[Goose]

Goose, this is a question about military history and the evolution of strategy.  Why would any major power adopt the military strategy of Russia and Ukraine given the historical examples of blitzkreig in WWII, Stormin Normin, etc.?  What general in his right mind would want to replay WWI, Iran/Iraq, etc. when there is an alternative strategy of movement?

A combined arms strategy only works if you can execute it. It takes highly skilled and highly trained troops to do that. It also takes equipment that is very costly and constant training to maintain the skills needed. If a country believes it will only be fighting defensive battles it may decide it doesn't need that capability because it will never use it. Finland for instance did just fine in WW II without any such capability. Eventually got swamped by Russians, but that wasn't a strategic defeat. It was a "too many Russians" defeat.

It is also wise to remember that the German "blitzkreig" and the US/Coalition in Iraq succeeded because 1) they had air superiority/supremacy and 2) their opponents were not prepared or motivated to deal with a war of movement and did not have enough combat power to defend everywhere. Combined arms breakthroughs are not a "given". They are often very expensive in terms of causalities. The Normandy breakout is a prime example. It was very costly, particularly to the British around Caen. The breakout only happened when the US used strategic air power to literally obliterate the Germans entrenched in front of the US Army. We accidentally obliterated one of our own divisions too, but "stuff happens".
 
Russia does have enough manpower to defend everywhere (at least to some degree), and they have had months to build fortifications in depth featuring interlocking fields of fire. ANYBODY assaulting such defenses is going to have trouble. The US army in 1990 could probably have done it. Today's army couldn't. The "strange" factor is that neither side has air capability anywhere near what was anticipated before the start of the war. Ukraine's attempt at combined arms was initially severely hindered by Russian air, both jets and Hokums. OTOH, Ukraine was never "all in" on the idea of a single massive assault. Probably a good thing. Too many things can go wrong when your troops are far from well trained and experienced.

Did the Soviets/Russians learn the wrong lessons from WWII?  Zhukov was not an "attack everywhere equally" kind of guy.  The Stalingrad trap involved a concentration of Soviet forces north and south of the city, no?

It is hard to actually categorize Zhukov, because for the last two year of the war he had such a numerical troop superiority and such massive artillery superiority he could pretty much do whatever he wanted. At Stalingrad, the Russians staged a massive attack all along the northern line defended by the Romanian troops. The Russians attacked every single Romanian division. It wasn't surgery. It was blunt force trauma. The Romanians were vastly under strength, had no anti-tank weapons that would work against the Russian tanks, and were defending a front much too long for them if they were at full strength. In the south, it was the same story. The Romanians were in an impossible position, but the Russians didn't pick a spot and concentrate their forces. They didn't have to. They attacked everywhere equally and succeeded everywhere equally. Not sure what one learns from that.

But even if the Soviet/Russians decided that their main advantage was with numbers and attrition, what in heaven's name is Ukraine doing?  They are a smaller, less populated nation that will inevitably lose a war of attrition with a much larger nation.  It does not take a Sun Tzu or a Clausewitz to realize that their greatest hope is with a fast war of movement, akin to Israel 1967, France 1940, Schwarzkopf 1991, etc.  A grind-it-out war over a period of years cannot be to Ukraine's advantage.  So why is Ukraine lapsing back into old Russian military doctrine after 32 years of independence?

The Ukrainians are not falling back to Russian military doctrine entirely. Importantly, they have many NCOs and young officers that are very good leaders of small infantry formations. They have lots of highly motivated and battle trained infantry. The "classic" Russian tactics emphasize bulk and numbers. As far as clearing minefields, that is what punishment battalions were for. Ukraine isn't doing this. They are fighting "smart" and keeping casualties as low as possible. This isn't the Russian approach. It remains to be seen if this methodical but well led approach will be able to succeed fast enough to prevent the Russians from bringing up reinforcements and holding on in the "land bridge".

The Ukrainians simply can't adopt mobile warfare because they are not well enough trained or practiced in it to be effective. They tried and proved they couldn't. It is also not "their way of war", which is harder to change than it seems. Military organizations have a corporate memory that influences greatly how they fight. The young learn from the old. Changing this culture is difficult, especially when the changes are inherently risky. It is like asking a wishbone team to go into the shotgun and run an air raid offense. On paper, it may be possible, but in reality it isn't.

Ukraine also does not have an air force that can rapidly arrive and "bail out" a combined arms attack that ran into a problem. The Russians can often muster up a bit of air support. This clearly "freaked out" the Ukrainians at the early parts of the offensive. The Ukrainians now appear to have adapted, but it was a problem at the start. Combined arms operations rely on timing. Things have to happen fast and in the right sequence. If somebody acts too soon or to late, or not at all, things go off the rails fast. Th threat of air attack, even if it never happens, can mess up the timing.

Isn't the problem that Ukraine now needs to unseat an entrenched foe with a sea to their back and no obvious way to flank them?  Their enemy can wait behind a defense prepared in depth and watch as they move into prepared kill zones and mine fields and still have the option to fall back into secondary (and tertiary) prepared positions when necessary.  Where's the opportunity for a war of movement in Ukraine?  It's not like they WANT to fight this way, correct?

Actually, a lot of them DO want to fight this way, given that they have to fight at all. They understand this type of war and have troops that can execute it. You are correct though. The Russians have created a very "hard" shell with multiple layers. The only way through it, given you have neither an air force nor sufficient artillery, is what Ukraine is now doing. You just need to avoid losing too many men while you do so.

