[Goose]

Long and technical but interesting report on the Russian Air Force and lessons going forward for NATO. The PDF is linked at site below. 

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/04/russ...imitations

The author of the above report, Justin Bronk, was recently on this podcast, which I also found informative

Geopolitics Decanted Podcast-  How Ukraine Can Survive the Exhaustion of Its Air Defense Stocks

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7d8W9yx...SBMvmtLaQQ


Some takeaways for me- replenishing Ukrainian air defense missiles far and away more important than getting Ukraine fighter jets. But no easy solution for replenishing Ukrainian stocks, as while Patriot is a good system, there are not nearly enough of them to replace S300 like for like. We will be better able to supply medium range systems with RIM7 for their Buks and AMRAAMs for NASAMS, but will be a different more distributed air defense system with less long range layered backup. NATO has operated with air superiority for decades and so air defense stocks are low and more focused on ballistic missile defense, so it's good that Ukraine had such a robust and deep stock of air defenses, though we are now reaching their limit.

VKS would obviously be better able to operate if there is no Ukrainian air defense system or a fragmentary one, but even then they would not be able to be as devastating as a NATO style air force. Would primarily see more dumb bomb usage from altitude, which could be a problem for cities and massed formations. But Russia has probably suffered very high casualties in their ground based air spotting forces for laser guided munitions and Russia is pretty much already doing what they can with precision guided munitions, which are in short supply anyway. And their close air support has never been good, as doctrinally they rely more on ground based fires. Even in Syria with total air superiority, they rarely flew sorties with more than one or two aircraft, usually using dumb bombs from high up or guided bombs with spotters.

IMO a GREAT post. The documents referenced are good and your summary of the conclusions to be drawn is excellent! The one area where I believe the implications are not clearly stated is the effect of Russian air on the Ukrainian proposed offensive.

If Ukrainian ground based long range air defenses are unable to "cover" the advance of the Ukrainian forces, either due to expending all their S-300 missiles or simply lack of numbers, the Russians can stay up at medium/high altitude with impunity. Their ability to drop bombs that provide "Grad-like" coverage against advancing troops in the open will be a big problem for Ukraine. The Russians can just sit there and bang away. Fast moving armored formations can probably weather this level of opposition (with non-zero but manageable losses), but their soft-skinned logistics and support train cannot. Ukraine will also need to transfer lots of their "leg" infantry into the territory their armored brigades capture in order to mop up / surround cut off and bypassed Russian fixed defenses. These units cannot sustain themselves against Russian air operating at high/medium altitudes, even with it's limitations.

The Ukrainians (finally) realize NATO simply doesn't have the missile systems to replicate the previously existing Ukrainian IADS, let alone expand it to cover advancing troops. NATO uses their air force to do that. Therefore, Ukraine wants F-16s to build a "NATO" air force. Ukraine sees it as "equalizing" the technology advantage Russian air currently has and giving Ukraine the ability to drive off Russian air. However, as the article points out, just being able to fly the plane doesn't give you a NATO air force. Ukraine probably doesn't "get" that. They just want to keep the Russians off their advancing troops. Having F-16s they can fly would do that, but the attrition would be significant. NATO wouldn't suffer that attrition because they would attack the Russian air force as part of the SEAD/DEAD mission. Ukraine can't do that without the "full Monty" NATO air force, and you can't build that in a year.

This situation leaves the following possible strategic options to Ukraine going forward: 1) Hold off on any offensive and play defense. Hope your missile supplies hold out and/or Russia runs out of missiles/troops/artillery ammunition/morale and just quits. Probably not a good option. 2) Start an offensive with the newly trained and armed armored brigades. Hope to make enough progress to break the land bridge and/or threaten Crimea. Best case, Russian morale fails and a rout ensues. Endure what Russian air can be thrown at the advance. This isn't a crazy option and this is what I expect to see. The downside is that if Ukraine doesn't make substantial progress, it becomes unclear how Ukraine can go forward. It becomes option 1 without a hope of near term victory. 3) Convince the US/NATO to give Ukraine F-16s. Wait till next year when you have enough pilots and planes to actually protect an offensive. Obvious downside is Russia gets time to retool and improve their forces, which everybody, including Ukraine, agrees they have been doing ("learning"). Not a good option, as there is no certainty Ukraine will ever get F-16s and even less certainty they can hold together playing defense for another year waiting to try their offensive.

IMO "the west" has been very short-sighted in how we have approached this war. As the articles point out, most of what we see here regarding Russian air and the Ukrainian IADS was predictable. The Ukrainians actually have done better than most expected in preserving their IADS. However, we knew they only had a finite number of S-300s, which are really what is needed to keep Russian aircraft at stand-off ranges from operating at high altitudes. The BUK systems are useful, but not at high altitude/long range, and are also a finite resource. We should have been training Ukrainian pilots from very early on, even if we were unsure we would ever give them planes. Even if we decide to give them planes now, they are a year away from a counter air capability. Could be too little too late at this point.

