[M T]

Ok, it isn't directly the war in Ukraine, but this is about a shadow fleet vessel.

Is anyone else confused and concerned about the fact that, with all the naval and air power the US had in the Caribbean, the US apparently wasn't able to stop and board the oil tanker that evaded us and now is claiming Russian protection?
NYT:

U.S. officials said the Coast Guard tried to intercept Bella 1 in the Caribbean after determining that it was not flying a valid national flag, making it subject to boarding under international law. But the ship did not comply and continued sailing. It has been pursued by U.S. forces ever since.

American officials have not publicly explained why the Coast Guard is waiting to board the tanker, which is not capable of outrunning U.S. vessels.

But boarding the fleeing Bella 1 would require a specialized boarding team capable of securing a moving vessel with a potentially hostile crew. It is unusual for civilian tankers to flee from such operations. The crews of two other tankers intercepted by U.S. forces near Venezuela this month both agreed to be boarded.

[M T]

Ok, it isn't directly the war in Ukraine, but this is about a shadow fleet vessel.

Is anyone else confused and concerned about the fact that, with all the naval and air power the US had in the Caribbean, the US apparently wasn't able to stop and board the oil tanker that evaded us and now is claiming Russian protection?
NYT:

U.S. officials said the Coast Guard tried to intercept Bella 1 in the Caribbean after determining that it was not flying a valid national flag, making it subject to boarding under international law. But the ship did not comply and continued sailing. It has been pursued by U.S. forces ever since.

American officials have not publicly explained why the Coast Guard is waiting to board the tanker, which is not capable of outrunning U.S. vessels.

But boarding the fleeing Bella 1 would require a specialized boarding team capable of securing a moving vessel with a potentially hostile crew. It is unusual for civilian tankers to flee from such operations. The crews of two other tankers intercepted by U.S. forces near Venezuela this month both agreed to be boarded.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/russ...19011.html

This is relevant to Ukraine in terms of interdicting Russian oil shipped via the "shadow fleet". Something in this scenario is rotten. No USCG vessel would be attempting to stop and "visit" another vessel without a boarding team embarked. IMO the US knew this vessel was Russia owned and that it would resist boarding. It probably has an armed anti-boarding team, or we fear it does. Otherwise, the stop and visit would have happened weeks ago.
 
Russia has now published a new registry of its ships that includes the tanker being pursued, under another name. Russia wants the US to leave it alone. What we SHOULD do is tell Russia that if it is a vessel registered in Russia it should have been flying a Russian flag. It was not. It also should be using its AIS transponder in accordance with international regulations. It was not. Therefore, the US needs to "visit" the vessel to ensure it indeed has the correct registration paperwork, has a Russian ensign, has a functioning AIS, has appropriate insurance, and that all its mariners are properly licensed. Then the questions of failure to comply with regulations can be addressed. Just tell them to stop and we will check these items out. If everything is as it should be, we will let them be on their way. Since they are now allegedly a legally registered Russian merchant ship, they should have no reason not to comply. We should also tell the Russians that if the vessel does not comply, we will have to assume it has been hijacked and we will act accordingly.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/russ...19011.html

This is relevant to Ukraine in terms of interdicting Russian oil shipped via the "shadow fleet". Something in this scenario is rotten. No USCG vessel would be attempting to stop and "visit" another vessel without a boarding team embarked. IMO the US knew this vessel was Russia owned and that it would resist boarding. It probably has an armed anti-boarding team, or we fear it does. Otherwise, the stop and visit would have happened weeks ago.
 
Russia has now published a new registry of its ships that includes the tanker being pursued, under another name. Russia wants the US to leave it alone. What we SHOULD do is tell Russia that if it is a vessel registered in Russia it should have been flying a Russian flag. It was not. It also should be using its AIS transponder in accordance with international regulations. It was not. Therefore, the US needs to "visit" the vessel to ensure it indeed has the correct registration paperwork, has a Russian ensign, has a functioning AIS, has appropriate insurance, and that all its mariners are properly licensed. Then the questions of failure to comply with regulations can be addressed. Just tell them to stop and we will check these items out. If everything is as it should be, we will let them be on their way. Since they are now allegedly a legally registered Russian merchant ship, they should have no reason not to comply. We should also tell the Russians that if the vessel does not comply, we will have to assume it has been hijacked and we will act accordingly.

[BostonCard]

Well, that, as they say, escalated quickly.

I lived about 5 minutes away from La Carlota (the airfield) that got struck.  I have lots of thoughts, as I grew up in Caracas from age 6 to 16, but this is perhaps not the best place to share them.

Just hope that however this turns out, it does so with a minimal loss of life.

BC

[BostonCard]

Well, that, as they say, escalated quickly.

I lived about 5 minutes away from La Carlota (the airfield) that got struck.  I have lots of thoughts, as I grew up in Caracas from age 6 to 16, but this is perhaps not the best place to share them.

Just hope that however this turns out, it does so with a minimal loss of life.

BC

[dabigv13]

The only way for a state to maintain sovereignty is possession of nuclear weapons. NK digested that lesson already.

[dabigv13]

The only way for a state to maintain sovereignty is possession of nuclear weapons. NK digested that lesson already.

