(06-13-2022, 05:22 PM)BostonCard Wrote: Good thread on Ukrainian asks versus what can be provided.It is indeed a good thread on what the US can actually provide, although parts of that are just a bit misleading. The really important point the General makes, IMHO, is that creating a Western style army from basically scratch is difficult, time consuming, and expensive. All that training isn't "optional". To make the NATO style army work, you have to have it. Ukraine is being forced to do it in the middle of a war while not losing said war. Even harder. This needs to be understood by the public. This is a very difficult thing to do.
https://twitter.com/markhertling/status/...i5OI2PAWBw
BC
I think the General under-stated the availability of M777 and MLRS systems by omitting the Marines and the National Guard from the enumeration. In fact, the Marines just shed a bunch of M777s in their reorg. The General undoubtedly knew that his divisions in Europe would have (Reinforced) beside their designator if we had ever seriously fought there. Even in Desert Storm 24th Mech had over 25K personnel assigned. It went into battle with 9 arty battalions, not 3. There are also reserve stocks of these weapons. Granted, the US has spent the last 30 years redesigning the Army to only fight failed states and terrorists, but many of the weapons are still there.
It is absolutely true that we don't have enough weapons to arm Ukraine with 1000 howitzers, and even if we did, we don't have nearly enough ammunition to supply them. The General correctly points out that our Army doesn't fight like the Russian army or Ukrainian army. We never expected to match the Russians "howitzer to howitzer". He said we have "other means" of countering Russian artillery numerical superiority. Unfortunately, he doesn't enumerate those means and explain how we can transition the Ukrainians to using those other means. This is a big issue, unfortunately.
First of all, the US Army never intends to ever fight a "linear battle" like the Ukraine is currently doing. We would use a mobile defense that is low-density and hard to target while moving, but able to concentrate rapidly, deliver a blow, and then disperse. We would also use rapidly moving armored striking forces on offense, overrunning most towed artillery and making self-propelled artillery ineffective because we would be a moving target. At least that is the theory. Second, and most importantly, the US Army always fights under the Aluminum Overcast. Neither of these conditions exist in Ukraine.
The General also seems to feel the speed with which the US has acted is appropriate. Given that he points out the difficulty in training and how much time it takes to do so, I find it hard to accept that only now have we reached a "proof of concept" stage with HIMARS. The past two and a half months were available for that training. Seems contradictory to me.
The following link is also IMHO a good read: https://coffeeordie.com/grey-wolf-team/ It casts some light on the current air battle. Right now, the Ukraine is holding it's own, but if the West is looking to have Ukraine fight "like a Western army", their Air Force is going to have to become much more effective. How does this happen?
