinawa island chain, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam. China seems to be trying to create its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. 
We do need to control the deep waters lying East of all these areas but I see no need to try and do anything but occasionally show the flag West of Taiwan.  No room to maneuver, too shallow and too close to China to risk some very expensive assets. 
None of that means anything unless we have a well thought out National Policy with plans to support it.
Russia on the other hand seems an even larger enigma. The big question, one which no seems to have an answer for is how long can Putin survive under current conditions?  And how bad are current conditions really?
I think our best bet now is to find ways to keep Ukraine supplied with at least a great part of what it needs and encourage Germany, Poland, the Baltic States to continue to invest in their military.  I suppose I could see declaring open season on the Shadow Fleet after making a clear announcement as to what will happen to those ships who haul Russian oil, but then that can lead to other complications.

[Goose]

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e...ale-order/
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir...e-362826e3
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienro...-missiles/

These articles, particularly the last,  illuminates two important truths. First, defense against ballistic missiles is ALWAYS going to be significantly more expensive and more technologically difficult than creating an effective ballistic missile offensive capability. Second, no ballistic missile defense, no matter how sophisticated, will be 100% effective. These truths applied to the Iran vs Israel conflict. They apply to the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. The will apply to the "golden dome" the administration is attempting to build.
 
It appears very likely that Israel was indeed running very low on Arrow missiles during the 12 day war. The US rushing several DDG-51s to the area to augment Israel's BMD capability was not just for show. Iran was also more successful against the Israeli BMD than Israel was willing to live with. Israel was unable to prevent Iran's missile offensive from being relatively effective, despite having the opportunity before they started the war to estimate both the threat Iran's missiles posed and the capability of the Israeli BMD. It appears they got both wrong. This might also account for the unexpected (by me anyway) passivity Israel has exhibited toward Iran. So far, Iran has not agreed to give up enrichment capability. While the estimates of how far the US/Israeli strikes against Iran's nuclear capability are still being "refined", the threat clearly still exists. This was an Israeli war aim. So far, it appears to have not been accomplished.

Ukraine is currently under attack by both UAVs and ballistic missiles. Israel was in the same condition, but the IAF was able to completely neutralize the Iranian drone threat. As discussed at length, Ukraine has not been able to accomplish that same feat. Russia is also increasing the number of drones used in their assaults, making Ukrainian efforts even less effective. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...d21746912b
 
It is important that everybody involved clearly understands that Patriot batteries are NOT in any way the answer to this problem. Other SAM missile systems, such as NASAMS and SAMP/T can help but only to a very limited extent. Point defense systems function under severe geometric handicaps in globally defeating the Shahed 136 class drones. They can defend themselves and a circle with about a 60 km diameter against "low flyers". That's it. They can also only engage a limited number of simultaneous targets inside that circle and have a significant reload "dead time" during which they are bricks. These systems can be overloaded fairly easily. Russia now has the ability to do that, which is hurting Ukraine's ability to even mitigate the damage these weapons can do.
 
The only practical defense against this class of drones is an "adequate" supply of aircraft with look-down shoot-down capability controlled by an AWACS that manages the air fight. This has been clearly demonstrated many in the Israel-Iran conflict. Arguably, it was also demonstrated back in WW II against the V-1, where half the V-1s that were destroyed were killed by aircraft. At that time the UAV (V-1s) had the immense advantage of being slightly faster than the aircraft hunting them. In Ukraine/Israel the aircraft "cruising" speed is 4 times that of the Shahed 136s they hunt. The aircraft top speed is 11 times that of a Shahed 136. Aircraft can go where the targets are and can relatively quickly concentrate to handle local "swarms". They can also engage the drones anywhere in their flight path. SAMs (and guns for that matter) are restricted to a much smaller geographic footprint and have a fixed, limited engagement time window.
 
Russia's ballistic missile threat in Ukraine and Iran's similar threat in Israel presents a difficult BMD problem. Israel possesses a 3 tier system. The long range tier of Israel's ABM system is the Arrow 3 interceptor. The Arrow 3 has a 1,500 mile range. It is a "hit to kill" weapon that uses both a high-resolution EO sensor and an active radar homing (ARH) seeker for terminal guidance.
 
The intermediate range tier of Israel's ABM is David's Sling, with a range of 190 miles. David's Sling utilizes both an EO/IR sensor and an ARH seeker for terminal guidance and is also a "hit to kill" weapon.
 
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE has an Ka (26.5-40 GHz) ARH terminal guidance seeker. Its range, depending on which source one believes, is 22 to 30 miles. It is immediately obvious that the Patriot as an ABM system has a very limited footprint. Subject to that limitation, the system has been quite effective in Ukraine https://kyivindependent.com/patriot-miss...rt-supply/. Recently Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have apparently had significant success defeating Patriot batteries by terminal phase maneuvers and/or multiple decoys. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/radar-deco...n-ukraine/ Given that earlier versions of the Patriot often became confused when Iraqi SCUDs broke up, these statements are plausible.
 
The THAAD missile has a range of 120 miles. It uses a IR optical seeker for terminal guidance. It is a hit to kill weapon. There are a total of 8 THAAD systems in existence. One was present in Israel and used during the 12 day war. Its successes/failures haven't been officially documented. However https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/193831...rt-2091465 indicates it was fairly extensively used. Its obvious shortcoming is the exorbitant cost of its missiles.

The SM-3 Block IIA missile has a range of about 750 miles. It is functionally equivalent to the Arrow 3. It is used on DDG-51 AEGIS ships and thus was present near Israel during the 12 day war. They were used. How many were effective is unknown. These missiles are also used in AEGIS Ashore sites. Israel was originally a target customer for these sites but they opted to develop the Arrow 3 instead.

IMO the takeaway for Ukraine is that the Patriot is never going to provide anything close to an adequate missile shield. It is a fairly capable point defense ABM system that needs even more software updates than it has already received. The lack of missile kinetic energy is and will remain a problem against maneuvering targets. Targets that remain on a ballistic trajectory allow the intercepting missile to follow an "optimal" path to intercept. This maximizes the effect of the limited missile thrust. If the missile has to maneuver in response to the targets trajectory changes, it loses energy. It may lack enough to accomplish an intercept under these conditions.
 
Ukraine would be much better served by AEGIS Ashore sites. The much greater range (and therefore greater kinetic energy) would be of use in Ukraine. However, their fixed location would greatly increase the danger of their destruction. They also take too long to build. The best solutions are all "left of launch". Unfortunately Ukraine has only limited capability to use these approaches.

Added: https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/...-conflict/ More details on missile usage.

[Goose]

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e...ale-order/
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir...e-362826e3
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienro...-missiles/

These articles, particularly the last,  illuminates two important truths. First, defense against ballistic missiles is ALWAYS going to be significantly more expensive and more technologically difficult than creating an effective ballistic missile offensive capability. Second, no ballistic missile defense, no matter how sophisticated, will be 100% effective. These truths applied to the Iran vs Israel conflict. They apply to the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. The will apply to the "golden dome" the administration is attempting to build.
 
It appears very likely that Israel was indeed running very low on Arrow missiles during the 12 day war. The US rushing several DDG-51s to the area to augment Israel's BMD capability was not just for show. Iran was also more successful against the Israeli BMD than Israel was willing to live with. Israel was unable to prevent Iran's missile offensive from being relatively effective, despite having the opportunity before they started the war to estimate both the threat Iran's missiles posed and the capability of the Israeli BMD. It appears they got both wrong. This might also account for the unexpected (by me anyway) passivity Israel has exhibited toward Iran. So far, Iran has not agreed to give up enrichment capability. While the estimates of how far the US/Israeli strikes against Iran's nuclear capability are still being "refined", the threat clearly still exists. This was an Israeli war aim. So far, it appears to have not been accomplished.

Ukraine is currently under attack by both UAVs and ballistic missiles. Israel was in the same condition, but the IAF was able to completely neutralize the Iranian drone threat. As discussed at length, Ukraine has not been able to accomplish that same feat. Russia is also increasing the number of drones used in their assaults, making Ukrainian efforts even less effective. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...d21746912b
 
It is important that everybody involved clearly understands that Patriot batteries are NOT in any way the answer to this problem. Other SAM missile systems, such as NASAMS and SAMP/T can help but only to a very limited extent. Point defense systems function under severe geometric handicaps in globally defeating the Shahed 136 class drones. They can defend themselves and a circle with about a 60 km diameter against "low flyers". That's it. They can also only engage a limited number of simultaneous targets inside that circle and have a significant reload "dead time" during which they are bricks. These systems can be overloaded fairly easily. Russia now has the ability to do that, which is hurting Ukraine's ability to even mitigate the damage these weapons can do.
 
