[BostonCard]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

Winters in Europe can be pretty harsh, and now even summers in Europe need more energy to run increasing numbers of air conditioning units.  I think Europe is doing its best to build out renewable supplies, but that hasn't scaled quickly enough.  Unless there are available, central Asian sources of natural gas not financially tied to Russia, it's hard to see what would fill the gap.

I believe these refineries deal mostly with crude oil, not natural gas, so most of the output goes to the transportation sector, whether cars (gasoline), trucks and ships (diesel) or aircraft (jet fuel).  Only a small amount of the oil goes to generating electricity because generating electricity from petroleum is generally not cost effective.

BC

[BostonCard]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

Winters in Europe can be pretty harsh, and now even summers in Europe need more energy to run increasing numbers of air conditioning units.  I think Europe is doing its best to build out renewable supplies, but that hasn't scaled quickly enough.  Unless there are available, central Asian sources of natural gas not financially tied to Russia, it's hard to see what would fill the gap.

I believe these refineries deal mostly with crude oil, not natural gas, so most of the output goes to the transportation sector, whether cars (gasoline), trucks and ships (diesel) or aircraft (jet fuel).  Only a small amount of the oil goes to generating electricity because generating electricity from petroleum is generally not cost effective.

BC

[GK3]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europes..._permalink

(Should be gifted)

BC

This situation is unique and inherently not solvable. The refineries are all old. The one in Berlin is Russian owned. The others are owned by a Hungarian company, MOL Group. They are built explicitly to refine "Soviet" crude oil, now rusian and the 'stan's. These refineries can't refine the crude oil the rest of the world can deliver. I think there are some Indonesian alternate sources, but that is it AFAIK. The other problem is delivery. These refineries are all land-locked. Delivery of low-grade but cheap crude oil by pipeline makes them economically viable. Shipping oil any other way is too expensive, and pipelines would have to be built from a port all the way into Hungary/Slovakia. Very expensive capital investment that promises little ROI. The "right answer" would have been to simply buy finished petroleum products elsewhere, but that would be a financial disaster for MOL. They aren't going to do it. The Berlin refinery isn't owned by an EU based company. The German trustee is in no position to expend the necessary funds to upgrade the refinery and find other sources of crude oil that would make economic sense. Thus, here we remain.

UPDATE: Things are a bit better than I thought. https://kyivindependent.com/hungarys-oil...ian-crude/ MOL may have an upgraded refinery by sometime in 2026. From the tone of the article it appears MOL does not intend to switch totally off Ural crude. It may be that only part of the refinery will be upgraded to process non-Ural oil. The Druzhba pipeline is a big source of cheap crude that MOL wants to be an option after this war is over.
 
The Croatian pipeline has a capacity problem. It has more customers than it can serve. Hungary needs another source.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Western Europe allowed itself to become dependent on Russian natural gas and oil products, a situation which Putin has tried to take advantage of. Only now is Western Europe looking for an alternative. Perhaps more important is the wheat production from Ukrain and Russia.  Both are forecast to be down.  
The following link disusses this issue: https://www.allaboutfeed.net/market/feed...l-exports/
Whatever you think about Global Warming there is obviously some abnormal weather patterns around the world.  Countries in the Northern Latitudes like Russia have gamble year in and year out on the weather. If your people cannot eat, then you are in rock and hard place position if you are Putin.

[GK3]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/europes..._permalink

(Should be gifted)

BC

This situation is unique and inherently not solvable. The refineries are all old. The one in Berlin is Russian owned. The others are owned by a Hungarian company, MOL Group. They are built explicitly to refine "Soviet" crude oil, now rusian and the 'stan's. These refineries can't refine the crude oil the rest of the world can deliver. I think there are some Indonesian alternate sources, but that is it AFAIK. The other problem is delivery. These refineries are all land-locked. Delivery of low-grade but cheap crude oil by pipeline makes them economically viable. Shipping oil any other way is too expensive, and pipelines would have to be built from a port all the way into Hungary/Slovakia. Very expensive capital investment that promises little ROI. The "right answer" would have been to simply buy finished petroleum products elsewhere, but that would be a financial disaster for MOL. They aren't going to do it. The Berlin refinery isn't owned by an EU based company. The German trustee is in no position to expend the necessary funds to upgrade the refinery and find other sources of crude oil that would make economic sense. Thus, here we remain.

