[BostonCard]

Context matters, and “aggression” by a NATO member is relative when we are talking about a Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Had this war started because of a Ukrainian push to recapture Crimea or the areas of Donbas they don’t control, we might be treating it more like Azerbaijan’s bid to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh, which is to say evenif we had sympathies, we would have stayed out of it.

An attack on a NATO member would be viewed as an escalation. NATO members, excepting Hungary and maybe Turkey are sympathetic enough to Ukraine to believe that arming the Ukrainians is justified. The balance of opinion as a result of Russian war crimes in Bucha, Mariupol, and elsewhere (as well as the Ukrainian success early in the war) has slowly been shifting towards more, rather than less, intervention. As The NY Times article has noted, we are doing things that we were previously reluctant to do, and this is broadly supported by the population of most NATO countries (indeed, the debate is whether we should be doing “more”). An attack on NATO would probably move the needle into further intervention.

So, while I don’t think we would directly attack Russia, I could see a retaliatory strike or providing more material support for Ukraine (maybe not quite a no fly zone, but at least air support).

BC

[BostonCard]

Context matters, and “aggression” by a NATO member is relative when we are talking about a Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Had this war started because of a Ukrainian push to recapture Crimea or the areas of Donbas they don’t control, we might be treating it more like Azerbaijan’s bid to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh, which is to say evenif we had sympathies, we would have stayed out of it.

An attack on a NATO member would be viewed as an escalation. NATO members, excepting Hungary and maybe Turkey are sympathetic enough to Ukraine to believe that arming the Ukrainians is justified. The balance of opinion as a result of Russian war crimes in Bucha, Mariupol, and elsewhere (as well as the Ukrainian success early in the war) has slowly been shifting towards more, rather than less, intervention. As The NY Times article has noted, we are doing things that we were previously reluctant to do, and this is broadly supported by the population of most NATO countries (indeed, the debate is whether we should be doing “more”). An attack on NATO would probably move the needle into further intervention.

So, while I don’t think we would directly attack Russia, I could see a retaliatory strike or providing more material support for Ukraine (maybe not quite a no fly zone, but at least air support).

BC