[Goose]

Interesting and well argued article on attrition versus maneuver, with a nice peppering of historical analogues to consider.

The author-

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He previously served at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center

.

Sounds like he thinks the US has more to learn from Ukraine than vice versa.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting...l-context/

A further critique has been that “Ukraine hasn’t been able to master combined arms warfare at scale.” Instead of attempting a single, massed breakthrough, they are attacking along three axes in dispersed attacks. Soviet interwar theorists, such as Aleksandr Svechin and Vladimir Triandafillov, examined the difficulty of overcoming a continuous defense in depth. They recognized the value of multiple axes of attack to prevent an enemy from massing their operational reserves on a single breakthrough. They highlighted the Brusilov offensive in 1916 as an example of a broad front offensive with multiple breakthroughs that overwhelmed the Austro-Hungarian reserves. Ukraine is attempting a similar approach, which is even more appropriate given the contemporary threat of Russian unmanned aerial systems providing observation for concentrated artillery fires on any massing of Ukrainian forces.

There are indeed interesting parallels to the Brusilov offensive to the war in Ukraine. The Austro-Hungarian suffered from the inability to move quickly, ever. Their troops had poor morale, and their leadership was terrible. The majority of the Austrian troops were actually Slavs. These are all characteristics of the current Russian army as well. Many of their troops are not ethnic Russians. We have seen their leadership and maneuver failures.

However, IMO there are more differences than similarities. The Russians greatly benefited from the fact the Austrians did not believe there was any way the Russian army could generate enough combat power to attack. The Russians had just suffered a crushing defeat. The Austrians therefore did not construct massive field fortifications and sow mines densely in front of it. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. It also must be remembered that both sides suffered massive casualties, over a million men in both armies. Austria suffered more, but neither army could sustain those losses. On top of that, Romania declared war against the Central Powers near the end of the Russian offensive. However, in the end, the Russians could not get through the Carpathians. They ran into German troops (including one Oberleutnant Irwin Rommel) that that was the end of the advance.  In the end, Russia had to leave the war.

The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

I totally agree the US should not, in fact must not, tell the Ukrainians how they should fight. I do think a collegial consultation is appropriate, and indeed the US Army may learn more from that than the Ukraine does! The deficiencies of the US army and it's ability to fight a near-peer competitor who is fighting a defensive battle are unquestionable. The US Army has assumed it will be fighting an aggressor that is attacking, not an enemy that is dug in and intends to hold. In the latter case, the theory is to isolate the defenses from supply via "deep strike". Ukraine lacks sufficient "deep strike" capability to even imagine trying this approach.

I do not believe Ukraine is in any way adopting a strategy of exhaustion or attrition. The fact must be faced that there are more Russians than Ukrainians, and that the Russian economy, while damaged by sanctions, is in much, much better shape than the Ukrainian economy. Given that Russia is a dictatorship, even civil disaffection will not necessarily end the war. It is always a bad idea to target the enemy will as a strategy for victory. The exhaustion strategy involves making it impossible for the enemy to continue, not unwilling to continue. Ukraine knows all this.

Ukraine's strategy is clear. They intend to cut the land bridge, destroy the Kerch bridge, isolate and take back Crimea. In the meantime, they will continue to fight in the Donbas to force Russia to commit significant resources to that area. Ukraine believes, apparently, that if they accomplish these goals, Russia cannot continue to fight. The Sea of Azov will be closed to Russia, inflicting another serious economic blow. No shipping out of Rostov-on-Don. The entire Ukrainian coast will be free of Russian naval threats, allow expansion of the existing grain corridor. Ukraine can start making serious threats to the port Novorossiysk (mines, drones, etc). There are reasons to believe that Russia would have to give up at that point. For them, there would be no good way ahead. Taking all of Ukraine by attacking through the Donbas is a very, very heavy lift.

Ukraine isn't attempting to exhaust Russia, they are attempting to defeat Russia, and so far they have shown a dedication and skill that just might do that.

[Goose]

Interesting and well argued article on attrition versus maneuver, with a nice peppering of historical analogues to consider.

The author-

Maj. Robert G. Rose, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade. He previously served at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center

.