UPDATE: Things are a bit better than I thought. https://kyivindependent.com/hungarys-oil...ian-crude/ MOL may have an upgraded refinery by sometime in 2026. From the tone of the article it appears MOL does not intend to switch totally off Ural crude. It may be that only part of the refinery will be upgraded to process non-Ural oil. The Druzhba pipeline is a big source of cheap crude that MOL wants to be an option after this war is over.
 
The Croatian pipeline has a capacity problem. It has more customers than it can serve. Hungary needs another source.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Western Europe allowed itself to become dependent on Russian natural gas and oil products, a situation which Putin has tried to take advantage of. Only now is Western Europe looking for an alternative. Perhaps more important is the wheat production from Ukrain and Russia.  Both are forecast to be down.  
The following link disusses this issue: https://www.allaboutfeed.net/market/feed...l-exports/
Whatever you think about Global Warming there is obviously some abnormal weather patterns around the world.  Countries in the Northern Latitudes like Russia have gamble year in and year out on the weather. If your people cannot eat, then you are in rock and hard place position if you are Putin.

[BostonCard]

Artillery still has a roll to play in this war:

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/old-sch..._permalink

But Ukrainian artillerists say they aren’t using howitzers any less because of drones. They are telling the U.S. and other allies that big guns retain some key advantages, not least greater firepower. Simplicity also matters, because complex modern software and electronics are sometimes unreliable, they say. Still, gunners must find ways to avoid being targeted by drones, such as using concealment and decoys.

BC

[BostonCard]

Artillery still has a roll to play in this war:

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/old-sch..._permalink

But Ukrainian artillerists say they aren’t using howitzers any less because of drones. They are telling the U.S. and other allies that big guns retain some key advantages, not least greater firepower. Simplicity also matters, because complex modern software and electronics are sometimes unreliable, they say. Still, gunners must find ways to avoid being targeted by drones, such as using concealment and decoys.

BC

[GK3]

Artillery still has a roll to play in this war:

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/old-sch..._permalink

But Ukrainian artillerists say they aren’t using howitzers any less because of drones. They are telling the U.S. and other allies that big guns retain some key advantages, not least greater firepower. Simplicity also matters, because complex modern software and electronics are sometimes unreliable, they say. Still, gunners must find ways to avoid being targeted by drones, such as using concealment and decoys.

BC

It is more than just the drones they have to worry about, they also have to worry about counter battery fire from enemy artillery and opposition air strikes.  A lot depends on who you are fightiing. It is possible for a enemy counter battery unit to return fire directred at the other unit within 60 seconds, 3 minutes is probably more normal.  Now just how capable Russian counter battery fire is another question.  
Unfortunately, a lot of how this works is buried in the fog of war.  Just because you can, doesn't mean you can.  You can only defend or conduct counter battery fire if you have the equipment, technology, trained soldiers and adequate defenses against return counter battery fire, drones and air strikes. That is a lot of ifs.

[GK3]

Artillery still has a roll to play in this war:

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/old-sch..._permalink

But Ukrainian artillerists say they aren’t using howitzers any less because of drones. They are telling the U.S. and other allies that big guns retain some key advantages, not least greater firepower. Simplicity also matters, because complex modern software and electronics are sometimes unreliable, they say. Still, gunners must find ways to avoid being targeted by drones, such as using concealment and decoys.

BC

It is more than just the drones they have to worry about, they also have to worry about counter battery fire from enemy artillery and opposition air strikes.  A lot depends on who you are fightiing. It is possible for a enemy counter battery unit to return fire directred at the other unit within 60 seconds, 3 minutes is probably more normal.  Now just how capable Russian counter battery fire is another question.  
Unfortunately, a lot of how this works is buried in the fog of war.  Just because you can, doesn't mean you can.  You can only defend or conduct counter battery fire if you have the equipment, technology, trained soldiers and adequate defenses against return counter battery fire, drones and air strikes. That is a lot of ifs.

[dabigv13]

Interesting if unfortunate video. Russian UAV video feed of a Ukrainian Neptune missile TEL (this was their indigenously designed and manufactured missile that destroyed the Russian Cruiser Moskva earlier in the war, and has subsequently been further developed for a land attack role, possible in an updated and longer range version).