The only practical defense against this class of drones is an "adequate" supply of aircraft with look-down shoot-down capability controlled by an AWACS that manages the air fight. This has been clearly demonstrated many in the Israel-Iran conflict. Arguably, it was also demonstrated back in WW II against the V-1, where half the V-1s that were destroyed were killed by aircraft. At that time the UAV (V-1s) had the immense advantage of being slightly faster than the aircraft hunting them. In Ukraine/Israel the aircraft "cruising" speed is 4 times that of the Shahed 136s they hunt. The aircraft top speed is 11 times that of a Shahed 136. Aircraft can go where the targets are and can relatively quickly concentrate to handle local "swarms". They can also engage the drones anywhere in their flight path. SAMs (and guns for that matter) are restricted to a much smaller geographic footprint and have a fixed, limited engagement time window.
 
Russia's ballistic missile threat in Ukraine and Iran's similar threat in Israel presents a difficult BMD problem. Israel possesses a 3 tier system. The long range tier of Israel's ABM system is the Arrow 3 interceptor. The Arrow 3 has a 1,500 mile range. It is a "hit to kill" weapon that uses both a high-resolution EO sensor and an active radar homing (ARH) seeker for terminal guidance.
 
The intermediate range tier of Israel's ABM is David's Sling, with a range of 190 miles. David's Sling utilizes both an EO/IR sensor and an ARH seeker for terminal guidance and is also a "hit to kill" weapon.
 
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE has an Ka (26.5-40 GHz) ARH terminal guidance seeker. Its range, depending on which source one believes, is 22 to 30 miles. It is immediately obvious that the Patriot as an ABM system has a very limited footprint. Subject to that limitation, the system has been quite effective in Ukraine https://kyivindependent.com/patriot-miss...rt-supply/. Recently Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have apparently had significant success defeating Patriot batteries by terminal phase maneuvers and/or multiple decoys. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/radar-deco...n-ukraine/ Given that earlier versions of the Patriot often became confused when Iraqi SCUDs broke up, these statements are plausible.
 
The THAAD missile has a range of 120 miles. It uses a IR optical seeker for terminal guidance. It is a hit to kill weapon. There are a total of 8 THAAD systems in existence. One was present in Israel and used during the 12 day war. Its successes/failures haven't been officially documented. However https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/193831...rt-2091465 indicates it was fairly extensively used. Its obvious shortcoming is the exorbitant cost of its missiles.

The SM-3 Block IIA missile has a range of about 750 miles. It is functionally equivalent to the Arrow 3. It is used on DDG-51 AEGIS ships and thus was present near Israel during the 12 day war. They were used. How many were effective is unknown. These missiles are also used in AEGIS Ashore sites. Israel was originally a target customer for these sites but they opted to develop the Arrow 3 instead.

IMO the takeaway for Ukraine is that the Patriot is never going to provide anything close to an adequate missile shield. It is a fairly capable point defense ABM system that needs even more software updates than it has already received. The lack of missile kinetic energy is and will remain a problem against maneuvering targets. Targets that remain on a ballistic trajectory allow the intercepting missile to follow an "optimal" path to intercept. This maximizes the effect of the limited missile thrust. If the missile has to maneuver in response to the targets trajectory changes, it loses energy. It may lack enough to accomplish an intercept under these conditions.
 
Ukraine would be much better served by AEGIS Ashore sites. The much greater range (and therefore greater kinetic energy) would be of use in Ukraine. However, their fixed location would greatly increase the danger of their destruction. They also take too long to build. The best solutions are all "left of launch". Unfortunately Ukraine has only limited capability to use these approaches.

Added: https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/...-conflict/ More details on missile usage.

[GK3]

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e...ale-order/
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir...e-362826e3
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienro...-missiles/

These articles, particularly the last,  illuminates two important truths. First, defense against ballistic missiles is ALWAYS going to be significantly more expensive and more technologically difficult than creating an effective ballistic missile offensive capability. Second, no ballistic missile defense, no matter how sophisticated, will be 100% effective. These truths applied to the Iran vs Israel conflict. They apply to the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. The will apply to the "golden dome" the administration is attempting to build.
 
It appears very likely that Israel was indeed running very low on Arrow missiles during the 12 day war. The US rushing several DDG-51s to the area to augment Israel's BMD capability was not just for show. Iran was also more successful against the Israeli BMD than Israel was willing to live with. Israel was unable to prevent Iran's missile offensive from being relatively effective, despite having the opportunity before they started the war to estimate both the threat Iran's missiles posed and the capability of the Israeli BMD. It appears they got both wrong. This might also account for the unexpected (by me anyway) passivity Israel has exhibited toward Iran. So far, Iran has not agreed to give up enrichment capability. While the estimates of how far the US/Israeli strikes against Iran's nuclear capability are still being "refined", the threat clearly still exists. This was an Israeli war aim. So far, it appears to have not been accomplished.

Ukraine is currently under attack by both UAVs and ballistic missiles. Israel was in the same condition, but the IAF was able to completely neutralize the Iranian drone threat. As discussed at length, Ukraine has not been able to accomplish that same feat. Russia is also increasing the number of drones used in their assaults, making Ukrainian efforts even less effective. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...d21746912b
 
It is important that everybody involved clearly understands that Patriot batteries are NOT in any way the answer to this problem. Other SAM missile systems, such as NASAMS and SAMP/T can help but only to a very limited extent. Point defense systems function under severe geometric handicaps in globally defeating the Shahed 136 class drones. They can defend themselves and a circle with about a 60 km diameter against "low flyers". That's it. They can also only engage a limited number of simultaneous targets inside that circle and have a significant reload "dead time" during which they are bricks. These systems can be overloaded fairly easily. Russia now has the ability to do that, which is hurting Ukraine's ability to even mitigate the damage these weapons can do.
 
The only practical defense against this class of drones is an "adequate" supply of aircraft with look-down shoot-down capability controlled by an AWACS that manages the air fight. This has been clearly demonstrated many in the Israel-Iran conflict. Arguably, it was also demonstrated back in WW II against the V-1, where half the V-1s that were destroyed were killed by aircraft. At that time the UAV (V-1s) had the immense advantage of being slightly faster than the aircraft hunting them. In Ukraine/Israel the aircraft "cruising" speed is 4 times that of the Shahed 136s they hunt. The aircraft top speed is 11 times that of a Shahed 136. Aircraft can go where the targets are and can relatively quickly concentrate to handle local "swarms". They can also engage the drones anywhere in their flight path. SAMs (and guns for that matter) are restricted to a much smaller geographic footprint and have a fixed, limited engagement time window.
 
Russia's ballistic missile threat in Ukraine and Iran's similar threat in Israel presents a difficult BMD problem. Israel possesses a 3 tier system. The long range tier of Israel's ABM system is the Arrow 3 interceptor. The Arrow 3 has a 1,500 mile range. It is a "hit to kill" weapon that uses both a high-resolution EO sensor and an active radar homing (ARH) seeker for terminal guidance.
 
The intermediate range tier of Israel's ABM is David's Sling, with a range of 190 miles. David's Sling utilizes both an EO/IR sensor and an ARH seeker for terminal guidance and is also a "hit to kill" weapon.
 
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE has an Ka (26.5-40 GHz) ARH terminal guidance seeker. Its range, depending on which source one believes, is 22 to 30 miles. It is immediately obvious that the Patriot as an ABM system has a very limited footprint. Subject to that limitation, the system has been quite effective in Ukraine https://kyivindependent.com/patriot-miss...rt-supply/. Recently Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have apparently had significant success defeating Patriot batteries by terminal phase maneuvers and/or multiple decoys. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/radar-deco...n-ukraine/ Given that earlier versions of the Patriot often became confused when Iraqi SCUDs broke up, these statements are plausible.
 
The THAAD missile has a range of 120 miles. It uses a IR optical seeker for terminal guidance. It is a hit to kill weapon. There are a total of 8 THAAD systems in existence. One was present in Israel and used during the 12 day war. Its successes/failures haven't been officially documented. However https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/193831...rt-2091465 indicates it was fairly extensively used. Its obvious shortcoming is the exorbitant cost of its missiles.

The SM-3 Block IIA missile has a range of about 750 miles. It is functionally equivalent to the Arrow 3. It is used on DDG-51 AEGIS ships and thus was present near Israel during the 12 day war. They were used. How many were effective is unknown. These missiles are also used in AEGIS Ashore sites. Israel was originally a target customer for these sites but they opted to develop the Arrow 3 instead.