[Goose]

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/01/03/...93c37a624b

It appears that Putin isn't the only "leader" that believes it is legitimate to seize a sovereign state because he doesn't like its politics. While IMO the government of Venezuela indeed was oppressive of its population and certainly not a democracy in any real sense, unilaterally overthrowing it is not in accordance with international norms previously advocated by the US. We may be off to a much better start than Putin was in terms of overthrowing the government, but as history as clearly shown, what comes next may not be pleasant for the US or Venezuela and may not lead to anything close to the "desired" end state, whatever that may be.
 
It is very difficult to explain how the US actions are in any way different legally and morally than what Putin is doing in Ukraine. We may have been better at it, and we probably have not yet committed war crimes or caused massive civilian casualties. We have taken the first steps toward "de-Maduroizing" Venezuela, just as Putin wants to de-Nazifying Ukraine. IMO many Venezuelans will not thank us for it. I also want to understand the process that allowed the US to execute this operation. Was congress' (both houses, both parties) leadership informed of this action and allowed to give or withhold its consent?

[Goose]

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/01/03/...93c37a624b

It appears that Putin isn't the only "leader" that believes it is legitimate to seize a sovereign state because he doesn't like its politics. While IMO the government of Venezuela indeed was oppressive of its population and certainly not a democracy in any real sense, unilaterally overthrowing it is not in accordance with international norms previously advocated by the US. We may be off to a much better start than Putin was in terms of overthrowing the government, but as history as clearly shown, what comes next may not be pleasant for the US or Venezuela and may not lead to anything close to the "desired" end state, whatever that may be.
 
It is very difficult to explain how the US actions are in any way different legally and morally than what Putin is doing in Ukraine. We may have been better at it, and we probably have not yet committed war crimes or caused massive civilian casualties. We have taken the first steps toward "de-Maduroizing" Venezuela, just as Putin wants to de-Nazifying Ukraine. IMO many Venezuelans will not thank us for it. I also want to understand the process that allowed the US to execute this operation. Was congress' (both houses, both parties) leadership informed of this action and allowed to give or withhold its consent?

[dabigv13]

Neither party's leaders were notified. The constitutional basis was the president's inherent authority to protect the country from the imminent threat of Venezuelan cocaine.

Rubio said called some members of Congress after. Said it was largely a law enforcement function

https://x.com/lrozen/status/2007502484718456956?s=20

[dabigv13]

Neither party's leaders were notified. The constitutional basis was the president's inherent authority to protect the country from the imminent threat of Venezuelan cocaine.

Rubio said called some members of Congress after. Said it was largely a law enforcement function

https://x.com/lrozen/status/2007502484718456956?s=20

[Mick]

It is very difficult to explain how the US actions are in any way different legally and morally than what Putin is doing in Ukraine. We may have been better at it, and we probably have not yet committed war crimes or caused massive civilian casualties. We have taken the first steps toward "de-Maduroizing" Venezuela, just as Putin wants to de-Nazifying Ukraine. IMO many Venezuelans will not thank us for it. I also want to understand the process that allowed the US to execute this operation. Was congress' (both houses, both parties) leadership informed of this action and allowed to give or withhold its consent?

Yeah, I'm not a fan despite the dictator overthrow. Separately, I wasn't aware that American forces had spirited his key opponent out of the country (this is the one that won the Nobel Peace Prize) before Maduro's forces could capture and torture her and I have no doubt that Maduro's allies and those benefiting economically will condemn the action.

In fact, I think that's the way it is for most voters. It's the economy, stupid -- according to the sign on President Clinton's desk. When there are economic shocks, the party in power loses...as both American parties have found out/are finding out.

How are the US actions different legally and morally than what Putin is doing? I'll give it a shot:

Nature and scale of war
Ukraine: A full-scale, multi-front interstate war to seize/hold territory, involving major ground, air, and missile campaigns across a large country.
Venezuela/Maduro: A short, targeted operation focused on capturing a head of state, paired with maritime strikes/interdictions framed as counter-narcotics actions.

Stated objectives
Ukraine: Russia has pursued maximal political and territorial aims (including claims over occupied areas and demands about Ukraine’s strategic alignment).
Venezuela/Maduro: The U.S. publicly justified action as removing a “narco-terror” leadership and disrupting drug trafficking networks/boats.

Territorial annexation vs. leadership removal
Ukraine: Russia has attempted to formalize control via annexation claims/referendums in occupied regions.
Venezuela/Maduro: No annexation claim; the operation was described as capture/removal and temporary administration goals rather than absorbing territory.

How each action is treated under international law (as argued publicly)
Ukraine: Widely condemned as aggression; the UN General Assembly demanded Russia withdraw.
Venezuela/Maduro: Also widely criticized as likely unlawful use of force absent UN authorization/self-defense; legal experts quoted described it as violating the UN Charter.

International response patterns
Ukraine: Broad, sustained diplomatic/economic response over years (sanctions, isolation, ongoing UN focus).
Venezuela/Maduro: Immediate condemnation and shock, but the situation is new and the global reaction is still forming in real time.