Unfortunately Russia was able to observe and quickly target with an Iskander ballistic missile, which did not directly hit the launcher, but seems to have heen close enough that we can see a secondary effect of one of the Neptune rockets firing off the back of the TEL.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1961136371717783755

Good- Ukraine has indigenous long range strike capability that they are continuing to use.

Bad- Russia, at least in this case, has a rapid enough ISR cycle they can target and destroy Ukraine's mobile TELs.

[dabigv13]

Interesting if unfortunate video. Russian UAV video feed of a Ukrainian Neptune missile TEL (this was their indigenously designed and manufactured missile that destroyed the Russian Cruiser Moskva earlier in the war, and has subsequently been further developed for a land attack role, possible in an updated and longer range version).

Unfortunately Russia was able to observe and quickly target with an Iskander ballistic missile, which did not directly hit the launcher, but seems to have heen close enough that we can see a secondary effect of one of the Neptune rockets firing off the back of the TEL.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1961136371717783755

Good- Ukraine has indigenous long range strike capability that they are continuing to use.

Bad- Russia, at least in this case, has a rapid enough ISR cycle they can target and destroy Ukraine's mobile TELs.

[M T]

The US administration's August 8 deadline to Russia came and went.  Russia continues its war unabated.  
The fact that Russia targeted two missiles within a few hundred meters of British and EU buildings in Kyiv would seem to indicate that Russian attacks against civilians is not due to a lack of precision.

Perhaps the US isn't playing with a full deck.
EDIT: I much later saw Trump's hot mic comment to the French President after the Putin meeting, which I think gives insight into how Putin is trumping him..

---

Interesting if unfortunate video. Russian UAV video feed of a Ukrainian Neptune missile TEL (this was their indigenously designed and manufactured missile that destroyed the Russian Cruiser Moskva earlier in the war, and has subsequently been further developed for a land attack role, possible in an updated and longer range version).

Unfortunately Russia was able to observe and quickly target with an Iskander ballistic missile, which did not directly hit the launcher, but seems to have heen close enough that we can see a secondary effect of one of the Neptune rockets firing off the back of the TEL.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1961136371717783755

Good- Ukraine has indigenous long range strike capability that they are continuing to use.

Bad- Russia, at least in this case, has a rapid enough ISR cycle they can target and destroy Ukraine's mobile TELs.

Since the drone was watching the launcher before the first-shown missile launch, we can't know how it acquired that position, but it wasn't from the first-shown launch.  So the seemingly rapid response is perhaps misleading.

[M T]

The US administration's August 8 deadline to Russia came and went.  Russia continues its war unabated.  
The fact that Russia targeted two missiles within a few hundred meters of British and EU buildings in Kyiv would seem to indicate that Russian attacks against civilians is not due to a lack of precision.

Perhaps the US isn't playing with a full deck.
EDIT: I much later saw Trump's hot mic comment to the French President after the Putin meeting, which I think gives insight into how Putin is trumping him..

---

Interesting if unfortunate video. Russian UAV video feed of a Ukrainian Neptune missile TEL (this was their indigenously designed and manufactured missile that destroyed the Russian Cruiser Moskva earlier in the war, and has subsequently been further developed for a land attack role, possible in an updated and longer range version).

Unfortunately Russia was able to observe and quickly target with an Iskander ballistic missile, which did not directly hit the launcher, but seems to have heen close enough that we can see a secondary effect of one of the Neptune rockets firing off the back of the TEL.

https://x.com/John_A_Ridge/status/1961136371717783755

Good- Ukraine has indigenous long range strike capability that they are continuing to use.

Bad- Russia, at least in this case, has a rapid enough ISR cycle they can target and destroy Ukraine's mobile TELs.

Since the drone was watching the launcher before the first-shown missile launch, we can't know how it acquired that position, but it wasn't from the first-shown launch.  So the seemingly rapid response is perhaps misleading.

[Goose]

Since the drone was watching the launcher before the first-shown missile launch, we can't know how it acquired that position, but it wasn't from the first-shown launch.  So the seemingly rapid response is perhaps misleading.

IMO interpreting these posted videos is often difficult. One has to remember that dumb luck often accounts for things like seemingly quick response. The drone just happened across the launcher and found it. It can also be cause by stupidity. Maybe the launcher was supposed to immediately displace but didn't. They are all N of one events until we can see a trend, and even then by the time the trend is established the other side may have a countermeasure in place. Our sources of info are very limited and not unbiased. OTOH, it is all we have :-).