IMO the takeaway for Ukraine is that the Patriot is never going to provide anything close to an adequate missile shield. It is a fairly capable point defense ABM system that needs even more software updates than it has already received. The lack of missile kinetic energy is and will remain a problem against maneuvering targets. Targets that remain on a ballistic trajectory allow the intercepting missile to follow an "optimal" path to intercept. This maximizes the effect of the limited missile thrust. If the missile has to maneuver in response to the targets trajectory changes, it loses energy. It may lack enough to accomplish an intercept under these conditions.
 
Ukraine would be much better served by AEGIS Ashore sites. The much greater range (and therefore greater kinetic energy) would be of use in Ukraine. However, their fixed location would greatly increase the danger of their destruction. They also take too long to build. The best solutions are all "left of launch". Unfortunately Ukraine has only limited capability to use these approaches.

Added: https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/...-conflict/ More details on missile usage.

\
Goose,  Thanks so much for a very interesting and clarifying post. 

What is the answer?  More F16's?

[GK3]

https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_e...ale-order/
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir...e-362826e3
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienro...-missiles/

These articles, particularly the last,  illuminates two important truths. First, defense against ballistic missiles is ALWAYS going to be significantly more expensive and more technologically difficult than creating an effective ballistic missile offensive capability. Second, no ballistic missile defense, no matter how sophisticated, will be 100% effective. These truths applied to the Iran vs Israel conflict. They apply to the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. The will apply to the "golden dome" the administration is attempting to build.
 
It appears very likely that Israel was indeed running very low on Arrow missiles during the 12 day war. The US rushing several DDG-51s to the area to augment Israel's BMD capability was not just for show. Iran was also more successful against the Israeli BMD than Israel was willing to live with. Israel was unable to prevent Iran's missile offensive from being relatively effective, despite having the opportunity before they started the war to estimate both the threat Iran's missiles posed and the capability of the Israeli BMD. It appears they got both wrong. This might also account for the unexpected (by me anyway) passivity Israel has exhibited toward Iran. So far, Iran has not agreed to give up enrichment capability. While the estimates of how far the US/Israeli strikes against Iran's nuclear capability are still being "refined", the threat clearly still exists. This was an Israeli war aim. So far, it appears to have not been accomplished.

Ukraine is currently under attack by both UAVs and ballistic missiles. Israel was in the same condition, but the IAF was able to completely neutralize the Iranian drone threat. As discussed at length, Ukraine has not been able to accomplish that same feat. Russia is also increasing the number of drones used in their assaults, making Ukrainian efforts even less effective. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukrain...d21746912b
 
It is important that everybody involved clearly understands that Patriot batteries are NOT in any way the answer to this problem. Other SAM missile systems, such as NASAMS and SAMP/T can help but only to a very limited extent. Point defense systems function under severe geometric handicaps in globally defeating the Shahed 136 class drones. They can defend themselves and a circle with about a 60 km diameter against "low flyers". That's it. They can also only engage a limited number of simultaneous targets inside that circle and have a significant reload "dead time" during which they are bricks. These systems can be overloaded fairly easily. Russia now has the ability to do that, which is hurting Ukraine's ability to even mitigate the damage these weapons can do.
 
The only practical defense against this class of drones is an "adequate" supply of aircraft with look-down shoot-down capability controlled by an AWACS that manages the air fight. This has been clearly demonstrated many in the Israel-Iran conflict. Arguably, it was also demonstrated back in WW II against the V-1, where half the V-1s that were destroyed were killed by aircraft. At that time the UAV (V-1s) had the immense advantage of being slightly faster than the aircraft hunting them. In Ukraine/Israel the aircraft "cruising" speed is 4 times that of the Shahed 136s they hunt. The aircraft top speed is 11 times that of a Shahed 136. Aircraft can go where the targets are and can relatively quickly concentrate to handle local "swarms". They can also engage the drones anywhere in their flight path. SAMs (and guns for that matter) are restricted to a much smaller geographic footprint and have a fixed, limited engagement time window.
 
Russia's ballistic missile threat in Ukraine and Iran's similar threat in Israel presents a difficult BMD problem. Israel possesses a 3 tier system. The long range tier of Israel's ABM system is the Arrow 3 interceptor. The Arrow 3 has a 1,500 mile range. It is a "hit to kill" weapon that uses both a high-resolution EO sensor and an active radar homing (ARH) seeker for terminal guidance.
 
The intermediate range tier of Israel's ABM is David's Sling, with a range of 190 miles. David's Sling utilizes both an EO/IR sensor and an ARH seeker for terminal guidance and is also a "hit to kill" weapon.
 
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE has an Ka (26.5-40 GHz) ARH terminal guidance seeker. Its range, depending on which source one believes, is 22 to 30 miles. It is immediately obvious that the Patriot as an ABM system has a very limited footprint. Subject to that limitation, the system has been quite effective in Ukraine https://kyivindependent.com/patriot-miss...rt-supply/. Recently Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have apparently had significant success defeating Patriot batteries by terminal phase maneuvers and/or multiple decoys. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/radar-deco...n-ukraine/ Given that earlier versions of the Patriot often became confused when Iraqi SCUDs broke up, these statements are plausible.
 
The THAAD missile has a range of 120 miles. It uses a IR optical seeker for terminal guidance. It is a hit to kill weapon. There are a total of 8 THAAD systems in existence. One was present in Israel and used during the 12 day war. Its successes/failures haven't been officially documented. However https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/193831...rt-2091465 indicates it was fairly extensively used. Its obvious shortcoming is the exorbitant cost of its missiles.

The SM-3 Block IIA missile has a range of about 750 miles. It is functionally equivalent to the Arrow 3. It is used on DDG-51 AEGIS ships and thus was present near Israel during the 12 day war. They were used. How many were effective is unknown. These missiles are also used in AEGIS Ashore sites. Israel was originally a target customer for these sites but they opted to develop the Arrow 3 instead.

IMO the takeaway for Ukraine is that the Patriot is never going to provide anything close to an adequate missile shield. It is a fairly capable point defense ABM system that needs even more software updates than it has already received. The lack of missile kinetic energy is and will remain a problem against maneuvering targets. Targets that remain on a ballistic trajectory allow the intercepting missile to follow an "optimal" path to intercept. This maximizes the effect of the limited missile thrust. If the missile has to maneuver in response to the targets trajectory changes, it loses energy. It may lack enough to accomplish an intercept under these conditions.
 
Ukraine would be much better served by AEGIS Ashore sites. The much greater range (and therefore greater kinetic energy) would be of use in Ukraine. However, their fixed location would greatly increase the danger of their destruction. They also take too long to build. The best solutions are all "left of launch". Unfortunately Ukraine has only limited capability to use these approaches.

Added: https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/...-conflict/ More details on missile usage.

\
Goose,  Thanks so much for a very interesting and clarifying post. 

What is the answer?  More F16's?

[Goose]

What is the answer?  More F16's?

More F-16s and even more pilots to fly both the ones Ukraine already has and the ones newly supplied. IMO the only way that can happen is the "Flying Tigers" approach where US citizen pilots fly for Ukraine. The US can "sell" F-16s that are going to the boneyard to Ukraine instead. I think $1.00 FOB wherever the aircraft are would be a fair price. Lots cheaper than paying to demilitarize them or preserve them. The Ukrainians should also be provided with APKWS rockets and associated pods, like these https://theaviationist.com/2025/07/19/f-...s-rockets/. 42 rockets on one aircraft may seem like a lot but with the strikes Russia is now mounting it is IMO required. So far this July Russia is averaging 234 drones per day into Ukraine, with a high of 700 in one day.
 
Obviously integrating and managing a force of around 100 aircraft would be a major task for Ukraine and it wouldn't be at all easy. However, Ukraine has shown itself to be quite adaptable and has accomplished things that few believed to be possible. This particular instance has the advantage that it isn't obvious there are any other choices available that can overcome the future scale of Russian drone attacks.
 
