[Goose]

Yes, Goose, you and I certainly see the war of movement and envelopment to offer the most promise for Ukraine.  As I understand it, the US and NATO adopted this combined arms war-of-movement strategy during and after WWII after the Germans more or less invented it.  The Soviet Union, however, during WWII and later did not fully embrace that doctrine--despite their spectacular success at Stalingrad.  And given that the Ukrainian military (until recently) has been more a product of Soviet doctrine than of Nato doctrine, is there simply a lag in military doctrine?  The Ukrainian success in the NE sure looked like it was designed to be a war of movement, but what is happening around Kherson does not.  I presume they really do want a Stalingrad and not a Verdun.

I don't think it is a "doctrine" problem as such. I think it is more a capability problem. NATO troops practice, practice, practice to fight to their doctrine. After 2014, Ukraine was adapting towards NATO style operations but had neither the budget nor the equipment to really adopt it. They had to get by with what they had. The war has greatly reduced their budget problem and the manpower problem, but in the middle of a war, they don't have time to practice and change their whole way of doing things. Their officers have to be re-trained as well, which is no mean feat even during peacetime. The Ukraine is fighting often using volunteers that have no training at all led by older troops that have only what they learned in their short UMS training years ago. There are lots of things this kind of force simply can't do. The Ukrainians are definitely "better" than they were at the beginning of the war, but they are still more a Warsaw Pact force than a NATO force. That said, some of the Warsaw Pact forces were damn good.

IMHO the Ukrainian success in the NE was very much a classical Russian approach with a bunch of Ukraine/NATO recon added. The Ukrainians found a real soft spot in the Russian defense line and exploited it, just like the Russians around Stalingrad shredded the Hungarian 2nd army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th army. The Hungarian 2nd army consisted of conscripts with minimal training defending a front that was entirely too long for them. Sound familiar? Same deal in the NE. The difference was that in Ukraine the Russians ran faster than the Hungarians did in WW II and had a place to run to. They also weren't being chased by an experienced and mobile Red tank army, but rather a very mixed group of partially trained Ukrainians. A lot of them got away. This was indeed a very important tactical victory for Ukraine, and may yet turn out to be a strategically important one if the Ukraine can continue the offensive. The main hope is that the continued Ukrainian advance in Donetsk/Luhansk may force Russia to call off their offensive operations near Bakhmut. If Ukraine can take Kreminna and Rubizhne, Russia will be in real trouble there. Unfortunately Russia is kind of holding on.

[Goose]

Yes, Goose, you and I certainly see the war of movement and envelopment to offer the most promise for Ukraine.  As I understand it, the US and NATO adopted this combined arms war-of-movement strategy during and after WWII after the Germans more or less invented it.  The Soviet Union, however, during WWII and later did not fully embrace that doctrine--despite their spectacular success at Stalingrad.  And given that the Ukrainian military (until recently) has been more a product of Soviet doctrine than of Nato doctrine, is there simply a lag in military doctrine?  The Ukrainian success in the NE sure looked like it was designed to be a war of movement, but what is happening around Kherson does not.  I presume they really do want a Stalingrad and not a Verdun.

I don't think it is a "doctrine" problem as such. I think it is more a capability problem. NATO troops practice, practice, practice to fight to their doctrine. After 2014, Ukraine was adapting towards NATO style operations but had neither the budget nor the equipment to really adopt it. They had to get by with what they had. The war has greatly reduced their budget problem and the manpower problem, but in the middle of a war, they don't have time to practice and change their whole way of doing things. Their officers have to be re-trained as well, which is no mean feat even during peacetime. The Ukraine is fighting often using volunteers that have no training at all led by older troops that have only what they learned in their short UMS training years ago. There are lots of things this kind of force simply can't do. The Ukrainians are definitely "better" than they were at the beginning of the war, but they are still more a Warsaw Pact force than a NATO force. That said, some of the Warsaw Pact forces were damn good.

IMHO the Ukrainian success in the NE was very much a classical Russian approach with a bunch of Ukraine/NATO recon added. The Ukrainians found a real soft spot in the Russian defense line and exploited it, just like the Russians around Stalingrad shredded the Hungarian 2nd army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th army. The Hungarian 2nd army consisted of conscripts with minimal training defending a front that was entirely too long for them. Sound familiar? Same deal in the NE. The difference was that in Ukraine the Russians ran faster than the Hungarians did in WW II and had a place to run to. They also weren't being chased by an experienced and mobile Red tank army, but rather a very mixed group of partially trained Ukrainians. A lot of them got away. This was indeed a very important tactical victory for Ukraine, and may yet turn out to be a strategically important one if the Ukraine can continue the offensive. The main hope is that the continued Ukrainian advance in Donetsk/Luhansk may force Russia to call off their offensive operations near Bakhmut. If Ukraine can take Kreminna and Rubizhne, Russia will be in real trouble there. Unfortunately Russia is kind of holding on.