[Goose]

Long and technical but interesting report on the Russian Air Force and lessons going forward for NATO. The PDF is linked at site below. 

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/04/russ...imitations

The author of the above report, Justin Bronk, was recently on this podcast, which I also found informative

Geopolitics Decanted Podcast-  How Ukraine Can Survive the Exhaustion of Its Air Defense Stocks

https://open.spotify.com/episode/7d8W9yx...SBMvmtLaQQ


Some takeaways for me- replenishing Ukrainian air defense missiles far and away more important than getting Ukraine fighter jets. But no easy solution for replenishing Ukrainian stocks, as while Patriot is a good system, there are not nearly enough of them to replace S300 like for like. We will be better able to supply medium range systems with RIM7 for their Buks and AMRAAMs for NASAMS, but will be a different more distributed air defense system with less long range layered backup. NATO has operated with air superiority for decades and so air defense stocks are low and more focused on ballistic missile defense, so it's good that Ukraine had such a robust and deep stock of air defenses, though we are now reaching their limit.

VKS would obviously be better able to operate if there is no Ukrainian air defense system or a fragmentary one, but even then they would not be able to be as devastating as a NATO style air force. Would primarily see more dumb bomb usage from altitude, which could be a problem for cities and massed formations. But Russia has probably suffered very high casualties in their ground based air spotting forces for laser guided munitions and Russia is pretty much already doing what they can with precision guided munitions, which are in short supply anyway. And their close air support has never been good, as doctrinally they rely more on ground based fires. Even in Syria with total air superiority, they rarely flew sorties with more than one or two aircraft, usually using dumb bombs from high up or guided bombs with spotters.

IMO a GREAT post. The documents referenced are good and your summary of the conclusions to be drawn is excellent! The one area where I believe the implications are not clearly stated is the effect of Russian air on the Ukrainian proposed offensive.

If Ukrainian ground based long range air defenses are unable to "cover" the advance of the Ukrainian forces, either due to expending all their S-300 missiles or simply lack of numbers, the Russians can stay up at medium/high altitude with impunity. Their ability to drop bombs that provide "Grad-like" coverage against advancing troops in the open will be a big problem for Ukraine. The Russians can just sit there and bang away. Fast moving armored formations can probably weather this level of opposition (with non-zero but manageable losses), but their soft-skinned logistics and support train cannot. Ukraine will also need to transfer lots of their "leg" infantry into the territory their armored brigades capture in order to mop up / surround cut off and bypassed Russian fixed defenses. These units cannot sustain themselves against Russian air operating at high/medium altitudes, even with it's limitations.

The Ukrainians (finally) realize NATO simply doesn't have the missile systems to replicate the previously existing Ukrainian IADS, let alone expand it to cover advancing troops. NATO uses their air force to do that. Therefore, Ukraine wants F-16s to build a "NATO" air force. Ukraine sees it as "equalizing" the technology advantage Russian air currently has and giving Ukraine the ability to drive off Russian air. However, as the article points out, just being able to fly the plane doesn't give you a NATO air force. Ukraine probably doesn't "get" that. They just want to keep the Russians off their advancing troops. Having F-16s they can fly would do that, but the attrition would be significant. NATO wouldn't suffer that attrition because they would attack the Russian air force as part of the SEAD/DEAD mission. Ukraine can't do that without the "full Monty" NATO air force, and you can't build that in a year.

This situation leaves the following possible strategic options to Ukraine going forward: 1) Hold off on any offensive and play defense. Hope your missile supplies hold out and/or Russia runs out of missiles/troops/artillery ammunition/morale and just quits. Probably not a good option. 2) Start an offensive with the newly trained and armed armored brigades. Hope to make enough progress to break the land bridge and/or threaten Crimea. Best case, Russian morale fails and a rout ensues. Endure what Russian air can be thrown at the advance. This isn't a crazy option and this is what I expect to see. The downside is that if Ukraine doesn't make substantial progress, it becomes unclear how Ukraine can go forward. It becomes option 1 without a hope of near term victory. 3) Convince the US/NATO to give Ukraine F-16s. Wait till next year when you have enough pilots and planes to actually protect an offensive. Obvious downside is Russia gets time to retool and improve their forces, which everybody, including Ukraine, agrees they have been doing ("learning"). Not a good option, as there is no certainty Ukraine will ever get F-16s and even less certainty they can hold together playing defense for another year waiting to try their offensive.

IMO "the west" has been very short-sighted in how we have approached this war. As the articles point out, most of what we see here regarding Russian air and the Ukrainian IADS was predictable. The Ukrainians actually have done better than most expected in preserving their IADS. However, we knew they only had a finite number of S-300s, which are really what is needed to keep Russian aircraft at stand-off ranges from operating at high altitudes. The BUK systems are useful, but not at high altitude/long range, and are also a finite resource. We should have been training Ukrainian pilots from very early on, even if we were unsure we would ever give them planes. Even if we decide to give them planes now, they are a year away from a counter air capability. Could be too little too late at this point.