[Goose]

I've seen maps of the Russian defense lines in the Z region. If Russia already believes they won't hold without moving assets from East to South, it doesn't augur well for them, IMO.

My question for months has been what does the "RISK board" look like in terms of how many forces are deployed where between Russia and Ukraine. I still have no idea, but it seems clear this move by Russia suggests it isn't very confident its previous distribution was going to hold occupied territory. This doesn't mean a new configuration won't work, but at some point, you are just re-arranging the deck chairs.

Ukrainian and Russian military intelligence spends lots of time on this, but their knowledge is imperfect. Unsurprisingly, they don't share this information, and you can rest assured that all of what we see in the press is wrong or incomplete. We just aren't going to know the ORBAT on either side. We also don't know the "reasons" Russia (or Ukraine) is doing what they are doing. It may be the units they are moving have been refitting in a quiet area of Kherson Oblast and were always intended to move about now into their "new" positions. However, the timing is indeed a bit suspicious. So far, Russia is looking "OK" in the south. Ukraine has made some gains but not big ones. The situation hasn't fundamentally changed and Melitopl isn't going to fall tomorrow. Still early days. Ukraine has been "doing things" indicating this is indeed an "axis" of advance.

Nice to see Congress approving ATACMS for Ukraine but I'm curious how they are going to be needed next year as much as right now?

Congress doesn't matter that much. Until the administration is willing to send them, they aren't going. Like many things Congress does, the effects are far enough in the future that things can be quietly changed and nobody will notice. The Congress gets the political credit. Their actions may increase the pressure to actually send them, so it isn't a total waste. However, the odds of Congress's actions actually mattering IMO are low.

[Goose]

I've seen maps of the Russian defense lines in the Z region. If Russia already believes they won't hold without moving assets from East to South, it doesn't augur well for them, IMO.

My question for months has been what does the "RISK board" look like in terms of how many forces are deployed where between Russia and Ukraine. I still have no idea, but it seems clear this move by Russia suggests it isn't very confident its previous distribution was going to hold occupied territory. This doesn't mean a new configuration won't work, but at some point, you are just re-arranging the deck chairs.

Ukrainian and Russian military intelligence spends lots of time on this, but their knowledge is imperfect. Unsurprisingly, they don't share this information, and you can rest assured that all of what we see in the press is wrong or incomplete. We just aren't going to know the ORBAT on either side. We also don't know the "reasons" Russia (or Ukraine) is doing what they are doing. It may be the units they are moving have been refitting in a quiet area of Kherson Oblast and were always intended to move about now into their "new" positions. However, the timing is indeed a bit suspicious. So far, Russia is looking "OK" in the south. Ukraine has made some gains but not big ones. The situation hasn't fundamentally changed and Melitopl isn't going to fall tomorrow. Still early days. Ukraine has been "doing things" indicating this is indeed an "axis" of advance.

Nice to see Congress approving ATACMS for Ukraine but I'm curious how they are going to be needed next year as much as right now?

Congress doesn't matter that much. Until the administration is willing to send them, they aren't going. Like many things Congress does, the effects are far enough in the future that things can be quietly changed and nobody will notice. The Congress gets the political credit. Their actions may increase the pressure to actually send them, so it isn't a total waste. However, the odds of Congress's actions actually mattering IMO are low.