It would also be real helpful if an AWACS capability could be provided to organize the anti-drone battle. The AWACS can detect the drones using its MTI radar. It can then assign targets to F-16s loitering at low altitudes in Ukraine. These assignment will be designed to minimize the distance the aircraft have to fly between intercepts in so far as possible. The AWACS could also provide targeting information for ground-based SAMs of all types and in some cases reposition Ukrainian gun assets to engage targets the aircraft for some reason cannot. Against a drone traveling 136 mph there is often enough time to move gun systems 20 miles or so. The ASC-890s Ukraine already has may be able to provide this function. If not, I suspect Israel would be willing to sell EL/W-2085s to Ukraine. Italy might be willing to part with one of their G550 CAEW aircraft in order to speed up the delivery. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/26734...spy-planes
 
IMO this plan is feasible and does not cross any real "red lines". It doesn't under international law make the US a combatant. "Neutral" nations can sell armament to combatants. It is perfectly legal. Russia might not be very happy about it but it isn't greatly different from things the US is currently doing. Will the US adopt this approach or one similar to it? IMO the answer is no. Possibly, just maybe the previous administration MIGHT have. IMO there is no chance the present administration will. Thus, the carnage will only increase.
 
Russia has realized that quantity has a quality all its own  in UAV warfare as well as in ground combat. These Shahed 136 replicas are much easier to build than ballistic missiles like the Iskander-M. They don't require nearly as many electronic parts that are difficult for Russia to obtain. They are also quite cheap. Previously, Ukraine was able to intercept the vast majority of the UAVs launched against it. That is no longer the case. The technology to do so exists, but Ukraine doesn't have it and if I am correct, cannot get it.

[Goose]

What is the answer?  More F16's?

More F-16s and even more pilots to fly both the ones Ukraine already has and the ones newly supplied. IMO the only way that can happen is the "Flying Tigers" approach where US citizen pilots fly for Ukraine. The US can "sell" F-16s that are going to the boneyard to Ukraine instead. I think $1.00 FOB wherever the aircraft are would be a fair price. Lots cheaper than paying to demilitarize them or preserve them. The Ukrainians should also be provided with APKWS rockets and associated pods, like these https://theaviationist.com/2025/07/19/f-...s-rockets/. 42 rockets on one aircraft may seem like a lot but with the strikes Russia is now mounting it is IMO required. So far this July Russia is averaging 234 drones per day into Ukraine, with a high of 700 in one day.
 
Obviously integrating and managing a force of around 100 aircraft would be a major task for Ukraine and it wouldn't be at all easy. However, Ukraine has shown itself to be quite adaptable and has accomplished things that few believed to be possible. This particular instance has the advantage that it isn't obvious there are any other choices available that can overcome the future scale of Russian drone attacks.
 
It would also be real helpful if an AWACS capability could be provided to organize the anti-drone battle. The AWACS can detect the drones using its MTI radar. It can then assign targets to F-16s loitering at low altitudes in Ukraine. These assignment will be designed to minimize the distance the aircraft have to fly between intercepts in so far as possible. The AWACS could also provide targeting information for ground-based SAMs of all types and in some cases reposition Ukrainian gun assets to engage targets the aircraft for some reason cannot. Against a drone traveling 136 mph there is often enough time to move gun systems 20 miles or so. The ASC-890s Ukraine already has may be able to provide this function. If not, I suspect Israel would be willing to sell EL/W-2085s to Ukraine. Italy might be willing to part with one of their G550 CAEW aircraft in order to speed up the delivery. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/26734...spy-planes
 
IMO this plan is feasible and does not cross any real "red lines". It doesn't under international law make the US a combatant. "Neutral" nations can sell armament to combatants. It is perfectly legal. Russia might not be very happy about it but it isn't greatly different from things the US is currently doing. Will the US adopt this approach or one similar to it? IMO the answer is no. Possibly, just maybe the previous administration MIGHT have. IMO there is no chance the present administration will. Thus, the carnage will only increase.
 
Russia has realized that quantity has a quality all its own  in UAV warfare as well as in ground combat. These Shahed 136 replicas are much easier to build than ballistic missiles like the Iskander-M. They don't require nearly as many electronic parts that are difficult for Russia to obtain. They are also quite cheap. Previously, Ukraine was able to intercept the vast majority of the UAVs launched against it. That is no longer the case. The technology to do so exists, but Ukraine doesn't have it and if I am correct, cannot get it.

[fullmetal]

I think North Korea is producing a lot of Shaheds for Russia now.  And Zelensky's signing of the bill targeting anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine has resulted in quite a drop in popularity.

[fullmetal]

I think North Korea is producing a lot of Shaheds for Russia now.  And Zelensky's signing of the bill targeting anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine has resulted in quite a drop in popularity.

[GK3]

What is the answer?  More F16's?

More F-16s and even more pilots to fly both the ones Ukraine already has and the ones newly supplied. IMO the only way that can happen is the "Flying Tigers" approach where US citizen pilots fly for Ukraine. The US can "sell" F-16s that are going to the boneyard to Ukraine instead. I think $1.00 FOB wherever the aircraft are would be a fair price. Lots cheaper than paying to demilitarize them or preserve them. The Ukrainians should also be provided with APKWS rockets and associated pods, like these https://theaviationist.com/2025/07/19/f-...s-rockets/. 42 rockets on one aircraft may seem like a lot but with the strikes Russia is now mounting it is IMO required. So far this July Russia is averaging 234 drones per day into Ukraine, with a high of 700 in one day.
 
Obviously integrating and managing a force of around 100 aircraft would be a major task for Ukraine and it wouldn't be at all easy. However, Ukraine has shown itself to be quite adaptable and has accomplished things that few believed to be possible. This particular instance has the advantage that it isn't obvious there are any other choices available that can overcome the future scale of Russian drone attacks.
 
It would also be real helpful if an AWACS capability could be provided to organize the anti-drone battle. The AWACS can detect the drones using its MTI radar. It can then assign targets to F-16s loitering at low altitudes in Ukraine. These assignment will be designed to minimize the distance the aircraft have to fly between intercepts in so far as possible. The AWACS could also provide targeting information for ground-based SAMs of all types and in some cases reposition Ukrainian gun assets to engage targets the aircraft for some reason cannot. Against a drone traveling 136 mph there is often enough time to move gun systems 20 miles or so. The ASC-890s Ukraine already has may be able to provide this function. If not, I suspect Israel would be willing to sell EL/W-2085s to Ukraine. Italy might be willing to part with one of their G550 CAEW aircraft in order to speed up the delivery. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/26734...spy-planes
 
IMO this plan is feasible and does not cross any real "red lines". It doesn't under international law make the US a combatant. "Neutral" nations can sell armament to combatants. It is perfectly legal. Russia might not be very happy about it but it isn't greatly different from things the US is currently doing. Will the US adopt this approach or one similar to it? IMO the answer is no. Possibly, just maybe the previous administration MIGHT have. IMO there is no chance the present administration will. Thus, the carnage will only increase.
 
Russia has realized that quantity has a quality all its own  in UAV warfare as well as in ground combat. These Shahed 136 replicas are much easier to build than ballistic missiles like the Iskander-M. They don't require nearly as many electronic parts that are difficult for Russia to obtain. They are also quite cheap. Previously, Ukraine was able to intercept the vast majority of the UAVs launched against it. That is no longer the case. The technology to do so exists, but Ukraine doesn't have it and if I am correct, cannot get it.

Seems like a lot of countries fly the F16, why not offer a "Flying Tiger" deal to any countries F16 pilot who is willing to move to Ukraine. But then they might need more planes too.

[GK3]

What is the answer?  More F16's?

More F-16s and even more pilots to fly both the ones Ukraine already has and the ones newly supplied. IMO the only way that can happen is the "Flying Tigers" approach where US citizen pilots fly for Ukraine. The US can "sell" F-16s that are going to the boneyard to Ukraine instead. I think $1.00 FOB wherever the aircraft are would be a fair price. Lots cheaper than paying to demilitarize them or preserve them. The Ukrainians should also be provided with APKWS rockets and associated pods, like these https://theaviationist.com/2025/07/19/f-...s-rockets/. 42 rockets on one aircraft may seem like a lot but with the strikes Russia is now mounting it is IMO required. So far this July Russia is averaging 234 drones per day into Ukraine, with a high of 700 in one day.
 
Obviously integrating and managing a force of around 100 aircraft would be a major task for Ukraine and it wouldn't be at all easy. However, Ukraine has shown itself to be quite adaptable and has accomplished things that few believed to be possible. This particular instance has the advantage that it isn't obvious there are any other choices available that can overcome the future scale of Russian drone attacks.
 
