(11-26-2025, 10:48 PM)M T Wrote: (11-26-2025, 04:35 PM)Goose Wrote: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025...p-analysis
IMO the question of who leaked the Witkoff calls is pretty "important". ...
IMO the question of why the administration continues to use non-military communications is close to criminal negligence.
In March, while Witkoff was in Russia, he took part in the infamous Houthi raid group chat over Signal. (He claims he only had his government issued phone with him at the time.) I still can't comprehend the use of that app without validation that the members of the chat have access to and need-to-know for such info.
It appears he was using WhatsApp for some of these conversations. I haven't seen anyone yet say that WhatsApp is approved for sensitive government communications. I wonder if he was using the same app(s) and device (and apparently a private plane) when his & Dmetriev's 28-point plan was leaked very recently.
Using any "app" and device that is not issued by the US government and transmitted entirely through government networks is not approved for classified information, period. Doing so is actually against the law, although only low-ranking people are ever punished for it. Realistically, anything radiated through the air is to some degree vulnerable. Military-grade encryption (and even more important military grade network characteristics and operating procedures) reduces the probability of a data breach to an "acceptable" level. If it goes over the public internet and/or the public telephone network the odds are very high it can be compromised, especially if high interest targets can be identified by signal externals. Sorting through the vast quantity of traffic on public networks is one of the main obstacles to finding "important" information.
Quote:I'm sure everyone realizes that if it were an allied nation-state that leaked these plans, all hell will break loose if that were found out, to the detriment of those & other allied nation-states.
Not necessarily. Often the aggrieved party is so embarrassed by the revelations they want the story to go away ASAP. Public airing of how it happened does the opposite of that. It is even more embarrassing that an ally was able to "break" the aggrieved party's communications security. While I am sure some smoking angry back-channel messages would be sent, IMO it is highly probable that would be the end of it.
Quote:I would find it hard to believe that any nation-state organization would risk that.
In general that is true. However there is precedent. One can go back as far as the Zimmerman Telegram. The UK was reading the (very simplistically coded) US traffic in real time at that point in history. There are other examples. GCHQ is one of the few allied organizations that can and has reliably kept the vast majority of its own secrets. There is also a direct path to the Prime Minister that is not subject to review or even documented. That is why I identified them as a distinct possibility. The rest of the UK government of course leaks, but they would never know or be involved in any way.
Quote:It could be someone as stupid as the guy that was indicted in spring of 2023 where he bragged about having top-secret material and showed it off just to prove he had it -- I meant JT as opposed to DJT.
Sure, it is possible but as both your examples show the desired notoriety requires attribution. Everybody, or at least the target audience, has to know who leaked it. The current leaks are very much non-attributed.
Quote:We know that the National Security Council reviews confidential calls, as mentioned in this recent news article. I would expect a Witkoff call with a Russian about this war would fall under that umbrella (*IF* WhatsApp is set up for that review to happen).
WhatsApp isn't involved. The National Security Council reviews (normally) summaries of "important" decrypted message traffic of various kinds from many sources. The various agencies identify what might be "interesting" and then an NSC minion reviews the data. Some of it may be interesting enough to go further. The NSC can ask for the "raw" decrypt if they deem it necessary. There may be push-back if the originating agency fears the raw data is potentially easily misinterpreted, easily attributable to its source, or if it reveals methods. The fact that these leaks were so proximate in time to the actual event argues against some low-ranking notoriety seeker being involved. The materials hadn't existed long enough for them to pass through lots of hands. Only people who either produced them or had a real "need to know" would have seen them. This very finite set would be the ones investigated for leaking. Again, not impossible but IMO improbable. Later on, others might have had access to them in the course of their work. Leaks then are much more probable.