[Goose]

Since the drone was watching the launcher before the first-shown missile launch, we can't know how it acquired that position, but it wasn't from the first-shown launch.  So the seemingly rapid response is perhaps misleading.

IMO interpreting these posted videos is often difficult. One has to remember that dumb luck often accounts for things like seemingly quick response. The drone just happened across the launcher and found it. It can also be cause by stupidity. Maybe the launcher was supposed to immediately displace but didn't. They are all N of one events until we can see a trend, and even then by the time the trend is established the other side may have a countermeasure in place. Our sources of info are very limited and not unbiased. OTOH, it is all we have :-).

[BostonCard]

Are you saying that there may be some sort of “fog” that descends during war that prevents us from knowing everything that is going on, even in our modern day with cameras everywhere? ;)

BC

[BostonCard]

Are you saying that there may be some sort of “fog” that descends during war that prevents us from knowing everything that is going on, even in our modern day with cameras everywhere? ;)

BC

[GK3]

Are you saying that there may be some sort of “fog” that descends during war that prevents us from knowing everything that is going on, even in our modern day with cameras everywhere? ;)

BC

A good question, but I would say, yes the "fog" of war still exisits, maybe in a mutated form.  Homo Sapiens are still involved and the old addage "stuff happens" still applies.  The day may come when all wars are fought by drones and robots, but I do not think we are there yet.  The big question that has yet been asked or answered will be are we better off running a confilict by Homo Sapiens or simply turning the whole thing to an AI which is of course designed by Homo Sapiens. There are so many variables it is almost impossible to answer this question. Terrain, weather, ground cover, enemy capabilities all play a role in what you decide to do and how you decide to do it.
I keep wondering how it might have been back in the day in the jungles of SE Asia if we had the tech then we have now.

[GK3]

Are you saying that there may be some sort of “fog” that descends during war that prevents us from knowing everything that is going on, even in our modern day with cameras everywhere? ;)

BC

A good question, but I would say, yes the "fog" of war still exisits, maybe in a mutated form.  Homo Sapiens are still involved and the old addage "stuff happens" still applies.  The day may come when all wars are fought by drones and robots, but I do not think we are there yet.  The big question that has yet been asked or answered will be are we better off running a confilict by Homo Sapiens or simply turning the whole thing to an AI which is of course designed by Homo Sapiens. There are so many variables it is almost impossible to answer this question. Terrain, weather, ground cover, enemy capabilities all play a role in what you decide to do and how you decide to do it.
I keep wondering how it might have been back in the day in the jungles of SE Asia if we had the tech then we have now.

[Goose]

Are you saying that there may be some sort of “fog” that descends during war that prevents us from knowing everything that is going on, even in our modern day with cameras everywhere? ;)

BC

A good question, but I would say, yes the "fog" of war still exisits, maybe in a mutated form.  Homo Sapiens are still involved and the old addage "stuff happens" still applies.  The day may come when all wars are fought by drones and robots, but I do not think we are there yet.  The big question that has yet been asked or answered will be are we better off running a confilict by Homo Sapiens or simply turning the whole thing to an AI which is of course designed by Homo Sapiens.  There are so many variables it is almost impossible to answer this question.  Terrain, weather, ground cover, enemy capabilities all play a role in what you  decide to do and how you decide to do it.
I keep wondering how it might have been back in the day in the jungles of SE Asia if we had the tech then we have now.

IMO the fog of war that descends on the general public always has been worse than that of the military that is actually running the war. Before WW I the general public knew almost nothing about what was happening in the war. Communication was so slow it might be weeks before reports of major battles were publicly available. These reports were influenced by propaganda and by the fact the few reporters had a very limited view of the action. It was only what they could physically see. Virtually never would the mauling of a 6 gun artillery battery make the papers. We see such incidents on X all the time now.  By WW I and certainly by WW II the reporting was much more timely. However, it was still heavily censored/propgandized and still limited by what the reporter could actually see for themselves. Of course the major military commands were by that time making regular press releases that delivered the "big picture", but most of these reports were heavily slanted (MacArthur) or total fiction (Goebbels et al).
 