It would also be real helpful if an AWACS capability could be provided to organize the anti-drone battle. The AWACS can detect the drones using its MTI radar. It can then assign targets to F-16s loitering at low altitudes in Ukraine. These assignment will be designed to minimize the distance the aircraft have to fly between intercepts in so far as possible. The AWACS could also provide targeting information for ground-based SAMs of all types and in some cases reposition Ukrainian gun assets to engage targets the aircraft for some reason cannot. Against a drone traveling 136 mph there is often enough time to move gun systems 20 miles or so. The ASC-890s Ukraine already has may be able to provide this function. If not, I suspect Israel would be willing to sell EL/W-2085s to Ukraine. Italy might be willing to part with one of their G550 CAEW aircraft in order to speed up the delivery. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/26734...spy-planes
 
IMO this plan is feasible and does not cross any real "red lines". It doesn't under international law make the US a combatant. "Neutral" nations can sell armament to combatants. It is perfectly legal. Russia might not be very happy about it but it isn't greatly different from things the US is currently doing. Will the US adopt this approach or one similar to it? IMO the answer is no. Possibly, just maybe the previous administration MIGHT have. IMO there is no chance the present administration will. Thus, the carnage will only increase.
 
Russia has realized that quantity has a quality all its own  in UAV warfare as well as in ground combat. These Shahed 136 replicas are much easier to build than ballistic missiles like the Iskander-M. They don't require nearly as many electronic parts that are difficult for Russia to obtain. They are also quite cheap. Previously, Ukraine was able to intercept the vast majority of the UAVs launched against it. That is no longer the case. The technology to do so exists, but Ukraine doesn't have it and if I am correct, cannot get it.

Seems like a lot of countries fly the F16, why not offer a "Flying Tiger" deal to any countries F16 pilot who is willing to move to Ukraine. But then they might need more planes too.

[Goose]

Seems like a lot of countries fly the F16, why not offer a "Flying Tiger" deal to any countries F16 pilot who is willing to move to Ukraine. But then they might need more planes too.

Each country that has "candidates" would have to have its own program. Ukraine would also have to agree the "Fighting Tiger" approach is acceptable and practical for them. There may be political and logistical issues that make such a plan impractical. I am surprised actually that Ukraine has not called for such a program, at least to fully staff the F-16s it already has. It could be they were told it was off the table, but it also could be for other reasons.
 
Many European countries have anti-mercenary laws that forbid their citizens from participating in wars that their homeland is not. These laws would be a problem to work around. The air forces of Europe that are converting over to the F-35 from the F-16 are relatively small, so losing a quantity of pilots is problematic for them. Most of these countries do not intend to continue using the F-16 at all so in order to stay in their air force conversion to the F-35 is necessary. Nobody will want to miss that unless they intend to leave the air force. That may yield some volunteers, but not many.
 
The US intends to continue using the F-16 for quite some time in our "high-low" mix. Our F-16 fleet even today dwarfs any European one. That means going to Ukraine to fight doesn't end your career. We also obviously have many more potential candidates. Most people won't be interested. It requires pilots with a bit of Boyington in their psyche to chose such a path. For these reasons, in order to make numbers, most of the pilots will have to be US.
 
It is unclear how many aircraft Ukraine actually has at the moment. The total promised as I understand it is 54. They are not all delivered yet, I think. IMO that isn't enough airplanes to day-in day-out neutralize the increasing level of Russian drone activity. An average of 234 targets per day and 50% aircraft/pilot availability would require each pilot to destroy 8-9 targets. That may not be even possible if Russia coordinates the drone arrivals to minimize Ukraine's opportunity to use one aircraft to attack multiple targets. These attacks right now have to happen inside Ukrainian airspace. Unfortunately many of the important targets are near the line of contact/Russian border. That means the time of flight inside Ukrainian air space is limited. Attacks against Odesa and Zaporizhzhia are much easier to deal with than attacks on Kharkiv. A Shahed drone crossing the Russian border at the closest point will spend less than 6 minutes in Ukrainian airspace before reaching targets in "the city". Kyiv would be "easy" to defend if Russia respected Belorussian air space. The time of a drone in Ukrainian airspace would be almost 90 minutes. Since Russia does not respect Belorussian air space, the actual time is about 40 minutes. Still much better than Kharkiv.
 
For these reasons I don't think 54 aircraft will be "enough". Ukraine also doesn't want to dedicate their entire F-16 force to drone suppression. Israel (and the US on their behalf) has the luxury of intercepting Iranian drones over other nation's airspace, i.e. Jordan, Syria,  Iraq and Lebanon. There are all sorts of game theory approaches that Ukraine and Russia will mutually use to fight the drone battle. The very low speed of the Shahed drones is a big handicap that partially compensates for Ukraine's lack of real-estate. In both Israel and Ukraine a good radar picture of the target space is critical to intercepting these mass attacks. It will never be possible to have as many F-16s as the enemy has drones. How many aircraft are required for any given notional attack can be calculated. I haven't done this but I assume Ukraine and the US have. My estimate is somewhere in the 50 available aircraft range for a 250  drone strike. There will be some leakers for the point defense SAMs to deal with. The SAMs are "good" for that. The required number of aircraft curve has a slope of less than one. Two drones on similar paths at similar times most often do not require a second airplane. Once a saturation point is reached more drones don't help much other than exhausting the ammunition of the interceptors. That is why the APKWS (and even cheaper systems in the future) are important. An F-16 can carry 6 AIM-9Xs. These missiles are massive overkill against Shahed drones. 42 APKWs are lots better.

[Goose]

Seems like a lot of countries fly the F16, why not offer a "Flying Tiger" deal to any countries F16 pilot who is willing to move to Ukraine. But then they might need more planes too.

Each country that has "candidates" would have to have its own program. Ukraine would also have to agree the "Fighting Tiger" approach is acceptable and practical for them. There may be political and logistical issues that make such a plan impractical. I am surprised actually that Ukraine has not called for such a program, at least to fully staff the F-16s it already has. It could be they were told it was off the table, but it also could be for other reasons.
 
Many European countries have anti-mercenary laws that forbid their citizens from participating in wars that their homeland is not. These laws would be a problem to work around. The air forces of Europe that are converting over to the F-35 from the F-16 are relatively small, so losing a quantity of pilots is problematic for them. Most of these countries do not intend to continue using the F-16 at all so in order to stay in their air force conversion to the F-35 is necessary. Nobody will want to miss that unless they intend to leave the air force. That may yield some volunteers, but not many.
 
The US intends to continue using the F-16 for quite some time in our "high-low" mix. Our F-16 fleet even today dwarfs any European one. That means going to Ukraine to fight doesn't end your career. We also obviously have many more potential candidates. Most people won't be interested. It requires pilots with a bit of Boyington in their psyche to chose such a path. For these reasons, in order to make numbers, most of the pilots will have to be US.
 
It is unclear how many aircraft Ukraine actually has at the moment. The total promised as I understand it is 54. They are not all delivered yet, I think. IMO that isn't enough airplanes to day-in day-out neutralize the increasing level of Russian drone activity. An average of 234 targets per day and 50% aircraft/pilot availability would require each pilot to destroy 8-9 targets. That may not be even possible if Russia coordinates the drone arrivals to minimize Ukraine's opportunity to use one aircraft to attack multiple targets. These attacks right now have to happen inside Ukrainian airspace. Unfortunately many of the important targets are near the line of contact/Russian border. That means the time of flight inside Ukrainian air space is limited. Attacks against Odesa and Zaporizhzhia are much easier to deal with than attacks on Kharkiv. A Shahed drone crossing the Russian border at the closest point will spend less than 6 minutes in Ukrainian airspace before reaching targets in "the city". Kyiv would be "easy" to defend if Russia respected Belorussian air space. The time of a drone in Ukrainian airspace would be almost 90 minutes. Since Russia does not respect Belorussian air space, the actual time is about 40 minutes. Still much better than Kharkiv.
 
For these reasons I don't think 54 aircraft will be "enough". Ukraine also doesn't want to dedicate their entire F-16 force to drone suppression. Israel (and the US on their behalf) has the luxury of intercepting Iranian drones over other nation's airspace, i.e. Jordan, Syria,  Iraq and Lebanon. There are all sorts of game theory approaches that Ukraine and Russia will mutually use to fight the drone battle. The very low speed of the Shahed drones is a big handicap that partially compensates for Ukraine's lack of real-estate. In both Israel and Ukraine a good radar picture of the target space is critical to intercepting these mass attacks. It will never be possible to have as many F-16s as the enemy has drones. How many aircraft are required for any given notional attack can be calculated. I haven't done this but I assume Ukraine and the US have. My estimate is somewhere in the 50 available aircraft range for a 250  drone strike. There will be some leakers for the point defense SAMs to deal with. The SAMs are "good" for that. The required number of aircraft curve has a slope of less than one. Two drones on similar paths at similar times most often do not require a second airplane. Once a saturation point is reached more drones don't help much other than exhausting the ammunition of the interceptors. That is why the APKWS (and even cheaper systems in the future) are important. An F-16 can carry 6 AIM-9Xs. These missiles are massive overkill against Shahed drones. 42 APKWs are lots better.