Duration and endgame
Ukraine: A long-running conflict (approaching four years as of late Dec 2025 reporting), with shifting battle lines and negotiation demands.
Venezuela/Maduro: Described as a rapid raid/strike culminating in capture, with downstream political/legal fallout rather than a prolonged conventional campaign.

Primary military method
Ukraine: Combined-arms invasion with large-scale ground occupation and sustained strikes.
Venezuela/Maduro: Special-operation-style capture plus maritime/air strikes on vessels alleged to be drug-running.

Targets
Ukraine: Military forces, infrastructure, and governance across wide areas—war fought against another state’s armed forces and territory.
Venezuela/Maduro: Leadership target (Maduro) and specific maritime targets (boats), with claims the strikes were aimed at trafficking networks.

Economic dimension
Ukraine: Economic coercion largely external (sanctions regimes, trade/energy disruptions) layered onto the battlefield war.
Venezuela/Maduro: Reports emphasize direct coercive pressure tied to oil/shipping (blockade/seizures) alongside the operation.

Information environment and controversy
Ukraine: Dispute often centers on battlefield facts, responsibility for attacks, and legitimacy of territorial claims.
Venezuela/Maduro: Dispute centers heavily on legality/authorization, civilian risk in “drug boat” strikes, and regime-change precedent.

[Mick]

It is very difficult to explain how the US actions are in any way different legally and morally than what Putin is doing in Ukraine. We may have been better at it, and we probably have not yet committed war crimes or caused massive civilian casualties. We have taken the first steps toward "de-Maduroizing" Venezuela, just as Putin wants to de-Nazifying Ukraine. IMO many Venezuelans will not thank us for it. I also want to understand the process that allowed the US to execute this operation. Was congress' (both houses, both parties) leadership informed of this action and allowed to give or withhold its consent?

Yeah, I'm not a fan despite the dictator overthrow. Separately, I wasn't aware that American forces had spirited his key opponent out of the country (this is the one that won the Nobel Peace Prize) before Maduro's forces could capture and torture her and I have no doubt that Maduro's allies and those benefiting economically will condemn the action.

In fact, I think that's the way it is for most voters. It's the economy, stupid -- according to the sign on President Clinton's desk. When there are economic shocks, the party in power loses...as both American parties have found out/are finding out.

How are the US actions different legally and morally than what Putin is doing? I'll give it a shot:

Nature and scale of war
Ukraine: A full-scale, multi-front interstate war to seize/hold territory, involving major ground, air, and missile campaigns across a large country.
Venezuela/Maduro: A short, targeted operation focused on capturing a head of state, paired with maritime strikes/interdictions framed as counter-narcotics actions.

Stated objectives
Ukraine: Russia has pursued maximal political and territorial aims (including claims over occupied areas and demands about Ukraine’s strategic alignment).
Venezuela/Maduro: The U.S. publicly justified action as removing a “narco-terror” leadership and disrupting drug trafficking networks/boats.

Territorial annexation vs. leadership removal
Ukraine: Russia has attempted to formalize control via annexation claims/referendums in occupied regions.
Venezuela/Maduro: No annexation claim; the operation was described as capture/removal and temporary administration goals rather than absorbing territory.

How each action is treated under international law (as argued publicly)
Ukraine: Widely condemned as aggression; the UN General Assembly demanded Russia withdraw.
Venezuela/Maduro: Also widely criticized as likely unlawful use of force absent UN authorization/self-defense; legal experts quoted described it as violating the UN Charter.

International response patterns
Ukraine: Broad, sustained diplomatic/economic response over years (sanctions, isolation, ongoing UN focus).
Venezuela/Maduro: Immediate condemnation and shock, but the situation is new and the global reaction is still forming in real time.

Duration and endgame
Ukraine: A long-running conflict (approaching four years as of late Dec 2025 reporting), with shifting battle lines and negotiation demands.
Venezuela/Maduro: Described as a rapid raid/strike culminating in capture, with downstream political/legal fallout rather than a prolonged conventional campaign.

Primary military method
Ukraine: Combined-arms invasion with large-scale ground occupation and sustained strikes.
Venezuela/Maduro: Special-operation-style capture plus maritime/air strikes on vessels alleged to be drug-running.

Targets
Ukraine: Military forces, infrastructure, and governance across wide areas—war fought against another state’s armed forces and territory.
Venezuela/Maduro: Leadership target (Maduro) and specific maritime targets (boats), with claims the strikes were aimed at trafficking networks.

Economic dimension
Ukraine: Economic coercion largely external (sanctions regimes, trade/energy disruptions) layered onto the battlefield war.
Venezuela/Maduro: Reports emphasize direct coercive pressure tied to oil/shipping (blockade/seizures) alongside the operation.

Information environment and controversy
Ukraine: Dispute often centers on battlefield facts, responsibility for attacks, and legitimacy of territorial claims.
Venezuela/Maduro: Dispute centers heavily on legality/authorization, civilian risk in “drug boat” strikes, and regime-change precedent.

[TrumpCard]

Reasons for concern:
Muscular U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela, Iran, etc., is creating apprehension about future conflicts. 
Difficulty with bright-line, principled distinctions between Venezuelan military action and other conflicts that are indisputably unjustified.
Unknown final outcome, with significant risks, some outside U.S. control.