Jumping forward to today we now get first hand reports with drone video of many, many individual actions. There are also many more "professional" reporters out there reporting on what they see. These reports are not "censored", but they are often misleading, either intentionally or unintentionally. Of course, the combatant military units release their own reports and videos that provide even more data. We also have groups like the ISW that attempt to sort this situation out. IMO the civilian fog of war indeed still exists. In many ways it is worse than ever. It is TMI situation that we can't in most cases properly evaluate or understand. Confirmation bias runs amok. I know, I have been guilty of it myself :-). "I expect X, so this video shows X". How well the various state actors and their military actually understands the "real" situation is a subject into which we have virtually no visibility.
 
IMO John Keegan's book Intelligence in War still has the situation exactly right, particularly Chapter 5 about Crete. It is important also IMO to remember that the course of the Franco-Prussian war was charted mostly by commanders who in different ways did not follow their orders exactly. Part of that was Auftragstaktik by individual commanders, but the key part was major commands moving forward quicker than the plan called for, resulting in the world's largest meeting engagement. The US civil war battle of Antietam was made possible by a major intelligence coup, but was indecisive because "stuff happens". These results are important for the use of AI in war.
 
At present, AI is "trained". It will always produced the "school" solution. This means AI is fundamentally incapable of executing Auftragstaktik unless it is very similar to a situation it has been trained upon, actually a "school solution". Against an intellectually agile opponent AI is at a tactical disadvantage. If and when AI achieves "General Intelligence" this limitation can be mitigated. At present, it would be possible to observe the opponent's previous responses to a certain threat and know exactly and reliably what your AI opponent will do. That can be fatally exploited. It is also unclear how and to what extent AI hierarchies can function. AI can only evaluate the data it has in the context of its training. If some of the "vital" data is missing, a situation that is common in war, no telling what the AI will do. The Borg solution requires lots of communication where the various parts of the entity "knows" a totality of what is transpiring. At present, such technology is well beyond the state of the art. The AI 11Bs available in the near future won't know much and are incapable of "figuring out" what to do and especially deciding to do it. Nobody is going to stand up and say "follow me" :-). If one did, none would follow because it isn't in their training set :-).
 
Therefore, IMO the most important use of AI in the near future is in intelligent weapons, specifically anti-drone weapons. It is a "detect, recognize, attack, pursue and destroy". For that, the school solution is fine. We have had wake-following weapons that could recognize specific ships and specific ship types for a long time. Super AI anti-drone weapons will IMO be in general use very soon.

[Goose]

Are you saying that there may be some sort of “fog” that descends during war that prevents us from knowing everything that is going on, even in our modern day with cameras everywhere? ;)

BC

A good question, but I would say, yes the "fog" of war still exisits, maybe in a mutated form.  Homo Sapiens are still involved and the old addage "stuff happens" still applies.  The day may come when all wars are fought by drones and robots, but I do not think we are there yet.  The big question that has yet been asked or answered will be are we better off running a confilict by Homo Sapiens or simply turning the whole thing to an AI which is of course designed by Homo Sapiens.  There are so many variables it is almost impossible to answer this question.  Terrain, weather, ground cover, enemy capabilities all play a role in what you  decide to do and how you decide to do it.
I keep wondering how it might have been back in the day in the jungles of SE Asia if we had the tech then we have now.

IMO the fog of war that descends on the general public always has been worse than that of the military that is actually running the war. Before WW I the general public knew almost nothing about what was happening in the war. Communication was so slow it might be weeks before reports of major battles were publicly available. These reports were influenced by propaganda and by the fact the few reporters had a very limited view of the action. It was only what they could physically see. Virtually never would the mauling of a 6 gun artillery battery make the papers. We see such incidents on X all the time now.  By WW I and certainly by WW II the reporting was much more timely. However, it was still heavily censored/propgandized and still limited by what the reporter could actually see for themselves. Of course the major military commands were by that time making regular press releases that delivered the "big picture", but most of these reports were heavily slanted (MacArthur) or total fiction (Goebbels et al).
 