[dabigv13]

Apparently a company called Swift Beat, headed by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, is producing drone interceptors, which have been effective.

Ekonomichna pravda reports that the interceptor UAV made by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt's Swift Beat company is responsible for approximately 90% of Shahed OWA that are downed by UAVs.

https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1948031845557522935
https://epravda.com.ua/oborona/milyarder...ye-809495/

Not much seems to be publicly known about the design or function of these interceptors, except that they integrate "AI".

[dabigv13]

Apparently a company called Swift Beat, headed by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, is producing drone interceptors, which have been effective.

Ekonomichna pravda reports that the interceptor UAV made by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt's Swift Beat company is responsible for approximately 90% of Shahed OWA that are downed by UAVs.

https://x.com/KofmanMichael/status/1948031845557522935
https://epravda.com.ua/oborona/milyarder...ye-809495/

Not much seems to be publicly known about the design or function of these interceptors, except that they integrate "AI".

[dabigv13]

Thailand using quadcopter drone bombers in the conflict with Cambodia. Note they have a separate drone following the bomber drone to take videos. A weapon for the social media age.

https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/1948404780851696034

More conventional weapons are also being used. Thailand reportedly has used their Ukrainian made T-84 Oplot tanks, along with F16s.

https://defence-blog.com/reports-thai-op...an-border/

https://x.com/anthraxxxx/status/1948354373345804586

[dabigv13]

Thailand using quadcopter drone bombers in the conflict with Cambodia. Note they have a separate drone following the bomber drone to take videos. A weapon for the social media age.

https://x.com/FaytuksNetwork/status/1948404780851696034

More conventional weapons are also being used. Thailand reportedly has used their Ukrainian made T-84 Oplot tanks, along with F16s.

https://defence-blog.com/reports-thai-op...an-border/

https://x.com/anthraxxxx/status/1948354373345804586

[M T]

Musk ordered shutdown of Starlink satellite service as Ukraine retook territory from Russia

The three people familiar with the order said they believed it stemmed from concerns Musk expressed later that Ukrainian advances could provoke nuclear retaliation from Russia. One of the people said the shutoff transpired on September 30, 2022. The two others said it was around then, but didn’t recall the exact date.
...
The shutoff of Starlink over parts of Ukraine in fall 2022 affected connectivity in some regions, including Kherson and Donetsk, still occupied by Russian forces today.
...
The Kherson episode is distinct from an earlier report of an incident that purportedly occurred that same September, involving Crimea just to the south, and raised concerns about Musk’s ability to influence the conflict in Ukraine. ...
He[Musk] said he had, rather[than cut-off existing service], rejected a Ukrainian request to provide service [in Crimea] ahead of Kyiv’s planned attack.


"Elon Musk’s current global dominance exemplifies the dangers of concentrated power in unregulated domains"
 - Martha Lane Fox, member of Britain's upper house of parliament

To be clear, Musk/SpaceX has provided millions of dollars of Starlink equipment for Ukraine.  The article indicates he was in discussions with the US administration prior to the shutdown.  But the article seems to suggest that it was Musk alone that chose to shutdown Starlink in the particular regions of the Ukraine counteroffensive.  You can imagine how severely that impacted the success of the counteroffensive plans.

[M T]

Musk ordered shutdown of Starlink satellite service as Ukraine retook territory from Russia

The three people familiar with the order said they believed it stemmed from concerns Musk expressed later that Ukrainian advances could provoke nuclear retaliation from Russia. One of the people said the shutoff transpired on September 30, 2022. The two others said it was around then, but didn’t recall the exact date.
...
The shutoff of Starlink over parts of Ukraine in fall 2022 affected connectivity in some regions, including Kherson and Donetsk, still occupied by Russian forces today.
...
The Kherson episode is distinct from an earlier report of an incident that purportedly occurred that same September, involving Crimea just to the south, and raised concerns about Musk’s ability to influence the conflict in Ukraine. ...
He[Musk] said he had, rather[than cut-off existing service], rejected a Ukrainian request to provide service [in Crimea] ahead of Kyiv’s planned attack.


"Elon Musk’s current global dominance exemplifies the dangers of concentrated power in unregulated domains"
 - Martha Lane Fox, member of Britain's upper house of parliament

To be clear, Musk/SpaceX has provided millions of dollars of Starlink equipment for Ukraine.  The article indicates he was in discussions with the US administration prior to the shutdown.  But the article seems to suggest that it was Musk alone that chose to shutdown Starlink in the particular regions of the Ukraine counteroffensive.  You can imagine how severely that impacted the success of the counteroffensive plans.

[M T]

Russia sends teenagers into the meat grinder.

School-leavers losing their lives for Russia in Putin's war with Ukraine

Alexander Petlinsky enlisted two weeks after his 18th birthday.
He was killed in Ukraine just 20 days later

Just 20 days from enlistment to the front line?
A tragedy that is a travesty.

Does this say anything new about Russia's military manpower situation?  Probably not.  Maybe the size of the cash bonuses does?
Different areas of Russia are paying different amounts, from $4500 to $22,000 (Jan 2025)

Ukraine is paying too.

[M T]

Russia sends teenagers into the meat grinder.

School-leavers losing their lives for Russia in Putin's war with Ukraine

Alexander Petlinsky enlisted two weeks after his 18th birthday.
He was killed in Ukraine just 20 days later

Just 20 days from enlistment to the front line?
A tragedy that is a travesty.

Does this say anything new about Russia's military manpower situation?  Probably not.  Maybe the size of the cash bonuses does?
Different areas of Russia are paying different amounts, from $4500 to $22,000 (Jan 2025)

Ukraine is paying too.

[Hurlburt88]

say this just now.   Feels like a continuation of many points in this thread.  Should be free, and I am curious for comments about both potential efficacy and the possibility that developing this might free up more older munitions for the Ukraine (doubt it given pace, but always looking for hope)

https://www.wsj.com/world/new-missile-fo..._permalink

[Hurlburt88]

say this just now.   Feels like a continuation of many points in this thread.  Should be free, and I am curious for comments about both potential efficacy and the possibility that developing this might free up more older munitions for the Ukraine (doubt it given pace, but always looking for hope)

https://www.wsj.com/world/new-missile-fo..._permalink

[M T]

The US administration has allegedly shortened the 50 days given to Russia on July 15 (ie, by about Sep. 3) to 10-12 days from now (ie, by about Aug 9, about 25 days earlier).   And the stick is yet more financial sanctions; I haven't heard any mention of military consequences (supplies, etc).    This is the latest in a string of "two weeks" decision points.

In the meantime, Polish & allied jets were scrambled in response to a Russian drone attack nominally directed against Ukraine.  One drone crossed into Lithuanian air space (from Belarus).  A Ukrainian official suggested that Russia was testing the NATO responses.

[M T]

The US administration has allegedly shortened the 50 days given to Russia on July 15 (ie, by about Sep. 3) to 10-12 days from now (ie, by about Aug 9, about 25 days earlier).   And the stick is yet more financial sanctions; I haven't heard any mention of military consequences (supplies, etc).    This is the latest in a string of "two weeks" decision points.

In the meantime, Polish & allied jets were scrambled in response to a Russian drone attack nominally directed against Ukraine.  One drone crossed into Lithuanian air space (from Belarus).  A Ukrainian official suggested that Russia was testing the NATO responses.

[fullmetal]

There was a drone attack on a Polish factory almost two weeks ago that appeared to be of Russian origin.  I don't think that was an accident.

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/...oland-says

[fullmetal]

There was a drone attack on a Polish factory almost two weeks ago that appeared to be of Russian origin.  I don't think that was an accident.

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/...oland-says

[GK3]

say this just now.   Feels like a continuation of many points in this thread.  Should be free, and I am curious for comments about both potential efficacy and the possibility that developing this might free up more older munitions for the Ukraine (doubt it given pace, but always looking for hope)

https://www.wsj.com/world/new-missile-fo..._permalink

One old munition that seems to be getting freed up is the Hawk Anti Aircraft missile.  Apparently there is something like 40,000  of the lying around NATO and work is afoot to get to Ukraine. Hopefully it is true, While it is OLD technology, it still works and apparently should work well against what Russia is sending against Ukraine.  i would think it is generally a better weapon than the Patriot and much cheaper for most purposes in Ukraine.