Reasons to wait-and-see:
Deposed leader actually was an authoritarian human rights violator who led a narcotics syndicate.
U.S. action to date has been targeted, with limited loss of innocent civilian life.

Broader context:
Deposing Latin American leaders has often turned out poorly
But the U.S. has achieved good results on occasion, such as with regime change in Panama and the Dominican Republic.  
Expanding the analysis to other regions, the U.S. decision to install the Shah worked out poorly, as did Saddam Hussein's overthrow.
But the U.S. did well in precipitating regime change in Central Europe at the end of the Cold War.
Highlighting one example or another can be misleading, and it's difficult to generalize whether regime change is ever/never a good idea.

[TrumpCard]

Reasons for concern:
Muscular U.S. foreign policy in Venezuela, Iran, etc., is creating apprehension about future conflicts. 
Difficulty with bright-line, principled distinctions between Venezuelan military action and other conflicts that are indisputably unjustified.
Unknown final outcome, with significant risks, some outside U.S. control.

Reasons to wait-and-see:
Deposed leader actually was an authoritarian human rights violator who led a narcotics syndicate.
U.S. action to date has been targeted, with limited loss of innocent civilian life.

Broader context:
Deposing Latin American leaders has often turned out poorly
But the U.S. has achieved good results on occasion, such as with regime change in Panama and the Dominican Republic.  
Expanding the analysis to other regions, the U.S. decision to install the Shah worked out poorly, as did Saddam Hussein's overthrow.
But the U.S. did well in precipitating regime change in Central Europe at the end of the Cold War.
Highlighting one example or another can be misleading, and it's difficult to generalize whether regime change is ever/never a good idea.

[BostonCard]

Per Mike McFaul (Stanford professor), the US is 4/14 on “successful” regime change and 3 of them are the Axis powers of World War II.  The 4th was Panama.  Obviously lots of varied definitions of “success” so hard to assess cleanly.

BC

[BostonCard]

Per Mike McFaul (Stanford professor), the US is 4/14 on “successful” regime change and 3 of them are the Axis powers of World War II.  The 4th was Panama.  Obviously lots of varied definitions of “success” so hard to assess cleanly.

BC

[M T]

• Consider the veracity of the person who is stating what the goals and reasons and future plans are.  
  
• Consider that this was described as being planned for months (apparently before calling all Generals to DC; before the resignation of the US Southern Command Admiral; before the movement of the US Navy; before the claims that this was about cocaine to the US) without letting Congress apply its Constitutional authority.  
  
• Consider the difference, if any, of taking the surface area versus taking the oil & minerals under the surface.  
  
• Consider the physical and/or territorial threats also made against other countries (Greenland, Colombia, Nigeria, Iran, Canada, Mexico) and the economic threats against the rest of the world and the opposition within the attacking country.
  
• Consider the lack of support of the population of the attacking country.
  

[M T]

• Consider the veracity of the person who is stating what the goals and reasons and future plans are.  
  
• Consider that this was described as being planned for months (apparently before calling all Generals to DC; before the resignation of the US Southern Command Admiral; before the movement of the US Navy; before the claims that this was about cocaine to the US) without letting Congress apply its Constitutional authority.  
  
• Consider the difference, if any, of taking the surface area versus taking the oil & minerals under the surface.  
  
• Consider the physical and/or territorial threats also made against other countries (Greenland, Colombia, Nigeria, Iran, Canada, Mexico) and the economic threats against the rest of the world and the opposition within the attacking country.
  
• Consider the lack of support of the population of the attacking country.
  

[Goose]

Yeah, I'm not a fan despite the dictator overthrow. Separately, I wasn't aware that American forces had spirited his key opponent out of the country (this is the one that won the Nobel Peace Prize) before Maduro's forces could capture and torture her and I have no doubt that Maduro's allies and those benefiting economically will condemn the action.

In fact, I think that's the way it is for most voters. It's the economy, stupid -- according to the sign on President Clinton's desk. When there are economic shocks, the party in power loses...as both American parties have found out/are finding out.

How are the US actions different legally and morally than what Putin is doing? I'll give it a shot:

Nature and scale of war
Ukraine: A full-scale, multi-front interstate war to seize/hold territory, involving major ground, air, and missile campaigns across a large country.
Venezuela/Maduro: A short, targeted operation focused on capturing a head of state, paired with maritime strikes/interdictions framed as counter-narcotics actions.

IMO the difference was that the US was competent and the Russians were not. Remember, Putin expected to capture Kiev in 24 to 48 hours max. It was definitely intended to be a short, targeted operation. Russia would then "run things". It became a full-scale multi-front war when Ukraine didn't fold up as Russia expected. The administration has a plan for what should evolve in Venezuela. If it doesn't go that way it can easily become a "full scale war". Remember, Iraq was supposed to be the quick and easy removal of a dictator and a quick installation of a flowering democracy. Didn't turn out that way.

Stated objectives
Ukraine: Russia has pursued maximal political and territorial aims (including claims over occupied areas and demands about Ukraine’s strategic alignment).
Venezuela/Maduro: The U.S. publicly justified action as removing a “narco-terror” leadership and disrupting drug trafficking networks/boats.