Jumping forward to today we now get first hand reports with drone video of many, many individual actions. There are also many more "professional" reporters out there reporting on what they see. These reports are not "censored", but they are often misleading, either intentionally or unintentionally. Of course, the combatant military units release their own reports and videos that provide even more data. We also have groups like the ISW that attempt to sort this situation out. IMO the civilian fog of war indeed still exists. In many ways it is worse than ever. It is TMI situation that we can't in most cases properly evaluate or understand. Confirmation bias runs amok. I know, I have been guilty of it myself :-). "I expect X, so this video shows X". How well the various state actors and their military actually understands the "real" situation is a subject into which we have virtually no visibility.
 
IMO John Keegan's book Intelligence in War still has the situation exactly right, particularly Chapter 5 about Crete. It is important also IMO to remember that the course of the Franco-Prussian war was charted mostly by commanders who in different ways did not follow their orders exactly. Part of that was Auftragstaktik by individual commanders, but the key part was major commands moving forward quicker than the plan called for, resulting in the world's largest meeting engagement. The US civil war battle of Antietam was made possible by a major intelligence coup, but was indecisive because "stuff happens". These results are important for the use of AI in war.
 
At present, AI is "trained". It will always produced the "school" solution. This means AI is fundamentally incapable of executing Auftragstaktik unless it is very similar to a situation it has been trained upon, actually a "school solution". Against an intellectually agile opponent AI is at a tactical disadvantage. If and when AI achieves "General Intelligence" this limitation can be mitigated. At present, it would be possible to observe the opponent's previous responses to a certain threat and know exactly and reliably what your AI opponent will do. That can be fatally exploited. It is also unclear how and to what extent AI hierarchies can function. AI can only evaluate the data it has in the context of its training. If some of the "vital" data is missing, a situation that is common in war, no telling what the AI will do. The Borg solution requires lots of communication where the various parts of the entity "knows" a totality of what is transpiring. At present, such technology is well beyond the state of the art. The AI 11Bs available in the near future won't know much and are incapable of "figuring out" what to do and especially deciding to do it. Nobody is going to stand up and say "follow me" :-). If one did, none would follow because it isn't in their training set :-).
 
Therefore, IMO the most important use of AI in the near future is in intelligent weapons, specifically anti-drone weapons. It is a "detect, recognize, attack, pursue and destroy". For that, the school solution is fine. We have had wake-following weapons that could recognize specific ships and specific ship types for a long time. Super AI anti-drone weapons will IMO be in general use very soon.

[M T]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

[M T]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

[Goose]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

[Goose]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

[GK3]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

I believe you are correct.  Russian doctrine must require that potential routes of withdrawl must be prepared, bridges and other choke points mined in case it becomes necessary to destroy them. I believe the Russians will never forget Operation Barberossa. Of course almost any competent military would want to be in position to be able to limit an agressor by destroying access routes.  While geographic barriers may not be as important as they once were, they are still important to some extent.

[GK3]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

I believe you are correct.  Russian doctrine must require that potential routes of withdrawl must be prepared, bridges and other choke points mined in case it becomes necessary to destroy them. I believe the Russians will never forget Operation Barberossa. Of course almost any competent military would want to be in position to be able to limit an agressor by destroying access routes.  While geographic barriers may not be as important as they once were, they are still important to some extent.

[BostonCard]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

And of course Ukranians knowing this can use the fact against Russians by detonating the mines by hitting them with drones.

BC

[BostonCard]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

And of course Ukranians knowing this can use the fact against Russians by detonating the mines by hitting them with drones.

BC

[Goose]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

And of course Ukranians knowing this can use the fact against Russians by detonating the mines by hitting them with drones.

BC

Very probably the case IMO. The Ukrainians said they saw "unusual activity" but I am guessing this was an attempt at deception. They knew the Russian SOP. It is also quite possible that is also Ukrainian SOP :-). After all, they are reading the same manuals in many cases. In fairness to both sides in previous conflicts storing the explosives to mine the bridge approaches and the bridge itself wasn't very dangerous. Without drones, there was no good way to locate them and set them off. Not anymore :-).

The Ukrainians have made progress in reorganizing their military based on the Corps system. If they can last long enough to pull this off it will make them a much better military. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/...-steam.php Obviously such a development doesn't remove all legacy bad doctrine. It should help though.

[Goose]

I suspect another Russian General might take a high dive.

