[GK3]

Race against time now before the rain and cold take over. I didn’t think Ukraine would be able to get as far as it has already, but soon the weather will make advances even more challenging.

Goose, doesn't winter put an under-supplied defender in an even worse position?  I'm trying to understand the differences between this situation and that of the Germans at Stalingrad.  Could the Ukrainians mount something like the Russian winter offensive from November though February 1942, trapping the overextended Russians?  How is winter going to make it easier to resupply the Russians in Kherson?  So much is said about the rain and mud, but eventually the ground freezes, and it becomes firm enough for vehicles and difficult to even dig a foxhole.  One might think that those conditions would favor a war of movement over a static war.  So why is the conventional wisdom that the Ukrainians can't continue their offensive when winter begins?

Ukraine can and will continue their offensive throughout the winter. The problem for both sides is that infantry can't spend too much time in the open or they will freeze. It is also real cold inside armored vehicles, even if the heaters are working. As you point out, digging new fighting positions becomes much more difficult. This all favors the defender who can stay inside existing structures and who has already created fighting positions. The defender can also rotate troops more easily to keep them warm. That doesn't mean Ukraine can't advance, it just means they will be cold and miserable doing so and can't use lots of infantry in the process. Under "normal" circumstances the poor weather would also make using air support very difficult, but so far in this war air support hasn't been much of a factor.

The "big deal" here really is the assumption that Russia would evacuate Kherson if they could. That is what a dispassionate military observer would probably recommend. Their supply lines are very tenuous (inadequate) and there is really no tactical advantage to hanging on there. One could argue there is a strategic reason in that if Russia intends to advance to Odessa they must have Kherson, but at present they are in no position to do so. Putin may not see it that way however. In any case, if/when the river freezes Russia can then (at least in theory) easily supply Kherson or easily withdraw from Kherson because they won't need bridges to do so. At that point Ukraine mostly forfeits the advantages they have gained from controlling the GLOCs by fire. This gives Russia the ability to get out of a real bad situation without losing lots of troops. We don't want that outcome. It also isn't for sure the river will freeze hard enough and long enough to allow withdrawal/relief of Kherson. Still, capturing Kherson before that is even a possibility would be better than waiting to find out. It just may not be possible.

FWIW, the Russian winter offensive near Stalingrad was made possible by the river freezing. At that point Russia was able to move supplies and troops to the right bank easily. Before that, the Russians in Stalingrad were told "You must fight like there is nothing to the east of the river". After that, there was plenty east of the river and it was going west.

A point that doesn't seem to get much discussion is how much longer can the USA continue to provide modern arms AND ammo to the Ukraine.  We have to be running up on some kind of limit before too long.  Sending 105 artillery pieces isn't going to cut it.  I read that the Ukraine is burning through 30,000 155 rounds every 60 days.  How long  before we have to start twisting arms of some our "allies" to make up some of the slack?  By the same token I am sure the Russian army is starting to have to use older ammo and gear too, but maybe not.  The side that runs out of stuff first loses.
The Iranian drones seem to be a problem also.    I have been wondering how the Ukrainian forces are dealing with the POW issue.  You don't need first line troops to guard the prisoners, but they still use up resources.  Maybe the Poles would volunteer to guard the Russians :)

[GK3]

Race against time now before the rain and cold take over. I didn’t think Ukraine would be able to get as far as it has already, but soon the weather will make advances even more challenging.

Goose, doesn't winter put an under-supplied defender in an even worse position?  I'm trying to understand the differences between this situation and that of the Germans at Stalingrad.  Could the Ukrainians mount something like the Russian winter offensive from November though February 1942, trapping the overextended Russians?  How is winter going to make it easier to resupply the Russians in Kherson?  So much is said about the rain and mud, but eventually the ground freezes, and it becomes firm enough for vehicles and difficult to even dig a foxhole.  One might think that those conditions would favor a war of movement over a static war.  So why is the conventional wisdom that the Ukrainians can't continue their offensive when winter begins?

Ukraine can and will continue their offensive throughout the winter. The problem for both sides is that infantry can't spend too much time in the open or they will freeze. It is also real cold inside armored vehicles, even if the heaters are working. As you point out, digging new fighting positions becomes much more difficult. This all favors the defender who can stay inside existing structures and who has already created fighting positions. The defender can also rotate troops more easily to keep them warm. That doesn't mean Ukraine can't advance, it just means they will be cold and miserable doing so and can't use lots of infantry in the process. Under "normal" circumstances the poor weather would also make using air support very difficult, but so far in this war air support hasn't been much of a factor.

The "big deal" here really is the assumption that Russia would evacuate Kherson if they could. That is what a dispassionate military observer would probably recommend. Their supply lines are very tenuous (inadequate) and there is really no tactical advantage to hanging on there. One could argue there is a strategic reason in that if Russia intends to advance to Odessa they must have Kherson, but at present they are in no position to do so. Putin may not see it that way however. In any case, if/when the river freezes Russia can then (at least in theory) easily supply Kherson or easily withdraw from Kherson because they won't need bridges to do so. At that point Ukraine mostly forfeits the advantages they have gained from controlling the GLOCs by fire. This gives Russia the ability to get out of a real bad situation without losing lots of troops. We don't want that outcome. It also isn't for sure the river will freeze hard enough and long enough to allow withdrawal/relief of Kherson. Still, capturing Kherson before that is even a possibility would be better than waiting to find out. It just may not be possible.

FWIW, the Russian winter offensive near Stalingrad was made possible by the river freezing. At that point Russia was able to move supplies and troops to the right bank easily. Before that, the Russians in Stalingrad were told "You must fight like there is nothing to the east of the river". After that, there was plenty east of the river and it was going west.

A point that doesn't seem to get much discussion is how much longer can the USA continue to provide modern arms AND ammo to the Ukraine.  We have to be running up on some kind of limit before too long.  Sending 105 artillery pieces isn't going to cut it.  I read that the Ukraine is burning through 30,000 155 rounds every 60 days.  How long  before we have to start twisting arms of some our "allies" to make up some of the slack?  By the same token I am sure the Russian army is starting to have to use older ammo and gear too, but maybe not.  The side that runs out of stuff first loses.
The Iranian drones seem to be a problem also.    I have been wondering how the Ukrainian forces are dealing with the POW issue.  You don't need first line troops to guard the prisoners, but they still use up resources.  Maybe the Poles would volunteer to guard the Russians :)