[Goose]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

Nixon was indeed prescient in his understanding of the situation. The first Bush administration was also pretty worried about Ukraine and Belarus not joining the Russian Federation and tried to steer them away from that. This was at least partially caused by their attachment to Gorbachev, as Nixion points out. However, it wasn't just because Bush "liked" him. The problem was that they couldn't find a reliable alternative. At that time, Yeltsin wasn't by any means a "sure thing".

Some have said that only the KGB understood the Russian economic situation in 1991. In reality, nobody did. It was much more convoluted and much worse than anybody thought. Ukraine and Belarus thought they could go their own way and would receive financial assistance from the US and the FRG on a par with what Poland and the Baltic states received. It couldn't be done. Germany had a big and open-ended cost of reunification. They had also paid for the Russian troops to leave Europe and had paid to build barracks in Russia to house them. They had also paid lots of money to support Poland and the Baltics. The US had also supported Poland and the Baltics, and at a lower level the rest of the Warsaw pact nations. No way the Congress was going to pony up a much larger amount to support Ukraine and Belarus.

These are much larger countries than Poland and the Baltics. Helping them convert their economies to the free market at the same scale was impossible. Both these countries were integrated deeply into the economy of the USSR. Pulling them apart was going to be very traumatic at best, to all three countries. Many of the "pundits" recognized there was significant nationalist sentiment in Ukraine and Belarus, but that their common economic interests with Russia would probably preclude them not joining the Russian Federation. Gorbachev certainly believed that was the case. The politicians in Ukraine and Belarus began to believe it would be to their personal advantage to become independent. They also believed (arguably without good reason) that the US would give them the money to do it. Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech was part of an attempt to say "No, we won't", but it didn't "take". Part of the problem was that the "independence" faction simply didn't want to deal with the complexity of their task. Becoming independent may have been a sociological inevitability, but more attention to the mechanics of doing so was sorely needed.

For these reasons, Clinton had limited cards to play, although he didn't play the cards he had very well (or at all really). The US basically stayed out of it. There were initiatives by the US military to embed themselves deeply in both the military and commercial activity of all three resultant states, but the administration eventually terminated all of them (that I was aware of). Nixon saw the potential problems, but he was not alone in that. The appropriate responses to the situation were unclear in many cases, but the US took the decision to do nothing at all. I can see why Clinton might regret that choice.

[Goose]

I think this will be of interest to many here. Nixon certainly had his failings as a President, but on foreign policy he was one of the greats. This letter is fascinating reading.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ukraine...r-2b83c050

When Bill Clinton eulogized Richard Nixon on April 27, 1994, he spoke of the former president’s “wise counsel, especially with regard to Russia . . . based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago.” For nearly 30 years, the content of that letter remained a secret. Thanks to its declassification this week through Mr. Clinton’s presidential library, it is hidden no longer.

What is most striking about the seven-page, single-spaced letter dated March 21, 1994, is that Nixon anticipated a more belligerent Russia, the rise of someone like Vladimir Putin, and worsening relations between Moscow and Kyiv. Nixon, who was 81, had just returned from a two-week trip to Russia and Ukraine. In 1972 he became the first sitting president to visit Moscow, where he signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. After leaving office he continued to have access to elites in governments and opposition leaders around the world. That Mr. Clinton was a Democrat and Nixon a Republican made no difference. The ultimate Cold Warrior was an elder statesman interested in the contours of the post-Cold War era.

....

Nixon also said that Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv would worsen. Though the dynamic had improved during Yeltsin’s tenure, the situation in Ukraine was “highly explosive.” “If it is allowed to get out of control,” Nixon warned, “it will make Bosnia look like a PTA garden party.”

And the direct link to the letter-

https://www.wsj.com/public/resources/doc...cle_inline

Nixon was indeed prescient in his understanding of the situation. The first Bush administration was also pretty worried about Ukraine and Belarus not joining the Russian Federation and tried to steer them away from that. This was at least partially caused by their attachment to Gorbachev, as Nixion points out. However, it wasn't just because Bush "liked" him. The problem was that they couldn't find a reliable alternative. At that time, Yeltsin wasn't by any means a "sure thing".

Some have said that only the KGB understood the Russian economic situation in 1991. In reality, nobody did. It was much more convoluted and much worse than anybody thought. Ukraine and Belarus thought they could go their own way and would receive financial assistance from the US and the FRG on a par with what Poland and the Baltic states received. It couldn't be done. Germany had a big and open-ended cost of reunification. They had also paid for the Russian troops to leave Europe and had paid to build barracks in Russia to house them. They had also paid lots of money to support Poland and the Baltics. The US had also supported Poland and the Baltics, and at a lower level the rest of the Warsaw pact nations. No way the Congress was going to pony up a much larger amount to support Ukraine and Belarus.

These are much larger countries than Poland and the Baltics. Helping them convert their economies to the free market at the same scale was impossible. Both these countries were integrated deeply into the economy of the USSR. Pulling them apart was going to be very traumatic at best, to all three countries. Many of the "pundits" recognized there was significant nationalist sentiment in Ukraine and Belarus, but that their common economic interests with Russia would probably preclude them not joining the Russian Federation. Gorbachev certainly believed that was the case. The politicians in Ukraine and Belarus began to believe it would be to their personal advantage to become independent. They also believed (arguably without good reason) that the US would give them the money to do it. Bush's "Chicken Kiev" speech was part of an attempt to say "No, we won't", but it didn't "take". Part of the problem was that the "independence" faction simply didn't want to deal with the complexity of their task. Becoming independent may have been a sociological inevitability, but more attention to the mechanics of doing so was sorely needed.

For these reasons, Clinton had limited cards to play, although he didn't play the cards he had very well (or at all really). The US basically stayed out of it. There were initiatives by the US military to embed themselves deeply in both the military and commercial activity of all three resultant states, but the administration eventually terminated all of them (that I was aware of). Nixon saw the potential problems, but he was not alone in that. The appropriate responses to the situation were unclear in many cases, but the US took the decision to do nothing at all. I can see why Clinton might regret that choice.