So far, the administration has presented no evidence I am aware of that Maduro is a "narco-terrorist". The somewhat externally similar removal of Noriega from Panama differed importantly in that Noriega had already been indited in two separate federal jurisdictions. If Maduro is so guilty, why was that not done? Another important legal (but probably not practical) difference was that Noriega was not an elected official of the Panamanian government. He was a military officer, not a legitimate government representative. I do hope the administration actually has the "goods" on Maduro.

Territorial annexation vs. leadership removal
Ukraine: Russia has attempted to formalize control via annexation claims/referendums in occupied regions.
Venezuela/Maduro: No annexation claim; the operation was described as capture/removal and temporary administration goals rather than absorbing territory.

Yet we are going to "run things". Our expectation is that US companies will be given access to the oil resources of Venezuela. Presumably we will at least initially have a "compliant" government in Venezuela. Operationally, the two things will not be all that different. Putin attempted the same by supporting a pro-Russian presidential regime in Ukraine, including personally campaigning for that outcome inside Ukraine. He expected to succeed in that effort, and most of the world expected that success.  When that didn't happen eventually force became the answer.

How each action is treated under international law (as argued publicly)
Ukraine: Widely condemned as aggression; the UN General Assembly demanded Russia withdraw.
Venezuela/Maduro: Also widely criticized as likely unlawful use of force absent UN authorization/self-defense; legal experts quoted described it as violating the UN Charter.

International response patterns
Ukraine: Broad, sustained diplomatic/economic response over years (sanctions, isolation, ongoing UN focus).
Venezuela/Maduro: Immediate condemnation and shock, but the situation is new and the global reaction is still forming in real time.

Duration and endgame
Ukraine: A long-running conflict (approaching four years as of late Dec 2025 reporting), with shifting battle lines and negotiation demands.
Venezuela/Maduro: Described as a rapid raid/strike culminating in capture, with downstream political/legal fallout rather than a prolonged conventional campaign.

Primary military method
Ukraine: Combined-arms invasion with large-scale ground occupation and sustained strikes.
Venezuela/Maduro: Special-operation-style capture plus maritime/air strikes on vessels alleged to be drug-running.

Targets
Ukraine: Military forces, infrastructure, and governance across wide areas—war fought against another state’s armed forces and territory.
Venezuela/Maduro: Leadership target (Maduro) and specific maritime targets (boats), with claims the strikes were aimed at trafficking networks.

Economic dimension
Ukraine: Economic coercion largely external (sanctions regimes, trade/energy disruptions) layered onto the battlefield war.
Venezuela/Maduro: Reports emphasize direct coercive pressure tied to oil/shipping (blockade/seizures) alongside the operation.

Information environment and controversy
Ukraine: Dispute often centers on battlefield facts, responsibility for attacks, and legitimacy of territorial claims.
Venezuela/Maduro: Dispute centers heavily on legality/authorization, civilian risk in “drug boat” strikes, and regime-change precedent.

While I do agree with many of the points you make, what the US has done is regime change, whatever out justification. That is also what Russia initially desired in Ukraine. They wanted another Belarus. When that didn't happen, military action was the result. Russia expected a very quick victory. The US already believes it has achieved victory in Venezuela. If that actually happens the two outcomes may diverge. However, the ends don't justify the means. OTOH, if the  Venezuela story becomes less of a quick victory (as we experienced in Iraq) the to outcomes may end up looking much more alike.

---

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/...-terrorism

It turns out there was an outstanding indictment of Maduro. Again, I hope the DOJ can actually prove its case with evidence that will stand up in court.

[Goose]

Yeah, I'm not a fan despite the dictator overthrow. Separately, I wasn't aware that American forces had spirited his key opponent out of the country (this is the one that won the Nobel Peace Prize) before Maduro's forces could capture and torture her and I have no doubt that Maduro's allies and those benefiting economically will condemn the action.

In fact, I think that's the way it is for most voters. It's the economy, stupid -- according to the sign on President Clinton's desk. When there are economic shocks, the party in power loses...as both American parties have found out/are finding out.

How are the US actions different legally and morally than what Putin is doing? I'll give it a shot:

Nature and scale of war
Ukraine: A full-scale, multi-front interstate war to seize/hold territory, involving major ground, air, and missile campaigns across a large country.
Venezuela/Maduro: A short, targeted operation focused on capturing a head of state, paired with maritime strikes/interdictions framed as counter-narcotics actions.

IMO the difference was that the US was competent and the Russians were not. Remember, Putin expected to capture Kiev in 24 to 48 hours max. It was definitely intended to be a short, targeted operation. Russia would then "run things". It became a full-scale multi-front war when Ukraine didn't fold up as Russia expected. The administration has a plan for what should evolve in Venezuela. If it doesn't go that way it can easily become a "full scale war". Remember, Iraq was supposed to be the quick and easy removal of a dictator and a quick installation of a flowering democracy. Didn't turn out that way.

Stated objectives
Ukraine: Russia has pursued maximal political and territorial aims (including claims over occupied areas and demands about Ukraine’s strategic alignment).
Venezuela/Maduro: The U.S. publicly justified action as removing a “narco-terror” leadership and disrupting drug trafficking networks/boats.