Sounds like he thinks the US has more to learn from Ukraine than vice versa.

https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/biting...l-context/

A further critique has been that “Ukraine hasn’t been able to master combined arms warfare at scale.” Instead of attempting a single, massed breakthrough, they are attacking along three axes in dispersed attacks. Soviet interwar theorists, such as Aleksandr Svechin and Vladimir Triandafillov, examined the difficulty of overcoming a continuous defense in depth. They recognized the value of multiple axes of attack to prevent an enemy from massing their operational reserves on a single breakthrough. They highlighted the Brusilov offensive in 1916 as an example of a broad front offensive with multiple breakthroughs that overwhelmed the Austro-Hungarian reserves. Ukraine is attempting a similar approach, which is even more appropriate given the contemporary threat of Russian unmanned aerial systems providing observation for concentrated artillery fires on any massing of Ukrainian forces.

There are indeed interesting parallels to the Brusilov offensive to the war in Ukraine. The Austro-Hungarian suffered from the inability to move quickly, ever. Their troops had poor morale, and their leadership was terrible. The majority of the Austrian troops were actually Slavs. These are all characteristics of the current Russian army as well. Many of their troops are not ethnic Russians. We have seen their leadership and maneuver failures.

However, IMO there are more differences than similarities. The Russians greatly benefited from the fact the Austrians did not believe there was any way the Russian army could generate enough combat power to attack. The Russians had just suffered a crushing defeat. The Austrians therefore did not construct massive field fortifications and sow mines densely in front of it. Obviously that isn't the case in Ukraine. It also must be remembered that both sides suffered massive casualties, over a million men in both armies. Austria suffered more, but neither army could sustain those losses. On top of that, Romania declared war against the Central Powers near the end of the Russian offensive. However, in the end, the Russians could not get through the Carpathians. They ran into German troops (including one Oberleutnant Irwin Rommel) that that was the end of the advance.  In the end, Russia had to leave the war.

The U.S. military should not push the Ukrainian military to conduct a high-risk form of warfare in the hope of a spectacular victory. Hans Delbrück explained that Ludendorff tried to wage a war of annihilation that revolved around a single, decisive victory, not recognizing that the strategic context of World War I was fundamentally different from the wars of the 19th century. Delbrück contrasted a strategy of annihilation with a strategy of exhaustion, which sought to gradually wear down an enemy across military, political, and economic fronts until continuing a war was no longer worthwhile. In its current context, Ukraine, with the support of all countries that are against wars of imperial conquest, should pursue an attritional operational approach as part of a broader strategy of exhaustion.

I totally agree the US should not, in fact must not, tell the Ukrainians how they should fight. I do think a collegial consultation is appropriate, and indeed the US Army may learn more from that than the Ukraine does! The deficiencies of the US army and it's ability to fight a near-peer competitor who is fighting a defensive battle are unquestionable. The US Army has assumed it will be fighting an aggressor that is attacking, not an enemy that is dug in and intends to hold. In the latter case, the theory is to isolate the defenses from supply via "deep strike". Ukraine lacks sufficient "deep strike" capability to even imagine trying this approach.

I do not believe Ukraine is in any way adopting a strategy of exhaustion or attrition. The fact must be faced that there are more Russians than Ukrainians, and that the Russian economy, while damaged by sanctions, is in much, much better shape than the Ukrainian economy. Given that Russia is a dictatorship, even civil disaffection will not necessarily end the war. It is always a bad idea to target the enemy will as a strategy for victory. The exhaustion strategy involves making it impossible for the enemy to continue, not unwilling to continue. Ukraine knows all this.

Ukraine's strategy is clear. They intend to cut the land bridge, destroy the Kerch bridge, isolate and take back Crimea. In the meantime, they will continue to fight in the Donbas to force Russia to commit significant resources to that area. Ukraine believes, apparently, that if they accomplish these goals, Russia cannot continue to fight. The Sea of Azov will be closed to Russia, inflicting another serious economic blow. No shipping out of Rostov-on-Don. The entire Ukrainian coast will be free of Russian naval threats, allow expansion of the existing grain corridor. Ukraine can start making serious threats to the port Novorossiysk (mines, drones, etc). There are reasons to believe that Russia would have to give up at that point. For them, there would be no good way ahead. Taking all of Ukraine by attacking through the Donbas is a very, very heavy lift.

Ukraine isn't attempting to exhaust Russia, they are attempting to defeat Russia, and so far they have shown a dedication and skill that just might do that.