[Goose]

General Barry McCaffrey was just on cable news indicating that the offensive "is not going very well."  Difficulties in coordinating a combined-arms attack, the slowness of getting through the mine fields, etc.  The armor, he said, is best suited for exploiting after a sudden, surprise attack, and the presence of thousands of overhead drones has fundamentally changed the battlefield, making surprise much harder--or impossible--to achieve.

Of course this war is of interest because of the clash between the two nations, but it also is of interest in what it says about the evolution and future of warfare.  The cheapness of mines and ubiquitous of drones may be turning the tide of war back to defense.

Looking at ISW's interactive map is eye-opening.  All the talk about the "offensive" and the land that shows up as changing hands are little slivers on a massive front. 

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon. Achieving strategic surprise has always been difficult. It is especially difficult if you are "in contact" everywhere along a very long front. The presence of aerial reconnaissance since WWI has made it difficult to concentrate large bodies of troops/material undetected. That isn't new. The effects of the large number of drones in Ukraine are mostly tactical, close to the FEBA. Achieving tactical surprise is much more difficult. However, the converse is also true. Achieving defensive concealment is (or ought to be) also more difficult.

Perhaps the best "modern" comparison would be the "breakout" from the beachhead after D day or the Russian advance into East Prussia. In both cases the forces were in close contact all along the line. The Russians didn't achieve surprise. They concentrated their artillery and pulverized what was in front of them. The British tried repeated armored attacks around Caen. Heavy casualties on both sides but no breakthrough. Similarly, the US troops fought their way through the bocage country field by field. The daily land captured was minuscule. Finally, the US used strategic air power to pulverize the wired-in, dug-in resistance in front of them. Then and only then the 3rd Army rolled it's tanks into open country and started to move fast.

Ukraine is apparently right now attempting to use it's artillery to force it's way through. The "fault" many NATO people find in Ukraine's approach is that they like to use probing attacks to see what they are dealing with. This gives the enemy tactical warning and allows him to start his response before he is struck with the full weight of the attack. Ukraine also hasn't demonstrated the ability to concentrate forces quickly. The idea is that yes, your enemy sees what you are doing but your highly trained professionals are moving faster than the Russian response possibly can and achieve tactical superiority, even if the Russians make no mistakes and interpret your objectives correctly.

Well, guess what? 45 days of training for the striking forces can't produce that and Ukraine also has to rely on a lot of support elements that have no such training. As others have said, it is probable that most NATO troops couldn't do it either. As an aside, Ukraine hasn't demonstrated a great ability to use drones to locate Russian ambushes while the Ukrainian armor is "on the move". They run into defended artillery-laid minefields. IMO this is a failing that the US Army largely shares. This is a "lesson learned".

IF Ukraine can get through the first layer of the Russian defense and get some maneuvering room they may be able to achieve tactical surprise by moving fast and showing up sooner that the Russians can respond. I hope they plan to bypass as many strongly defended points as possible. Battering their way to Melitopol village by village is going to be expensive. I hope that isn't their intention, but I fear it well may be.

[Goose]

General Barry McCaffrey was just on cable news indicating that the offensive "is not going very well."  Difficulties in coordinating a combined-arms attack, the slowness of getting through the mine fields, etc.  The armor, he said, is best suited for exploiting after a sudden, surprise attack, and the presence of thousands of overhead drones has fundamentally changed the battlefield, making surprise much harder--or impossible--to achieve.

Of course this war is of interest because of the clash between the two nations, but it also is of interest in what it says about the evolution and future of warfare.  The cheapness of mines and ubiquitous of drones may be turning the tide of war back to defense.

Looking at ISW's interactive map is eye-opening.  All the talk about the "offensive" and the land that shows up as changing hands are little slivers on a massive front. 

https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a...1cf64bd375

Mines are a very old and very familiar weapon. Achieving strategic surprise has always been difficult. It is especially difficult if you are "in contact" everywhere along a very long front. The presence of aerial reconnaissance since WWI has made it difficult to concentrate large bodies of troops/material undetected. That isn't new. The effects of the large number of drones in Ukraine are mostly tactical, close to the FEBA. Achieving tactical surprise is much more difficult. However, the converse is also true. Achieving defensive concealment is (or ought to be) also more difficult.

Perhaps the best "modern" comparison would be the "breakout" from the beachhead after D day or the Russian advance into East Prussia. In both cases the forces were in close contact all along the line. The Russians didn't achieve surprise. They concentrated their artillery and pulverized what was in front of them. The British tried repeated armored attacks around Caen. Heavy casualties on both sides but no breakthrough. Similarly, the US troops fought their way through the bocage country field by field. The daily land captured was minuscule. Finally, the US used strategic air power to pulverize the wired-in, dug-in resistance in front of them. Then and only then the 3rd Army rolled it's tanks into open country and started to move fast.

Ukraine is apparently right now attempting to use it's artillery to force it's way through. The "fault" many NATO people find in Ukraine's approach is that they like to use probing attacks to see what they are dealing with. This gives the enemy tactical warning and allows him to start his response before he is struck with the full weight of the attack. Ukraine also hasn't demonstrated the ability to concentrate forces quickly. The idea is that yes, your enemy sees what you are doing but your highly trained professionals are moving faster than the Russian response possibly can and achieve tactical superiority, even if the Russians make no mistakes and interpret your objectives correctly.

Well, guess what? 45 days of training for the striking forces can't produce that and Ukraine also has to rely on a lot of support elements that have no such training. As others have said, it is probable that most NATO troops couldn't do it either. As an aside, Ukraine hasn't demonstrated a great ability to use drones to locate Russian ambushes while the Ukrainian armor is "on the move". They run into defended artillery-laid minefields. IMO this is a failing that the US Army largely shares. This is a "lesson learned".

IF Ukraine can get through the first layer of the Russian defense and get some maneuvering room they may be able to achieve tactical surprise by moving fast and showing up sooner that the Russians can respond. I hope they plan to bypass as many strongly defended points as possible. Battering their way to Melitopol village by village is going to be expensive. I hope that isn't their intention, but I fear it well may be.