So far, the administration has presented no evidence I am aware of that Maduro is a "narco-terrorist". The somewhat externally similar removal of Noriega from Panama differed importantly in that Noriega had already been indited in two separate federal jurisdictions. If Maduro is so guilty, why was that not done? Another important legal (but probably not practical) difference was that Noriega was not an elected official of the Panamanian government. He was a military officer, not a legitimate government representative. I do hope the administration actually has the "goods" on Maduro.

Territorial annexation vs. leadership removal
Ukraine: Russia has attempted to formalize control via annexation claims/referendums in occupied regions.
Venezuela/Maduro: No annexation claim; the operation was described as capture/removal and temporary administration goals rather than absorbing territory.

Yet we are going to "run things". Our expectation is that US companies will be given access to the oil resources of Venezuela. Presumably we will at least initially have a "compliant" government in Venezuela. Operationally, the two things will not be all that different. Putin attempted the same by supporting a pro-Russian presidential regime in Ukraine, including personally campaigning for that outcome inside Ukraine. He expected to succeed in that effort, and most of the world expected that success.  When that didn't happen eventually force became the answer.

How each action is treated under international law (as argued publicly)
Ukraine: Widely condemned as aggression; the UN General Assembly demanded Russia withdraw.
Venezuela/Maduro: Also widely criticized as likely unlawful use of force absent UN authorization/self-defense; legal experts quoted described it as violating the UN Charter.

International response patterns
Ukraine: Broad, sustained diplomatic/economic response over years (sanctions, isolation, ongoing UN focus).
Venezuela/Maduro: Immediate condemnation and shock, but the situation is new and the global reaction is still forming in real time.

Duration and endgame
Ukraine: A long-running conflict (approaching four years as of late Dec 2025 reporting), with shifting battle lines and negotiation demands.
Venezuela/Maduro: Described as a rapid raid/strike culminating in capture, with downstream political/legal fallout rather than a prolonged conventional campaign.

Primary military method
Ukraine: Combined-arms invasion with large-scale ground occupation and sustained strikes.
Venezuela/Maduro: Special-operation-style capture plus maritime/air strikes on vessels alleged to be drug-running.

Targets
Ukraine: Military forces, infrastructure, and governance across wide areas—war fought against another state’s armed forces and territory.
Venezuela/Maduro: Leadership target (Maduro) and specific maritime targets (boats), with claims the strikes were aimed at trafficking networks.

Economic dimension
Ukraine: Economic coercion largely external (sanctions regimes, trade/energy disruptions) layered onto the battlefield war.
Venezuela/Maduro: Reports emphasize direct coercive pressure tied to oil/shipping (blockade/seizures) alongside the operation.

Information environment and controversy
Ukraine: Dispute often centers on battlefield facts, responsibility for attacks, and legitimacy of territorial claims.
Venezuela/Maduro: Dispute centers heavily on legality/authorization, civilian risk in “drug boat” strikes, and regime-change precedent.

While I do agree with many of the points you make, what the US has done is regime change, whatever out justification. That is also what Russia initially desired in Ukraine. They wanted another Belarus. When that didn't happen, military action was the result. Russia expected a very quick victory. The US already believes it has achieved victory in Venezuela. If that actually happens the two outcomes may diverge. However, the ends don't justify the means. OTOH, if the  Venezuela story becomes less of a quick victory (as we experienced in Iraq) the to outcomes may end up looking much more alike.

---

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/...-terrorism

It turns out there was an outstanding indictment of Maduro. Again, I hope the DOJ can actually prove its case with evidence that will stand up in court.

[Papa John]

I'm going to refrain from detailing my mixed reaction to the deposing of Maduro and hope for the best. And yes, I know that hope is not a strategy...

But back to the topic of this thread, anyone care to speculate how today's events might affect Russia's war in Ukraine?

[Papa John]

I'm going to refrain from detailing my mixed reaction to the deposing of Maduro and hope for the best. And yes, I know that hope is not a strategy...

But back to the topic of this thread, anyone care to speculate how today's events might affect Russia's war in Ukraine?

[Goose]

But back to the topic of this thread, anyone care to speculate how today's events might affect Russia's war in Ukraine?

Interesting question. On the one hand, Putin may believe this is a distraction for the president that will cause peace in Ukraine to become a much less important issue for this administration. Putin may also evaluate the action as liable to get the US enmeshed in another long-running military money and troop sink. That would weaken the US ability to act elsewhere.
 
OTOH it is an action directed against a Russian ally. It is also arguably an example of the administration acting unpredictably. That may cause Putin to exercise more caution regarding his ability to get the administration to follow Putin's desired "peace" process. One day the administration may totally unexpectedly and without discussion with Russia just give Ukraine Tomahawks.

[Goose]

But back to the topic of this thread, anyone care to speculate how today's events might affect Russia's war in Ukraine?

Interesting question. On the one hand, Putin may believe this is a distraction for the president that will cause peace in Ukraine to become a much less important issue for this administration. Putin may also evaluate the action as liable to get the US enmeshed in another long-running military money and troop sink. That would weaken the US ability to act elsewhere.
 