---

A question for those who know more about this stuff.  We talk all the time about he GPS system, and how to jam it etc.  China and Russia both have their own GPS systems and I assume their weapons track on their systems.  I hope/presume we are more than capable of jamming their systems.  Makes me dizzy to think how many satellites are running around up there over our heads.

[GK3]

say this just now.   Feels like a continuation of many points in this thread.  Should be free, and I am curious for comments about both potential efficacy and the possibility that developing this might free up more older munitions for the Ukraine (doubt it given pace, but always looking for hope)

https://www.wsj.com/world/new-missile-fo..._permalink

One old munition that seems to be getting freed up is the Hawk Anti Aircraft missile.  Apparently there is something like 40,000  of the lying around NATO and work is afoot to get to Ukraine. Hopefully it is true, While it is OLD technology, it still works and apparently should work well against what Russia is sending against Ukraine.  i would think it is generally a better weapon than the Patriot and much cheaper for most purposes in Ukraine.

---

A question for those who know more about this stuff.  We talk all the time about he GPS system, and how to jam it etc.  China and Russia both have their own GPS systems and I assume their weapons track on their systems.  I hope/presume we are more than capable of jamming their systems.  Makes me dizzy to think how many satellites are running around up there over our heads.

[Goose]

say this just now.   Feels like a continuation of many points in this thread.  Should be free, and I am curious for comments about both potential efficacy and the possibility that developing this might free up more older munitions for the Ukraine (doubt it given pace, but always looking for hope)

https://www.wsj.com/world/new-missile-fo..._permalink

One old munition that seems to be getting freed up is the Hawk Anti Aircraft missile.  Apparently there is something like 40,000  of the lying around NATO and work is afoot to get to Ukraine. Hopefully it is true, While it is OLD technology, it still works and apparently should work well against what Russia is sending against Ukraine.  i would think it is generally a better weapon than the Patriot and much cheaper for most purposes in Ukraine.

https://armyrecognition.com/military-pro...-states-uk
https://www.twz.com/air/first-inside-loo...se-systems
https://www.twz.com/ukraine-to-receive-h...from-spain
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-23_Hawk
https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analys...e-missiles

Indeed 40,000 HAWK missiles were delivered over the years. How many are still in existence is another question. The performance of various MIM-23 variants is also quite different. For use against drones such as the Shahed 136 MIM23-E or F will be required. While I am relatively sure lots of those were built I have no idea how many are "out there" today.

Ukraine has confirmed it has received I-HAWK Phase III batteries from Spain. Spain also has HAWK XXI systems that perhaps are what was actually donated. These systems have the AN/MPQ-64 acquisition radar, which is actually "modern" since it is the radar used in the NASAMS. I can see this variant being quite useful. The literal "Phase III" systems using an AN/MPQ-62 for low altitude acquisition are indeed a significant step down. They "work", but the smaller targets low radar cross sections are problematic.
 
The fact that must be remembered is that ALL HAWK MIM-23 missiles are SARH. That means the illuminator must stay on the target the entire time. The reflection from the target must also be large enough that the missile can detect and process it. Unlike an AMRAAM the HAWK system has NO uplink. You can't launch the missile stupid and guide it toward the target until it goes active and acquires the target. The HAWK missile HAS to acquire almost immediately or it goes stupid permanently. The battery may be tracking the target just fine but if the missile doesn't acquire, game over. Of course, if the the battery loses track, the illuminator will too and that is equally game over.
 
It must also be noted that the HAWK systems will suffer the same serious limitations against low altitude targets that all point defense systems share. There will never be enough of them. The HAWK has the additional limitation that it can only engage two targets at a time because it only has two illuminators. For a few years there were attempts to "time share" a single illuminator but apparently that didn't work.

[Goose]

say this just now.   Feels like a continuation of many points in this thread.  Should be free, and I am curious for comments about both potential efficacy and the possibility that developing this might free up more older munitions for the Ukraine (doubt it given pace, but always looking for hope)

https://www.wsj.com/world/new-missile-fo..._permalink

One old munition that seems to be getting freed up is the Hawk Anti Aircraft missile.  Apparently there is something like 40,000  of the lying around NATO and work is afoot to get to Ukraine. Hopefully it is true, While it is OLD technology, it still works and apparently should work well against what Russia is sending against Ukraine.  i would think it is generally a better weapon than the Patriot and much cheaper for most purposes in Ukraine.

https://armyrecognition.com/military-pro...-states-uk
https://www.twz.com/air/first-inside-loo...se-systems
https://www.twz.com/ukraine-to-receive-h...from-spain
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-23_Hawk
https://armyrecognition.com/focus-analys...e-missiles

Indeed 40,000 HAWK missiles were delivered over the years. How many are still in existence is another question. The performance of various MIM-23 variants is also quite different. For use against drones such as the Shahed 136 MIM23-E or F will be required. While I am relatively sure lots of those were built I have no idea how many are "out there" today.

Ukraine has confirmed it has received I-HAWK Phase III batteries from Spain. Spain also has HAWK XXI systems that perhaps are what was actually donated. These systems have the AN/MPQ-64 acquisition radar, which is actually "modern" since it is the radar used in the NASAMS. I can see this variant being quite useful. The literal "Phase III" systems using an AN/MPQ-62 for low altitude acquisition are indeed a significant step down. They "work", but the smaller targets low radar cross sections are problematic.
 
The fact that must be remembered is that ALL HAWK MIM-23 missiles are SARH. That means the illuminator must stay on the target the entire time. The reflection from the target must also be large enough that the missile can detect and process it. Unlike an AMRAAM the HAWK system has NO uplink. You can't launch the missile stupid and guide it toward the target until it goes active and acquires the target. The HAWK missile HAS to acquire almost immediately or it goes stupid permanently. The battery may be tracking the target just fine but if the missile doesn't acquire, game over. Of course, if the the battery loses track, the illuminator will too and that is equally game over.
 
It must also be noted that the HAWK systems will suffer the same serious limitations against low altitude targets that all point defense systems share. There will never be enough of them. The HAWK has the additional limitation that it can only engage two targets at a time because it only has two illuminators. For a few years there were attempts to "time share" a single illuminator but apparently that didn't work.

[GK3]

Musk ordered shutdown of Starlink satellite service as Ukraine retook territory from Russia

The three people familiar with the order said they believed it stemmed from concerns Musk expressed later that Ukrainian advances could provoke nuclear retaliation from Russia. One of the people said the shutoff transpired on September 30, 2022. The two others said it was around then, but didn’t recall the exact date.
...
The shutoff of Starlink over parts of Ukraine in fall 2022 affected connectivity in some regions, including Kherson and Donetsk, still occupied by Russian forces today.
...
The Kherson episode is distinct from an earlier report of an incident that purportedly occurred that same September, involving Crimea just to the south, and raised concerns about Musk’s ability to influence the conflict in Ukraine. ...
He[Musk] said he had, rather[than cut-off existing service], rejected a Ukrainian request to provide service [in Crimea] ahead of Kyiv’s planned attack.


"Elon Musk’s current global dominance exemplifies the dangers of concentrated power in unregulated domains"
 - Martha Lane Fox, member of Britain's upper house of parliament

To be clear, Musk/SpaceX has provided millions of dollars of Starlink equipment for Ukraine.  The article indicates he was in discussions with the US administration prior to the shutdown.  But the article seems to suggest that it was Musk alone that chose to shutdown Starlink in the particular regions of the Ukraine counteroffensive.  You can imagine how severely that impacted the success of the counteroffensive plans.

I ran across this article which touches on your subject but also illustrates China's apparent fixation on Starlink.  https://apnews.com/article/spacex-musk-s...ca8a6916df

I had no idea so many other players were taking active steps to further populate space with similar satellites.  A quick addition says if all were complete there would be 40,000 of those devices surrounding the earth. There must be some serious money to be made through these systems at the same time the full capabilities of those satellites will probably not be public knowledge.

So if China takes action to destroy Starlink hardware does this represent an attack on the USA also?

[GK3]

Musk ordered shutdown of Starlink satellite service as Ukraine retook territory from Russia

The three people familiar with the order said they believed it stemmed from concerns Musk expressed later that Ukrainian advances could provoke nuclear retaliation from Russia. One of the people said the shutoff transpired on September 30, 2022. The two others said it was around then, but didn’t recall the exact date.
...
The shutoff of Starlink over parts of Ukraine in fall 2022 affected connectivity in some regions, including Kherson and Donetsk, still occupied by Russian forces today.
...
The Kherson episode is distinct from an earlier report of an incident that purportedly occurred that same September, involving Crimea just to the south, and raised concerns about Musk’s ability to influence the conflict in Ukraine. ...
He[Musk] said he had, rather[than cut-off existing service], rejected a Ukrainian request to provide service [in Crimea] ahead of Kyiv’s planned attack.


