[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/military-ukra...21502.html

Obviously Russia has greatly increased the number of jammers available in forward areas. If the length of the "line of contact" is 1,200 km (+/-), it will require "only" 120 jammers to cover the whole thing. It is probable they have also protected other "critical" areas (like the Kerch bridge) with such jammers, probably with many backups. No Uber Eats in Crimea. The Storm Shadow visual/IR target recognition capability may now be much more important in hitting anything.

These jammers have got to be destroyed. They can easily be hit if Ukraine had the "right" technology. They don't, and this is a big problem. It isn't necessary to destroy them all. You only need to destroy the ones operating in areas you are attaching at the moment. Russia probably also has alternate jammers that are not activated until required. This too needs to be dealt with. It can be done, but it appears clear Ukraine can't do it without significant US help.

EDIT: https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/P..._RF_Jammer
One version mounted on cell phone towers. Probably much cheaper that vehicle mounted ones and great for protecting places that have cell phone service.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/military-ukra...21502.html

Obviously Russia has greatly increased the number of jammers available in forward areas. If the length of the "line of contact" is 1,200 km (+/-), it will require "only" 120 jammers to cover the whole thing. It is probable they have also protected other "critical" areas (like the Kerch bridge) with such jammers, probably with many backups. No Uber Eats in Crimea. The Storm Shadow visual/IR target recognition capability may now be much more important in hitting anything.

These jammers have got to be destroyed. They can easily be hit if Ukraine had the "right" technology. They don't, and this is a big problem. It isn't necessary to destroy them all. You only need to destroy the ones operating in areas you are attaching at the moment. Russia probably also has alternate jammers that are not activated until required. This too needs to be dealt with. It can be done, but it appears clear Ukraine can't do it without significant US help.

EDIT: https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/P..._RF_Jammer
One version mounted on cell phone towers. Probably much cheaper that vehicle mounted ones and great for protecting places that have cell phone service.