It seems Russian troops thought it was a good idea to stash a load of mines under bridges, presumably to hide them from surveillance.  Ooops.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/30/world/vid...sia-digvid

I doubt that was the reason. IMO it was following a "normal" Soviet practice of storing enough mines in the superstructure/underneath bridges to both a) mine the approach roads of the bridge if ordered and b) destroy the bridge if necessary. https://www.cnn.com/2025/08/29/world/ukr...rones-intl
This article seems to confirm that interpretation.

And of course Ukranians knowing this can use the fact against Russians by detonating the mines by hitting them with drones.

BC

Very probably the case IMO. The Ukrainians said they saw "unusual activity" but I am guessing this was an attempt at deception. They knew the Russian SOP. It is also quite possible that is also Ukrainian SOP :-). After all, they are reading the same manuals in many cases. In fairness to both sides in previous conflicts storing the explosives to mine the bridge approaches and the bridge itself wasn't very dangerous. Without drones, there was no good way to locate them and set them off. Not anymore :-).

The Ukrainians have made progress in reorganizing their military based on the Corps system. If they can last long enough to pull this off it will make them a much better military. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/...-steam.php Obviously such a development doesn't remove all legacy bad doctrine. It should help though.

[Goose]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/30/us/po...=url-share

This article should be gifted. It discusses the current relationship between the US administration and Modi. The US usage of "secondary tariffs" to reduce the trade in Russian oil is a tool that can possibly force Putin to stop the war. At the moment it is IMO probably the largest "card"" the US has to play. India is key to this process, as it is a very large importer of Russian oil. The administration had to bring a "deal" to India that was as close to revenue neutral as possible. This could have been accomplished. Instead the administration is resorting to brute force of tariffs to force India to cave on the Russian oil issue. That may or may not "work". Even if it does it will create lasting bad blood between India and the US. It will also come at a great political cost to Modi and he will not forget it.
 
India has never been an "ideal" trading partner with the US. It is not and won't for the foreseeable future be an ally of the US. However, attempting to force India into an agreement as a very "junior" partner has never worked in the past. It would be politically untenable for Modi if nothing else. Right now India has changed directions and once again building closer relations with Russia and China. If China builds pipelines that can deliver Russian oil to India the three nations can form a formidable energy alliance. The administration did not increase the China tariff in an attempt to force China to stop buying Russian oil. They may believe that China is too strong to be forced into such an action, while India OTOH is not. The result may be an agreement that insulates India from US pressure. In any case, the degraded relationship between India and the US bodes ill for the secondary tariff as a weapon for peace in Ukraine. It is one of the few cards the US has to play. So far, we are IMO seriously misplaying it.

[Goose]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/30/us/po...=url-share

This article should be gifted. It discusses the current relationship between the US administration and Modi. The US usage of "secondary tariffs" to reduce the trade in Russian oil is a tool that can possibly force Putin to stop the war. At the moment it is IMO probably the largest "card"" the US has to play. India is key to this process, as it is a very large importer of Russian oil. The administration had to bring a "deal" to India that was as close to revenue neutral as possible. This could have been accomplished. Instead the administration is resorting to brute force of tariffs to force India to cave on the Russian oil issue. That may or may not "work". Even if it does it will create lasting bad blood between India and the US. It will also come at a great political cost to Modi and he will not forget it.
 
India has never been an "ideal" trading partner with the US. It is not and won't for the foreseeable future be an ally of the US. However, attempting to force India into an agreement as a very "junior" partner has never worked in the past. It would be politically untenable for Modi if nothing else. Right now India has changed directions and once again building closer relations with Russia and China. If China builds pipelines that can deliver Russian oil to India the three nations can form a formidable energy alliance. The administration did not increase the China tariff in an attempt to force China to stop buying Russian oil. They may believe that China is too strong to be forced into such an action, while India OTOH is not. The result may be an agreement that insulates India from US pressure. In any case, the degraded relationship between India and the US bodes ill for the secondary tariff as a weapon for peace in Ukraine. It is one of the few cards the US has to play. So far, we are IMO seriously misplaying it.

[GK3]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

Winters in Europe can be pretty harsh, and now even summers in Europe need more energy to run increasing numbers of air conditioning units.  I think Europe is doing its best to build out renewable supplies, but that hasn't scaled quickly enough.  Unless there are available, central Asian sources of natural gas not financially tied to Russia, it's hard to see what would fill the gap.