"Elon Musk’s current global dominance exemplifies the dangers of concentrated power in unregulated domains"
 - Martha Lane Fox, member of Britain's upper house of parliament

To be clear, Musk/SpaceX has provided millions of dollars of Starlink equipment for Ukraine.  The article indicates he was in discussions with the US administration prior to the shutdown.  But the article seems to suggest that it was Musk alone that chose to shutdown Starlink in the particular regions of the Ukraine counteroffensive.  You can imagine how severely that impacted the success of the counteroffensive plans.

I ran across this article which touches on your subject but also illustrates China's apparent fixation on Starlink.  https://apnews.com/article/spacex-musk-s...ca8a6916df

I had no idea so many other players were taking active steps to further populate space with similar satellites.  A quick addition says if all were complete there would be 40,000 of those devices surrounding the earth. There must be some serious money to be made through these systems at the same time the full capabilities of those satellites will probably not be public knowledge.

So if China takes action to destroy Starlink hardware does this represent an attack on the USA also?

[M T]

Starlink (the commercial company) has re-applied to have 30,000 (additional?) Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites.   Last I paid attention, I think they have on the order of 6,000 in orbit, and are approved for 12,000.  But that's just the start.

You're probably used to thinking of how planes fly at different altitudes. Those going in particular directions are at a set of altitudes while those going in a different direction are flying at a different set of altitudes.  (Assume a flat, infinite earth for a moment) Imagine if you had 10,000 planes flying east to west at one set of altitudes, and another set of 10,000 planes flying north to south at a different set of altitudes.  If you keep the members of each set of planes separated from each other by, say, 1,000' feet, you don't have to worry about collisions between the two sets (except when they have to land).

The LEO satellites are deployed in orbits in shells, where a shell is a particular altitude (say 350 miles) and a particular angle (say 53 degrees) relative to earth's axis.  Now suppose you put up 10 satellites in exactly the same orbit (ie, on an ellipse in a plane that cuts through the center of the earth) where each follows the other by 10% of the length of that orbit, meaning each follows the other 9(?) minutes behind it.  Those satellites would never collide with each other.  Now realize that the earth is rotating every 24 hours. Suppose at midnight, that first plane cut through the earth on a line from, say, EL Paso to Seattle.  10 minutes later, that plane is cutting through some large distance west of those two cities.  Consider a second plane that cuts through El Paso to Seattle at 12:10AM.  You could put up another set of satellites that share the orbit in that plane, without them crossing paths with those in the same shell but another plane.  (I'm not an expert in this field so I may be inaccurate, but this is how I understand it.)   For some visualizations, try this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VIQr1UyhwWk

By putting the shells at different altitudes, the satellites in one shell won't interact with another shell.  By using a single angle within the shell, and using these rotated planes, one can pack a lot of satellites into a single shell.   I believe Starlink is using (or has plans to use) three shells.  The original shell used something like 53 degrees, which allowed it to cover most of the populated areas of the world.  The second shell uses something approaching 90 degrees (ie, polar orbit) to cover the polar regions.

Starshield is the name for the US military set of LEO satellites.  SpaceX is putting them in orbit (Wikipedia indicates at least 183 in orbit by April 2025).  AIUI, these would be in a different shell than those of the other LEO systems. (As GK3 wrote, there are a number of LEO systems being deployed, but Starlink is far in advance.)

And, as indicated in the article, China is putting up their own set of LEO satellites, Guowang.  I don't know if they have a second LEO network planned for the military or whether the satellites will be used for both commercial and military.

One can imagine that Starshield will employ military-grade communications as well as other military technology.  Starshield would be the first target for China should we ever get into a kinetic war.  But, even short of such a war, each side will be very exposed to the other side's LEO satellites.

By the way, LEO satellites are designed to eventually fall back into the earth's atmosphere and burn up.  Normally, that will happen under the control of the operator, but if control of a satellite is lost, it will de-orbit within a few years.

Another use of LEO satellites is to reduce dependence on fiber-optic cables.  For instance, should some enemy destroy all the fiber-optic cables between Hawaii and mainland US, satellite links can be used.  Starlink has Inter-Satellite Links (laser communications) between their satellites.  They speak of them being used in a mesh-like pattern.   Other satellite deployments (middle-earth-orbit, geostationary) can also be used for this purpose, with higher latency.

I hadn't seen this article before:
  Russia illegally using Musk’s Starlink satellites to advance in Ukraine
Since the Starlink User Terminals are licensed individually, and since they need to specify their approximate positions, I'd think Starlink can shut these down (even if a Russian fraudulent Starlink user terminal tries to identify itself as a licensed Ukrainian user terminal that is 1 mile away).  If not, they didn't design their authentication well.

[M T]

Starlink (the commercial company) has re-applied to have 30,000 (additional?) Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites.   Last I paid attention, I think they have on the order of 6,000 in orbit, and are approved for 12,000.  But that's just the start.

You're probably used to thinking of how planes fly at different altitudes. Those going in particular directions are at a set of altitudes while those going in a different direction are flying at a different set of altitudes.  (Assume a flat, infinite earth for a moment) Imagine if you had 10,000 planes flying east to west at one set of altitudes, and another set of 10,000 planes flying north to south at a different set of altitudes.  If you keep the members of each set of planes separated from each other by, say, 1,000' feet, you don't have to worry about collisions between the two sets (except when they have to land).

The LEO satellites are deployed in orbits in shells, where a shell is a particular altitude (say 350 miles) and a particular angle (say 53 degrees) relative to earth's axis.  Now suppose you put up 10 satellites in exactly the same orbit (ie, on an ellipse in a plane that cuts through the center of the earth) where each follows the other by 10% of the length of that orbit, meaning each follows the other 9(?) minutes behind it.  Those satellites would never collide with each other.  Now realize that the earth is rotating every 24 hours. Suppose at midnight, that first plane cut through the earth on a line from, say, EL Paso to Seattle.  10 minutes later, that plane is cutting through some large distance west of those two cities.  Consider a second plane that cuts through El Paso to Seattle at 12:10AM.  You could put up another set of satellites that share the orbit in that plane, without them crossing paths with those in the same shell but another plane.  (I'm not an expert in this field so I may be inaccurate, but this is how I understand it.)   For some visualizations, try this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VIQr1UyhwWk

By putting the shells at different altitudes, the satellites in one shell won't interact with another shell.  By using a single angle within the shell, and using these rotated planes, one can pack a lot of satellites into a single shell.   I believe Starlink is using (or has plans to use) three shells.  The original shell used something like 53 degrees, which allowed it to cover most of the populated areas of the world.  The second shell uses something approaching 90 degrees (ie, polar orbit) to cover the polar regions.

Starshield is the name for the US military set of LEO satellites.  SpaceX is putting them in orbit (Wikipedia indicates at least 183 in orbit by April 2025).  AIUI, these would be in a different shell than those of the other LEO systems. (As GK3 wrote, there are a number of LEO systems being deployed, but Starlink is far in advance.)

And, as indicated in the article, China is putting up their own set of LEO satellites, Guowang.  I don't know if they have a second LEO network planned for the military or whether the satellites will be used for both commercial and military.

One can imagine that Starshield will employ military-grade communications as well as other military technology.  Starshield would be the first target for China should we ever get into a kinetic war.  But, even short of such a war, each side will be very exposed to the other side's LEO satellites.

By the way, LEO satellites are designed to eventually fall back into the earth's atmosphere and burn up.  Normally, that will happen under the control of the operator, but if control of a satellite is lost, it will de-orbit within a few years.

Another use of LEO satellites is to reduce dependence on fiber-optic cables.  For instance, should some enemy destroy all the fiber-optic cables between Hawaii and mainland US, satellite links can be used.  Starlink has Inter-Satellite Links (laser communications) between their satellites.  They speak of them being used in a mesh-like pattern.   Other satellite deployments (middle-earth-orbit, geostationary) can also be used for this purpose, with higher latency.

I hadn't seen this article before:
  Russia illegally using Musk’s Starlink satellites to advance in Ukraine
Since the Starlink User Terminals are licensed individually, and since they need to specify their approximate positions, I'd think Starlink can shut these down (even if a Russian fraudulent Starlink user terminal tries to identify itself as a licensed Ukrainian user terminal that is 1 mile away).  If not, they didn't design their authentication well.