(09-22-2022, 07:51 PM)BostonCard Wrote: I think it is interesting that you (Matt) call out Shaw’s decent to good recruiting as a negative. If you are what your record says you are, does it matter that you got there by recruiting bad players and coaching them well or recruiting good players and coaching them poorly?
Because Shaw has shown he can coach good players to excellent results (2011 to 2017), I probably would be more concerned if the story was that after Harbaugh left, recruiting went in the toilet, and Shaw did the best he could with what he had, surviving for a few years on Harbaugh’s recruits before the poor recruiting caught up with him.
I have some issues with Shaw’s recruiting, especially in the years where we chronically recruited too few players for the trenches, leaving us vulnerable to injury or too dependent on one or two players. That seems to be better now, but I think many people, including yourself, have commented that while Shaw has recruited players that, from a ranking perspective look good on paper, that he has not recruited the intangibles well, and thus the culture of the team has suffered. It’s a plausible theory, but one that still relies on a subjective assessment of the number of “renaissance men” versus football-first players. So, I’m not 100% convinced that the players Shaw has recruited over the past few years are comparable in quality to those over his first 7 or so years, but I’m also not convinced that a generic replacement coach could do better. I think you have to go all the way back to Walsh II to find comparable quality recruiting if you base it on rankings, but I am willing to be convinced that a different coach would be better at “shaping” the team with his recruiting to enable success.
The alternative to a decline in recruiting is that what we’ve experienced is a decline in coaching the recruits we have (this includes player development and in game coaching) as an explanatory variable. I presume Shaw hasn’t forgotten how to coach, but I think a reasonable case can be made that the coaching staff, as a whole, is inferior, and, specifically, the transition from Derick Mason to Lance Anderson in 2014 has coincided with a substantial decline in the defense.
Obviously a new coach gets us a new DC, so if you believe that Shaw’s problem is his unwillingness to fire anyone, then this is a roundabout way to solve the problem.
BC
I don't mean to call Shaw recruiting better than Willingham a negative. Of course I agree with you that it doesn't matter if a coach recruits bad players and coaches them well or recruits good players and coaches them poorly if the record is the same. It's about results. The issue with Shaw is he's given himself the advantage of some of the best on-paper talent and depth in Stanford history and for numerous years stopped getting competitive results out of it. I cite recruiting/NFL draft selections/etc. to dramatize the under-performance but it's not the crux of the argument. The crux of the argument is the results.
Similarly, I may or may not be right about my various theories but it doesn't matter as they're not the crux of the issue, which is the on-field results. I believe several things:
* Shaw's football philosophy was much better suited to managing a bully and cold-bloodedly squeezing the will out of opponents than it is to building a contender from a position of irrelevance.
* Shaw's character, personality, style, areas of emphasis, prioritization of academics, and more all create a football-second culture.
* Said mix of philosophy and personal traits combined magically with what he inherited to give us the best results in Stanford history, which I don't believe many (any?) other coaches would have accomplished over so long a period.
* While Shaw has had several successful hires (Bloomgren, Akina, Kennedy), most of the coaching that really mattered most (Turley, Hart, Mason, even Anderson) was inherited from Harbaugh and, as you suggest, over time the coaching has declined (particularly the most critical jobs: strength and conditioning, coordinators, and lines).
* Recruiting in general but particularly defensive recruiting subtly declined over time and there have been fewer studs to work with the last few years than had been Shaw's norm.
* Shaw's style/prioritization of 40 year decisions, changes in the zeitgeist for Stanford players/college football players generally, changes in the rules for transfers and such, and the relatively joyless experience Stanford football has become all combined to make player retention much more difficult, which has really hurt us in the trenches, where the name of the game is getting players to their fifth or sixth year so you can cash in on the investments earlier in their careers.
These theories add up to a grand theory that Shaw was an excellent driver of a Ferrari but a lousy engineer of one once he had to fully own the product. Parts broke down and had to be replaced, paint had to be re-applied, changes in racing required new technology....and Shaw couldn't build the car like he had been able to drive it under 2011-2017 racing conditions.
Here's the thing: I may or may not be right about any of these individual theories or even the grand theory, but it doesn't matter. In this profession, at this level, with this compensation, you get judged by results. The results are unambiguous. Shaw 2018-2022 is one of the worst coaches in the nation and the most under-achieving relative to the talent he's recruited.
As a result, I think you are wrong not to be convinced a generic replacement coach could do better. Or, I should say since there's always uncertainty, wrong that a generic replacement coach wouldn't be a prudent bet. Between 2019-2021, the median Power Five football coach win percentages were Herman Edwards (Arizona State) at .600 and Dave Doeren (NC State) at .583. Before Shaw, the median win percentage among Ralston, Christiansen, Walsh, Dowhower, Wiggin, Elway, Green, Willingham, Teevens, Harris, and Harbaugh was .500. If you exclude Dowhower and Harris because they barely spent time at Stanford, it's .549.
A median, replacement level Power Five coach should be in the 50 to 60 percent win range. Since the last Sun Bowl, Shaw is at 37.5 percent. If you count the Sun Bowl year, Shaw is at 46.7 percent. If you count both the Sun Bowl and Alamo Bowl years (this cannot be a serious argument that these data points reflect the 2022 Shaw but I am stretching charity to make a point), even that is 50.8 percent. You can take Shaw's last SIX seasons and he's at below replacement level. Ok, let's make this really ridiculous - lump the 10-3 2016 Sun Bowl in there - a seven year stretch - 55.6 percent, right around the historical Shaw median and below the 2019-2021 Power Five median.
You shouldn't be scared of a generic replacement. Generic replacement would have a fair shot of doing better than Shaw and, if not, we'd get another bite at the apple in a few years as we did after Teevens and then again after Harris, striking gold on the third try. But the more we wait the less initiative we have to respond to changes in college football and, eventually, as an institution we may lose spirit for it or it may become too late.