[Goose]

Goose, this is a question about military history and the evolution of strategy.  Why would any major power adopt the military strategy of Russia and Ukraine given the historical examples of blitzkreig in WWII, Stormin Normin, etc.?  What general in his right mind would want to replay WWI, Iran/Iraq, etc. when there is an alternative strategy of movement?

A combined arms strategy only works if you can execute it. It takes highly skilled and highly trained troops to do that. It also takes equipment that is very costly and constant training to maintain the skills needed. If a country believes it will only be fighting defensive battles it may decide it doesn't need that capability because it will never use it. Finland for instance did just fine in WW II without any such capability. Eventually got swamped by Russians, but that wasn't a strategic defeat. It was a "too many Russians" defeat.

It is also wise to remember that the German "blitzkreig" and the US/Coalition in Iraq succeeded because 1) they had air superiority/supremacy and 2) their opponents were not prepared or motivated to deal with a war of movement and did not have enough combat power to defend everywhere. Combined arms breakthroughs are not a "given". They are often very expensive in terms of causalities. The Normandy breakout is a prime example. It was very costly, particularly to the British around Caen. The breakout only happened when the US used strategic air power to literally obliterate the Germans entrenched in front of the US Army. We accidentally obliterated one of our own divisions too, but "stuff happens".
 
Russia does have enough manpower to defend everywhere (at least to some degree), and they have had months to build fortifications in depth featuring interlocking fields of fire. ANYBODY assaulting such defenses is going to have trouble. The US army in 1990 could probably have done it. Today's army couldn't. The "strange" factor is that neither side has air capability anywhere near what was anticipated before the start of the war. Ukraine's attempt at combined arms was initially severely hindered by Russian air, both jets and Hokums. OTOH, Ukraine was never "all in" on the idea of a single massive assault. Probably a good thing. Too many things can go wrong when your troops are far from well trained and experienced.

Did the Soviets/Russians learn the wrong lessons from WWII?  Zhukov was not an "attack everywhere equally" kind of guy.  The Stalingrad trap involved a concentration of Soviet forces north and south of the city, no?

It is hard to actually categorize Zhukov, because for the last two year of the war he had such a numerical troop superiority and such massive artillery superiority he could pretty much do whatever he wanted. At Stalingrad, the Russians staged a massive attack all along the northern line defended by the Romanian troops. The Russians attacked every single Romanian division. It wasn't surgery. It was blunt force trauma. The Romanians were vastly under strength, had no anti-tank weapons that would work against the Russian tanks, and were defending a front much too long for them if they were at full strength. In the south, it was the same story. The Romanians were in an impossible position, but the Russians didn't pick a spot and concentrate their forces. They didn't have to. They attacked everywhere equally and succeeded everywhere equally. Not sure what one learns from that.

But even if the Soviet/Russians decided that their main advantage was with numbers and attrition, what in heaven's name is Ukraine doing?  They are a smaller, less populated nation that will inevitably lose a war of attrition with a much larger nation.  It does not take a Sun Tzu or a Clausewitz to realize that their greatest hope is with a fast war of movement, akin to Israel 1967, France 1940, Schwarzkopf 1991, etc.  A grind-it-out war over a period of years cannot be to Ukraine's advantage.  So why is Ukraine lapsing back into old Russian military doctrine after 32 years of independence?

The Ukrainians are not falling back to Russian military doctrine entirely. Importantly, they have many NCOs and young officers that are very good leaders of small infantry formations. They have lots of highly motivated and battle trained infantry. The "classic" Russian tactics emphasize bulk and numbers. As far as clearing minefields, that is what punishment battalions were for. Ukraine isn't doing this. They are fighting "smart" and keeping casualties as low as possible. This isn't the Russian approach. It remains to be seen if this methodical but well led approach will be able to succeed fast enough to prevent the Russians from bringing up reinforcements and holding on in the "land bridge".

The Ukrainians simply can't adopt mobile warfare because they are not well enough trained or practiced in it to be effective. They tried and proved they couldn't. It is also not "their way of war", which is harder to change than it seems. Military organizations have a corporate memory that influences greatly how they fight. The young learn from the old. Changing this culture is difficult, especially when the changes are inherently risky. It is like asking a wishbone team to go into the shotgun and run an air raid offense. On paper, it may be possible, but in reality it isn't.

Ukraine also does not have an air force that can rapidly arrive and "bail out" a combined arms attack that ran into a problem. The Russians can often muster up a bit of air support. This clearly "freaked out" the Ukrainians at the early parts of the offensive. The Ukrainians now appear to have adapted, but it was a problem at the start. Combined arms operations rely on timing. Things have to happen fast and in the right sequence. If somebody acts too soon or to late, or not at all, things go off the rails fast. Th threat of air attack, even if it never happens, can mess up the timing.

Isn't the problem that Ukraine now needs to unseat an entrenched foe with a sea to their back and no obvious way to flank them?  Their enemy can wait behind a defense prepared in depth and watch as they move into prepared kill zones and mine fields and still have the option to fall back into secondary (and tertiary) prepared positions when necessary.  Where's the opportunity for a war of movement in Ukraine?  It's not like they WANT to fight this way, correct?

Actually, a lot of them DO want to fight this way, given that they have to fight at all. They understand this type of war and have troops that can execute it. You are correct though. The Russians have created a very "hard" shell with multiple layers. The only way through it, given you have neither an air force nor sufficient artillery, is what Ukraine is now doing. You just need to avoid losing too many men while you do so.