OTOH it is an action directed against a Russian ally. It is also arguably an example of the administration acting unpredictably. That may cause Putin to exercise more caution regarding his ability to get the administration to follow Putin's desired "peace" process. One day the administration may totally unexpectedly and without discussion with Russia just give Ukraine Tomahawks.

[Mick]

I'm going to refrain from detailing my mixed reaction to the deposing of Maduro and hope for the best. And yes, I know that hope is not a strategy...

But back to the topic of this thread, anyone care to speculate how today's events might affect Russia's war in Ukraine?

1. Doesn't directly change battlefield dynamics, Ukrainian capabilities or Russian force posture.
2. Propaganda "moral" boom for Moscow. 
3. Russian Image as protector suffers, since they were close to Venezuela (also lost Assad in Syria). Maduro government was propped up by Russia, including loans, arms, military advisors. have to write that off now.
4. Overall weakens Putin's Global posture. Signals U. S. willingness to dismantle Russian allies. Russian multipolar influence eroded.
5. Possibility: Tacit exchange, Russia accepts U.S. interests in Venezuela for concessions in Ukraine. Some think Russia have baited the U.S. into this move.
6. Lesser propaganda boom for China, esp. if they want to attack Taiwan.
7. U. S. Aid to Ukraine gets messier. U.S. Political attention bandwidth shifts, slowing decision cycles.
8. Alliance cohesion risk. U. S. European allies will not be favorable.
9. Energy price channel changes. Short term: Russian war effort sensitive to oil & gas revenue and Venezuela was a key partner for Russia to circumvent sanctions, will be worse if U.S. authorities run things in Venezuela. Will make it harder for Russia to fund military activities. 
10. Venezuela is likely to increase capacity to max to boost revenue, lowering global oil costs.
11. Long term, Venezuela has brobdingnagian reserves, but degraded capacity, output recovery will take years. They will need financing. It won't come from Russia. Some already there from China. How deeply will the USA jump in?
12. how does it affect China/Russian alignment? China has Venezuelan interests, could alter China's support for Russia.

Overall: May hasten end to Ukraine conflict. Political distraction, messaging leverage for russia. Only truly material lever is energy market effects.

[Mick]

I'm going to refrain from detailing my mixed reaction to the deposing of Maduro and hope for the best. And yes, I know that hope is not a strategy...

But back to the topic of this thread, anyone care to speculate how today's events might affect Russia's war in Ukraine?

1. Doesn't directly change battlefield dynamics, Ukrainian capabilities or Russian force posture.
2. Propaganda "moral" boom for Moscow. 
3. Russian Image as protector suffers, since they were close to Venezuela (also lost Assad in Syria). Maduro government was propped up by Russia, including loans, arms, military advisors. have to write that off now.
4. Overall weakens Putin's Global posture. Signals U. S. willingness to dismantle Russian allies. Russian multipolar influence eroded.
5. Possibility: Tacit exchange, Russia accepts U.S. interests in Venezuela for concessions in Ukraine. Some think Russia have baited the U.S. into this move.
6. Lesser propaganda boom for China, esp. if they want to attack Taiwan.
7. U. S. Aid to Ukraine gets messier. U.S. Political attention bandwidth shifts, slowing decision cycles.
8. Alliance cohesion risk. U. S. European allies will not be favorable.
9. Energy price channel changes. Short term: Russian war effort sensitive to oil & gas revenue and Venezuela was a key partner for Russia to circumvent sanctions, will be worse if U.S. authorities run things in Venezuela. Will make it harder for Russia to fund military activities. 
10. Venezuela is likely to increase capacity to max to boost revenue, lowering global oil costs.
11. Long term, Venezuela has brobdingnagian reserves, but degraded capacity, output recovery will take years. They will need financing. It won't come from Russia. Some already there from China. How deeply will the USA jump in?
12. how does it affect China/Russian alignment? China has Venezuelan interests, could alter China's support for Russia.

Overall: May hasten end to Ukraine conflict. Political distraction, messaging leverage for russia. Only truly material lever is energy market effects.

[TrumpCard]

I think we've hit the nail on the head with three points:
(1) At this stage, we don't know the extent of evidence of Maduro's involvement in narcotics trafficking.  
(2) The situation in Venezuela could escalate, but as of now, the situation is not remotely comparable to the situation in Ukraine.  
(3) Using statistics like "the U.S. succeeded in 4/14 military actions to effectuate regime change" is a fraught exercise because the sample sizes are small and the uncontrolled variables are significant.  

Based on these conclusions, I think outsiders to the foreign policy establishment, like most of us on this board, should defer judgment on the whether the U.S. did the right thing.  It's interesting to follow world events, but I tend to tune out reflexive commentary that's based on what, in theory, might happen in the future.  For now, I just hope that the administration has "the goods" on Maduro and that the U.S. doesn't get pulled deep into chaos in Venezuela.  For that reason, I tend to think the posts in this thread on Venezuela are just thread drift and that, at least for now, the exercise of trying to connect the two conflicts in Venezuela and Ukraine is misguided.  For example, although the U.S. may be interested in improving its own access to Venezuelan oil, I think it's highly speculative to posit that U.S. action in Venezuela will significantly alter the overall amount of oil that Venezuela contributes to global supply, let alone effect Russia's economy enough to alter the war in Ukraine.