I believe these refineries deal mostly with crude oil, not natural gas, so most of the output goes to the transportation sector, whether cars (gasoline), trucks and ships (diesel) or aircraft (jet fuel).  Only a small amount of the oil goes to generating electricity because generating electricity from petroleum is generally not cost effective.

BC

This report and associated graphs help illustrate the issue.  I am not sure if is a lack of ability or a lack of desire on part of Europe to find a  way to deal with the Shadow Fleet.
https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-cont...4.2025.pdf

[GK3]

You might think that four years into a war on their doorstep, European countries might diversify their energy supplies, but…

Winters in Europe can be pretty harsh, and now even summers in Europe need more energy to run increasing numbers of air conditioning units.  I think Europe is doing its best to build out renewable supplies, but that hasn't scaled quickly enough.  Unless there are available, central Asian sources of natural gas not financially tied to Russia, it's hard to see what would fill the gap.

I believe these refineries deal mostly with crude oil, not natural gas, so most of the output goes to the transportation sector, whether cars (gasoline), trucks and ships (diesel) or aircraft (jet fuel).  Only a small amount of the oil goes to generating electricity because generating electricity from petroleum is generally not cost effective.

BC

This report and associated graphs help illustrate the issue.  I am not sure if is a lack of ability or a lack of desire on part of Europe to find a  way to deal with the Shadow Fleet.
https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-cont...4.2025.pdf

[BostonCard]

https://www.politico.eu/article/top-russ...osthetics/

I can’t even…

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.politico.eu/article/top-russ...osthetics/

I can’t even…

BC

[GK3]

https://www.politico.eu/article/top-russ...osthetics/

I can’t even…

BC

BC thanks for posting that only as it allows us to see the thinking going on in Russia.  Here is a pretty current analysis of the Russian economic situation which according to this is not too bright.  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/09/04/rus...get-peace/

[GK3]

https://www.politico.eu/article/top-russ...osthetics/

I can’t even…

BC

BC thanks for posting that only as it allows us to see the thinking going on in Russia.  Here is a pretty current analysis of the Russian economic situation which according to this is not too bright.  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/09/04/rus...get-peace/

[Goose]

https://www.politico.eu/article/top-russ...osthetics/

I can’t even…

BC

BC thanks for posting that only as it allows us to see the thinking going on in Russia.  Here is a pretty current analysis of the Russian economic situation which according to this is not too bright.  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/09/04/rus...get-peace/

From the above link

In fact, economic pressure remains the best leverage that Ukraine’s supporters have over the Kremlin. It remains to be seen whether Europe and the United States will choose to play the economic ace they still have up their sleeves.

The "best" leverage may be inadequate, but it is what we have to work with. We must use it, and use it well. Modi has to be given an alternative source of crude at a price that isn't too much worse than he is paying Russia. That will be a "good deal" for him when the alternative is slightly cheaper Russian oil but also an extra 25% tariff on all India's exports to the US. IMO we really need to make this happen. The longer Russia can hang around economically the more probable it is other nations will "normalize" Russian aggression and go back to buying energy from them. The article may be incorrect. Russia may be in a "good" spot to weather a new set of sanctions. However, given that is our best leverage, we MUST execute it now before it ceases to be useful.

[Goose]

https://www.politico.eu/article/top-russ...osthetics/

I can’t even…

BC

BC thanks for posting that only as it allows us to see the thinking going on in Russia.  Here is a pretty current analysis of the Russian economic situation which according to this is not too bright.  
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/09/04/rus...get-peace/

From the above link

In fact, economic pressure remains the best leverage that Ukraine’s supporters have over the Kremlin. It remains to be seen whether Europe and the United States will choose to play the economic ace they still have up their sleeves.

The "best" leverage may be inadequate, but it is what we have to work with. We must use it, and use it well. Modi has to be given an alternative source of crude at a price that isn't too much worse than he is paying Russia. That will be a "good deal" for him when the alternative is slightly cheaper Russian oil but also an extra 25% tariff on all India's exports to the US. IMO we really need to make this happen. The longer Russia can hang around economically the more probable it is other nations will "normalize" Russian aggression and go back to buying energy from them. The article may be incorrect. Russia may be in a "good" spot to weather a new set of sanctions. However, given that is our best leverage, we MUST execute it now before it ceases to be useful.