[Goose]

If that is true, what is going on?  Seems exceedingly callous to sacrifice 80 tanks and 400 men in a live war just to practice.  ???


BC

BC, I obviously don't know what happened, but I doubt it was just for practice. The synthesis I believe happened is as follows. Short answer is the unit that got across the river suffered heavy casualties and was in no position to exploit reaching the West bank of the river. Probably there was a follow-on force that was supposed to subsequently cross into the bridgehead and exploit Southwest like mad, but that force never showed up. It could be that it was one of those units who refused to fight. It could be they got lost or ran out of fuel. It could be some staff officer screwed up and the orders were never issued, or due to communications problems never reached the follow-on unit. It also could be, given this is the Russians, the follow-on unit never existed but everybody was afraid to tell "the boss" that and so the river crossing went in anyway. It could also be that since the other crossings failed the high command figured this one would too and didn't bother with the exploitation force.

At the end of the day a badly cut up force found itself in enemy territory with a river to it's back and no supporting forces behind it or passing through it. Either they themselves decided to retreat or their higher commanders looked at the situation and ordered the retreat. In any case, they probably figured they were toast if they stayed where they were.

As to why any of these river crossings were attempted, the best explanation I can come up with is that the Russians were still fiddling with the "broad envelopment" that was suggested as a possible strategy for them to adopt. At present, given what is happening in Donbas, the "narrow envelopment" is in the process of playing out, and Ukraine is having to decide whether and how to prevent significant forces from being cut off. You may remember that the "broad envelopment" would have required crossing the river someplace and exploiting South and West to essentially isolate over 1/3 of the Ukraine and trapping basically the entire defensive force East of the river. If such had been attempted and succeeded, it probably would have ended the "war", as the "back door" would be open to Western Ukraine with few/no troops in the way. However, while the Russians were repositioning, many of the pundits said they didn't think the Russians had the combat power to pull off the "wide envelopment".

What did the Russians think? We don't know, but Russia has a very long history of not choosing one strategy but rather pursuing multiple strategies at the same time. When one of them appears to be succeeding, they then choose that one. It is also true that in this war Russia has tied down a large portion of the Ukrainian forces by threatening attacks across a broad front. Sometimes they actually do attack, as they must to keep the threat credible. Continuing to attack around Karkiv is similar. It isn't going anywhere, but it ties down Ukrainians all out of proportion to the effort required. These river crossing attempts keep the "broad envelopment" on the table. Of course, you can't tell the poor bastards doing the attacking that you aren't serious, so they do and die.

You also can't wait for the river to drop, because that doesn't tie down the Ukrainians.  It lets them train and incorporate their new weapons in relative peace, so when you do wade across the river you meet a much better prepared enemy. So, were these attacks "serious" or a feint? Who knows?

[Goose]

If that is true, what is going on?  Seems exceedingly callous to sacrifice 80 tanks and 400 men in a live war just to practice.  ???


BC

BC, I obviously don't know what happened, but I doubt it was just for practice. The synthesis I believe happened is as follows. Short answer is the unit that got across the river suffered heavy casualties and was in no position to exploit reaching the West bank of the river. Probably there was a follow-on force that was supposed to subsequently cross into the bridgehead and exploit Southwest like mad, but that force never showed up. It could be that it was one of those units who refused to fight. It could be they got lost or ran out of fuel. It could be some staff officer screwed up and the orders were never issued, or due to communications problems never reached the follow-on unit. It also could be, given this is the Russians, the follow-on unit never existed but everybody was afraid to tell "the boss" that and so the river crossing went in anyway. It could also be that since the other crossings failed the high command figured this one would too and didn't bother with the exploitation force.

At the end of the day a badly cut up force found itself in enemy territory with a river to it's back and no supporting forces behind it or passing through it. Either they themselves decided to retreat or their higher commanders looked at the situation and ordered the retreat. In any case, they probably figured they were toast if they stayed where they were.

As to why any of these river crossings were attempted, the best explanation I can come up with is that the Russians were still fiddling with the "broad envelopment" that was suggested as a possible strategy for them to adopt. At present, given what is happening in Donbas, the "narrow envelopment" is in the process of playing out, and Ukraine is having to decide whether and how to prevent significant forces from being cut off. You may remember that the "broad envelopment" would have required crossing the river someplace and exploiting South and West to essentially isolate over 1/3 of the Ukraine and trapping basically the entire defensive force East of the river. If such had been attempted and succeeded, it probably would have ended the "war", as the "back door" would be open to Western Ukraine with few/no troops in the way. However, while the Russians were repositioning, many of the pundits said they didn't think the Russians had the combat power to pull off the "wide envelopment".

What did the Russians think? We don't know, but Russia has a very long history of not choosing one strategy but rather pursuing multiple strategies at the same time. When one of them appears to be succeeding, they then choose that one. It is also true that in this war Russia has tied down a large portion of the Ukrainian forces by threatening attacks across a broad front. Sometimes they actually do attack, as they must to keep the threat credible. Continuing to attack around Karkiv is similar. It isn't going anywhere, but it ties down Ukrainians all out of proportion to the effort required. These river crossing attempts keep the "broad envelopment" on the table. Of course, you can't tell the poor bastards doing the attacking that you aren't serious, so they do and die.

You also can't wait for the river to drop, because that doesn't tie down the Ukrainians.  It lets them train and incorporate their new weapons in relative peace, so when you do wade across the river you meet a much better prepared enemy. So, were these attacks "serious" or a feint? Who knows?