[TrumpCard]

I think we've hit the nail on the head with three points:
(1) At this stage, we don't know the extent of evidence of Maduro's involvement in narcotics trafficking.  
(2) The situation in Venezuela could escalate, but as of now, the situation is not remotely comparable to the situation in Ukraine.  
(3) Using statistics like "the U.S. succeeded in 4/14 military actions to effectuate regime change" is a fraught exercise because the sample sizes are small and the uncontrolled variables are significant.  

Based on these conclusions, I think outsiders to the foreign policy establishment, like most of us on this board, should defer judgment on the whether the U.S. did the right thing.  It's interesting to follow world events, but I tend to tune out reflexive commentary that's based on what, in theory, might happen in the future.  For now, I just hope that the administration has "the goods" on Maduro and that the U.S. doesn't get pulled deep into chaos in Venezuela.  For that reason, I tend to think the posts in this thread on Venezuela are just thread drift and that, at least for now, the exercise of trying to connect the two conflicts in Venezuela and Ukraine is misguided.  For example, although the U.S. may be interested in improving its own access to Venezuelan oil, I think it's highly speculative to posit that U.S. action in Venezuela will significantly alter the overall amount of oil that Venezuela contributes to global supply, let alone effect Russia's economy enough to alter the war in Ukraine.

[BostonCard]

I think for anyone hoping that this was somehow a catalyst to a free and Democratic Venezuela, things are off to an inauspicious start.

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/world...ident.html

So, the rightfully elected leader of Venezuela, Edmundo González is not in either Trump’s nor the regime’s plans, and Nobel Peace Prize winner and leader of the opposition Maria Corina Machado was dismissed as “very nice woman [who] doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country”.

BC

[BostonCard]

I think for anyone hoping that this was somehow a catalyst to a free and Democratic Venezuela, things are off to an inauspicious start.

https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/world...ident.html

So, the rightfully elected leader of Venezuela, Edmundo González is not in either Trump’s nor the regime’s plans, and Nobel Peace Prize winner and leader of the opposition Maria Corina Machado was dismissed as “very nice woman [who] doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country”.

BC

[dabigv13]

I don't think anyone, let alone a US citizen in whose name 40+ people were killed for this, should defer judgement on this operation. I think it's very fair to question how this makes the US safer. Or whether violating other nation's sovereignty is likely to make the world a more or less poor and violent place.

Early indications are US oil companies had earlier notification of our Venezuela attack than our elected representatives (and don't particularly want to be involved).

https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/03...n-00709782

I think that indicates the foresight and planning that went into the post-kidnapping "reconstruction", or lack thereof.

Also, the wife of Trump advisor Stephen Miller posted this, of you wonder where our imperial aims are next.

https://x.com/KatieMiller/status/2007541...44266?s=20

(A map of Greenland with the American flag superimposed, and text SOON)

[dabigv13]

I don't think anyone, let alone a US citizen in whose name 40+ people were killed for this, should defer judgement on this operation. I think it's very fair to question how this makes the US safer. Or whether violating other nation's sovereignty is likely to make the world a more or less poor and violent place.

Early indications are US oil companies had earlier notification of our Venezuela attack than our elected representatives (and don't particularly want to be involved).

https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/03...n-00709782

I think that indicates the foresight and planning that went into the post-kidnapping "reconstruction", or lack thereof.

Also, the wife of Trump advisor Stephen Miller posted this, of you wonder where our imperial aims are next.

https://x.com/KatieMiller/status/2007541...44266?s=20

(A map of Greenland with the American flag superimposed, and text SOON)

[BostonCard]

Bringing this back to Russia/Ukraine, I thought this was pretty funny (from the Darth Putin account).



BC

[BostonCard]

Bringing this back to Russia/Ukraine, I thought this was pretty funny (from the Darth Putin account).



BC

[Maple Leaf]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/31/magaz...ussia.html

This article could be behind the paywall.  Use of AI to go after Russian targets and not having to rely on GPS to do.

A quote from one of the American developers:

“If you think military drone missions are hard,” he says, “try making Steven Spielberg happy.”

[Maple Leaf]

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/31/magaz...ussia.html

This article could be behind the paywall.  Use of AI to go after Russian targets and not having to rely on GPS to do.

A quote from one of the American developers:

“If you think military drone missions are hard,” he says, “try making Steven Spielberg happy.”

[BostonCard]

Another Times article, this one a tour de force describing the diplomatic efforts than have been taking place over the last year.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...ussia.html

(Warning, it is very long, but worth a read in its entirety).

BC

---

Add, if you don’t have time, this is sort of the TL;DR version, which describes 6 takeaways from the reporting.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/30/world...aways.html

BC

[BostonCard]

Another Times article, this one a tour de force describing the diplomatic efforts than have been taking place over the last year.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025...ussia.html

(Warning, it is very long, but worth a read in its entirety).

BC

---

Add, if you don’t have time, this is sort of the TL;DR version, which describes 6 takeaways from the reporting.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/30/world...aways.html

BC