[Goose]

More on

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world...74f24220a2

In the extended battle, both sides sent tanks into the fray, rumbling over dirt roads and maneuvering around tree lines, with the Russians thrusting forward in columns and the Ukrainians maneuvering defensively, firing from a distance or from hiding places as Russian columns came into their sights.

When it was over, not only had Russia failed to capture Vuhledar, but it also had made the same mistake that cost Moscow hundreds of tanks earlier in the war: advancing columns into ambushes.

What is stunning to me is that this is the kind of mistake you should never make twice.

BC

Let's be "fair" to the Russians. The Ukrainians did most of their damage by firing a minefield into an area the Russians had just cleared. Ukraine hadn't done that before and the Russian's didn't realize what was happening. The "ambush" wasn't mostly direct fire. The Russians kept hitting artillery laid mines, even while simply trying to flee.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...29a21655e3

Showing your enemy your armor to draw them onto your anti-tank defenses is an old German tactic. Instead of PAK-38s Ukraine used mines. The Russians cleared most of the "conventional" mines but had no answer for artillery laid mines. Unfortunately Ukraine has only 6000 of them.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volcano_mine_system

This isn't currently relevant to Ukraine, but it is one of my "all time favorite" systems. Since we have retired it, we probably have a lot of them available that could go to Ukraine. This "instant minefield" system is a great way to mess up an opponents carefully planned offensive. Best case for the opponent, he has to stop and clear the obstacle. If you defend it even minimally that will take lots of time. During that time, everybody else has to stop. That makes them extremely vulnerable to conventional indirect fires. The opponent doesn't know how big the minefield is. There could be another one 50 yards behind the first. Best case for the defense, the opponent runs blindly into an unexpected minefield and suffers heavy casualties of men and equipment. Everybody comes to a stop and nobody knows what to do. Indirect fire has a very good day with what remains.

[Goose]

More on

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/01/world...74f24220a2

In the extended battle, both sides sent tanks into the fray, rumbling over dirt roads and maneuvering around tree lines, with the Russians thrusting forward in columns and the Ukrainians maneuvering defensively, firing from a distance or from hiding places as Russian columns came into their sights.

When it was over, not only had Russia failed to capture Vuhledar, but it also had made the same mistake that cost Moscow hundreds of tanks earlier in the war: advancing columns into ambushes.

What is stunning to me is that this is the kind of mistake you should never make twice.

BC

Let's be "fair" to the Russians. The Ukrainians did most of their damage by firing a minefield into an area the Russians had just cleared. Ukraine hadn't done that before and the Russian's didn't realize what was happening. The "ambush" wasn't mostly direct fire. The Russians kept hitting artillery laid mines, even while simply trying to flee.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...29a21655e3

Showing your enemy your armor to draw them onto your anti-tank defenses is an old German tactic. Instead of PAK-38s Ukraine used mines. The Russians cleared most of the "conventional" mines but had no answer for artillery laid mines. Unfortunately Ukraine has only 6000 of them.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volcano_mine_system

This isn't currently relevant to Ukraine, but it is one of my "all time favorite" systems. Since we have retired it, we probably have a lot of them available that could go to Ukraine. This "instant minefield" system is a great way to mess up an opponents carefully planned offensive. Best case for the opponent, he has to stop and clear the obstacle. If you defend it even minimally that will take lots of time. During that time, everybody else has to stop. That makes them extremely vulnerable to conventional indirect fires. The opponent doesn't know how big the minefield is. There could be another one 50 yards behind the first. Best case for the defense, the opponent runs blindly into an unexpected minefield and suffers heavy casualties of men and equipment. Everybody comes to a stop and nobody knows what to do. Indirect fire has a very good day with what remains.